


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THE MOST RECENT PHASES OF THE TARIFF QUESTION.

SECOND ARTICLE.

IN the preceding number of this REVIEW (May, 1883) the assertion was made that our existing national fiscal or economic policy was so shrivelling up the manufacturing industries and trade of the country, and entailing so much of labor discontent and disturbance, that nothing could long divert the attention of the people from an earnest consideration of the tariff question, or prevent it from coming to the front, as a political issue of the first importance. In the two months which have now elapsed since the article referred to was written, much evidence additional to that then submitted in support of this position has accumulated; which in general may be summed up by saying, that continued failures, suspension of the work of production, and attempted reduction of wages on the part of manufacturers; strikes and resistance (rarely successful) on the part of employees; with a curtailment of the business of the country, and a reduction of profits on the transaction of the same to a degree most unsatisfactory,—have been and are now the most noticeable features of the situation; to which the further remark may be added, that one must be indeed sanguine who expects anything different in the *immediate* future, except as the result of one of those happy accidents, or “special providences,” which on occasions of difficulty are said to always happen for the relief of infants, drunken men, and the United States.¹ The condition of one other great domestic industry,

¹ When the maximum of industrial depression and commercial disturbance, arising from production artificially stimulated and in excess of current demand, is once reached, the recovery, in a country situated as is the United States, of necessity commences. The marvellous increase in our population alone causes

in addition to those previously noticed in detail, namely, that of the woollen manufacture, is, however, worthy of special attention. With the exception of the manufacture of iron and steel, this industry, more than any other, has now been protected in the United States for many years, by complex tariff provisions carefully devised for the purpose by representatives of the involved interests, and subsequently enacted without the slightest regard to either the interests of consumers, or of the state in respect to revenue. The result, so far as the *past* is concerned, is that no one of the domestic industries has been more subject to periods of extreme fluctuation, or has paid so small an average profit on the total capital invested, as has the woollen and worsted manufacture of this country since the enactment of the wool tariff of 1867; while, in regard to the present, there is almost no divergence of opinion "among the trade" that the woollen machinery and the production of woollens in the United States is very far in excess of any existing market requirements. Indeed, the estimate of some who assume to be qualified to speak is "that not over *fifty* per cent of the domestic manufacture of spring clothing and woollens for the seasons of 1882 and 1883 has really passed into consumption." It has, therefore, followed (to quote from a leading commercial review under date of June 6),

"that a heavy capital is locked up in old stock carried by clothiers and cloth jobbers, and that the spring clothing lately sold by the former has been forced on the market at less than the actual cost of manufacture."

consumption to rapidly gain upon production under such circumstances; until finally the community all at once realizes that supply has become unequal to the demand. Then those of the producers who have been able to keep their heads above water during the period of depression enjoy another season of remarkable prosperity; when others again rush into business in excess of any need, and the old experience is again repeated. Such has been the history of the industry of the country for the last twenty years under the influence of a high protective tariff, and such is most noticeably its present experience. To use a familiar expression, it is always "either high water or low water" with the business of the United States: no middle course and no stability. What the people gain as consumers at one time from low prices they more than compensate at another by the recurrence of extreme rates; and as producers, by periodic suspension of industry, reduction of wages, and depression of business. Meanwhile the loss to the country from the destruction of capital and the waste and misapplication of labor is something which no man can estimate.

Under such circumstances the woollen manufacturers of the United States, generally recognizing that there is to them no other prudent alternative to producing without orders, or at the best at infinitesimal profits, but to suspend operations, have begun to adopt this latter policy; and a very large number of woollen-mills are already closed (nearly 800 sets of machinery reported idle, July 1), or working upon reduced time, and the progress of events is making it every day less and less a matter of choice to the manufacturer as to what course he will take.

So much, then, for one phase of the tariff question indicative of influences that are irresistibly working to compel changes in popular sentiment and a new "crystallization of political forces" on this subject.

Consideration is next asked to another phase of this question, which developed itself more conspicuously during the last session of Congress than ever before; namely, the antagonism of different interests under the protective policy—an antagonism that bids fair to evolve more of bitterness and hatred than has ever been manifested by protectionists as a whole against the free-traders; which from the necessity of the case must continue to intensify; and which sooner or later will divide the protective party into hostile factions, and inevitably wreck the whole system which it advocates.¹

It is evident that the representatives of many branches of domestic manufactures, more especially those engaged in the higher forms of production, are beginning to feel that their prosperity and even industrial existence is dependent upon a cheaper

¹ That this statement is fully warranted, attention is asked to the following extract from a letter reviewing the tariff legislation of the last Congress recently written by Senator John Sherman to the *Commercial-Gazette* of Cincinnati. He says:

"When the bill was reported to the Senate it was met by two kinds of opposition—one the blind party opposition of Democratic free-traders; the other (much more dangerous) the conflict of selfish and local interests, mainly on the part of manufacturers who regarded all articles which they purchased, as raw material, on which they wished the lowest possible rate of duty; and their work as the finished article, on which they wished the highest rate of duty. In other words, what they wanted to buy they called raw material, and what they wanted to sell they wanted protected. It was a combination of the two kinds of opposition that made the trouble."

and better supply of their raw or crude materials, through a reduction or entire abrogation of the tariff taxes on the importation of such articles. That the attainment of such a result is most important to New England has already been pointed out.

But upon what principle of equity or consistency is protection through the agency of the tariff to be given to those who manufacture machinery, tools, hardware, and cutlery out of crude iron and steel, or who spin and weave wool, and the fibres of flax into cloth, and to be denied to the ore-miner, the iron smelter and forger, and the wool and flax grower? Is not the laborer as much entitled to have the state protect him against the competition of the so-called pauper labor of Europe in the one case as in the other? It seems almost needless to say that no answer in favor of such discrimination can be given that does not involve inconsistency and inequity. Nevertheless such discrimination in the levying of duties under the tariff has got to be made, if extended markets for our manufactured products are to be obtained through cheaper production. And the inevitable alternative in default of such discrimination is, that our industrial growth, and the sphere of opportunity for the employment of manufacturing labor, will be restricted to the comparatively limited and (in view of our capacities) wholly inadequate demands of an almost exclusively home market; with a continued threat of business stagnation through excessive production to employers, and of reduction of wages to the employees.

Among the many illustrations which might be adduced in proof of the inevitable antagonism of protected interests that is, and is to be; and how unquestionably protection destroys protection under a system like that now recognized in the United States, which attempts to protect every manufacturing industry, —the following, derived from the records of the Federal House of Representatives at the last session of Congress, is among the most curious and instructive.

The glass-bottle manufacturing interest, comparatively one of the smallest industries in the United States, and enjoying a protective duty on competitive imports of 35 per cent, asked to have this protection increased to such an extent that it would amount to near 100 per centum ad valorem. The representatives of this industry were, however, too wise to propose that

any such increase should be incorporated into the statute in language sufficiently clear to be readily understood—the day for the enactment of 100-per-cent duties plain and simple, on the importation of articles of common use, having obviously passed; and they therefore, with a seeming absence of all guile, merely asked that specific rates be substituted for ad valorem, and fixed at $1\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound; the relative ad valorem of which none but experts could understand. But in opposition to this change appeared, some little time afterwards, the representatives of the great brewing interest of the United States—employing a capital of \$91,208,000, while the whole common glass manufacture, a small proportion of which only is engaged in the manufacture of bottles, represents but \$19,844,000 of invested capital; and in the course of the debate which ensued on the proposition to amend the tariff on bottles the following statements were submitted:

1st. That the proposed increase in duties would increase the price of beer-bottles to the extent of \$2.13 per gross, and the cost of bottling to the extent of \$14,807.86 for every 6000 barrels so treated; and that as there are brewers—individuals or firms—in the United States who now bottle over 100,000 barrels of beer annually, such manufacturers would, in the interest of the bottle-makers, be subject in consequence to a tax, in addition to what they now pay, of near \$250,000 per annum. 2d. That the business of manufacturing beer—"ales" and "lagers"—in the United States has within recent years grown to enormous proportions; that the products of such manufacture are now beginning to be exported with success to Mexico, South America, Australia, and even to Europe; and that they can be exported safely only in bottles. 3d. That the increase of the tariff taxation on bottles to the extent asked by the bottle manufacturers, would tend to entirely break up and destroy this export business. And as evidence on this point a letter was submitted from the president of a single brewing association in Missouri, claiming to employ more labor and capital than any five bottle-making establishments in the United States, of which the following is an extract:

"While the present high duty of 35 per cent ad valorem is a great impediment to the exportation of American bottled beer, we have neverthe-

less managed to compete with some success with Europe for the trade of Mexico, Central America, Sandwich Islands, and parts of Brazil and Australia, and the demand for the better American brands is constantly increasing. If there was no duty at all on bottles, as should be the case, nearly the entire trade of the countries named, which is considerable, could be diverted to the United States, where it properly belongs. We have now to contend against this drawback of higher bottles than the European bottler pays. But a prohibitory tariff of $1\frac{1}{4}$ cents per pound would result in driving out all American competition from such foreign lands and damage the trade immensely."

Here, then, was clearly a case in which *not to discriminate* in the imposition of duties in respect to different manufactures, and *not to deny*, in the specific instance cited, the demands for any additional protection, was to militate *against* the extension and prosperity of one of the largest branches of our domestic industry; against a most promising but incipient extension of our foreign commerce, and in favor of a restricted market for one of the leading products (barley) of our agriculture.

In the debate which took place on this proposition to increase the duties on bottles the members of the House of Representatives did not fail to see the importance of the point involved, and accordingly, in two successive votes, *viva voce* and by tellers, refused to increase the rates; but in the juggle of the Committee of Conference the duty on bottles notwithstanding, came out at 1 cent per pound, in place of the former rate of 35 per cent ad valorem, or was increased nearly 100 per cent; and in the closing hours of the session, and with the cognizance of only a very few members, the change was enacted into law.

Representatives of the Western beef and pork packing interests also appeared before Congress at its last session, and protested against further discriminations in the levying of duties on imported salt, whereby benefits extended to the packers and curers of fish in the Eastern sections of the country are not equally given to the packers and curers of meats at the West. This petition or remonstrance was almost unnoticed, but it is nevertheless worth while to note how they presented their case. After calling attention to the fact that during the year 1881, 133,024,447 pounds of foreign salt paid no revenue to the government, it having been withdrawn from bond in accordance with a provision of the act of 1866 that all salt used in the cur-

ing of fish shall be exempt from duty,—the assumption being that much of the fish thus cured is sent to a foreign market, where it competes with similar productions of those countries,—the petitioners go on to say:

“The same argument” (*i.e.*, in favor of those who cure fish) “can be advanced in favor of the people of the balance of our country who continue to pay duties on salt, for in the West and South large quantities of pork, beef, and other products are annually cured with salt and sent to foreign countries for a market, and are sold in competition with similar articles of other countries. Why, therefore, should the products of one section of the country be thus discriminated against, and those of another section be encouraged and protected? Is this equity? is it justice?”

The curious state of things brought to light by the petition presented to Congress at its last session by the Harrison Wire Company of St. Louis ought also not to be passed unnoticed in this exposition of newly developing tariff antagonisms. In this petition it was represented that the company named was engaged in the State of Missouri in the manufacture of wire for fencing purposes; that their business was rapidly increasing in volume, creating new and extensive opportunities for the employment of labor; and that their present production of wire was nearly one hundred tons per day. It was further represented that the wire thus produced is manufactured from soft steel, known to the trade as the Bessemer product; but that, owing to the high price charged for this latter in this country, the company had hitherto been compelled to purchase their supplies in Europe; that recently it had been discovered that ores out of which such steel could be easily and profitably produced by the so-called “basic process” existed in large quantities in Missouri, Alabama, and Tennessee; and that to take advantage of such discovery the aid of foreign capital had been sought and obtained. That the assignment of the right to use the basic process had been also obtained from the apparent owner thereof, and that suitable works, involving an ultimate expenditure of five millions of dollars, had been commenced, and would have been now completed, but for legal proceedings instigated by the American Bessemer Steel Company, avowedly for the purpose of preventing the Harrison Wire Company from proceeding with their new enter-

prise, and for the purpose of enabling the former company "to keep up the price of its products" and "monopolize the iron and steel business interests of the country." It was also set forth in the petition, that the interference of the Bessemer Company was based on a claim to have patents on this basic process, but which process the Bessemer Company had not only never used and did not desire to use, but also did not propose to allow any one else to use outside of their own organization; and further, that a suit commenced by the "Bessemer" against the "Harrison" Company for an infringement of patents was a pretence, inasmuch as, if the former did really own the patents (which is disputed), there could be no actual infringement so long as the new steel-works were incomplete and had not commenced operations. "And thus it is," continues the petition, "that Congress prevents foreign importation by a protective tariff, and the patent-laws enable the Bessemer Company to prevent all new competitive enterprises in this country." The Harrison Company therefore prayed Congress for relief; to wit, by so amending the tariff "as to prohibit the joint purchase by corporations of any patent for reducing iron-ore, as an act contrary to public policy;" and also, "that if any such patent be now owned under any purchase or pretended purchase," such owner shall "be compelled to license all who desire to convert such ores at a reasonable price." And "if they neglect or refuse" so to do, they shall forfeit all rights under any patent, either foreign or domestic." When this petition was first introduced, it was no secret at Washington that its object was to force the Bessemer Company (mainly a Pennsylvania interest) to abandon its "dog-in-the-manger" policy in respect to the Harrison Company and other domestic manufacturers, through a threat of serious tariff defection and revolt on the part of Western producers; and that the political influence of the family of the president of the Harrison Company was also to be invoked for the same end. But be this as it may, as the petition after presentation was not made the basis of any attempted legislative action, it is probable that the object sought for was accomplished in another but not less effective manner.

Again, in further illustration of the bitterness of feeling that the policy of protection is certain to provoke among the ranks

of the protectionists, it is interesting to note that one of the most bitter, almost ferocious, exhibits of personal feeling that has ever been displayed during the whole twenty years of the present tariff controversy was embodied in a pamphlet distributed to Congress at its last session; in which Mr. Joseph Wharton, manufacturer of nickel in Pennsylvania, and a protectionist, attacked certain Connecticut plated-ware manufacturers, and the members of the Senate of the United States from Connecticut, all also and alike protectionists, because the latter desired and advocated a reduction of duties on nickel, which is a crude and raw material in the manufacture of plated ware, but which the former desired to produce, and through the maintenance of high duties to also monopolize and control the American market. And as a specimen of this personal feeling, and also of the unity that prevails among these brothers in selfishness,—for self-interest and no other motive is the only ground of difference between the man who wants to make and monopolize, and the men who want to use nickel, as to how the government shall interfere in the matter,—the following extracts from Mr. Wharton's pamphlet are here quoted:

"Senator Platt's constituents have nickel-ore quite similar to mine, and in apparent abundance, within a few miles of their German-silver works at Torrington, at Litchfield, and probably at other places in the Naugatuck Valley. That Torrington ore was never successfully worked in Connecticut, whether because the brass and German-silver business paid the canny wooden-nutmeg men better, or whether their consciences forbade them to bloat themselves with the ungodly profits of the nickel manufacturer, history does not inform us. Let us believe it was piety."

And again:

"It is pitiful to think that the industries of our country should be at the mercy of legislators, some of whom are actually hostile and many of whom are so ignorant; to think that any lie of the busy agents of our national industrial enemies—mostly small barking creatures—should be believed, even when not understood, and that the statements of a fellow-citizen of known respectability should be disbelieved and cheapened, simply because he is a fellow-citizen. It would be ludicrous if it were not lamentable to think that a tree bearing good fruit should be cut down by legislators" (*i.e.*, the Senators from Connecticut) "who know little more about the subject than a cow knows about Sunday. . . . I have supported and aided the government more than it has supported and aided me. I am

one of the men who create and maintain the prosperity of the nation, and who enable it to survive even the affliction of wrong-headed and cranky legislators. We are the toiling oxen who make the nation's harvests, notwithstanding the gadflies."¹

¹ Readers curious to know what was said on the other side by the "spoon-makers" of Connecticut and certain "actually hostile" and "so ignorant" legislators who spoke for them, will obtain this information from the following official report of a debate in the Senate of the United States, January 29, 1883; the subject under consideration being the duties on nickel:

"Mr. PLATT. Mr. President, nickel under the present law in the ore is 30 cents per pound, and nickel alloys are 20 cents per pound. Either duty is practically prohibitory. A single establishment in Connecticut uses of nickel annually three times the amount that has been imported into this country.

"Mr. INGALLS. Where is it mined in this country?

"Mr. PLATT. It is mined in one single mine near Lancaster, Pennsylvania, I think. When this duty was imposed of 30 cents on the ore and 20 cents on the alloy, nickel was worth from \$2 to \$2.50 or \$2.75 a pound. A duty of 15 cents a pound to-day would be a higher ad-valorem duty than that imposed when nickel was from \$2 to \$2.75 a pound and the duty was really 20 cents per pound on the alloy.

"All this nickel, or three quarters of it, is consumed in Connecticut for the manufacture of German silver.

"It is said that this nickel mine is closed. It is simply closed not because it does not pay, but because at the present time there happens to be an overproduction, and the owner of it will not reduce the price. The price at the present time is about \$1 to \$1.05 a pound. It can be produced—I do not make this statement from my own knowledge, but I make it from representations made to me by persons who I think are entirely familiar with the subject—it can be produced in this country as cheap as it can abroad, owing to the fact that this ore here is more easily refined.

"Mr. BAYARD. What is the foreign price?

"Mr. PLATT. The foreign price is somewhere in the neighborhood of 70 cents at the present time. I believe that 15 cents per pound is more than a fair protective duty to the gentleman who produces this nickel. Certainly my constituents are very greatly interested in not having so high a rate of duty placed upon it as to unnecessarily enhance the cost of the article which they manufacture, and which is then taken in its third stage and worked into articles which go all over the country.

"Mr. SEWELL. I would ask the Senator from Connecticut if the manufacture of this article in this country has not reduced the price of the foreign article very largely?

"Mr. PLATT. The producer of nickel in this country produced nickel for a number of years at 50 cents, or from 50 to 70 cents a pound. He sold it from \$2 to \$2.50 and as high as \$3 a pound, because there was a scarcity of it in the whole world. Recently a mine has been opened in New Caledonia which produces large quantities of nickel, and has thereby forced him to reduce the price, but I still believe he makes 100 per cent on every pound of nickel he produces.

It needs no gift of prophecy, therefore, to foretell what will happen if, with a view of promoting the interests of the greater industries of the country—those which employ the largest amounts of capital and the largest number of laborers—the old policy of attempting to protect everything is in any degree to be abandoned. It cannot fail to provoke the most violent antagonisms. And, to borrow an illustration from old Æsop, if any of the smaller protection monkeys should have their tails cut off—a work of necessity, if genuine protection of American industry by removal of burdens is ever to be entered upon—we may be sure that those experiencing such misfortune will be the most clamorous for the subjection of all the other monkeys to a like operation. For example, when the Senate at its last session, in recognition of a general and favorable public sentiment, largely reduced the duties on lumber, the indignation at such action, expressed both by action and word by at least one Senator specially representing the lumber interests, was almost ludicrous; and notice was promptly served that unless such vote was rescinded active opposition would be made to the whole protective system, and more particularly to the maintenance of those duties in which New England was known to be specially interested. And before such threat, which would otherwise have undoubtedly been executed, the duties taken off pine lumber in the first instance were substantially restored, nearly every Senator from New England concurring. When the writer subsequently asked a Senator whose views, privately expressed, were in favor of the abolition of all duties upon lumber, why he voted for the retention of the duties, he received this reply: “It is

“MR. SEWELL. Does the Senator from Connecticut say that the price of nickel is 75 cents a pound?

“MR. PLATT. That is stated by those persons who consume it.

“MR. SEWELL. Mere hearsay.

“MR. PLATT. It is not mere hearsay. There are eleven establishments in Connecticut engaged in the manufacture of German silver, all of whom depend upon this producer for the nickel. He has practically the control of the market in this country. They are very intelligent men; they are men who have examined this matter with the greatest care, and it is their statement that I make when I say that I believe Mr. Wharton can produce nickel at 50 cents a pound. I have never seen it denied by him. The statement has been made over and over again, and I do not think they intend to misrepresent him.”

of no use for you to ask me this question. Without such a change of votes the interests of New England would have been slaughtered." But how unsatisfactory must be the industry of the country, or any section of it, whose prosperity depends upon the accidents of votes under such influences!

There are certain phases also of the tariff, or more precisely of the protective policy, involved in the so-called "silver question," which have not heretofore been generally recognized, but which it is well not to overlook in prospecting the future course of events—economic and political—in the United States. Notwithstanding all pretences and assertions to the contrary, the compulsory obligation imposed some years since by legislation on the Federal Treasury, and still continued, to purchase and coin silver, in disregard of any necessities or requirements of the business of the country, was never in any sense entitled to be regarded as a measure in the interest of the currency or of the bi-metallic problem, but on the other hand was from the very outset a measure of protection, pure and simple, for the benefit of a special industry, tho not in the usual form of a tariff enactment. Thus, with the reduction in the world's price for silver bullion consequent on the world's increased product of silver, and the disinclination everywhere manifested in all countries of high civilization and prices to use silver coinage, as too bulky and inconvenient for effecting exchanges, it became evident to the owners of silver-mines in the Southwest and on the Pacific that the market for their products was likely to be less profitable and certain than it would have been, had the old-time condition of affairs remained unaltered. And with the precedent and experience of legislation avowedly for protection under the tariff before them, what more natural than that the representatives of silver-mining should not only seek, but demand as a right, that government should interfere, and by means of additional taxation upon all other pursuits and industries of the country, make profitable to them a business which natural circumstances were tending to make less profitable or possibly wholly unremunerative. As tariff restrictions could not, however, help in this matter; as the price for silver throughout the world was irrespective of any question as to whether the labor entering into its production was "pauper"

or affluent; and as legislation in favor of an annual bounty of some twenty-four millions to be paid directly from the Federal Treasury to the silver producers was not likely to find favor with the public, the solution of the problem involved might have seemed at the outset to be not a little difficult. But happily and ingeniously all difficulties were overcome by apparently transferring the issue from the domain of protection and bounties to that of the currency, and this was accomplished by alleging that the people were suffering from an insufficiency of silver coinage; that the "gold-bugs," speculators and monopolists were everywhere hostile to the circulation of silver; that the honor of the country required that the "dollar of the fathers" demoralized by a trick should be reinstated in its former position; and finally that the solution of the vexed problem of bi-metalism would be greatly aided if the Federal Government would largely increase its coinage of silver and lend all its influence to force the same into circulation. And under such circumstances and pretences it was not difficult for the silver-mine interests to obtain a large measure of protection, by creating an extraordinary and wholly artificial but nevertheless a certain large additional market for their products, through an enactment that the Federal Treasury should regularly buy silver bullion, irrespective of all circumstances, to the extent of *two millions* of dollars per month, or twenty-four millions per annum, as a minimum. That the reasons put forth for the enactment of such a law were pretences and shams, as asserted, is made evident from the circumstances that now that the people have got all the "dollars of the fathers" in circulation that they want; now that silver bullion and dollars are rapidly accumulating in the national treasury and remaining unused simply because no one wants any more of such material for currency (\$61,000,000 of silver bullion, coined dollars and fractional currency being reported on hand June 1st, 1883); now that it is admitted that the existing coinage policy of the United States instead of aiding is greatly complicating and delaying the settlement of the bi-metallic currency problem; now, in short, that every object for which the coinage act of 1877 was ostensibly passed has been either accomplished or proved to be beyond the province of legislation, the very men who were most anxious for the original enactment

of the law are now most opposed to its repeal. And it ought to be further understood that the real reason why Congress refused at the last session to give heed to an almost general sentiment among business men that the further coinage and accumulation of silver by the Treasury should be stopped, was the open threat or intimation on the part of the Senators and Representatives of the silver-producing States, that in case of such action their support and votes could no longer be relied on for the maintenance of continued high duties under the tariff, on the ground that the principle and expediency of protection by the government being once admitted, there was no good reason for objection to one method of its application rather than another. Whether this threat will be made good, and a serious defection be so created in the ranks of the high-tariff party, by the repeal of the act for the continued purchase and useless accumulation of silver—a measure which the common-sense and necessities of the country will at no distant time compel—is a matter for the future to determine. But for the present it is sufficient to note that the silver problem has become one of the new phases of the tariff question; and to also call the attention of those who, apprehensive of financial disorder from the continuance of our present coinage policy, are solicitous for a change, that the issue before them involves a discussion of the principles of protection, and not in any rightful sense the principles of currency.

One further point in connection with this subject. In discussing the question of the protective policy from the standpoint of expediency, which is claimed to be the only proper one from which the people of the United States can wisely consider the subject, the desirability of finding some actual and practical cases in the everyday operations of production and exchange, in which the tests "*does protection really pay*"? or "*how much does it specifically cost to protect*," could be fairly applied and clearly worked out, has always been acknowledged. The finding of such cases and their acceptance by all interested, as satisfactory, has, however, been thus far most difficult. But in this silver business it would seem as if there was sufficient evidence ready at hand, unimpeachable and clearly understandable, to allow of the making of an approximately fair estimate of the cost to the country, present and prospective, of the interference of the

government, for the sake of artificially fostering and sustaining its industries, in at least one case, namely, that of silver-mining. And the items of such evidence may be summed up as follows:

1st. An annual present cost, defrayed by taxation, of \$24,000,000 for the purchase of bullion and its conversion into coin, which is not only not needed, but which the people seek to avoid using. 2d. A present annual loss of interest on some sixty millions of silver coin idly hoarded in the vaults of the Treasury, which at an estimate of three per cent would represent \$1,800,000 per annum; a no very large sum in the accounts of a nation, but which nevertheless represents all the profits, assumed at twenty cents per bushel, on the growing by somebody of 900,000 bushels of wheat. 3d. The loss contingent on the present withdrawing from the channels of domestic trade or foreign commerce of some sixty millions in value of an industrial product of the country, and the movement and sale of which in the open market and in accordance with natural laws would be no less desirable and beneficial than the movement and sale of an equal value in bushels of wheat, bales of cotton, tons of lead, or yards of cloth. 4th. The loss contingent on the future sale of surplus silver by the government at a discount from the prices at which it was originally purchased, a result which would seem to be an inevitable alternative in the future to a compulsory use of a fluctuating depreciated currency. 5th. The immense loss to the business and commerce of the country through the derangement and depreciation of the currency, which nearly all who have carefully studied the subject are agreed must result from any long continuance of the present silver coinage policy—a loss which cannot be forecast in figures smaller than hundreds of millions—and all this to protect an industry enjoying natural advantages of an exceptional character, and the value of the total product of which for the year 1881 was only \$43,000,000.¹

¹ There is one other matter of curious interest connected with this silver experiment to which attention may be also called. The mint is required to purchase each month at least \$2,000,000 worth of silver bullion for the standard dollar. It is obvious that these purchases are effected from the proceeds of a like amount of Federal taxation. But these dollars are in turn coined by the government at a large profit; the profit from this coinage alone for the year 1881-2 having amounted to \$3,438,829. A pertinent question which now suggests itself is, Does not this profit represent a further tax? Thus, to state the case in detail, the

It would seem as if sufficient had now been said to fully prove the assertions which have been made the basis of this discussion; namely, that the tariff question before the country is rapidly assuming new phases, that public opinion in respect to it is in a transition state, and that its introduction into politics is unavoidable.

DAVID A. WELLS.

government purchases 84 cents worth of silver bullion and makes it into a coin of a nominal value of \$1, and in paying it out obtains a dollar's worth of commodities. Is not here an indirect tax of 16 cents for every dollar issued? Were silver alone the currency, a rise in prices would remedy this, as all values would be measured by the standard silver dollar. But at present, silver is not even the predominant element in the currency; and as the gold dollar is the standard, prices do not rise. In short, can the government at any time and in any manner obtain any money from the people except through the agency of a gift, a tax, or confiscation?

ANTHONY TROLLOPE.

IT has been said, with much justice, that a novelist who has a ready power of expression and who describes only such scenes and phases of character as are thoroughly familiar and interesting to himself can hardly fail to interest his reader. Such, to a great extent, was Trollope's literary position. His style was never marked by much beauty or variety, but, from his earliest productions to his latest, he showed the same unvarying capacity for putting down his thoughts in a clear, simple, and highly readable form. His career was such as to afford him a wide knowledge of men and a great variety of general information. His social nature and habit of dining out kept the changing phases and interests of society always before him. His experience as a candidate for Parliament and his constant attention to public affairs are reflected in political scenes interspersed through a dozen novels. He could write with accuracy of official life, having himself passed half a lifetime in the civil service. His graphic descriptions of fox-hunting were the results of many a run with the Essex hounds, when, we are told, the short-sighted novelist jumped places from which men with better vision were careful to turn aside. By his strong constitution and healthy, well-balanced mind, by his methodical habits and love of work, he was eminently qualified to embody the characteristics of English life in the nineteenth century in a manner especially pleasing to English minds. Born in 1815, he had almost completed the traditional term of threescore and ten, and, in addition to his official labors, he had published fifty-seven separate works of travel, biography, and fiction.

The generation which wondered at the prolificness of Sir Walter Scott would have stood aghast at such a list of novels as

Trollope left behind him. There are no less than forty of these, besides three volumes of stories, all written within thirty-five years. This is at the rate of more than one a year; a remarkable average, and still more remarkable when we consider the amount of other work which the author accomplished. In 1864, 1865, 1872, 1875, and 1881, two novels were published in each year; 1867 and 1870 each produced two, besides a volume of stories; 1879 two, besides the biography of Thackeray; and 1882 three, besides the biography of Lord Palmerston. On the other hand, five unproductive years elapsed between the appearance of "*La Vendée*" in 1850 and "*The Warden*" in 1855. The explanation of such prolificness coupled with a merit so uniform is to be found in the character of the work which Trollope undertook and in the methods which he was able to adopt for its performance.

His subjects were not of a nature to require long study and meditation, nor were they such as need to be treated in moments of literary enthusiasm or excitement. His stories and incidents were of a quiet, familiar description, suggested by knowledge of the world and spun easily out of a reserve fund of observation. We feel, in reading the novels of Anthony Trollope, that the author is telling us of scenes and persons witnessed and known by himself, which give him little trouble to describe. But we do not expect to find in his pages, as we do in those of George Eliot, for instance, situations and phases of character which require time for their conception and great artistic labor for their portrayal. In complete accord with Trollope's truthful pictures of every-day life was the business-like nature of his literary habits. With a ready pen, with an imagination under perfect control, he could sit down before his desk at six o'clock in the morning, write steadily till ten or eleven, rise from his work in the midst of a trial or a love-scene, and proceed to business or the hunting-field with a confidence, seldom misplaced, that his manuscript would be acceptable to the public. Such literary habits seem very prosaic when we think of Beckford writing "*Vathek*" in three days and two nights, during which he never took off his clothes; or of Sir Walter, in a fit of inspiration, throwing off page after page of "*Waverley*" by lamplight, while a party of convivial young men

watched his tireless hand with wonder from an opposite window. And from a man who wrote so calmly and methodically as the author of the *Barchester Chronicles* we do not expect the poetical nor the impassioned. To Trollope novel-writing was so thoroughly a matter of business that he was led to believe it to be an occupation that could be learned by any intelligent and properly trained person. Experience does not bear out his theory. We have only one Trollope; and it is certain that to write as he wrote a man must have his qualities—great literary facility under perfect control, joined to a catholic and sympathetic habit of observation.

While this writer's literary aims and methods were such as to produce a profusion of entertaining reading, they were not such as to procure artistic success. "The Macdermotts of Ballycloran," the first novel, of which the authorship was acknowledged in later life, contained all the elements of a well-constructed plot—a narrative full of movement, incidents bearing directly on the *dénouement*, and characters in just sufficient number and sufficiently closely related to enable the author to lead his story without interruption to its logical end. Altho "Dr. Thorne," written eleven years later, has a rather involved beginning, its plot is skilfully planned; and toward the end of the book, when Mary inherits the Scatchard property, when the title-deeds of the Gresham estate are seen in Dr. Thorne's little back office, and it is evident to the Squire that the marriage he has so earnestly striven to prevent has become the only means of averting his own ruin, the reader's interest is worked up to a high pitch. Instances such as these may be adduced to show that a good plot was easily within the range of Trollope's power, but a recollection of the slight thread of story which runs through most of his novels is enough to show that he seldom aimed at excellence of this kind. In "Barchester Towers" he took care to assure the anxious reader that Mrs. Bold would never marry either Mr. Slope or Mr. Stanhope, and then openly proclaimed his objection to a system of novel-writing which maintains to the end a mystery as to the fate of the principal personage. "What," he asked, "can be the worth of that solicitude which a peep into the third volume can utterly dissipate?" The interest of plot is not now required by the

public. But yet there is one constructive quality which a novel must possess in order to satisfy any artistic standard, and that is concentration of aim. The story may be as slight as possible, but, such as it is, the author must keep to it with a singleness of purpose which does not admit of the introduction of irrelevant matter, however entertaining. Trollope's desire to swell his work to the remunerative three-volume size frequently caused him to introduce a secondary story which had a very slight, if any, connection with the main narrative. Such irrelevant chapters as those concerning Johnny Eames's boarding-house experiences, in "The Small House at Allington" and "The Last Chronicle of Barset," are a burden on the works which contain them. This characteristic looseness of construction, a result, probably, of Trollope's prolificness, is certainly his great literary defect. It offends the artistic sense of the critical, and detracts from the interest of the general reader.

One respect in which Trollope carried his method of novel-writing to a high point was the success with which he connected a number of novels together by a common *locale* and a common set of characters. The Barchester Chronicles, comprising "The Warden," "Barchester Towers," "Doctor Thorne," "Framley Parsonage," "The Small House at Allington," and "The Last Chronicle of Barset," form a complete study of the social structure of an English county and its cathedral town. Each novel has its separate story and deals with its own phase of provincial life, but it is connected with the other books of the series just as one class in a community is connected with the others, through a common interest of neighborhood and acquaintance. The Parliamentary series, including "Phineas Finn," "The Eustace Diamonds," "Phineas Redux," "The Prime Minister," and "The Duke's Children," is devoted to the consideration of the political and social life of a number of personages whose careers and interests are so various and at the same time so interwoven as to present a comprehensive picture of metropolitan existence. Every novelist is obliged to introduce into his work a certain number of supernumerary characters who are needed to act out minor parts or to add to the effect of the *mise en scène*. These are commonly slight sketches, if not mere lay-figures. But Trollope, in seeking his accessory characters among those which

he had already carefully studied, not only avoided the presence of uninteresting secondary personages, but also afforded his reader a truly delightful pleasure in the renewal of old acquaintance. In "Framley Parsonage," when we accompany the Rev. Mr. Robarts to Chaldicotes, Sowerby's country-seat, our pleasure is doubled by meeting there, instead of a party of strangers who have to be fully described, our old friends Dr. and Mrs. Proudie, Fothergill, the Duke of Omnium's land-agent, and the famous Miss Dunstable, the heiress of the Oil of Lebanon. "'Mrs. Proudie, I'm sure you'll let me go with you,' said Miss Dunstable at the last moment, as she came down the stone steps, 'I want to hear the rest of that story about Mr. Slope.'"

Not less pleasant is it, in the same novel, to take a run down to Greshamsbury, to see the domestic happiness of Mr. and Mrs. Frank Gresham, whose ante-matrimonial troubles excited our interest in "Doctor Thorne," and to hear that the hero of that work is engaged to Miss Dunstable. "'And so I am going to marry the richest woman in England,' said Dr. Thorne to himself as he sat down that day to his mutton-chop." To complete our enjoyment of the situation, we have only to hear the comments of another old acquaintance: "'He has been little better than a quack all his life,' said Dr. Fillgrave, the eminent physician of Barchester, 'and now he is going to marry a quack's daughter.'"

In the "Small House at Allington," the incident of Crosbie's visit to Hiram's Hospital under the guidance of old Mr. Harding, and the circumstance that the woman for whose sake Crosbie jilted Lily Dale was a member of that De Courcy family whose unworthiness the reader knows so well, add greatly to the interest of that very attractive book. In the Parliamentary series, the reappearances of Phineas Finn, the Duke of Omnium, Lady Max, Barrington Erle, and others are managed with great skill. But the brilliant, generous, and eccentric character of Lady Glencora is the link which most delightfully joins this group of novels. When the reader opens the "Duke's Children" and reads on the first page that the Duchess is dead, he feels a sense of personal loss and wonders how the author can write another novel without her.

It is evident that the novelist who reproduces the characters of one book in another is subject to a great, if not a fatal,

danger. The personages who reappear must be interesting. If they have not already won an ordinary approval, the reader will decline to continue their acquaintance. Trollope usually escaped this danger completely. But in "*The Last Chronicle of Barset*," in which there were so many familiar characters to be finally disposed of, it is not surprising to find one serious failure. We can say, with the author, that we are always glad "to sit at the table of Archdeacon Grantly, to walk through the High Street of Barchester arm-in-arm with Mr. Robarts of Framley, and to stand alone and shed a tear beneath the modest black stone in the north transept of the cathedral on which is inscribed the name of Septimus Harding." We are interested in the tragic fate of Mrs. Proudie, and are glad to meet again with the Luftons and Mrs. Thorne of Chaldicotes. But we feel that the reopening of Lily Dale's love-affairs is straining the point; and the reappearance of Johnny Eames, with the long account of his intrigues with Miss Demoulines and his quarrels with Sir Raffle Buffle, which have nothing whatever to do with the main story, form a disagreeable excrescence upon an otherwise beautiful work. These chapters remain a wholesome warning to whomsoever would adopt a method of novel-writing the dangers of which even Anthony Trollope could not always encounter with impunity.

As we turn from this author's literary workmanship to the scenes and characters which he has made so familiar and actual to us, it is impossible to overlook the breadth of sympathy which could investigate so many and such varied conditions of life. The striking and entertaining characteristics of the Irish attracted his early attention, and among them was laid the scene of his first two acknowledged novels, "*The Macdermotts*" and "*The Kellys*." The former of these is, we believe, Trollope's only tragedy, and in it are powerfully illustrated the miseries of Irish life, the national improvidence, the perpetual difficulties between landlord and tenant, and at the same time the many redeeming traits of the people. The author's fondness for Ireland caused him to place there the scene of several later novels, like "*Castle Richmond*," and to make occasional incursions across the channel, as in "*Phineas Finn*." In 1850, two years after the publication of the "*Kellys and the O'Kellys*," ap-

peared "*La Vendée*," a historical novel on the well-worn theme of the French Revolution. A subject of this kind was out of Trollope's line, and not well calculated to bring his peculiar powers into play. Altho the story has not a little narrative interest, the reader feels that the characters lack the stamp of reality which the author could give to the inmates of Barchester close, and that a study of violent, romantic passion like that of Adolphe Denot was ill adapted to the pen so perfectly at home in describing the conventional every-day loves of a Lord Lufton or a Frank Gresham. Five years elapsed after the publication of "*La Vendée*" before Trollope gave another work to the world, and then appeared the first of those Barchester Chronicles from which the novel-reading public has derived so much entertainment and their author so well deserved a fame.

The part of the cathedral town which the reader remembers with most pleasure is Hiram's Hospital, the retreat for superannuated workmen, where live the twelve old bedesmen, and, in his comfortable home close by, their warden, with his pretty daughter and his cherished violoncello. Septimus Harding typifies all that is pure and self-denying in the clergy. "'I feel sure,' said Archdeacon Grantly, when the gentle spirit of the Warden had passed away, 'that he never had an impure fancy in his mind, or a faulty wish in his heart. His tenderness has surpassed the tenderness of woman, and yet, when an occasion came for showing it, he had all the spirit of a hero.'"

The Archdeacon represents the secular arm of the church, the priest militant, whose practical, businesslike habit of mind and combative disposition fit him to champion the cause of his weaker brother, but not to attain the latter's spiritual elevation. He is the personage who holds the interest of the reader most closely through the Barchester series of novels, and is, on the whole, the most thoroughly human and natural of the author's conceptions. As he stood in the precincts of Hiram's Hospital, reproving the old bedesmen for their participation in the revolutionary ideas which had been taught by the enemies of the church, Trollope sketched him with the pen of an artist who could see the man beneath the outward form:

"As the Archdeacon stood up to make his speech, erect in the middle of that little square, he looked like an ecclesiastical statue placed there, as a

fitting impersonification of the church militant here on earth; his shovel hat, large, new, and well pronounced, a churchman's hat in every inch, declared the profession as plainly as does the Quaker's broad brim; his heavy eyebrow, large open eyes, and full mouth and chin expressed the solidity of his order; the broad chest, amply covered with fine cloth, told how well-to-do was his estate; one hand, ensconced within his pocket, evinced the practical hold which our mother church keeps on her temporal possessions; and the other, loose for action, was ready to fight if need be in her defence; and, below these, the decorous breeches, and neat black gaiters, showing so admirably that well-turned leg, betokened the decency, the outward beauty and grace, of our church establishment."

It would seem as tho the Dean and chapter of Barchester must have lived on forever in unbroken ecclesiastical quiet, listening to the authoritative words of the Archdeacon and the sonorous chanting of Septimus Harding, were it not for the advent of the henpecked Dr. Proudie and his insolent chaplain, Slope. These characters, together with the scholarly Arabin, and Dr. Stanhope, corroded by the rust of Italian idleness, complete a group of clergymen for the delineation of which Trollope is justly famous. He was at one time severely attacked for having described clergymen simply as men, apart from their sacred office. But to this he justly replied that the clergyman in the pulpit was no subject for the novelist: he became so only when he mingled with general society. The Rev. Mr. Crawley, however, is a very fine study of religious enthusiasm and earnestness. In no case did Trollope write of the clergy with flippancy or disrespect. He studied them as one who revered their calling, but who met them too familiarly in social life to avoid noting those weaknesses from which the best of men are never free.

"To me," said the author of the Barchester Chronicles, "Barset has been a real county, and its city a real city, and the spires and towers have been before my eyes, and the voices of the people are known to my ears, and the pavements of the city ways are familiar to my footsteps." The same stamp of reality which he impressed on his imaginary cathedral town marks his pictures of country life. Gatherum Castle, the seat of the great political magnate, the Duke of Omnium, looms up magnificent and comfortless. Yet more familiar is Courcy Castle, the country home of that De Courcy family which supplied Trollope

with such telling illustrations of the worldliness and corruption of aristocratic life. There is the old Earl, broken by dissipation, making his family wretched by his savage ill-temper; Lady de Courcy and her daughters, striving to reconcile their pride of birth with the business of husband-hunting; Lord Porlock, the eldest son, ruined like his father and longing for his death; the Hon. John and the Hon. George seeking an idle maintenance in mercenary marriages with tradesmen's daughters. Not less vivid and much more agreeable are such scenes as the village of Greshamsbury, the home of Squire Gresham, Dr. Thorne, the rich contractor Scatchard, and the precise clergyman Oriel; Framley Parsonage, nestling in a corner of the Lufton estate, and Allington, the quiet scene of Lily Dale's pathetic love-story.

When the reader is taken to London, he meets with a larger number of characters and a greater variety of social interests. The careers of Plantagenet Palliser and Phineas Finn are mediums for the study of all forms of political activity, Parliamentary elections, intrigues for office, the characteristic habits of the House of Commons, the varieties of political ambition, and the requisites for success. The brilliancy of Lady Glencora's social position and the charming eccentricities of her character make her the centre of a fashionable circle which is treated with a careful truthfulness seldom to be found in novels dealing with this class of life. Mr. Chaffanbrass takes the reader to the law-courts, Adolphus Crosbie and Johnny Eames give him a thorough acquaintance with the work and habits of the civil service.

In no part of his work was this author more thoroughly at home than in his studies of domestic relations. Nothing could be more natural than the intercourse of Archdeacon Grantly with his son the major and his daughter Lady Dumbello, or the scene of the Duke of Omnium at breakfast with his two sons when they had incurred the parental displeasure. The doctrine of love and marriage taught by Trollope's novels is the doctrine now most commonly received in the upper and middle classes of society wherever Anglo-Saxon ideas prevail: that love should be lord over all considerations of selfish and material interest, but never lord over duty. Almost all his love-stories hinge simply on the final victory of affection over obstacles such as

disparity in fortune or social position. Such were the experiences of Lord Lufton and Lucy Robarts; of Lord Silverbridge and Miss Boncassen, the American girl; of Frank Gresham and Mary Thorne; of Major Grantly and Grace Crawley. Altho the marriage of interest arranged between Plantagenet Palliser and Lady Glencora turns out happily, such unions are almost universally marked by the wretchedness of Adolphus Crosbie and Lady Alexandrina. The most interesting of Trollope's love-stories is that of Lily Dale, in which is described a passion of the strongest and at the same time of the purest kind; a love which, once openly given, can neither be wholly withdrawn from its object nor transferred to another. But, as a rule, he attempted little beyond the description of conventional, every-day courtship; and the reader may usually rest assured that, after a sufficient number of pages have been filled with parental objections and the not very heartrending tribulations resulting therefrom, the desired ceremony will take place in due form, and all opposition will have been forgotten by the time the Lady Lufton of the story finds occasion to remark to the Lucy Robarts: "Yes, my dear, the big room looking into the little garden to the south was always the nursery, and if you ask my advice, it will still remain so."

The humorous, the pathetic, and the satirical elements of fictitious composition are not prominent in Trollope's work, but good examples of them all are not difficult to find. The scene of Father John passing his hat at the McGovern wedding, of Lady de Courcy's insolence worsted by that of the Signora Neroni at the Ullathorn garden-party, and of Mrs. Proudie inspired by the hope of victory as her eyes fell on her husband's pillow, all these are described in a vein of quiet humor. The nobly borne sufferings of Lily Dale's heart and Crawley's mental anguish, Harding's surreptitious visits to his violoncello when he had become too feeble to play upon it, and to his surplices when too old to officiate at the cathedral, are thoroughly pathetic. The death of Thady Macdermott is the best if not the only example of Trollope's tragic power. There is a delicate vein of satire in the greeting accorded to Mary Thorne, when she becomes an heiress, by Lady Arabella Gresham, and in the correspondence between Lady Amelia de Courcy and Augusta

Gresham concerning the "responsibilities" of rank in the matter of marriage.

Trollope's position in fiction is not a difficult one to fix. He was essentially a realist, but a realist who preferred the agreeable to the disagreeable. He was as true to nature as it is possible for a novelist to be, but he chose to study nature under the forms which please and not under those which shock the sympathies and taste of men. He had none of Scott's romantic nor of Lytton's poetical imagination. He had no social evils to expose like Dickens, no philosophical theories to expound like George Eliot. He was not a satirist like Thackeray. He may justly be described as a literary photographer of social life in the upper ranks. He described clergymen, doctors, lawyers, members of Parliament, nobles, squires, lovers, from the standpoint of an observer rather than of a critic. He was a chronicler much more than a literary artist. The popularity of his works was due neither to symmetry of proportions, nor to skillfulness of construction, nor to an abundance of beautiful thoughts; their value rests on the truthfulness with which they reflect the occupations, interests, and amusements of a peaceful and industrial community. While Trollope will never be studied as a master of art, the future historian will seek in his pages, as Mr. Lecky has sought in those of Fielding, for trustworthy information regarding contemporary social life.

Among the novelists of the nineteenth century, the name of Anthony Trollope will be placed in the second rank. Not because the work he aimed at doing was not thoroughly well done; but because he did not aim at the highest excellence. The best photography cannot reach the plane of art. To reproduce easily and voluminously in fictitious composition the results of daily observation is not as great a task as the origination and laborious execution of high conceptions. To connect entertaining descriptions of common life by a thread of story is an accomplishment undeserving that admiration which we accord to a work in which narrative, characters, and incidents are combined in one artistic perfectly proportioned whole. But, altho in the history of English fiction the talents of Trollope will be placed below the genius of Scott, Hawthorne, Thackeray, and George Eliot, his name will be honored as much as theirs for honesty

and purity of purpose. He plainly saw that no author can create fictitious characters and interest his readers in their thoughts and careers without inculcating, unconsciously perhaps, some definite standard of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood. And it was Trollope's constant endeavor, successfully attained through a long series of novels, so to write that his readers should be the better for what he placed before them. He will be remembered as a fine example of a man of letters, industrious, honest, unaffected, who could elevate while he entertained, who could be a realist without ceasing to be pure, who could write for gain without pandering to low or vulgar tastes.

BAYARD TUCKERMAN.

THE ALLEGED CONFLICT OF NATURAL SCIENCE AND RELIGION.

IT is not uncommon at present to hear it asserted or insinuated that religion, and the Christian religion in particular, has been an obstacle in the way of the progress of natural science,—including under this designation the various departments of research which concern themselves with the material world. Sometimes Christianity is spoken of as an enemy still formidable. Sometimes the pæan of triumph is sounded as over a slain foe. There has been, if we are to credit the writers referred to, one continuous conflict between the religious class on the one hand and the devotees of scientific knowledge on the other. The students of nature have had to press their way forward in the face of the sword and the fagot. Scientific inquiry has been confronted by preconceived opinions concerning its subject-matter, having their basis in theological creeds. Dogmas of the church have warned off the student who has been disposed to look upon the heavens and the earth with an open, inquisitive eye. He has been enjoined to see to it that his investigations conduct him to certain foreordained conclusions. Independent judgment, founded on an unprejudiced inspection of the phenomena, in the light of inductive logic, has been branded as profane. The naturalist has had to pursue his toilsome search with telescope and microscope while the din of ecclesiastical rebuke has tormented his ears. The questions which he has striven to settle by observation and reasoning he has been told are already determined, once for all, by the infallible authority of the Bible. What is the flickering torch of the feeble intellect of man, ever stumbling on his way, by the side of a direct illumination from the source of all light, irradiating

the mind of prophet and seer who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost? The pulpit, it is said, is always ready to shower anathemas upon the head of the pioneer who opens new vistas of truth in the field of scientific exploration. If flames and torture are dispensed with, it is very likely from lack of power. The spirit of religious intolerance in relation to the sciences of nature is the same as of old. The weapons of warfare are blunted, but the nature of the struggle is unaltered. Christianity assumes to define within a realm which science claims as its own. It looks on science as a trespasser breaking down sacred landmarks. Science, on the contrary, within its province, disowns the usurped authority of religion: it treats the definitions of the creed with disdain.

This will be recognized as a not unfair paraphrase of what one may frequently meet with in books and periodicals of the day. The errors and distortions mingled in representations of this sort I shall hope to point out. At the beginning, however, it is well to confess that the general allegation is not without plausibility. It is not a pure fabrication. There are facts on which it is founded, whatever mistake and whatever exaggeration are carried into the interpretation of them. That, in the name of religion, in past times, nearer and more remote, the legitimate pursuits, researches, arguments, and hypotheses of physical inquirers have been frowned upon, denounced, and proscribed, is undeniable. That bodily punishments have been inflicted, and, in other cases, the penalty of unpopularity and ostracism, on account of opinions, and well-warranted opinions, in natural science, history is a witness. In antiquity, prior to Christ, science was not without its persecuted votaries. Socrates, to be sure, was convicted and put to death, not for heresies in physics; for the study of physical phenomena appeared to him to be time wasted, and an encroachment on a province that might better be left to the regulation of the gods. Aristotle was threatened with persecution, like Socrates, for alleged mischievous teaching in relation distinctively to theology and ethics. But Anaxagoras was arraigned before an Athenian court for holding impious physical doctrine, such as the opinion that the sun is an incandescent stone, larger than the Peloponnesus; and he owed his deliverance to the friendship and the eloquence of

Pericles. Passing down into Christian times, with which we are now specially concerned, it is a familiar fact that in the middle ages the students who early interested themselves in chemical experiments, whether in the hope of transmuting the baser metals into gold, or for some better reason, were suspected of having entered into a league with the devil, and of accomplishing their experiments with the aid of this dark confederate. Even Albert the Great, the teacher of Aquinas, did not wholly escape this dangerous suspicion. At a later day, Roger Bacon had more to endure on the ground of analogous imputations. At a time when the air was thought to be thronged with invisible demons, it was natural to attribute the strange effects produced by chemical manipulation to a preternatural cause. Turning to still later times, we are at once reminded of the ecclesiastical antagonism to astronomy, and of the memorable case of Galileo. The publication of the documents connected with this case has put it into the power of every candid person, who will give the requisite attention to them, to get at an exact knowledge of the facts; and it has put it out of the power of theological partisans to conceal or to distort the truth. It is true that much is still said of the Florentine astronomer's imprudence in the advocacy of his doctrines, and of his temerity in venturing to discuss the biblical relations of his discoveries, instead of leaving the interpretation of texts to the authorized mouthpieces of the church. Even the writer of the article on Galileo in the new edition of the "*Encyclopædia Britannica*" lays stress on the "sanguine" habit of the philosopher, and on the harm which it brought upon him. It is true that Galileo's anxiety to spread the knowledge of his wonderful discoveries led him into covert means of accomplishing his end. It is true that his ethical feeling, like that of too many Italians of that day, made prevarication, and, when driven to the wall, direct falsehood, facile to him. But nothing that he did affords any valid excuse, or hardly even a faint palliation, for the enormous wrong of the organized, unrelenting endeavor to suppress the publication of important scientific truth, and for the more terrible sin of driving an old man to perjure himself by abjuring beliefs which his tempters and persecutors well knew that in his heart he really held. The lesson which ought to be derived, for all time, from this glaring

instance of bigotry and cruel intolerance will be lost if the real character of it is allowed to be covered up by sophistical apologies. It is a fact that, at the command of Pope Paul III., in 1616, by a decree of the Congregation of the Index, the Copernican theory was declared to be false and contrary to Scripture; that in 1633, Galileo, with the approbation if not at the command of Urban VIII., was condemned to abjure the doctrine as heretical, which, seventeen years before, had been pronounced false and contradictory to Scripture. This abjuration, together with the judgment of the Inquisition, at the command of the Pope were published to the world. The prohibition of the books which teach the Copernican doctrine is in all the issues of the Index that followed; it is in that approved expressly by a bull of Alexander VII., in 1664; and it remained in the Index until its partial removal by Benedict XIV., in 1757. The circulation of books which inculcate the Copernican theory was not expressly authorized until it was sanctioned by Pius VII., in 1822.¹ It is beyond all dispute that a Congregation acting under the commission of the Pope condemned as false a truth in science; that, by the express authority of the Pope, the condemnation and abjuration of this truth by Galileo were ordered to be published abroad to the church.² This comes perilously near an *ex cathedra* declaration from the throne of St. Peter. What could the faithful infer from such proceedings, taken under the express authorization of the Pope, but that the Copernican theory is false and unscriptural? This is a point, however, with which we are not at the moment specially concerned. It is easy to understand the tremendous shock which the Copernican theory gave to existing religious views. It was not merely that particular texts, like the command of Joshua to the sun to stand still, and the assertion of the Psalmist that the sun rejoices as a strong man to run a race in his daily path across the sky, appeared to be contravened; the whole cosmological conception of Genesis, besides numerous echoes of it in subsequent pages of Scripture, seemed to be subverted; at the same time

¹ See, on the whole subject, the proofs given by Reusch, "Der Process Galilei's," etc. (Bonn, 1879). Reusch's conclusions are on pp. 450, 451, 462, seq.

² See Berti, *Il Proc. original. di Galileo Galilei*, etc. (Roma, 1876). Doc. LXIV. p. 121.

that established ideas respecting the future state of existence and the location of the different abodes of the good and the evil—ideas sanctioned by patristic and scholastic authority—were shaken to the foundation.

Nothing so disgraceful as the condemnation of old Galileo, and his abjuration, compelled under menace of the torture, can be laid to the charge of Protestants, as regards the treatment accorded to the devotees of natural science. But Protestantism has to acknowledge that the same sort of mistake has been made, with circumstances less tragic and signal, by professed advocates of a larger liberty of thought. From the first rise of geology down to a recent day the students of this branch of science have had to fight their way against an opposition conducted in the name of religion and of the Bible. They were charged with a presumptuous attempt to contravene the plain teaching of revelation. Cowper, in satirizing the dreams and delusions which get hold of the minds of men, does not omit to castigate those who

“drill and bore

The solid earth, and from the strata there
Extract a register, by which we learn
That he who made it, and revealed its date
To Moses, was mistaken in its age.”

There is no doubt that the amiable poet intends to pour scorn upon the theory that the globe is more than about six thousand years old—a theory then novel, but now universally accepted. The geologists were flying in the face of Moses; they were audaciously setting up their pretended record, dug out of the earth, against the Creator's own testimony given in writing. What could indicate more palpably the arrogance of reason? How many pulpits thundered forth their denunciation of the impious fiction of the geologists! The teachers of the new geologic cosmogony were pelted with the grave rebukes or contemptuous sneers of good men who considered themselves called to crush the adversaries of a tenet long established and having its firm warrant in Scripture. In this country Professor Moses Stuart, who fifty years ago was the leading biblical scholar among us, a man of brilliant talents and of extensive if not always accurate learning, took the field against

the conclusions of geology, which he considered at war with any fair interpretation of the opening page of the Bible. The late Professor Silliman was obliged to contend, for many years, with sceptical theologians on whom his arguments made no more impression than hail-stones upon a rock. Sometimes it was said that the fossils which are found imbedded in the mountains, or buried on the sea-shore, are the relics of the great and devastating Noachian deluge. Not unfrequently it was deemed sufficient to declare that God may have created them just as they are and where they lie. Hugh Miller, even at the late day when he wrote, found it requisite to argue from analogy—from the inference justified in the case of cemeteries which contain human bones—that the hypothesis of the immediate creation of fossils in the fossil form is inconsistent with sound logic, and involves a disparagement of the Creator's veracity. The most recent instance of mistaken religious zeal in a blaze against the naturalists is furnished by the advent of Darwinism. The recollection is still fresh of the outcries which the appearance of Darwin's "Origin of Species" and "Descent of Man" provoked. How far the different sorts of animals and other organized beings are bound together by a genetic connection is still an open question; altho the traditional beliefs as to the origin of these various divisions may be said to have dropped, for the most part, from the scientific creed. Even if species come into being by descent, it is problematical whether the doctrine of natural selection is a solvent of so great power as the Darwinian form of the evolution hypothesis has maintained. But the bearings of Darwinism, in the shape in which its author propounded it, upon theism and Christian belief, are now well understood. It has been abundantly shown that it leaves the being and attributes of God, as Christians conceive of them, untouched. Speculations of Darwin pertaining to the origin of the mind and of the moral faculty may wear a threatening look; but these are a subordinate part of the Darwinian discussion; and it should not be lightly assumed that even these of necessity clash with the Christian idea of man as a spiritual and responsible creature. A preacher of so high a type of ecclesiasticism and of an orthodoxy so stainless, as Dean Liddell tells us, in a sermon preached since Darwin

was entombed, that the theory which has made his name famous carries in it no antagonism to the creed of a Christian. The conflict about which there has been so great a noise is pronounced to be unreal. If this be so, then the guns of a myriad pulpits have been turned upon a man of straw.

The causes of the attitude of intolerance which has frequently been taken by religious men towards new opinions in natural science are multiple. There is, first, the customary impatience of new truth, or of new doctrine which stands in opposition to cherished ideas—ideas that have long had a quiet lodgment in the mind. This species of conservatism is far from being peculiar to theologians or to the religious class; it belongs to other classes of human beings as well, and is manifested equally in connection with other beliefs. Innovators in politics, or in these very sciences which have to do with the material world, are very apt to be confronted with resistance—often with stubborn and angry resistance—from people engaged in the same pursuits. Few ministers expressed a more unsparing antipathy to Darwinism than Agassiz, the apostle of a different zoological system. The path which scientific discoverers have to tread, apart from the religious and ecclesiastical jealousies which they are liable to awaken, is not apt to be a smooth one. The *odium theologicum* is only one specific form of a more generic odium which vents itself in learned scientific bodies and in the controversial papers of rival schools of *savans*. It would seem as if men come at length to look on their established opinions as a piece of property, and upon all who seem disposed to rob them of this agreeable possession as thieves and robbers. Fanaticism may be kindled in behalf of any cause or creed with which personal feeling has become associated, or with which intellectual pride has irrevocably become involved. Hence every important revolution in scientific opinion has succeeded not without a conflict with the adherents of the traditional view,—an internecine war among the cultivators of science themselves.

Then, secondly, religious faith, as it exists in almost every mind, is habitually associated with beliefs erroneously supposed to be implicated in it. Beyond the truth itself on which a man really lives, there is a mass of connected belief which not one out of a hundred, to speak moderately, either attempts to dis-

sever from it, or imagines it possible to dissever. To disconnect this accretion of secondary beliefs, be they well-founded or ill-founded, from that which is vital, it is tacitly taken for granted, is out of the question. That which would remain after the amputation, it is silently assumed, would bleed to death. It is only the few disciplined and rigorously logical minds who approximate closely to a perception of what is, and what is not, vital to a doctrine or a system. Such a discrimination is seldom made with any high degree of accuracy. Hence one may think that his life is threatened when the surgeon's knife is lopping off an excrescence, or is removing a member the loss of which leaves the body with undiminished or increased vigor. Religious beliefs in the average mind are so interwoven with one another, as the mere effect of association, where there may be no necessary bond of union, that where one of them is assailed the whole are thought to be in danger. Time was when a belief in witchcraft was held by many to be an *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiæ*. Even John Wesley expresses this opinion, or something equivalent. It was a belief that had existed so long, it had been adopted and practised on by so many of the bad and good, it was judged to be so recognized in the Scriptures, it entered so intimately into the accepted mode of conceiving of supernatural agents, that the loss of it out of the faith of a Christian was felt to be like a displacement of a stone from the arch: it would lead to the downfall of the whole structure. The old Greeks held that the stars were severally the abode of deific beings; they were animated and moved by intelligences. Plato and Aristotle were not delivered from this way of thinking. When a man like Anaxagoras said that the sun was a stone, the entire theological edifice was felt to be menaced with overthrow. Men did not at once discern that atheism did not follow. They did not see that a belief either in one God, or in gods many or lords many, might still subsist, and subsist just as well, when the traditional tenet which personified the stars had been relinquished. It is a matter of daily experience to witness a vociferous opposition to the introduction of some new mode of conceiving of a religious truth, or of defending it, where the motive of the embittered outcry is a misconception of the effect of the opinion in question upon the substance of religious belief. The disposition "to multiply

essentials," old Richard Baxter considered the bane of the church, the prolific source of intolerance and division. The tendency to identify accident with substance, the failure to discern the core of a truth from its integuments, is at the root of much of the rash, and unreasoning, and vehement resistance that has been offered, in past times, to the advances of natural science.

In adverting to the occasions of conflict between persons specially interested in religious truth and students of natural science, there is one other observation to be made to which it is well for theologians to give heed. The ground is often practically taken, and sometimes avowedly, that the views relative to the teaching of Scripture respecting the material world, both as to its meaning and authority, which have come down to us, we ought to cling to until we are *forced* to abandon them. The maxim is to part with the traditional opinions on this topic only when the concession is extorted by evidence no longer to be withstood. Never yield an inch of ground until it is found impossible to hold it. This way of viewing the subject is wholly unscientific and unworthy of theology, if theology would keep its place as a science. It rests on a false assumption respecting the rightful relation of religion to the studies of nature. It is mischievous, it is hurtful to the cause of religion. It is in fact, in its proper tendency, suicidal. It is unscientific, in the first place. If the progress of natural science has taught in repeated instances, and taught impressively, that the traditional views taken of the Scriptures contain error, the aim should be to eliminate that error, and to do it, if possible, forthwith, and not wait to receive blow after blow. Some new canon of interpretation should be found which places the reader of the Bible above the reach of these rude disturbances of his belief. If this is found impracticable, if it be found that fair interpretation, without any such strain as offends the critical sense and the ethical sense as well, fails to set the scriptural expressions in harmony with the ascertained results of inductive science, then let the inspiration-dogma be revised. Let the theory relative to the authority of Scripture be formulated in accordance with the facts. Our position is that it is unworthy of the church to stand idle and passive, but prepared to give up one point after

another as it may find itself obliged to do so. This is virtually the position which many would assume. They stand, waiting for some new demand from natural science—stand shivering, perhaps, lest they should be stripped of another inherited notion respecting the world and the way in which it was made. The proper course for the thinkers of the church to take is to anticipate the demands of natural science, and, as far as the light they possess will enable them, take up a position as to the teaching of Scripture and the substance of the faith from which they cannot be dislodged. No course could be better adapted to excite a general distrust of Scripture than that of making a stand at one point after another, only to beat a retreat at the first regular onset of the assailant. The policy which we here condemn rests upon the assumption that natural science is to be looked upon as an adversary bent upon conquest, instead of a branch of human knowledge to be hailed as an ally and a friend. The progress of physical discovery has gone far enough to render it practicable for Christian theologians, if they will clear their minds of bias either on the side of tradition or of innovation, to compare the utterances of the Bible with the settled doctrines of science, and then determine what modification of formulas and interpretations is required. The seventeenth century was far less favorably situated than the nineteenth as regards the discrimination between the human and the divine factors which conspire in the production of the Scriptures. The proper authority of the Bible, and the bounds of that authority, it is now more practicable to define, since the phenomena of Scripture are more thoroughly understood, and other branches of knowledge which require to be consulted as aids in the investigation have made an immense advance.

Having made these preliminary remarks on the causes of complaint which students of nature have had in times distant and recent, I proceed to affirm that the general allegation against religion and Christianity of having proved a hindrance to the advancement of scientific knowledge is destitute of any just foundation. The school of Buehle, whose superficial and pretentious "History of Civilization" abounds in manifestations of anti-Christian prejudice, is fond of representing religion as in perpetual "conflict" with science. In the Patristic age, in the

history of ancient Christianity, these writers can find little that can help them to bolster up their fictitious charge. To understand the middle ages, one must take into view the domination of Aristotle, which, partly for good and partly for evil, established itself, in the thirteenth century, in the educated class. At first Aristotle was resisted, especially when the Arabic Pantheism linked itself to his teaching; but, finally, he came to be considered as a chosen man who had exhausted the possibilities of natural reason. Considering what the character of civilization was in that era, the influence of the great Stagyrte was natural, and not without a great intellectual benefit. With the Reformation, his sceptre was broken. The way was opened by this emancipation for the progress of physical and natural science. The epochs in this great emancipation are marked by the advent of the voyagers, Columbus and Da Gama, by the discoveries of Copernicus and Vesalius, by the revolution effected by Newton, by the extension of astronomical science through the elder Herschel, and by the final triumph of the method of experimental and inductive research, which owed much to the influence of Boem, but the glory of which must be shared by a multitude of explorers. To figure this progress of culture through Aristotle's reign, and since his downfall, as a "conflict with religion" is a proceeding as shallow as it is calumnious.¹

The late Dr. John W. Draper may be taken as an example of a class of authors who have labored to disseminate the impression which is here contradicted. A man of marked ability, and justly eminent in certain provinces of scientific knowledge, he has, nevertheless, in his work on "The Intellectual Development of Europe" and in a smaller work on "The Conflict of Religion and Science," given currency to what we consider a false and injurious view of the proper tendency and actual influence of Christianity. It is true that Dr. Draper is much more lenient in his judgment of Protestantism than of Roman Catholicism. But his thesis is that "a divine revelation must necessarily be intolerant of contradiction; it must repudiate all improvement on itself, and view with disdain that arising from the progressive

¹ Zöckler's work, which I had not examined until this article was in type. "*Gesch. d. Beziehungen d. Theol. u. Naturwissenschaft*" (1877) contains interesting matter on the points here considered.

intellectual development of man."¹ His representation is that there are always two parties, science on the one side and religious faith on the other. The drift of his teaching is to the effect that the great mistake—the "great neglect of duty"—on the part of the heathen sages of antiquity was in failing to make provision for the propagation of their saving doctrines; the design being apparently to suggest that the world would have been delivered from the blinding and narrowing influence of that system of religious belief which actually obtained sway in Europe.² There is a certain *naïveté* in this lament; as if the failure to engage in active propagandism did not grow out of the essential character of the systems which the much lauded sages and philosophers cherished. This is one point in Dr. Draper's view of history. Another ground of lamentation is found in the failure of Arabic culture and philosophy to become dominant. Coupled with this sentiment is an exalted view of the scientific merit of the Saracenic philosophers in comparison with the Christian culture and philosophy which displaced them. The ideal system appears to be found in the pantheistic speculations of Averroes. The indebtedness of Europe to Arabic science is depicted in warm colors.

All this involves a considerable amount of error and exaggeration. It is conceded that Christian writers have been sometimes niggardly in awarding credit to the work done by Mohammedan scholars in the earlier portion of the middle ages. Religious prejudice has had its effect in lowering unduly the estimate which should be put upon Arabic learning and the services rendered by it in the education of Europe. The universities of Bagdad and Damascus, of Cordova and Seville, were lights in a dark age. The knowledge gained by inquisitive ecclesiastics from the North in the Moorish schools of Spain communicated the impulse out of which scholasticism sprang into being. The schoolmen owed their first knowledge of Aristotle to Latin translations from Arabic versions of his writings. In several of the sciences, as medicine and astronomy, the Arabs gained a knowledge above that of their contemporaries, and even con-

¹ "History of the Conflict of Religion and Science," p. vi.

² Ibid. p. vii.

tributed in no inconsiderable measure to the advancement of these branches. Laudation of the Arabs cannot justly go much beyond this point. In the first place, it is to be remembered that the Arabians derived their science from the Greeks. Not only their methods, but the greater portion of their stock of knowledge, were acquired from the ancient writers whom they studied through the medium of translations. In the second place, it is not to be forgotten that the Arabs were indebted to Christians for their introduction to and knowledge of Greek authors. Versions of Aristotle and of other authors were made into Arabic by Syrian Christians. Nestorians were the tutors and guides of the Arabs. Alfarabi and Avicenna were pupils of Syrian and Christian physicians. In the ninth century, Hasein Ibn Ishak was at the head of a school of interpreters at Bagdad, by whom the Arabs were furnished with the treatises of the Stagirite and of his ancient commentators.¹ Thirdly, the additions which the Arabs made to the stock of learning were comparatively small. We say "comparatively." In comparison with what they learned from the Greeks, their contributions were small. But, especially, in comparison with the scientific achievements of Christian students of later days, the discoveries of the Mohammedans were insignificant. Whewell in his "History of the Inductive Sciences" has brought out very distinctly the fact that it was not until scientific discovery and experiment were taken up under Christian auspices and by Christian explorers that the astonishing advances were made which give character to modern science. In astronomy, the favorite study of the Arabs, and one in which they really did much, what is all their original teaching when set by the side of the work done by Copernicus, Galileo, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, and Newton? The methods, the instruments, the observations, the brilliant inductions, which have revolutionized our conceptions of the sidereal universe, are not due to the Arabs. They are owing to the genius of the Christian masters whose names have just been given, and to others who have trod in their path. It is in the atmosphere of Christianity, amid the influences which Christian civilization has originated, in the bosom of Christian society, that the amazing progress of natural and physical science in all of its depart-

¹ See Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," vol. I. p. 410. *seq.*

ments has taken place. It is not that praise of the Arabs for what they learned and taught is begrudged. It is only that the praise bestowed on them is exaggerated, and that the idea of some stupendous work which they *would* have done, if they had been let alone, is illusive and visionary.

The foregoing remarks are to show that the accusation of having been on the whole a barrier in the way of science, which is brought against Christian society at large, is founded on a misjudgment respecting the factors concerned in the development of modern civilization and culture. A kindred fallacy inhering in this allegation is in the identifying of the acts of ecclesiastical rulers with the sentiments and inclinations of the body of Christian people. The proceedings of the hierarchy of the Latin Church in particular cases are not to be confounded with the spontaneous voice of Christian society as a whole. The multitude of communicants even in that body might not concern themselves in these measures of persecution. We may take as an illustration the case of Galileo. How much did even Catholics generally know of what the Inquisition was doing in this affair? The body of the laity were not consulted. There was no room for a free expression of their sympathy in one direction or the other. For ages the Christian Church was dominated in the West by the Latin hierarchy. To hold the church at all times, much more Christianity itself, responsible for every deed of cruelty and fanaticism which the rulers of the church committed is a manifest injustice. Yet it is the fashion of censorious writers who would fain exhibit religion as hostile to science to rake together from the annals of the past all the instances of priestly intolerance of this nature, and to lay them in a lump at the door of the Christian Church.

A fallacy still more flagrant of which the class of writers to whom we are referring are guilty is deserving of special attention. The exposure of it goes far to nullify the popular assertions with regard to the opposition, in past days, of religion to natural science. These writers unconsciously overlook the fact that, for the most part, the pioneers of scientific discovery who have had to endure persecution for broaching novel views upon the constitution and origin of nature, have been themselves Christians. It has not been a war of disbelievers and sceptics

on the one side, who have been obliged to suffer at the hands of believers in Christianity for teaching scientific truth. It has commonly been a contest of Christian against Christian. Where there has been a combat of this sort it has been an intestine struggle. To represent by implication that in one camp have been found atheists and infidels, eager and successful in exploring the secrets of nature, while in the other have been collected the host of Christian disciples, their persecutors, is utterly false and misleading. Where the war has existed it has been a war of Greek against Greek. Christian men, taught in Christian schools, or stimulated intellectually by the aggregate of influences which Christianity has in the process of time, to a great degree, called into being, make some new discovery in science, which clashes with previous opinions, and strikes many as involving the rejection of some article of Christian belief. Debate ensues. Intemperate defenders of the received opinion denounce those who would overthrow it. Intolerant men, if they have the power, instigated by passion and, probably, thinking that they are doing God service, resort to force for the purpose of suppressing the obnoxious doctrine and crushing its advocates. These advocates, denying that Christianity is impugned by their new scientific creed, stand, with more or less constancy, for the defence of it. In some cases they are imprisoned; in other cases they are driven into exile, or put to death. Some become martyrs to science; some weakly renounce their convictions. This, in the main, is the story of persecution as directed against promoters of natural and physical science. It has been, with some exceptions, the melancholy tale of Christians so far misled by passion, or by bad logic, or false notions of duty, as to interfere with the proper liberty of fellow-Christians who are blessed with more light.

Let us glance at some of the individuals who have been named among the votaries of science that have earned reproach for supposed religious aberrations. Albertus Magnus should hardly have a place among them; yet his name figures often among those who are said to have suffered on account of his interest in alchemy. Some of his ignorant contemporaries, it is true, thought him a magician. But this great light of the Dominican order, and teacher of Thomas Aquinas, was as far as possible

from free-thinking in religion. It was his fame in the church that gave him the title of "the Great." He was a Christian thinker, justly held in honor in his own generation, and somewhat in advance of his times in the interest which he took in natural science. Who was Roger Bacon, who is so often pointed out as one of the victims of religious bigotry? His eminence when compared with the men of his time there may be a tendency at present to exaggerate; but he was unquestionably on a level with the greatest minds of the thirteenth century, so prolific in examples of intellectual power. He was persecuted by reason of the scientific spirit which he manifested and exemplified in his researches. His lectures at Oxford were interdicted by Bonaventura, the General of the Franciscan order of which he was a member. He lived at Paris under a sort of ecclesiastical surveillance for ten years. Later, his books were condemned, and he was in prison for fourteen years. This is one chapter of the story. On the other hand, he was himself a sincere Christian believer,—as firm a believer as were the ecclesiastics who imposed penalties on him for his teaching. This is not all. Among his numerous supporters was that liberal-minded man, Robert Grosseteste, afterwards Bishop of Lincoln. Moreover, it was Guy de Foulques, after his election to the papacy under the name of Clement IV., who called upon him to write out a treatise on the sciences which, when a papal legate, he had requested of him. This pope, it would appear, interested himself in his favor; and it was not until the accession of Nicholas IV. to the papal chair, a man of a very different temper, that the persecution of Bacon was begun with renewed severity. It must be remembered that the philosopher had inveighed with vehemence against the vices of the monks and the clergy, and against their ignorance, and had gathered against him on this account an array of personal enemies. The story of Roger Bacon is the story of a contest within the church in a half-enlightened age, an age when European life was emerging out of the barbarism that followed upon the fall of the Western Empire, and that was only briefly and partially interrupted in the era of Charlemagne, to return again in the tenth century with increased darkness and confusion. The story of Bacon is the story of a conflict between an able Christian teacher, who was decorated with the honorary

appellation of "Doctor Mirabilis," who counted prelates and a pope among his friends, and a much more numerous set of adversaries, partly frightened by the new ideas that he broached and partly exasperated by the stinging rebukes, however deserved, which had flowed from his sharp pen. To represent this as a contest between "religion and science," under the implication that anti-Christian students of science were on one side and the collective body of Christians on the other, is to misrepresent history, with the result, if not for the purpose, of feeding an infidel prejudice. As for Galileo, there is no reason to question that he was a Christian believer and a Catholic, with that low ethical standard as regards the obligation of veracity; which was only too common among the countrymen of Machiavelli. There is no proof that he doubted the divine authority of the Bible, more than did Cardinal Baronius, to whom Galileo refers, not by name, as the author of the remark that the Scriptures were given to tell us how to go to heaven, and not how heaven goes. Nor was Galileo without warm sympathy from ecclesiastics, some of them high in station, who went as far as they dared in the attempt to shield him against the implacable bigotry by which he was pursued. Among his opponents were not a few men of science, ardent Aristotelians, who combined with ill-informed and narrow churchmen to bring down upon the head of their illustrious rival the wrath of the Inquisition. The history of Galileo is the history of a Christian man of science, having among his friends and supporters no inconsiderable number of Christian people, who constituted, however, in Italy, at that time, a powerless minority in the face of the organized and relentless vigilance and force of the party of bigotry and intolerance. Coming down to recent days, we find that the earliest and most efficient promoters of geological science were not unfriendly to the doctrine of theism or of revelation. In this country they were Christian believers, like the late Professor Silliman and President Hitchcock. Such men as these, with candid Christian scholars and ministers among their auxiliaries, fought the battle between the cause of science and its well-meaning, but mistaken and often intolerant, opposers.

The aspersions cast upon Christianity and the Christian Church for an alleged interference with the progress of science

would be very much diminished if the authors of them would learn to discriminate between science and philosophy. Under the ægis of what is called "science" assent is claimed for guesses and theories which belong, if they belong anywhere, in the domain of metaphysical speculation. They seek to pass unquestioned in the livery of "science." In themselves they may deserve respect or disrespect; but it is a mere blunder or a trick to proclaim them as the legitimate products of inductive investigation. When a bright-minded physicist proclaims that Plato and Shakespeare are potentially present in the sun's rays, he is not speaking in the character of a sober student of nature, but of a metaphysical dreamer. His proposition is without proof, and is absolutely incapable of proof by any process known to physical science. The authority that may justly pertain to him when he stands on his own ground he loses utterly when he leaps the fence into a field not his own. When a biologist assumes to be an oracle respecting the origin and end of the universe, the freedom of the will, and the nature of consciousness, his utterances may be wise or foolish, but they are, at least, not in the least authoritative. If the prominent naturalists, or several of them, would preach less, they would be more instructive, even if less notorious. The agnosticism of Herbert Spencer is an idea of Hamilton and Mansel as to the relativity of knowledge, caught up and dissevered from its adjuncts; an idea derived first from Kant. So far from having any verification in natural and physical science, it lies quite outside of their province. Yet this underpinning of Spencer's system is gravely mistaken by some for a "scientific" truth instead of a philosophical assumption of such a character that the structure reared on it is a house built on the sand.

If all that has been said of the opposition offered, in past times, to scientific progress by Christian people were true—and we have tried to state how much of truth there is in the imputation, and how much of error—no conclusion adverse to the truth of Christianity could be inferred. To justify such a conclusion it would be necessary to prove that the Christian faith, the doctrine of Christ and of His redemption, carries in it by natural or necessary consequence this antipathy. It might be that the professed adherents of a religious system fail, in

numerous instances, to apprehend in certain particulars its true genius. They may identify their own preconceptions with its actual teaching. They may misinterpret that teaching in some important aspects of it. They may carry their own ideas into the sacred books instead of receiving their ideas from them. They may fail to apprehend clearly the design and scope of their sacred writings, the character and limits of their authority. They may cling to the letter, and let the spirit in a measure escape them. They may fail to separate between the essential and the accidental in their contents; the truth and the vehicle which embodies it. Unless it can be shown then that Christianity involves a view of the material world and its origin, of the laws of nature, and its final cause, and of man, which is at variance with the results of natural investigation, nothing which the adherents of Christianity have said or done in this matter is of vital moment. That Christianity, fairly understood and defined, involves no such contradiction to scientific belief is capable of being proved. But the proper limits of the present essay preclude us from prosecuting the discussion.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

ON THE EDUCATION OF MINISTERS: A REPLY TO PRESIDENT ELIOT.

THE article by President Eliot on the Education of Ministers, which appeared in the last number of this REVIEW, has received the attention to which it was entitled by the representative position of its author. As a rule the critics have contented themselves with an earnest repudiation of two or three of its leading ideas. They have not treated it as an uncalled-for and unfair attack upon the integrity of the Protestant ministry, and in this respect they have dealt very leniently with President Eliot; for he has not hesitated to say that ministers are under the strongest temptations to insincerity, and to imply that these temptations are not very effectually resisted. We shall follow the example of the critics just alluded to in avoiding further reference to the spirit of the article under consideration, and shall confine ourselves to the task of commenting upon the several positions taken in it. A higher authority than President Eliot, or even that of Channing or Emerson whom he quoted so approvingly, has told us that "if a man desire the office of a bishop he desireth a good work." With this statement of Scripture the author seems to be in full accord, and here our sympathy with his article begins and ends. President Eliot seems to look upon the ministry as a noble profession that is in danger of falling into unworthy hands. He seems to think that those who ought to enter it keep out of it, and that those who are recruiting its ranks add to a lack of intellectual attainment the greater lack of proper moral discernment. To such a charge, even if it were categorically made, it would be hard to reply in other terms than those of indignant denial. But it is by implication and suggestion rather than by direct statement that the idea has been communicated to the

readers of this REVIEW that the gospel of truth is being preached by dishonest men. The impressions of which we speak are produced by statements made here and there in an article which for vulnerability may safely challenge comparison with anything of recent date within the domain of periodical literature. We may therefore leave the vindication of ministerial character to the sober judgment of those who are the daily witnesses of ministerial life, and devote the few pages that have been placed at our disposal for the purposes of this article to a consideration of the points in President Eliot's paper.

The article in question deals with two propositions: first, that "the position and environment of the Protestant minister have changed fundamentally within a hundred years;" and secondly, that "to fit him for his proper place in modern society much greater changes ought to be made in his traditional education than have hitherto been attempted." What the points of difference are between the minister's position to-day and his position a hundred years ago, and wherein the traditional training of ministers should be modified, the author proceeds to set forth—not very logically and with no great array of fact or argument, it is true, but nevertheless with considerable perspicuity. And the most cursory reading of the article will suggest to the critic that very possibly such a fundamental difference of position and environment does not exist; or that if it does exist it does not call for any great change in the minister's traditional training; or, finally, that if such a change were needed the particular modifications indicated in the paper under review would not meet the requirements of the case.

When it is said that the position and environment of the Protestant ministry have changed fundamentally during a hundred years, we suppose that the writer means to convey the idea that the relations subsisting between clergy and laity to-day are fundamentally different from those which subsisted a hundred years ago. We are led to put this construction upon the author's first proposition, partly because of the nature of some of the arguments adduced in support of it, partly because he refers to one of them as "the most potent cause of change in the relative positions of the ministry within this century," and partly also because we cannot imagine that any

would think it necessary to prove to the readers of this REVIEW that the minister of to-day is in many important respects different from the minister of a hundred years ago. We do not suppose that President Eliot has busied himself in an effort to elucidate a trifling proposition. As we understand it, however, President Eliot's proposition is far from being one of trifling importance; but so understood the considerations offered in its support fail to make it good.

One of these considerations is the fact that ministers no longer have a monopoly of learning, that it is very common now for lawyers and physicians to be university men, and that the press is a formidable competitor of the clergy in the race for intellectual supremacy. These facts have a bearing upon the problem of ministerial education. They prove that the falling off in the number of candidates for the ministry cannot be accurately estimated by a table of ratios based upon college statistics; that the 45 per cent of Princeton graduates who studied for the ministry between 1761 and 1770, against the much smaller percentage of later years, is due partly, in all probability, to a lessening tendency toward the ministry on the part of educated men, but partly also to an increasing desire to become educated men on the part of those who under no circumstances would have had the ministry in view. But the facts referred to can lend but a qualified support to President Eliot's proposition unless we assume that the ministry have been stationary in the midst of the march of intelligence. We suppose, however, that ministers as well as people have felt the influence of the times. If the people a hundred years ago depended upon the minister's sermons for intellectual stimulus, the minister himself had correspondingly small intellectual resources. If the press is educating the people to-day, it is educating the minister as well; and the new book or the review is quite as likely to be found in the parsonage as in the home of the lawyer or the merchant. If our author means that there has been a general growth of intelligence, and that the intellectual equipments of a hundred years ago will not suit the requirements of to-day, he is saying what is obviously true; but a commonplace is getting more dignity than it deserves when it is spoken of as a fundamental change in the minister's position and environment.

It is said, moreover, that this is an age of great corporations,, of concerted action for philanthropic purposes, and that ministers are expected to have opinions on great social questions like "intemperance, prostitution, divorce, and pauperism." That is to say, we are swimming in a larger ocean, we are sweeping a wider horizon ; men know more, and more is demanded of ministers. This, however, does not imply any change of relation between ministers and people as compared with a former day, for ministers are quite as likely to take the lead in the discussion of these topics ; and while these new subjects of knowledge common to both ministers and people serve to change the ratios formerly existing between them, they cannot be said to do so to the extent indicated in President Eliot's proposition or indeed to imply much more than a reaffirmation of what has been already said, namely, that we have more to think about than our fathers had. Whether we do not lose in depth what we gain in breadth, and whether the minister should not avail himself more than he sometimes does of the law of division of labor and keep to the terms of his commission as a preacher of the everlasting gospel, are questions that might be very properly considered. Waiving these inquiries, however, and conceding that, since the relations of religion to the general problem of life are becoming more complicated and need more careful handling, the minister needs more than ever to be an educated man, this does not support President Eliot's proposition ; for, as we have already implied, ministers are quite as receptive of new ideas as the people are.

The author of the pages under review next proceeds to illustrate the fundamental change of position and environment of the Protestant minister by observing that "the temper of the public mind has undergone a wonderful revolution within a century upon points which vitally affect the clerical profession." This change is illustrated under the three heads of repudiation of authority, the spirit of inquiry, and the logical result of political convictions. It is said that "a minister's cloth, his office, and his sacerdotal quality no longer command the respect they once did." This, however, is a generalization that should be qualified. For in certain quarters, that is to say in the prelatric branch of Protestantism, the "sacerdotal quality" of the minister seems on the whole to be commanding more respect than in

former years. The High Church party is growing. On the other hand, in non-prelatic communions the "sacerdotal quality" of the minister was never recognized, tho he has been highly esteemed, and perhaps never more so than to-day, "for his work's sake." If, however, as is sometimes the case, poorly paid and self-sacrificing gentlemen of culture and refinement who serve God in the ministry of his Son are made to feel that the scale of social value is fixed by a pecuniary standard, this is a change (if indeed it be a change) in the minister's position which calls for no corresponding change in his traditional training, but rather for a revolution of sentiment in regard to the mammon-worship of to-day which threatens to be the curse of the Republic.

Once more, we are told that the people question everything and accept nothing on trust; and that "the exemption of the minister from instant debate carries with it a loss of influence." Our author continues: "The lawyer daily encounters his adversary, the business man his competitor, and the statesman his political opponent: but no one answers the minister; and the people think that a protected man may not be a strong man." President Eliot has given form to a sentiment that has often been expressed, but we fail to see any contrast between ministers and other classes of men in the matters here spoken of. Do lawyers argue with their clients? Do physicians hold consultations with their patients? Do bankers defer respectfully to the financial wisdom of the clerical members of College Boards of Trusteeship? Do astronomers compare notes with theologians? Is not the rule as prevalent to-day as it ever was, and in all departments of thought quite as much as in theology: *cuique in arte sua credendum est*? So far as our experience goes, ministers insist upon this rule less than any other class of professional men. And as for the minister being "a protected man," we fail to understand what President Eliot means. He surely would not have an open debate take the place of the sermon; and if a stranger should venture to interrupt President Eliot's minister in the course of his sermon, we imagine that President Eliot would be the first to say that his minister ought to be "a protected man." And in what other sense is the minister "a protected man"? He is not shielded from the criticisms

of his hearers. Men and women, and, we are sorry to add, even the children, exercise the right of private judgment as to the minister's sermon, to its fullest extent. After being told that the minister has to face the competition of the press it is amusing to find him spoken of as "a protected man;" for the competition of the press quite commonly takes on the form of very unceremonious criticism of what the pulpit has to say.

There is yet another point illustrative of a change of temper on the part of the people in regard to matters affecting the ministry. It concerns the bearing of political upon theological convictions. Politics and religion undoubtedly sustain relations to one another. Some have found it hard to square their politics with their religion, but we trust that only a very limited number would be willing to say that a man must square his religion with his politics. This, however, is the position taken by President Eliot; and he intimates that "the Protestant ministry as a whole will not recover their influence with the people of this country until the accepted dogmas of the churches square with the political convictions of the people." Then we hope that they may never recover it. The influence gained by sacrificing the language of Scripture to the vocabulary of American politics would not be worth perpetuating. A dogmatic theology made out of the Declaration of Independence is not the gospel of salvation, and the men who preach it will have no claim upon Christian sympathy because they call themselves Protestants, and the Pope the Man of Sin. If the American people have grown so republican that they cannot speak of the kingdom of God, and even the title 'Lord of hosts' is less majestic than it used to be; if they are depending upon the "beautiful conception which rises before our minds at the words 'our country'" to lead them up to a conception of the infinite God; if they have begun to doubt whether men be totally depraved, "to question the authenticity of alleged revelations which are said to contain such doctrine, and to distrust religious teachers whose tenets seem to be so at variance with the cherished political convictions and hopes of the people,"—they have taken a long step in the direction of discarding Christianity altogether. And if President Eliot means to imply that the hearty acceptance of republican ideas leads logically to these results, he has

said the most damaging thing that could be said against republican government. There is a natural connection between the thoughts of men regarding the divine government and their thoughts regarding human government; and when we find the men of former ages falling into confusion whenever they undertake to argue upon the basis of this connection, we are apt to account for it by supposing that the men of olden time lacked the nice powers of discrimination which mark the thinkers of to-day. But it may seem to enhance our respect for the past, or at least to abate our boastful appreciation of the present, to discover that the President of Harvard University has fallen into the old errors, and *mutatis mutandis* has made the same illicit use of analogy which was common to those who defended the divine right of kings. Indeed the argumentative advantage is altogether with the older writers; for it is far more legitimate to argue from the revelation of what the kingdom of heaven is to what the kingdom of earth ought to be, than it is to argue from what the experience of the people in the United States has been to what the government of God must be. It is a pity that President Eliot should have given occasion to those who are never slow to ridicule national conceit, because it is, after all, only a partial reply to such ridicule to say that the conceit is altogether provincial and does not fairly represent the American people. Yet the plain logic of President Eliot's article is that the government of God cannot be radically different from the Constitution of the United States, and that any ministry that holds that it is radically different need not expect to hold the confidence of the American people. We believe that President Eliot stands almost alone in the avowal of this belief; and as his position, commanding tho it be, can hardly be said to constitute an "environment," we cannot say, on the score of political convictions, that "the position and environment of the Protestant minister have changed fundamentally within a hundred years."

We come now to what is spoken of in the article referred to as "the most potent cause of change in the relative positions of the ministry within this century, namely, the rise and development of physical and natural science."

Our author does not refer to the fact that by means of

physical science we have come into possession of a great body of truth unknown to our fathers. There is no contrast between ministers and people so far as the knowledge of scientific truth is concerned. Clerical mediævalism does not go the length of entire ignorance of recent scientific development. But the particular point insisted upon is that we owe to physical science the development of "a new method or spirit of inquiry" which is characterized by "an absolute freedom on the part of the inquirer from the influence of prepossessions or desires as to results." Hence "even the ignorant have learned to despise the process of searching for proofs of a foregone conclusion. Apologetics have ceased to convince anybody, if they ever did." Connected with the spirit of inquiry is a confidence in progress which it seems is so strong that it destroys confidence in everything else; so that "the lay world . . . is persuaded that there must be incessant progress in theological science;" so that "indeed, fixity of opinion is hardly respectable among scholars." If President Eliot is right here, the difference of "position and environment" contended for in his paper must in a measure be conceded. But we cannot agree with President Eliot. We do not believe that a pure love of truth was unknown before the development of physical science. We should like to ask whether all historians have written under the influence of foregone conclusions, whether all judges have taken bribes, whether philosophers have uniformly built their systems in a dogmatic interest, and whether the students of physical science were the first to commend to us the unbiassed examination of fact without fear or favor. Virtually this is what President Eliot says, and in support of this grave statement he tells us that "it is the electric light of science which has made white and transparent the whole temple of learning." This, however, is not a foundation of fact, but only a pretty figure of a poetic brain. We should also like to know whether among scientific men there is no jealousy, no bitterness, no pride of opinion, no tenacity of individual judgment, no reluctance to part with a cherished conviction, no gathering of evidence to sustain a tottering hypothesis or to bolster up one too young as yet to stand alone. Do scientific men so universally represent the judge, and theologians so universally represent the advocate? We have seen

nothing as yet to convince us that there is any radical difference between the theological method and the method of physical inquiry, and tho attempts have often been made to represent these differences by playing upon the words 'inductive' and 'deductive,' they generally owe their plausibility to misrepresentations.

As for apologetics, it is of course easy to cast ridicule upon it by saying that it is a gathering of evidence to support a foregone conclusion. But will any one say that there is not an honorable place for labor of this kind in all departments of life? If character is assailed, is there no place for defence? If title to property is challenged, does the scientific spirit forbid the search for proofs of a foregone conclusion? If the attempt were made to show that the corporation of Harvard University had no legal right to their endowments, we should expect to see a system of Harvard apologetics, and we are not sure that it would exhibit a very irenic temper. Protestant Christians believe that they have a great inheritance of immortality. They believe that it comes to them through the new testament of Christ's blood. Must they be silent when men try to break the force of that testament, when it is pronounced a forgery, when it is construed contrary to its plain intent, or when it is said Jesus had no power to convey the inheritance to those who rejoice to be called his heirs?

When the spirit of science shuts up the courts and abolishes jurisprudence it will be time enough to say that it is opposed to apologetics and the search for proofs of foregone conclusions. But the spirit of science as understood by President Eliot, with its alleged opposition to creeds and apologetics, seems to exert only a very limited influence, and this according to the showing of President Eliot himself; for he says that "the fault is quite as much that of the churches or sects as that of the individual ministers; for almost every church or sect endeavors to tie its ministers to a creed, a set of articles, or a body of formulas." There is no great difference of sentiment, then, between the ministry and the churches; and as the churches, particularly in America, constitute by far the larger part of the people, it can only be in a very limited sense that the scientific spirit has succeeded in alienating popular sympathy from the clergy. We

do not deny, of course, that there is a "lay-world" outside of the churches, and that this lay-world, meaning the author of the article under consideration "in common with millions of thoughtful men," believes that ministers "are peculiarly liable to be deficient in intellectual candor;" nor do we challenge the statement that with a certain class of men "fixity of opinion is hardly respectable." But the influence of this "lay-world" and of these "thoughtful men" is very limited after all: it only means that a great many do not believe in revealed religion; and this is not a new condition of things. It, therefore, is no proof of a fundamental change in the minister's position and environment, and instead of calling for a modification of his traditional training it only shows the absurdities into which men may be easily led when they allow themselves to be victims of over-statement and a one-sided view of the world. For it would seem that the extreme desire of men to be sure of truth ends in making them sure of nothing, and that the pursuit of knowledge ends in nescience. If, then, it is not respectable to have fixed opinions, religion must cease to be respectable or cease to have any fixed beliefs; and what need there is of religion, or what basis remains for religious belief after all fixity of belief has been discarded, we are at a loss to know. We do not believe that fixity of opinion has ceased to be respectable. We believe that it will be possible for many a day to come for a man to appear in good society who has unabated confidence in the multiplication-table, in the doctrine of the excluded middle, and the law of gravitation. If, however, the antithesis between the ministry and the world of thoughtful men is not that of dogmatic science and dogmatic theology, but of agnostic science and positive religion; if men can oppose Christianity only by saying that we do not know whether anything is true and therefore do not know whether Christianity is true [or false], we need no modification of the minister's traditional training to remedy this condition of affairs. We have only to wait and see how long it will take for men to grow sick of this perpetual see-saw between "yes" and "no."

Finally, we are reminded that "the position of a minister is less stable and his livelihood less certain than it was in the last century." It would be better to say that the pastoral relation

is less permanent than it once was; and while this may be regretted, it cannot be looked upon as a radical change in the minister's position and environment. The minister is quite as apt to seek a dissolution of the pastoral relation as the people are, and the instability of his position is due to many causes—to increased facilities of travel, to more frequent interchanges of thought through the press, to inequalities of support which vary all the way between salaries ridiculously small and salaries temptingly large, to the disaffections of congregations and the discontent of ministers themselves. This is a condition of things which, however deplorable, calls for no modification of the minister's traditional training, and which no such modification can remedy.

Had President Eliot been more successful than we suppose him to have been in the support of his first proposition, it would not have followed from it that any change in the minister's traditional training was called for. The minister has a special work, and needs for it a special training. The growth of general intelligence may make it more important for him to be a man of general information, but general information can never properly supersede the special studies of his profession. The multiplication of questions bearing upon religion may make it desirable that he should be able to speak intelligently in regard to them. But he cannot be expected to speak with the authority of a specialist, and in the majority of cases outside of the range of his own profession he must make use of the ordinary sources of information that are open to other men; and if he brings the powers of a well-disciplined mind to bear upon these, he will suffer no serious inconvenience by reason of the limitations of his traditional training. If, however, the alleged decline of ministerial influence be due to a general repudiation of authority, to the antagonisms of the scientific spirit, or to the preaching of doctrines that are incompatible with cherished political convictions, the remedy for this lies not in changing the curriculum of ministers' education, but in changing the traditional conception of the ministerial office, and of so changing it as practically to abolish it altogether. For the Protestant conception of the minister is that he is a divinely appointed officer in a divinely founded institution, and that he is charged with the duty of de-

claring a specific and authoritative message in the name of God. If these elements in the Protestant conception of the ministry be discarded, the minister's office and occupation are gone.

Let us, however, attend to the suggestions which are brought to our notice in the second part of President Eliot's paper. It is contended here that "to prepare the minister for his work in modern society grave changes ought to be made in his traditional education." These grave changes are considered under three heads, which we may indicate as (1) the encouragement of freedom of thought; (2) the abandonment of beneficiary education; (3) the modification of the theological curriculum. We do not believe that any good reasons can be given for these changes, and we are sure that there are very strong reasons against them; but whether they be good or bad in themselves, it needs little argument to show that they must be particularly inoperative in the direction where President Eliot looks for their best results.

For it is not theological education but ministerial education that is under discussion. And a ministry implies a church. The church, however, holds certain definite convictions regarding God, the future life, and a way of salvation through the blood of Jesus Christ. It is pledged to the propagation of this faith through all the world and its perpetuation through all time. To this end it educates and ordains a ministry. If the church had no definite convictions, it would cease to be; and if it ceased to have the definite convictions just referred to, it would have no need of a ministry and certainly no divine warrant for one. It is absurd, therefore, to say that the theological teacher should be allowed to teach what he pleases if he teaches under the authority of the church. And it is absurd to suppose that the church should not take the oversight of the theological training of her ministers. Grant now that the "academic freedom," which, according to President Eliot, is more likely to abound in "universities and seminaries situated in large cities," were made so ample as to attract the attention of those "young men of force" who are said to be deterred from entering the ministry by reason of a lack of this freedom: this would not have the effect which President Eliot anticipates. For we must remember that the minister is not merely a man who is to pursue theolog-

ical science in a university, but he is a man to receive support in the service of an ecclesiastical organization; and the conditions of that organization are such that it must either impose its creed upon its ministers or else it will sooner or later reach a position where it will need no ministers at all. We do not doubt that young men of force are often kept out of the ministry because they cannot accept the church's creed, just as others are kept out because they have no love for the church's work or no special aptitude for the duties of the ministerial office. But President Eliot seems to think that it is hard for a man to sign a creed and be sincere: he cannot realize that it is possible for a man to adhere to his religious convictions without material modification through a long life, or that he should have the moral courage to leave a church whose doctrines he has discarded. "No other profession," he says, "is under such terrible stress of temptation to intellectual dishonesty as the clerical profession is," and "this," he continues, "is the state of things which deters many young men of ability and independence from entering the profession and causes the acknowledged dearth of able ministers."

Let the fires of Smithfield, the graves of Covenanter and Huguenot, tell whether Protestant ministers have been insincere. Let the lives of ministers everywhere be interrogated that it may be seen whether hypocrisy is the minister's besetting sin. But let these "young men of force" who fear that the obligations of a creed would prove too great a strain upon their honesty rest assured that no change in the minister's traditional training will be inaugurated for their advantage; for the authority of the minister, as we learn from the article under review, depends largely upon "the purity and strength of his character," and they are not wanted in the ranks of the Protestant clergy upon any terms.

The second of the "grave changes" proposed is indicated in the following way: "Two practices which greatly discredit the ministry in the eyes of laymen ought to be stopped: I mean, first, the practice of subsidizing boys in academies and colleges from the funds of sectarian societies on the understanding that the beneficiaries will subsequently go into the ministry; and secondly, the practice of supporting in theological seminaries,

and ultimately imposing upon parishes, young men of small mental capacity and flaccid physical or moral fibre.”¹ The objection to beneficiary education urged by President Eliot is that laymen believe that “incompetent and unworthy persons are drawn into the seminaries by the standing offer of gratuitous board, lodging, and instruction,” and that this belief “works incalculable injury to the Protestant ministry” because “it impairs confidence in its sincerity.” Yet President Eliot tells us that “the profession is not unattractive pecuniarily.” And he adds: “It is not the average earnings in any learned profession but its few prizes which induce ambitious young men to enter it.” Suppose, then, that the present system of beneficiary education were abolished, and that the other “grave changes” contemplated in the article under notice were to go into operation, so that ambitious young men should be induced to enter the ministry: would not those who love to criticise the ministry be apt to say that these men were drawn into it by the hope of winning the “few prizes” that are offered? And would not such a belief, if it were prevalent, be quite as detrimental to the ministry as the belief that young men are drawn into it by the offer of free board and lodging? We should like, to see everything done

¹ The statement is often made that the ablest men among college graduates do not in any fair proportion enter the ministry. Dr. Duffield has examined the statistics of Princeton College with reference to this matter, and has embodied the results of his inquiry in the following communication which he has kindly placed at our disposal. These results, it will be seen, are of the most gratifying character:

COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY,
PRINCETON, N. J., April 12, 1883.

The number of graduates of the Academic Department of the College of New Jersey for the decade ending with the year 1880 is 894. Of these, 192—about 21½ per cent—have entered the ministry. The number receiving Honorary Appointments for Commencement, for the same period, was 300. Of these, 103—about 34 per cent—have entered the ministry.

Of the 26 graduates of the College of New Jersey now students in the Princeton Theological Seminary, 13—over 69 per cent—received Honorary Appointments for Commencement. Of these, 12 received “Special Honorary Orations,” for special excellence in scholarship. One was the First Honorman of his class, three were Second Honormen, one was third in rank for scholarship, one received the Valedictory Oration. Nine of the 26 represented their respective literary societies as Junior Orators.

JOHN T. DUFFIELD,

that can be wisely done in order "that the ministry be not blamed," but we cannot see that much would be gained in the direction contemplated by President Eliot by abolishing beneficiary education. But there are strong reasons why the existing system of beneficiary education should be continued and placed upon a more generous footing; and tho these reasons have been given again and again by different writers, the importance of the subject is a sufficient justification for repeating them here.

1. All forms of the higher education partake of the beneficiary character. The buildings, apparatus, and professorial endowments of great educational institutions are provided by private benefactions or public grants, and the fees of students pay only the smallest fraction of college expenses.

2. No good reason can be given why poverty should be a bar to a liberal education if any individual or if a corporation will so far act *in loco parentis* as to pay the expenses incident to a young man's college life that are not otherwise provided for endowments. It is hard to see that benevolence of this kind becomes wrong by being made systematic and by being specially directed to the aid of those who study for the ministry.

3. The church is in need of ministers. She is the organized agency for the conversion of the world. It is her duty to use every wise endeavor to secure men and means for the dissemination of the gospel throughout the earth. There is a great difference in this respect between the ministry and the professions of law and medicine with which it is so often compared. When it is said that we do not organize societies to aid lawyers and physicians in securing their professions, it is enough to say that aid is given to theological students not as a favor to them but as part of the church's work in the evangelization of the world.

4. The supply of ministers falls far short of the demand. We have to face the fact that there is a falling off in the number of candidates for the ministry, and at the same time a rapid development of the church's work that calls more loudly than ever for an increase of the ministerial force. It is in vain to point to the fact that in older, smaller, and settled countries there is no lack of ministerial candidates. It is absurd to apply rules that suit one set of conditions to a set of conditions altogether dif-

ferent. The beneficiary system does not account for a falling off of ministerial candidates. It is idle to suppose that the abolition of it will remedy the difficulty.

5. Candidates for the ministry are very commonly poor. It were to be wished that a larger proportion of the sons of those who are well-to-do would enter the ministry; but we shall not succeed in getting them by abolishing the system of beneficiary education. It is sometimes said that men of this class are kept out by their unwillingness to be associated with a system that lives so largely on benevolence. But we doubt the correctness of this remark, and we should not think highly of the zeal that could be diverted from the greatest of all callings by a consideration so worldly as this. If, however, there is any force in the criticism, the objection to the existing method of beneficiary education would be obviated by making it conform more closely to the cadet system in the army and navy.

6. There are special difficulties attending efforts at self-support in the great majority of cases. Only a few can find remunerative employment during the progress of their studies. It is easy to recommend students to support themselves rather than receive aid; but those who have ever interested themselves in securing employment for a student know what a difficult thing this is to do. And self-support, even when employment is found, often means pinching poverty. It is said sometimes that discipline of this sort is what gives the church an able and efficient ministry; but this is a cruel application of the law of the survival of the fittest. Some go safely through the ordeal, but some die, and a great many suffer through life as the result of the privations to which they were subjected in their fight with poverty. Besides, the student's time can be more profitably employed in the prosecution of his studies than in doing any work, even tho it be religious work, that turns his thoughts away from the particular duties that pertain to him as a student of theology. It is wise for the church to make such provision for him that he will be under no necessity to earn money by performing services that lie outside of his duties in the seminary.

7. It is not fair to condition the right of a poor man to enter the ministry by his ability as tested in a competitive examina-

tion to exceed the ordinary requirements of the theological curriculum. This, however, is what is involved in the system advocated by some. For the man who can support himself needs only to perform the ordinary work prescribed in the curriculum; but the poor man, according to the plan which many favor, must win a scholarship or he will fail to prosecute his studies for want of funds. We have nothing to say against a system of scholarships and fellowships awarded after competitive competition. We only object to that part of the system that would make the ability of a poor man to secure the advantages of a thorough theological education depend upon his ability to outstrip another in a race for intellectual pre-eminence.

8. The existing system has worked well. It is said that unworthy men are drawn into the ministry by means of this system, that it fosters insincerity, and particularly that by this means the way is made easy for men of inferior ability and feeble physical vitality to enter the ministry. That individual cases can be found illustrating these positions we do not doubt, yet the value of a system must not be judged by isolated cases, and still less should be condemned on the ground of certain *a priori* judgments respecting its tendency. This system has been in operation in the several seminaries of this land long enough to give those who have watched it opportunity to form a judgment respecting its effects. The judgment of those who have been in closest connection with it is uniformly in its praise, and their opinion must be regarded as having more right to consideration than the judgment of those who have never been known to have a very deep interest in ministerial education, or of those who somewhat hastily condemn a system which was planned with special reference to the exigencies of this country by contrasting it with the methods which have operated successfully under very different conditions in other lands.¹

President Eliot next proceeds to tell us what "the mental furnishing of a minister ought to be." We should not accept everything that President Eliot has said upon this subject, but

¹ We are indebted to the Rev. W. H. Roberts, Librarian of Princeton Theological Seminary, for the following statement illustrative of the results of beneficiary education: The total number of students matriculated at Princeton Theological Seminary, from 1849-50 to 1873-74, a period of twenty-five years, was 1355, of whom 961 received aid, and 394 were self-supporting. In the year

we cannot see that the programme of theological education as he has sketched it (except as it concerns the principle of elective studies) can be regarded as a grave change in the minister's traditional training. The churches generally hold that a candidate for the ministry should have a liberal education before entering upon strictly professional studies. American colleges have been very generally founded with special reference to the securing of these results, and so far as their means will allow they are offering to their undergraduates at this moment the opportunity to study the very subjects which President Eliot thinks every candidate for the ministry should master. Indeed, with the exception of Hebrew these preliminary studies described by President Eliot are comprehended in the ordinary college curriculum. Some topics have been omitted which we think are very desirable. We should have added mathematics; and then a knowledge of logic, the history of philosophy, and philosophic jurisprudence are quite as important to the minister

1881, or at date of previous death, the occupations, etc., of these students, as furnished by the General Catalogue, is shown in the following tabulated statement:

OCCUPATIONS, ETC.	NUMBER.		PER CENT.	
	Aided.	Self-sup- porting.	Aided.	Self-sup- porting.
Missionaries.....	64	20	6.6	5.1
Secretaries, Editors, and Agents of Bene- volent Societies.....	16	10	1.5	2.5
Presidents, Professors, etc.....	62	26	6.4	6.6
In charge of churches.....	652	198	67.8	50.1
Died before Ordination.....	19	7	1.9	1.7
In Secular Employments.....	33	48	3.4	12.1
Without Charge, or Occupation unknown in 1881.....	115	85	11.9	21.5

This statement places the ability and usefulness of aided students in most favorable light. Even in the matter of vitality the figures favor them in comparison with the self-supporting students. During the twenty-five years covered by the statement, 134 aided students (13.9 per cent) died, as against 63 self-supporting students (16 per cent). But the emphatic fact of the statement is that 33.6 per cent of the self-supporting students were at death, or in 1881, in secular employments, without charge, or their occupation was unknown.

A statement made by Prof. Phelps of Andover Theological Seminary in 1873, covering the occupations of living Andover students for the years 1849-73, presents practically the same results as the Princeton statement. This will be seen by a comparison between the two classes of students with reference to Pastoral Service. In 1873, 72.4 per cent of the aided students of Andover Seminary were in charge of churches, as against 55.9 per cent of self-supporting.

as are some of the topics which find a place in President Eliot's list. Turning then to the scheme of professional education, which according to President Eliot should consist of Semitic studies, New Testament criticism, ecclesiastical history, comparative religion, psychology, etc., systematic theology, and charitable and reformatory methods, our main criticism would be directed to the elective feature which in President Eliot's mind seems to be so essential to its successful operation. We are not saying that no place should be given to elective studies in a theological curriculum, but we are sure that a scheme of studies which makes it possible for a young man to be graduated from a theological seminary without having studied Old or New Testament exegesis, ecclesiastical history, or systematic theology is radically wrong. Yet President Eliot's scheme makes it possible for a candidate for the ministry to give his entire attention during his stay in the theological seminary to comparative religion; psychology, ethics, and the philosophy of religion; and charitable and reformatory methods, etc.

It is quite true that the "minister's education should not end with the theological school, but should be prolonged like that of the teacher or physician to the latest day of his life;" and we think that the minister will compare very favorably with the physician so far as the matter of keeping up his studies is concerned, tho like him he is liable to endless interruptions. We doubt the wisdom of keeping on hand "some more continuous and erudite work than sermon-writing." A pastor's best powers should go into his sermons. Authorship of this kind will be continuous enough whether it be erudite or not. We would not advise a man "sometimes to comment upon a fresh book instead of preaching a sermon." His business is to "preach the Word." And after all these grave changes in the minister's traditional training, whereby "young men of small mental capacity" are to be kept out of our theological seminaries and "young men of force" are to be brought in, it ought not to be necessary for the minister "sometimes to read other men's sermons instead of his own." President Eliot gives these advices because he emphasizes more than he ought the literary side of the minister's life. And he does this because he has a wrong conception of the ministerial office.

FRANCIS L. PATTON.

RECENT RESEARCHES IN CEREBRAL PHYSIOLOGY.

IN the last few years the domain of cerebral physiology has been almost revolutionized, and so striking have been the advances that they have called into existence what might be called a separate literature on this subject. In many of these writings unprovable hypotheses are so mingled with scientific fact, and mere assertion with the clearest proof, that it becomes necessary to take deliberate account of what is known and what is only inferred. Among many philosophers of the present day there is a tendency to maintain that the mind is merely the product of the physical and chemical activities of the cerebral molecules. By such superficial writers as Luys this self-evident proposition is regarded as scarcely worth the trouble of demonstration, and they found their reasoning upon it as an axiom. In marked contrast to this school is the position taken by Wundt, whose great work¹ is certainly the most important of the recent contributions to Physiological Psychology; a work pre-eminently distinguished by candor and fairness of treatment.

In order to make intelligible to non-professional readers the discussion of the physio-psychological problems which Wundt suggests to us, it will be necessary to preface them with some account of the anatomy of the nervous system.

The human nervous system consists of two main kinds of elements, nerve-cells and nerve-fibres, each one of which has its special properties. The cells make up an essential part of all central nervous organs, and form the so-called gray matter of those organs; the fibres are both in the brain and spinal cord

¹ Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie. 2te Aufl. Leipzig, 1880.

(where they form the so-called white matter), and in the peripheral nerves. They are the means of communication between different groups of nerve-cells, and with all parts of the body.

Connecting the central organs with the periphery are twelve pairs of cranial and thirty-one pairs of spinal nerves, which may be classified according to their function into *motor* and *sensory*. Each spinal nerve is of mixed character, and arises by two roots, of which the anterior supplies the motor, and the posterior the sensory, fibres. The nerves are made up of excessively fine fibres, which pass to all parts of the body. Each fibre arises as




FIG. 1.—(after Quain). A, segment of the spinal cord, oblique view; B, end view; *g.m.*, gray matter; *a.c.*, anterior; *l.c.*, lateral; *p.c.*, posterior, columns of white matter; *a.r.*, anterior (motor); *p.r.*, posterior (sensory) root of spinal nerve; *Sp.*, spinal nerve.

a continuation of a nerve-cell, and seems to remain distinct throughout its entire length.

The *Spinal Cord* is a nervous mass running the whole length of the trunk in a special canal of the vertebral column. Deep fissures divide it into two lateral halves (Fig. 1), which are connected by transverse bridges, and these enclose a small central canal. The cells are collected together in the centre into a mass shaped like two crescents, one in each lateral half of the cord. The anterior horn of each crescent gives rise to the motor, and the posterior to the sensory, root of the nerve of its

own side. The white matter of the cord surrounds the gray, and is formed by longitudinal fibres. Each half of the cord is superficially divided into anterior, median, and posterior columns (Fig. 1). The anterior column contains motor fibres which will pass to the same side of the body, the posterior contains sensory fibres coming principally from the opposite side of the body, while the lateral column is made up of both kinds.

As the spinal cord enters the skull it expands into the *Medulla Oblongata* (Fig. 2, M.O.), the lowest division of the brain,




FIG. 2.—Base of the human brain (after Wundt). M.O., medulla oblongata; Cb., cerebellum; P.V., pons Varolii; C.C., crura cerebri; Opt., optic nerve; Olf., olfactory bulb; C.H., cerebral hemispheres.

and the canal widens into the fourth ventricle. Superficially like the cord, the medulla has a different structure, the gray matter being broken up into special ganglionic centres. At its lower end the anterior columns of the cord pass to the opposite side,¹

¹ There is considerable individual variation as to the completeness of this crossing. See Ferrier, *Localization of Cerebral Disease*, pp. 11, 12.

so that the motor fibres going to the right half of the body arise from the left half of the brain.

The fibres of the medulla pass largely at its upper end into the *Pons Varolii* (Fig. 2, P.V.), a transverse band, where the crossing of both sensory and motor tracts becomes more complete, so that injury to one side of the pons nearly always produces loss of sensation and motion on the opposite side of the body.

From the pons the fibres pass forward in two thick bands, the *Crura Cerebri* (Fig. 2, C.C.), in which the sensory and motor tracts are distinctly separated. In the crura the cavity is a narrow passage, the upper wall of which is formed by four rounded masses, the *Corpora Quadrigemina* (Fig. 3, C.Q.), or *Optic Lobes*. These bodies receive some of the motor fibres of the crura.

The other motor fibres of the crura pass forward into a pair of great ganglia, the *Corpora Striata* (Fig. 3, C.S.), formed by



FIG 3.—Brain of cat dissected (after Gegenbaur). Cb., cerebellum; C.Q., corpora quadrigemina; Th., optic thalami; C.S., corpora striata.

the thickening of the outer and lower wall of each hemisphere. Some of the fibres seem to run directly through these ganglia, and radiate to the surface of the hemispheres; but most of the fibres are connected with the nerve-cells of the corpora striata, and, by means of other fibres arising from these cells, with the hemispheres.

Between the corpora striata and the optic lobes is another pair of great ganglia, the *Optic Thalami* (Fig. 3, O.T.), which receive most of the sensory fibres of the crura.

The *Cerebral Hemispheres*, which together form an oval mass,

make up the great bulk of the human brain. They are covered by a richly convoluted cortex of nervous cells (gray matter), the interior being a mass of fibres. Each hemisphere contains a cavity, the lateral ventricles, which communicates with the third ventricle in the optic thalami. The two hemispheres are connected by a great transverse band of white fibres. The internal mass of white fibres puts all parts of the hemispheres in communication with each other and with the rest of the brain and spinal cord.

The *Cerebellum* forms a sort of side branch of the fibres passing to and from the cerebrum. It lies (Fig. 2, Cb.) behind the medulla, and is composed of a median and two lateral lobes. It has a transversely convoluted cortex of cells, and an interior mass of white fibres. Three pairs of fibrous bands connect the cerebellum with the rest of the brain; the lower pair contains sensory fibres from the medulla which end in the cells of the cortex. From these cells arise two other sets of fibres, one of which forms the middle pair of bands and goes to the pons; the other, forming the upper pair, runs to the crura cerebri and optic lobes. The fibres of the middle bands are so crossed that each half of the cerebellum is specially related to the opposite hemisphere.

The next question to be considered is, What are the functions of these various centres?

The chief kinds of nervous action are reflex, automatic, and volitional. The first two imply no necessary connection with consciousness.

Reflex action presupposes a sensitive surface connected by a sensory nerve with a group of nerve-cells, from which again one or more motor nerves arise. When the sensory nerve is stimulated, the impulse is sent by the cells along the motor nerve, and results in a muscular contraction. This change is not merely one of direction, but a profound modification in degree and kind. "The number, intensity, character, and distribution of the efferent [motor] impulses is determined chiefly by the events which take place in the protoplasm of the reflex centre" (Foster¹). A familiar example of reflex action is the sneeze caused by tickling the nose.

¹ Text-book of Physiology, p. 129.

Automatic action is called forth by such stimuli as originate within the nervous centres themselves, yet are not under the control of the will. These stimuli seem to have their origin in the chemical condition of the blood. The movements of the heart and respiratory apparatus are automatic actions.

To take up now the functions of the various nerve-centres in detail, we begin with the

Spinal Cord. Besides being a medium of communication between the brain and the periphery, the spinal cord is an important centre, eminently the seat of reflex action. The reflexes of the spinal cord show a surprisingly adaptive character in the lower vertebrates. If acid be put on the side of a decapitated frog, the animal will brush it off with the foot of the same side; if that is cut off, it will use the other leg. This classical experiment has often been made the ground of attributing an intelligent choice to the spinal cord. But in view of the fact that such an animal exhibits no spontaneous movements, and is perfectly quiescent except in response to some definite external stimulus, this conscious action of the spinal cord becomes doubtful, to say the least. This doubt is confirmed by an experiment of Goltz's which showed that by a gradual increase of temperature a decapitated frog will submit quietly to being boiled, while a sound frog will make frantic efforts to escape. Nevertheless the brainless animal responds as usual to the proper stimuli. This experiment goes very far to prove the absence of any sensation properly so called in the spinal cord.

Reflex action is shown more strongly in a brainless than in an intact animal, and certain parts of the brain have when stimulated the power of neutralizing the reflexes of the cord more or less completely. Such a neutralizing effect is called *inhibition*. In some cases reflex actions may be inhibited by the will, in others not.

When the spinal cord of a mammal is cut, the parts of the body below the section are under complete motor and sensory paralysis, but after the shock of the operation has passed off the isolated part of the cord will perform its reflex functions even better than before.

In man, section of the cord causes complete paralysis below

that point. Yet in such a patient a convulsive action of the legs may be produced by tickling the feet, which he cannot control or even is not conscious of. We are hence justified in denying conscious activity at least to the human spinal cord.

The *Medulla Oblongata* is a co-ordinating centre of even more complicated and important reflexes than those of the spinal cord. Here are situated the centres which control circulation and respiration, of facial expression, and such modified respiratory movements as sneezing and coughing. If food be put into the mouth of an animal deprived of its brain above the medulla, it will chew and swallow it. Even cries, as of pain, may be called forth in such an animal.

It will be best at first to treat as a whole the functions of the parts of the brain lying between the medulla and the cerebrum. These are the pons varolii, cerebellum, optic lobes, optic thalami, and corpora striata (Figs. 2 and 3).

When an animal is deprived of its cerebrum it seems to lose all volition, and yet is capable of very complex co-ordinations of movement when properly stimulated. A frog thus treated can be made to perform all its natural motions; thrown into the water it will swim until exhausted or until it reaches a place where it can crawl out. Put on its back it will at once recover its natural position; on a tilted surface it will balance itself perfectly; if pinched it will leap away, avoiding large obstacles in its path; if its flanks be stroked it will croak with perfect regularity. Such a frog will leap out of water as soon as it becomes uncomfortably warm, not allowing itself to be quietly boiled like a perfectly brainless frog, and will perform many surprising adaptive actions. The animal reacts with the regularity of a machine to proper stimuli, yet it becomes quiescent immediately when they are withdrawn.

A bird deprived of its hemispheres can still maintain its equilibrium, and when properly stimulated will walk or fly steadily. But when left to itself it will remain perfectly motionless, paying no attention to the food or drink that may be near it.

In mammals the shock of this operation causes death in a few hours, and yet essentially the same phenomena may be observed. When pinched the animal will run, avoiding obstacles

that throw deep shadows; a loud noise makes it start; it will follow a bright light with motions of the head; and can be made to cry as if with pain.

It is evident, therefore, that the co-ordinating centres for these complex movements lie elsewhere than in the cerebrum. "The lower ganglia are centres of immediate responsive actions only, as contradistinguished from the mediate or self-conditioned activity, which the hemispheres alone possess."¹

While so much seems certain with regard to this region of the brain as a whole, it is by no means easy in the present state of our knowledge to apportion to each one of the centres its own share in the work, as there is on these questions the greatest mass of contradictory evidence. The shock attendant upon the operations is often so great as to vitiate the inferences which have been drawn from the experiments, and many of the pathological cases have been so carelessly analyzed and recorded that they must be used with the greatest caution, as there is scarcely any hypothesis that cannot find support from some of them. Nevertheless some points seem to be pretty well established.

Corpora Striata and Optic Thalami. We have seen that the motor fibres of the crura cerebri for the most part enter the corpora striata, and the sensory fibres the optic thalami; these bodies are therefore means of communication between the hemispheres on the one hand, and the lower nervous centres on the other. When the corpus striatum and optic thalamus of one side are removed by injury or disease, there follows a loss of sensation and motion on the opposite side of the body. The chain is broken, and no impulses can reach or come from the hemisphere. These "basal ganglia" have certainly a modifying influence upon the impulses which pass through them.

There is a strong probability that the corpora striata have to do with the elaboration of the *motor* impulses. When we will to walk we may not know anything of the process by which we do it, a large part of the mechanism is governed by reflexes which are entirely outside the domain of consciousness, and yet without them rapid and certain co-ordination is impossible.

¹Ferrier, op. cit.

The corpora striata are now generally regarded as the co-ordinating ganglia of motion.

The functions of the optic thalami are more doubtful, and there is great diversity of opinion with regard to them. The most trustworthy experiments and observations tend to show that they have to do with sensory impulses, more especially those of touch. Wundt regards them as reflex centres of touch, in which "by means of tactile impressions complex motions of the body are at once produced." Luys¹ considers that these bodies have special centres for the senses of sight, smell, hearing, and touch, and that from these centres fibres pass to the cortex of the hemispheres. While this view cannot be said to be entirely untenable, yet the evidence for it is so insufficient that we are justified in giving it no further consideration, especially as the investigations of Meynert are entirely opposed to such a conclusion.

The *Corpora Quadrigemina* are important centres of vision and of the reflex movements which depend upon the sense of sight. If these bodies be destroyed on both sides the animal becomes totally blind, and the pupils no longer react to light, showing that the centre connecting the optic nerve with the nerve supplying the muscle of the iris is situated here. In these bodies is also placed the reflex centre which regulates the contractions of the iris according to the motions of the eyeballs. When the lobes of one side are destroyed, blindness of the opposite eye is the result, but its iris is still sensitive to light, showing that (to use Ferrier's expression) here, as in so many other cases, movements which are normally associated together are bilaterally co-ordinated in each centre, so that one centre can affect both sides. In mammals the removal of one anterior lobe is enough to cause blindness in the opposite eye, and conversely the destruction of an eye causes the degeneration of the opposite anterior lobe.

Besides these functions the corpora quadrigemina are evidently also co-ordinating ganglia of equilibration, but beyond this we know little of their importance.

The *Cerebellum* is also a co-ordinating centre, but its exact importance is one of the most obscure questions of this whole

¹ Le Cerveau et ses Fonctions. Première Partie, Ch. IV.

subject. Injury to or loss of this organ causes great unsteadiness and feebleness of gait without loss of power over any given set of muscles. In the case of a French girl who had neither cerebellum nor pons, locomotion was possible but very unsteady, and the intelligence was very defective. Cerebellar diseases often produce similar effects, and vertigo is more commonly associated with diseases of the cerebellum than with those of other parts of the brain. Vertigo seems to consist in the sense of the loss of bodily equilibrium. Wundt considers that the cerebellum is the organ for the immediate regulation of the voluntary motions by means of sensory impressions, and that the loss of such regulation destroys the sense of equilibrium.

We have thus seen that the parts of the brain lying below the hemispheres are capable of extraordinarily complex functions, and that animals possessing them alone react to all kinds of sensory stimuli, can walk, run, swim, or fly, balance themselves, avoid objects throwing a strong shadow, start at loud noises, and the like. Does all this imply consciousness? At first sight it would seem that it necessarily does, and yet on a closer examination such an assumption becomes very doubtful.

Carpenter's¹ view is that all the ganglia lying at the base of the brain, including those from and in the medulla oblongata to the corpora striata, together form what he calls the sensorium, and which he considers to be the instruments of sensory and sensori-motor consciousness even in man. The argument used to support this position is the very unsafe one from analogy of the nervous system of the invertebrates, which Carpenter regards as equivalent to the brain of the vertebrates minus the cerebrum. But this view is really an assumption, not an argument; we have no ground for denying that the nervous system of the invertebrates is equivalent to the *whole* nervous system of the vertebrates, only far less differentiated. Insects show spontaneity, volition, preference for certain objects, capacity for some degree of education, while animals deprived of their hemispheres show none of these. In this respect the position taken by Ferrier seems very strong.

¹ Mental Physiology. Part I.

What positive reasons have we for doubting the conscious activity of the lower brain-centres? In the first place, an animal from which the cerebrum has been removed remains perfectly motionless except when specially stimulated, and shows no spontaneity whatever. No true volition seems to be present; tho surrounded by its food, the animal neither eats nor drinks, even when kept alive for months by artificial feeding. In this respect such a mutilated animal stands below the *Amœba*, a simple speck of protoplasm without organs of any kind, which seeks its food.

The mechanism of co-ordination and responsive-action does not necessarily imply *present* consciousness for its perfection; it depends upon many factors, especially upon the impulses coming from the sense-organs. "Our movements," says Foster, "are guided not only by the muscular sense, but also by contact sensations, auditory sensations, visual sensations and visual perceptions, and when we say they are guided we mean that without the sensations the motions become impossible."

Each one of the senses contributes its quota to the necessary sum-total. A frog deprived of its hemispheres can still balance itself perfectly, but if its hind legs be skinned this power is lost, because the ordinary tactile impulses are lost and there is no volition to compensate for them. In patients afflicted with locomotor ataxia the same thing is seen. In this disease the sense of touch in the feet and legs is greatly diminished or destroyed. There is no loss of motor power, but co-ordination is very difficult, and the patient reels and staggers if he attempts to walk. By means of attention and will this co-ordination can still be imperfectly performed, but if the patient closes his eyes it becomes at once impossible. If the sense of touch is destroyed in an arm, it can be moved only under the guidance of the eye. Demeaux gives an interesting account of a patient thus affected who could move her arm at will, but could not tell its position without looking at it. Once, when her arm was, without her knowledge, fastened down, she was told to carry it to her head; she struggled a moment and then stopped, believing she had executed the movement.

The influence of visual impressions is of less, tho considerable, importance; abnormal conditions of the eyes often

give rise to staggering and vertigo, and we all know how unsteady even our most accustomed movements become in the dark.

Among the most important impressions of all are those which come from the labyrinth of the ear. When these canals are cut the most remarkable disturbances follow; if they are destroyed on both sides the effects will be permanent, and the animal becomes almost helpless. In the case of a pigeon, the bird keeps its head in the most peculiar attitudes and is utterly unable to fly. The sense of hearing is not disturbed, nor is there any paralysis, only a lack of co-ordinating power. These labyrinthine impulses form a very important part of the sense of bodily equilibrium.¹

The observations of M'Bride² have led him to believe that these canals have another function, which is "to produce through the ampullar nerves reflex rotation of the head and eyes towards the point whence the sound proceeds."

In an animal retaining its hemispheres the loss of certain sense-impulses may be partially compensated by attention and will, but in one without its cerebrum such compensation cannot take place. The conscious character of these responsive movements in the lower animals is therefore at least doubtful.

In man it seems almost certain that consciousness is not concerned in the operations of the lower centres. If the fibres connecting the optic thalami with the cerebral cortex be severed by disease, as happens not very rarely, the sense of touch is lost in the opposite side of the body, no matter how much the patient strains his attention to perceive the touch. Again, even in cases of paralysis in which the eyelids cannot be closed by any effort of the will, a sudden flash of light, or a threatening gesture, may cause them to close,³ by the reflex action of the lower brain-centres, without any affection of consciousness whatever.

We now come to the most important question of psychophysiological inquiry, the functions of the *Cerebral Hemispheres*.

¹ The results of Cyon and Tomaszewicz, if confirmed, would tend to throw doubt upon this generally accepted view.

² Journ. Anat. and Physiol., 1883, p. 212.

³ Carpenter, op. cit. p. 82.

When we saw that animals deprived of their hemispheres seemed to be mere reflex machines without consciousness or volition, acting only in response to definite stimuli, and at once becoming quiescent when such stimuli were withdrawn, we already negatively indicated something as to the functions of the hemispheres; but the details of these functions remain to be investigated.

In harmony with these observations is the fact that in man an original deficiency or wide-spread destruction of both hemispheres is always connected with a condition of idiocy. It follows from this that the cerebrum stands in some very close relation to the mental functions, a fact which is confirmed by a comparison of different races of animals, in which we find that great development and rich convolutions of the hemispheres may be taken as an indication of superior intelligence. The hemispheres are the last links in the various chains which connect the external world with the consciousness; a break in any of these chains before it reaches the cerebrum cuts that particular chain out of consciousness, or, in the case of motor functions, removes it from the control of the will. All sensory and motor tracts not of purely reflex character begin and end here; and while it would be rash to affirm that all forms of cerebral activity directly affect the consciousness, yet we have every reason to believe that only such activities come into its range. Thus vision may be destroyed by injury to the eye, the optic nerve, or the corpora quadrigemina, and yet all these structures may be intact and still visual perceptions are impossible if the connection with the hemispheres are destroyed. It is therefore clear that the organ most indispensable for the operations of a conscious intellect and will is the cerebrum.

So far nearly all physiologists are agreed. Now can we find any reason to believe that the functions of the cerebrum are localized in its cortex? Till lately the view of Flourens was very generally accepted, that all parts of the cerebrum acted indifferently, and that there was no localization in any part of it. Much of the cortex in man or animals may be destroyed without perceptible results. When the amount removed is very large the animal becomes more dull and stupid, but in the lower vertebrates these effects may

be transitory, so that a pigeon which has lost the whole of one hemisphere or large parts of both is often after the lapse of a few weeks indistinguishable from a sound one. But these effects become more permanent as the cerebrum increases in size and complexity, so that in man they are most marked of all. For these lesions to affect the *psychical* functions it is usually necessary that considerable portions of *both* hemispheres should be destroyed, as several cases of the complete destruction of one hemisphere are known which have not been followed by any perceptible injury to mental activity. Yet we cannot conclude from this that large masses of the cerebral cortex are superfluous, as such individuals are more easily fatigued than those in whom the brain is sound.

Within the last few years the experiments of Hitzig and Fritsch, Ferrier, Carville and Duret, and others have given a completely new turn to this subject. It was found that the cortex, which is indifferent to mechanical and chemical irritation, may be stimulated in definite ways by electric currents. Broca discovered that lesions of the third frontal convolution result in aphasia or loss of speech, and Hughlings-Jackson observed that certain localized lesions of the cortex of one hemisphere gave rise to localized epileptiform convulsions on the opposite side of the body. From these data a complex theory of localization of function has been made out, and the surface of the brain mapped with as much elaboration as was ever done by the older phrenologists.

The evidences for the theory of localization¹ are of two kinds, those from experiments on animals and those from pathological observations on man. The experiments are conducted both by stimulation of certain parts of the cortex by electrical currents, and also by removing these parts altogether. The experiments of Hitzig and Fritsch, Ferrier, and others do certainly show that there is a connection between the electrical stimulation of certain definite areas of the cerebral cortex and the contraction of certain groups of muscles. Certain parts of the brain are, however, insensible to any form of stimulus, and

¹ For a careful discussion of this whole question of localization in defence of Ferrier's views see W. J. Dodds, "Localization of the Functions of the Brain," *Journ. Anat. and Phys.*, Vol. xii., 1878, Jan., Ap., July.

by this test the cortex is divided into three main areas, an anterior, median, and posterior. The median one is most sensitive to such stimulation, and is considered to be the *motor* region, while the posterior is supposed to be the *sensory* region.

In the motor region (see Fig. 4) are various definite areas, each one of which calls some special group of muscles into action. The motor centre of speech, for example, is put in the third frontal convolution (Fig. 4, 4), usually in the left hemisphere, but it is interesting to note that in left-handed persons it is usually in the right hemisphere. In the so-called sensory re-




Fig. 4.—(After Wundt) Left side of human brain, showing some of the localized centres. The shaded part is the interior region. 4 Speech centre. 3 Centre of hearing. 5 Centre of sight according to Ferrier. 2 The same according to Munk.

gion each one of the senses is supposed to have a definite location in the cortex. According to Ferrier the centre of hearing is in the first temporal convolution, (Fig. 4, 3) the angular convolution is the centre of sight, the tactile centre is in the hippocampal region, and on the *inner* side of the temporal lobe the centre of smell. He even goes so far as to indicate a centre of hunger; the intelligence he places in the frontal lobes; and in short the whole cortex is elaborately divided into small areas, each one of which has its special function.

These determinations have been tested by removal of the

different areas. The results were partial paralysis or loss of certain sensations corresponding to the areas previously determined. The case is still further strengthened by an array of pathological cases which have been collected and discussed with great skill by Charcot, Ferrier, and others. An extensive selection of these may be found in a late work by Ferrier.¹ From these various kinds of evidence it has been confidently asserted that the localizers had made out their case.

But careful physiologists were not so positive as to the trustworthiness of these results. The inferences drawn do not, in many cases, follow from the experiments, nor do the latter fulfil all the requisite conditions. The same results follow stimulation when the cortex is cut away and the fibres stimulated, or even when a deep hole is made in the brain and the electric poles plunged in the blood. Stronger currents will produce results when weaker ones fail. "At all events," says Foster,² "these various experiments show that the fact of certain movements following upon stimulation of certain areas is in itself no satisfactory proof that these areas are to be considered 'motor centres.'"

With regard to the results attendant upon extirpation of these centres, the conditions are still less satisfactory. The subjects of experiment have for the most part been allowed to survive only a few days, and after such severe operations the functions of all parts of the brain are more or less disturbed, and very frequently the paralysis eventually passes off. This is not due to the function being assumed by the corresponding area of the opposite hemisphere, as was shown by Carville and Duret.³ They found that on the removal of certain centres in the right hemisphere localized paralysis of the left side of the body ensued, which soon passed away; on destroying the corresponding portions of the cortex in the *left* hemisphere there was a temporary paralysis of the right side of the body, but no return of that on the left.

The very elaborate and careful experiments of Goltz are en-

¹ Localization of Cerebral Disease. London, 1878.

² Text-book of Physiology, Third Ed., p. 645.

³ Archives de Physiol., 1875, p. 352.

tirely opposed to the theory of strict localization. In his recent work¹ he gives a trenchant criticism of the methods and results of those whom he calls the modern phrenologists.

In the first place, Goltz points out the untrustworthiness of observations made soon after the operations, as in that case it is impossible to decide how far the results are due to destruction, and how far to inhibition of other centres by irritation. He enforces this very strongly by showing the effects which follow the section of the spinal cord in a mammal. Such a wound is never repaired in the sense of a union of the two parts of the cord, but each end gradually heals over for itself. For weeks after such an operation the isolated part of the cord will exhibit no reflexes, these being inhibited by the irritation of the wounded surface, just as in a frog the reflex excited by one sensory nerve may be inhibited by the stimulation of another. When once the cut ends have healed over, the isolated part of the cord can perform the most complicated reflexes, tho the parts of the body below the section are as completely paralyzed as ever. In all probability just such inhibitory action is called forth by the operations on the cerebrum, and while it lasts no certain deductions can be made. Goltz avoided this source of error by keeping the animals alive for long periods, sometimes extending over a year and more.

One of the most striking of these experiments is the case of a dog in which nearly the entire cortex of both hemispheres was removed in four operations, extending from July, 1879, to February, 1880; the animal was killed in February, 1881. Besides the loss of cortex, of which only the basal parts, the frontal lobes and a portion of the occipital were left, the whole brain had shrunk remarkably, so that its weight was only about one seventh that of the normal brain and did not nearly fill the cranial cavity. This animal, as would naturally be expected, was a canine idiot. He went about slowly, snuffing the ground, and paying no attention to the men or animals around him; the strongest lights produced no effect upon him, and one might think he was stone-blind; but this was not the case, as several experiments showed. His visual perceptions were, however, very feeble.

¹Verrichtungen des Grosshirns, Bonn, 1881.

He was not entirely deaf, but paid very little attention to even the loudest sounds. All the other senses were extremely dull, but not entirely wanting. When pinched he became furious and bit blindly about him. His motions were slow and very clumsy, and he would often fall. When food was put in the accustomed corner of his cage he could find it himself, but not when it was placed out in the room. Reflex actions of the spinal cord showed themselves with surprising force and regularity, as the inhibiting action of the brain was very much reduced.

Immediately after each of the operations the animal showed very great disturbances of function, but in every case they were much relieved after a few weeks. Thus after the first operation—removal of the left anterior portion—the right side of the body was profoundly affected, with almost entire loss of the senses of sight and touch, and of power over the limbs. In three months most of these disturbances disappeared. Similar restitutions of function took place after each of the other operations. After the fourth the animal could not eat for weeks and had to be artificially fed, when he learned to eat for himself. "The eating centre had grown again," Goltz scornfully remarks.

I wish to emphasize the difference between this mutilated animal and one from which the whole mass of the hemispheres has been removed, in that the former still shows some volition, moving about spontaneously and showing hunger and thirst by howling, while the latter exhibits no spontaneity whatever. It is true that mammals which have lost both hemispheres cannot be kept alive long enough to make it certain that these effects are not due to inhibition, but the lower vertebrates can be so kept for months, and they render the conclusion already drawn extremely probable.

In another dog Goltz removed nearly all the cortex of one hemisphere, but he could observe no impairment of the intelligence, tho the sense-organs of the opposite side were much duller and the muscles less steady. In a third case the cortex of the posterior part of both hemispheres was cut away; the animal became idiotic, but in spite of the loss of the so-called sight-centre he saw very well with both eyes. After the second oper-

ation he ate freely of dog-flesh, which a normal dog will do only under pressure of the severest hunger. Still these experiments seem to indicate a general sort of localization. The loss of the forward parts of both hemispheres seems to cause *permanently* a greater clumsiness of motion and a reduction of tactile sensibility. Removal of the hinder part brings about a greater dulness of sense-perception, more especially of sight.

To my mind these remarkable observations of Goltz completely destroy the experimental evidence in favor of localization. Objections have been made to Goltz's method of removing the cortex by jets of water, so he repeated the experiments by cutting the brain, with exactly the same results. Nor can much stress be laid on Ferrier's objection, that what may be true of the dog is not true of monkeys or of man. The cardinal objection to Ferrier's observations is that he did not allow his animals time to recover from the effects of the operations. No single set of muscles or organ of sense is ever permanently thrown out of use by removals of small portions of the cortex, and even very wide-spread removals seem to be more general than special in their results.

Pathological evidence seems to show that localization has gone somewhat further in the human brain. Ferrier has brought together a very strong array of cases in support of his thesis.¹ The causal connection between lesions of the third frontal convolution and loss of speech is universally admitted, as must be the connection between localized destructions in the motor region (Fig. 4) and paralysis of certain sets of muscles. Yet even here the connection does not seem invariable nor always permanent. With regard to the localization of sensory functions, Ferrier's own statement of the case will show how vague and unsatisfactory the evidence is.

As Wundt very justly observes, it certainly is not probable that in the simultaneous sensations of a sound, a light, and a muscular movement the entire mass of the brain is occupied with all three kinds of action, but rather that they are relegated to different elements. There is probably therefore a functional difference in the parts of the cerebrum, but no such con-

¹ Localization of Cerebral Disease.

stancy as has been maintained. The destroyed centres can be functionally replaced to a remarkable extent ; the rapidity and perfection of these restitutions are largely dependent on the complexity of organization of the brain. In the frog or bird they take place very rapidly and completely, more slowly in the dog, while in man the effects of large lesions seem never to pass away completely except when they occur in infancy.

The mental functions cannot be localized. Because disease of certain parts produces certain intellectual disturbances it does not follow that they are the producers of that mental process, but merely that they perform some action necessary to its perfection. From the fact that a blind man can form no idea of color we cannot infer that the retina or optic nerve is the seat of visual consciousness. We must remember that the cells of the cortex are very indifferent functionally and can perform one or another kind of action in accordance with the circumstances in which they are placed.

Perhaps the best statement of our present knowledge of this complex question of localization will be found in the following propositions of Wundt's :

(1) *The Connection of Elements.* Every nerve-element is connected with others, and only then is it capable of physiological functions.

(2) *Indifference of Function.* No element performs specific functions, but the form of its function depends upon its connections and relations.

(3) *Representative Functions.* Elements whose function is inhibited or destroyed may be represented by other elements, so far as the latter stand in the necessary connections.

(4) *Localization of Function.* Every definite function has, under given conditions of conduction, a definite place in the central organ.

(5) *The Principle of Practice.* Every element becomes the better adapted to a definite function the more frequently it is caused to perform it.

We thus see that the cerebrum is the most essential part of the brain for mental action, and that only through it can the impulses from the sense-organs rise into consciousness, or the

will affect the body. Further than this there is very strong evidence that it is indispensable to memory.

The relations of brain-changes to memory have been very carefully elaborated in a recent work by M. Ribot,¹ a book which contains a great deal of valuable material, tho we may be allowed to dissent from some of its conclusions.

It is now very generally admitted that the renewed sensation, idea, or feeling is produced by the same mechanism as the original one. A remarkable experiment of Wundt's affords strong confirmation to this view. If one looks steadily at a brilliantly colored object for some time and then suddenly at a white surface, one may see an image of the object in the *complementary color*. Now if with *closed eyes* one visualizes (to use Galton's expression) this object for a long time and then suddenly opening them looks at a white surface, one may see a faint image, likewise of the complementary color. This points decidedly to the fact that perception and memory are dependent on the same processes. Of course the success of the experiment depends upon the vividness of the visualizing power.

According to Ribot the physiological conditions of memory are: (1) a particular modification impressed upon the nervous elements; (2) a specific association established between a given number of elements. Every action of the nerve-cells changes their molecular arrangement, and frequent repetition of the action will produce a profound modification of it. Now each act of perception and memory is a very complex thing, and so these organic changes demand not only a modification of molecular structure, but also "the formation among them of determinate associations for each particular act" (Ribot), and by repetition these associations may become as fixed as the original constitution of the elements, so that actions which have to be learned slowly and painfully become, after long practice, automatic and can be carried on without the aid of the attention.

All these changes imply the expenditure of energy and the destruction of tissue. The nervous elements are in a state of constant waste; the old complex molecules are broken up, carried off in the circulation, and eliminated by the lungs and kidneys.

¹ The Diseases of Memory. Internat. Scien. Series. New York, 1883.

Their place is supplied by new material taken from the blood. An important fact in this connection is that in all mental labor the flow of blood to the brain is largely increased.

It is no objection to this view of memory that the nervous elements are in unceasing change, because the new material supplied atom by atom may and does take the exact disposition of the old. Whenever the blood-supply of the brain is impeded, impairment of memory is almost sure to follow.

Memory is largely an automatic process and may be excited in many ways independently of the will. The poisoned blood of fever often does this so as to bring out experiences that had long vanished from the consciousness. Yet this automatic activity may be largely guided and controlled by the will, by starting the train of association in a given way, confining the attention to that train which will lead us to what we seek, and rigorously cutting off whatever is extraneous. It is the play of automatic action without volitional control which gives to dreams their absurd and inconsequential character.

The close connection between memory and the state of the brain is very clearly seen in the physical causes which temporarily weaken or permanently destroy it. Temporary impairment of memory may be caused by fatigue or disturbance of the cerebral circulation, as is well shown by cases given by Carpenter and Ribot, as well as by some that have come under my own observation. Partial loss of memory may be caused in a great variety of ways, often very capriciously as to what is lost; thus a blow on the head has been followed by the loss of a single language, or of some accomplishment, like music. Stoppage of an artery may cause aphasia. Or the loss may cover only a portion of time, as in a case, cited by Ribot, of a young woman who, after a very severe illness, lost all memory of the year preceding that illness and never regained it.

General and permanent destruction of memory always proceeds from extensive lesions of the hemispheres, caused by softening, paralysis, cerebral hemorrhage, or similar disease. When, as is usually the case, the destruction of memory is a gradual process, it follows a definite law; it advances "progressively from the unstable to the stable." First recent events are lost, then more distant and stable associations are broken up, and last of all those

formed during the impressible period of childhood. In aphasia the loss is in the same order: proper and then common nouns, adjectives and verbs, then interjections, and, last of all, gestures. Space does not permit me to pursue this subject further, but perhaps enough has been said to show that there is a very close connection between brain-changes and memory.

Much light may be thrown on the interrelations of mind and brain by the study of abnormal conditions. Various poisons, such as alcohol, opium, chloroform, or the blood of fevers, have profound effects upon the mind. All these substances stimulate the automatic at the expense of the volitional powers, calling up all sorts of memories and associations, or fantastic images, but destroying the power of directing the thoughts or of fixing the attention.

To sum up the *psychical* function of the cerebrum, it seems that we are justified in saying that the contents of our consciousness, of sense-perception, association, and memory, are very largely given us by its agency. It is the link that binds us to the external world, by means of which all our knowledge of that world, present and past, is obtained.

But has anything in our investigation given us a clue to the origin and meaning of consciousness? It must be admitted that nothing whatever has done so. Consciousness is an ultimate fact beyond which we cannot go, and all attempts to explain the transition from the unconscious to consciousness are merely clever tricks to evade the real question. The materialistic hypothesis regards the soul as a function of organized matter, the result of vibrating molecules, in the same sense that heat is a product of such vibrations. But this is entirely untenable. The step from vibrating molecules to thought and feeling is an impossible one, and that unconscious atoms should become conscious by agglomeration into complex molecules is simply unthinkable. To avoid this difficulty some materialists have changed their standpoint and maintained that sensation is a fundamental quality of matter, a view that in its last analysis comes dangerously near to dualism.

Our immediate knowledge is that of consciousness; consciousness is the fact, matter the inference. To use Wundt's words: "Besides the imminent necessity of changing its stand-

point, the theoretical untenableness of materialism betrays itself in the complete incapability of explaining the continuity of internal experience which it has shown. Tho the psychological systems may be very defective which have been produced by other theories of the universe, still it is only materialism which has barred its own way to a scientific treatment of internal experience. This miscarriage arises from the vicious error in the theory of perception which materialism commits at the first step towards the erection of its structure. It misapprehends the fact that priority over all external experience belongs to internal experience; that the objects of the outer world are presentations which have developed themselves within us according to psychological laws, and that above all the concept of matter is a purely hypothetical one which we lay at the foundation of the phenomena of the external world in order to make its changing play intelligible to us."

But it would not be candid to leave the impression that Wundt accepted either the dualistic or idealistic hypotheses, both of which he declares to be untenable. He proposes a theory of his own, which, however, is only provisional and does not pretend to give us the reality of things, of which we know nothing at all. This hypothesis consists in "so widening the concept of substance that it will include the psychical expressions of life in these complicated substance-complexes." This substance is the "bearer of the elementary psychical phenomenon, tendency (Trieb)." This elementary psychical tendency is present in each atom, but in order for this to have a psychological bearing there must be an internal (*i.e.*, subjective) connection, because the psychical element in each atom is an unconscious one. The association of these atoms into complex organic molecules, whose equilibrium is in a constant state of disturbance and restoration, gives this connection of psychical states which is the necessary condition of a consciousness.

But it is difficult to see how this ingenious theory which the limitations of space compel me to state so meagrely advances us any nearer to an intelligent view of the subject. The real difficulty is evaded as to how the association of unconscious elements can give a consciousness, for this does not consist in the necessary preconditions of it. Is the psychical element some-

thing essentially different from the material atom that carries it? If so, we have dualism, the difficulties of which are in no wise diminished by a subdivision into atoms. If not, we have either materialism or idealism, certainly nothing new. The distinction between this theory of Wundt and that of Spinoza, which he refutes, is very slight, and the objections to one apply equally to the other.

It seems, therefore, that our science has brought us little nearer to the solution of the main problem, and it may even be doubted whether it ever can do so. But those who believe that the underlying cause of the universe is Conscious Thought have at least a standpoint which makes an intelligible answer to this great question possible.

WILLIAM B. SCOTT.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN FRANCE AFTER THE DEATH OF GAMBETTA.

IT was natural that the death of the most eminent statesman of the Third Republic should exercise a great influence on the political situation in France at the present time, not only because the new régime has just lost its representative man and its most illustrious servant, but also because we are anxious to answer the grave question how its political heritage may be guarded and how his policy may be carried out.

Everything was written about Gambetta on the very day after he died: therefore I shall content myself with sketching hastily his varied career, which, beginning in the ranks of the lower bourgeoisie, ended at the summit of glory and political fame. To properly estimate the far-reaching consequences of his death we must thoroughly know what the man really was. Having had an intimate knowledge of him as his fellow-member in the National Assembly, I can speak with experience. I shall lay particular stress upon his political views, and especially upon what may be called his policy, inquiring how far the French democracy may be disposed to adopt it and how much they are inclined to reject.

I.

The ascendancy which Gambetta exercised over his generation dates from his youth, when he was a poor law-student at Paris, where he dazzled his fellow-students by his brilliant eloquence, keen wit, and generous ideas. With no other rostrum than a table in some café, surrounded by a crowd of smokers, he revealed himself a great orator. Even then he had enthusiastic followers who already predicted his great future. Circumstances, too, were favorable for the development of his great

powers. All the generous part of the French youth who were not striving for the advancement of self-interest had sworn a mortal hatred against the Second Empire and passionately longed to re-establish public liberty.

In spite of appearances, the government of Napoleon III. was not sufficiently strong to restrain the overwhelming tide of liberalism, of which such orators as Jules Favre were the mouth-piece in the National Assembly. A despotism which is more irritating than powerful can only excite without allaying opposition. In his energetic protestation against the Napoleonic Cæsarism, Gambetta was the true representative and the inspired leader of his generation. But before one can step upon the scene of the great theatre of contemporary history an opportunity is necessary. This presented itself suddenly with the famous Baudin case in 1868.

Baudin was a representative of the people who had taken arms on the 2d of December, 1851, against the army of the *coup d'état*, and who died heroically fighting behind a barricade. In 1868 a demonstration was made at his grave in one of the cemeteries of Paris. Shortly after, those who had instigated or justified it in the press were indicted. It was for this reason that the famous Delescluze, who was to perish so sadly in the Commune, came to be seated on the criminal's bench. Gambetta was his advocate. In reality it was the trial of the *coup d'état* of the Empire. On that occasion the young advocate, unknown the day before outside a circle of intimate friends, entered at a bound into fame. Gambetta's speech of the 14th of November, 1868, is perfect of its kind; and what, in my mind, constitutes its extraordinary power was the boldness of the orator. The moment had now come when it was possible to publicly attack the Empire at its principles and at its source. What had hitherto been hinted or whispered could now resound through all Paris before the magistrates of the Empire, who sat pale with wrath and furious at their powerlessness.

This speech of November 14th, 1868, was the public conscience coming out of the darkness and rendering its verdict without extenuating circumstances, amid the frantic applause of an entire people, proclaiming to the Empire that it had not power to punish what it dared to call a crime. Public rejoicing

proved that all liberal France was with the orator, who henceforth became one of her leaders. This speech was not only an event, it was an advent: for we can say that it was the first exposure of the causes of the coming downfall of the Empire; and was universally considered as such by the country. From that day Gambetta became the incarnation of the republican ideas; and this was the first cause of his prestige. Hence I have deemed it necessary to lay stress upon his entrance into public life.

I now come to a second and greater cause of his influence, which consisted in his personifying the patriotism of France during the terrible crisis of 1870. Gambetta had already become the leader of the patriots in the legislative corps of the Empire after his election in 1869; and as soon as our first disasters were known, he was zealously foremost in urging the equipment of the National Guard, in peremptorily demanding the formation of a committee of defence, and in pursuing the government with cutting questions about the events of the war which they were concealing. Finding patriotic accents corresponding to the growing gravity of the situation, he uttered in the session of August 13th these significant words: "We must know if we have here made our choice between the safety of our country and the safety of a dynasty."

To the plausible declarations of one of the ministry which were working to destroy the country, the orator exclaimed, "It is my opinion that we have been silent long enough—for too long a time has a veil been thrown over events which now hasten to destroy us; and in my inmost heart I feel that this country, without being conscious of it, is rolling toward the edge of a yawning abyss." In thundering accents he closed the mouths of those hirelings who tried to declare that the dangers in the situation existed solely in his imagination. "As for you, who never had anything but complacency, the worth of which you can to-day measure, hold your peace! You have now but one attitude which will become you, that is Silence and Remorse."

It seems to be France herself whose avenging voice is heard in these few thrilling words, which yet tell all.

We know under what tragic circumstances Gambetta took office when the Second Empire was broken, after the defeat of

Sedan and the Prussian invasion. Nothing can describe the disorganized state of the country. It had but one army, which Bazaine traitorously kept back in Metz, in pursuance of his own personal political views, and which he shortly surrendered to the enemy. Paris organized to defend her own ramparts—she could do nothing more. To represent the government in the provinces there were only two honest but weak and old men, MM. Glais Bézoïn and Cremieux. Nothing could check the invasion unless something new and unheard-of should happen. But something new fortunately did happen, and that was Gambetta's arrival at Tours. I shall never forget that October day when I saw him enter the balloon in the hopes of reaching the field of action. For more than a whole month Paris had been entirely shut in by the Prussian cannon thundering at her gates. To leave the city it was necessary to surmount this wall of iron and fire. I still see Gambetta as he stepped into the balloon with an expression of indomitable heroism stamped upon his face. As the balloon floated upward we all felt that it bore the last hope of France; and with painful anxiety we gazed at it until it was beyond the reach of the Prussian bullets. It is easy to understand our relief when we learned from a dispatch brought back by a carrier-pigeon that Gambetta had arrived safely at Tours. It all seems but yesterday!

Henceforth everything was changed. Gambetta lost no time before issuing to the French provinces, still free to act, a stirring proclamation, whereby he called upon all the troops of the country to repel the invasion step by step. Becoming virtually Dictator, he at once did everything to relieve and organize the forces that gathered there, aided in his task by a few workers as energetic as himself, of whom I might mention M. de Freycinet, the future Minister of the Republic. The army of the Loire was first reorganized, and under the leadership of the illustrious Chanzy, who died a few days after Gambetta, it succeeded in checking for two months the Prussian army. In the north, General Faidherbe was succeeding in doing excellent service with his hastily collected troops.

Finally, the great eastern expedition to turn the German army was organized with the greatest dispatch. It is true, success did not crown these heroic efforts, since this was impossible

after Bazaine's surrender of Metz and his gallant army; for there the old framework had broken as under the walls of Sedan. The government of national defence had only young, ill-disciplined troops to oppose to the best military organization of Europe.

Far be it from me to regret this terrible and bloody effort of France under Gambetta's guidance. Honor is of more importance than success, and honor would have been seriously compromised if France had not struggled with the last broken bit of a sword-hilt to guard her soil and to defend her sons and daughters who were about to be torn from her by the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. It is true that during his dictatorship Gambetta made many mistakes; that at Tours he was too willing to dictate to the generals placed by him in command, quarrelling with them at the first check and imposing his plans upon them, making them feel oftentimes too rudely the weight of his authority. His gravest mistake, however, was his proclaiming an electoral law which forbade the candidature of all the old supporters of the Empire. This measure was passed at the first session of the convocation of the National Assembly, and was repealed by the members of the government left in Paris; thus menacing the Republic with a grave danger.

To judge this justly we must go back to the time when it was passed. Gambetta still thought that the war could be prolonged, and could not bring himself to yield. Yet, as he possessed true patriotic grief, his errors were pardoned by the whole-souled portion of our nation; and in spite of the burning and implacable hatred of which he was the object during this four months' dictatorship, he became in the eye of his country the personification of the national defence, the Leonidas of our Thermopylæ. Nothing contributed more to make him the most powerful man of the Republic of 1871, and after the defeat of M. Thiers, on the 15th of May, 1872, he became the most able in the National Assembly.

What I shall now lay particular stress upon will be his wonderful ability for statesmanship, for at first sight it would not seem to be in keeping with the vivacity of his character, and yet by it he became truly the second founder of the Republic. His victory in the Assembly was first begun by a victory over

self, when he freely sacrificed everything in his chosen policy that could not at once be realized.

This former policy of Gambetta's was one of radical republicanism, and contemplated the concentration of all authority in a single house of assembly capable at its pleasure of making and defeating the government, but also capable of crushing the liberty of individuals in its powerful machinery, as was done in the convention of 1793. It was apparent to the eye of the statesman that such a policy must be given up, since with it the republican party could never hope to obtain a majority in the National Assembly, as the existing majority would only perpetuate itself. He feared also lest the country even after defeating monarchical schemes, becoming wearied by the struggle, might fall an easy prey to some military dictatorship, since one Bonapartist conspiracy had already appeared.

In order to profit by the disorganization of the royalist majority it was necessary to unite at once with the moderate republicans in forming one compact group capable of choosing a republican constitution and willing to bring about the dissolution of the National Assembly. If Gambetta had been merely a demagogue, or even a democratic idealist like Louis Blanc and Edgar Quinet, he would have continued to refuse all constitutional power to the Assembly, and by such a course he would only have succeeded in making it perpetual, to the lasting benefit of some future Bonaparte. His particular merit consisted in his seizing the exact opportunity for working a sudden change of front without hesitation, in his recognizing at once an inherent right in the Assembly to establish a constitution, and then in his submitting to the necessity of the establishment of a parliamentary republic possessing two legislative chambers and a president having executive power. But what was far more difficult was to persuade his own party to make the same sacrifice. To achieve this he had to work with new weapons—persuasion and diplomacy. Heretofore the thunderbolts of indignant eloquence had accomplished all. Only the few who attended the secret sessions of the republican party know of the prodigious work done by Gambetta apart from his public duties to accomplish this end. It was in this that he showed himself a consummate statesman; for it is due to his influence with that

of M. Thiers' followers that the constitution was passed in 1875 by an Assembly which four years before had belonged to the royalists. On May 16th, 1877, when Marshal MacMahon vigorously began his policy of reaction by dismissing the Chamber, he was resisted by Gambetta with an admirable combination of prudence and force. At once it became necessary both to restrain and to excite the people: to restrain them, lest a street war might furnish to the conspirators of May 16th an opportunity to obtain the easiest of all victories—one by force; and yet to excite them so that they might hold their own unmoved by the arguments of corruption or violence.

During the period which followed the defeat of the attempt of May 16th, Gambetta was invested with the great influence of a moral dictator; and this the downfall of his Ministry, to which we shall presently refer, weakened but for a moment. The cause of his influence is found in his personality. His physique indicated force. His grandly moulded features, his forehead shadowed by heavy locks, his flashing eye, and his easy and forcible gestures, all combined to make him the most popular and skilful of orators. If he was passionate, he had no bitterness; for he possessed in the highest degree that rarest of gifts, good-humor which smooths even relations with adversaries. He threw himself with the heartiest enthusiasm into everything. His powers of assimilation were prodigious,—finance, foreign relations, and especially military organization, each in turn he mastered without skipping even the slightest details. To know Gambetta at his best one should have seen him at some great crisis in the Assembly, where he walked as a lion, and where after some burst of his magnetic eloquence, when the powerful voice had drowned all tumults, one longed to cry with Shakespeare, "Well roared!" While logically developing some chain of argument, he could pause in his speech to reply in a sparkling sally of wit to some interruption, and then picking up the thread could resume as if there had been no interruption. At the commencement of a speech Gambetta labored, but when once aroused his eloquence became irresistible. I distinctly remember one day when he had descended from the tribune, pale and trembling from the effects of his oratory, I said to him, "Permit me to congratulate the great orator and the great patriot." "Thanks for the

patriot," said he; "as for the orator, that is of little consequence."

To Gambetta twice or thrice in the days that cannot be forgotten there came the honor of causing the very soul of France to speak, and this is why she, in the person of her young and most fitting representatives, followed him to the grave with the wonderful funeral ceremonies of January 6th.

II.

It is easy to understand, after this rapid sketch of the personality of Gambetta, how the sudden removal of such a power has thrown matters into a state of disorder.

The monarchical parties, always in a state of irreconcilable opposition, have not failed to profit by the occasion. In addition to this, the ridiculous manifesto of Prince Napoleon openly demanding a plébiscite in favor of his dynasty adds to the confusion, for it has tempted the Chamber of Deputies to extreme and unjust measures that would have ended solely in the profit of the Extreme Left. I refer to the proscription of all the families who have formerly reigned over France. But, thanks to the firmness and wisdom of the Senate, this disastrous measure has been defeated. Those indeed were days full of uncertainty, when the government of the Republic seemed floating no one knew whither. Altho no pretender could offer himself with the least chance of success, still the situation could only be prolonged with peril.

The country cannot forget that the chief claim the Bonapartists can offer for public notice is the mutilation of our soil caused by their brutal folly in 1870.

It is vain for the legitimists to wave frantically their white flag: that flag in reality is their shroud, as it represents to the great mass of the French people a dead past, hateful with monarchical and clerical despotism.

The Orleanists are impossible in a country of universal suffrage, whose great tides would soon destroy the delicate machinery of constitutional liberty.

It is clear beyond a doubt that the danger to existing institutions will come from another direction, from the depths of

demagogism violently agitated by social convulsions. Shortly after Prince Napoleon's manifesto the anarchists made their demonstration in an absurd street parade which ended in the imprisonment of that Madonna of the Communards, the notorious Louise Michel. This perhaps was a mistake, as she no longer carried weight with her audiences, since nothing is more monotonous than extreme violence when wedded to powerlessness of action. I do not think that the anarchists at present are a very serious menace to France, as they are to the other countries of Europe where monarchical rule has not yet been overthrown, and where petroleum and dynamite are words of peculiar meaning.

This senseless party, which in a desire to suppress all political institutions wishes to sweep away all former moulds of society, cannot win over our masses to the belief that the argument of the ballot-box had better be replaced by murder and arson. Beyond a certain disorder consequent upon the death of Gambetta I do not see any immediate danger to the Republic, and this disorder has ceased even more rapidly than could have been expected, thanks to a new Ministry of real talent, composed for the most part of old friends of Gambetta, with Jules Favre at their head. Yet after carefully scrutinizing the signs of the times we cannot hide the gravity of the situation, for the danger does not come from the enemies of the republican party but from the republican party itself, owing to its want of political spirit, to its proneness to become divided, and to its attitude towards some of the gravest questions of home politics. On this account the death of Gambetta is a true misfortune. By his death the question of the cohesion of the party is rendered especially difficult; for even while he was living the republican majority showed itself capricious, incapable of logical sequence in formulating its policy, and always as ready to break a Ministry as a child is to break a toy, solely because it is tired of it. Gambetta knew this incoherency, and justly attributed it in a great measure to the present method of election, which makes each deputy to be elected by his district instead of the department making one single list. It is due to this system of *scrutin d'arrondissement* (voting by district or ward) that we have now the misfortune of seeing local interests prevail over general

ones, and that we are now unable to form a majority founded on some principle for a government majority. It was for having presented to a Chamber just elected the substitution of *scrutin de liste* in place of *scrutin d'arrondissement*, and thereby threatening its dissolution, that Gambetta was overthrown in January, 1881. Yet, unless we wish to see shortly parliamentary anarchy and the success of the radical party with men like Clémenceau at its head, it will be necessary to adopt this very reform.

Radicalism became the declared adversary of Gambetta, particularly on the two essential points which I have mentioned in characterizing his policy, especially in its repudiation of his spirit of prudence, of the farsighted wisdom which weighs circumstances and the possibilities of realizing reforms, branding this with the name of "time-serving." If radicalism should now succeed, it would certainly cast aside the safeguards of the Republic, beginning with the Presidency and the Senate, and would inevitably subject the state to the dangers of a probable anarchy. Already these perilous reforms figure conspicuously in the policy of revision which it has submitted thus far without much success.

The radical party differs still more from Gambetta on another point, and that is on the tone of our foreign policy. And while I am far from supposing that the radicals would be wanting in patriotism if it became necessary to defend our soil, yet I think, in view of our position, they underestimate our prestige and are too much disposed to reduce the army to a state of dangerous inefficiency. This open neglect of the interest of France beyond our borders, which we cannot help blaming severely, became especially manifest in the late Egyptian affair, about which Gambetta made his last speech in July, 1882. It is evident that the radicals have obtained great opportunities by Gambetta's death, and these they will use sooner or later. Already the lack of cohesion in the government majority due to the *scrutin d'arrondissement* has permitted the radicals to obtain by surprise serious advantages in the Chamber of Deputies.

To the *scrutin d'arrondissement* we must also justly attribute the present serious state of our finances, consequent upon a foolish extravagance in building unnecessary lines of railroad

throughout the country, as our present system of local elections is the cause of this widespread local expenditure. There is need of severe economy in our finances in order that the Republic may be brought to a sound state.

The most difficult and dangerous problem for our French democracy to solve is that of the relations between church and state; this everything has tended to aggravate. Our greatest misfortune is that the national religion has always been hostile to the development of our liberties, and, in our day, that this very opposition, after the complete triumph of ultramontanism, has become an open war and has promptly passed into the domain of politics. Ultramontanism abused the chance majority that it obtained in the National Assembly to guarantee to the Roman Church the most unjust privileges, even while she was fighting as far as possible the establishment of the republican government. It was ultramontanism also that menaced the country on the 16th of May, when we saw the clergy throw themselves heart and soul into a contest that threatened a *coup d'état*. For such reasons the republican party cherishes a profound distrust of Catholicism, and in view of these Gambetta formulated that celebrated opinion, "Clericalism—that is the enemy!" It was owing to these causes that the triumphant Republic has now her *Kulturkampf*, which she is determined to carry out.

But to be just, it is necessary to distinguish between a policy instituted by a government to accomplish real reforms and a mere policy of strife which so frequently ends in persecution.

Among the reforms proposed by the government the one most in accordance with true principles is the secularization of the public schools, for as these are supported by the government they cannot have a confessional character without injuring the rights of the minority. Prior legislation, being strongly favorable to Catholicism, gave to the church great powers, the result of which was that children belonging to other creeds and opinions were often influenced to adopt her tenets. Therefore the Republic has done wisely in making the primary public schools neutral in principle, in spite of the passionate outcries of the clergy. But for the new law to work justly it is necessary that this neutrality should be preserved. It is certain that

under the influence of the town councillors of the great cities we are now finding a tendency to favor an irreligious spirit, especially in the introduction of text-books on morals virulently hostile to Catholicism and even to religion.

In Paris we have seen city councillors called to preside, at the primary schools, over the distribution of prizes which openly profess atheism. While these excesses are rare, and while we cannot deny that these manuals excited a strong opposition among the higher clergy who condemned them, yet it is true that a wrong was done in publishing the decree rendered against them by the Congregation of the Index, for it was contrary to the Concordat. These judgments have been entered in the Council of State against many bishops, threatening them with the loss of their revenue, and this treatment has already applied to quite a number of ordinary priests. For these reasons the situation between the government and the Catholic Church is very much strained; and what is the gravest factor in the present conflict is the manner in which the republican majority understands and wishes to apply the Concordat. Altho this famous treaty of peace entered into by Napoleon I. and the papacy has only bred quarrels and animosities, yet hitherto no French government has manifested a desire to deduce from it a means of ruling the church. Gambetta has contributed much to commit the republican party to this dangerous policy. At the commencement of his political career, like all his friends, he was a firm believer in the separation of church and state, but after he took office he became the declared adversary of this policy, and hoped to find in the Concordat itself the best means of subjugating the church. One of his best friends, M. Paul Bert, for a time Minister of Public Worship, has prepared a project supplementing the Concordat, and which has every chance of being passed by the Assembly. The first effect of this would be to establish a system of penalties against the clergy which would rudely menace their religious liberties.

Thus we have entered fully into the *Kulturkampf*, and we know by the example of Prussia that it will end only in the powerlessness of the state and the exasperation of the church. The separation of the two powers is advocated by the radical party, but it desires to realize this at once without allowing any

just compensation: it has decided to destroy the liberty of the church by cutting down her revenue. It looks as if they were formally presenting her with her liberty after having cut her wings. Without doubt there are manifold reasons for decreasing the privileges of the church, for abolishing every distinction in the cemeteries, for doing away with the religious oaths, and for making Catholicism subject to the common law; but to strike, as has been done, with the proscription of the congregations, not content to interdict proprietorship by mortmain, is to refuse the common right of association, and is a blow at the regular clergy. This is nothing less than a stab at liberty and a preparation for the most dangerous opposition.

We would be only too willing to see the héritage of Gambetta set aside as far as it concerns the *Kulturkampf*. As I have already said, this hatred for religion—too general in the republican party—depends for the most part on the illiberal form which ultramontanism has taken in France. But this is certainly no good reason for attacking the right of conscience even in the person of her worst enemy. To attempt to avenge liberty by oppressing her is, to say the least, a strange method of procedure.

The misconception which places liberty and religion in an irreconcilable opposition is France's greatest misfortune and the source of her chief danger. This became strikingly manifest in the patriotic outburst at Gambetta's grave, where in the distinctively civil ceremonies God was never once recognized, and no word was spoken of an eternal life. It is to destroy this misconception that men of faith, who are at the same time men of liberty, ought to work with all their energy. It will be the greatest service that they can render to their country and to liberty.

EDMOND DE PRESSENSÉ.

A COLLEGE FETICH.¹

THE traditional and occasionally oppressive decorum of the Commencement exercises at Harvard College has now and then been diversified by a sensational incident. The last festive occasion was distinguished by two events of the kind. The first was the somewhat embarrassing relations into which the university was brought with the chief magistrate of the ancient and honorable commonwealth of Massachusetts. The second was the decidedly revolutionary assault which was made upon the classical traditions of the college by a gentleman of an honored name and well-earned reputation and of no inconsiderable tho peculiar, personal and public influence. From the awkwardness of the first predicament both parties were happily extricated by the admirable tact which was displayed on both sides. Whether the interests of the college and of the higher education will gain or lose by the latter must be determined by the arbitrament of time. The assault upon the classical traditions of a century and a half is not significant alone from the energy with which it was urged or the high authority by which it was enforced. It is well understood that it represents the opinions of not a few eminent educators, and that the chief proposition which it embodies had many years ago been somewhat hesitatingly urged by the adventurous and sanguine President of Harvard College. We say, the proposition which it makes. We correct ourselves: we ought rather to say, the most prominent of several propositions which are directly or indirectly suggested and upon which Mr. Adams bestows the chief stress

¹ A COLLEGE FETICH: An Address delivered before the Harvard Chapter of the Fraternity of the Phi Beta Kappa, in Sanders's Theatre, Cambridge, June 28, 1883. By Charles Francis Adams, Jr.

of his varied and multiform argument ; viz., the formal abandonment of the study of Greek as a condition for admission to college of all candidates for the degree of Bachelor of Arts. Students are already admitted to many colleges without any knowledge of Greek, as to Harvard College and Cornell and Michigan Universities, and even to Yale College—to the first as irregular or special students with no expectation of a degree of any kind ; to Cornell and Michigan Universities as candidates for special degrees, but not in arts ; and to Yale College as members of the Sheffield Scientific School and candidates for the degree of Bachelor of Science. Had Mr. Adams acquainted himself as thoroughly with the constitution of the manifold and multiform so-called colleges and universities in this country as he has mastered the merits and defects of the working of our railway systems, he would have noticed that the very arrangement for which he contends has already been introduced into several highly respectable and numerous attended colleges and universities, with one difference, viz., that a knowledge of Greek, as yet, is universally retained as a condition of the degree of Bachelor of Arts. Possibly, had he been disciplined by such a training in German in place of Greek and in French instead of Latin as he contends would have fitted him for a more successful discharge of the special functions of modern life to which he has been called, he would not have fallen into this inadvertence.

We call attention to this as the real and single question which is at issue, for the reason that Mr. Adams's position in respect to it is the one single position which he maintains with any considerable tenacity or consistency from the beginning to the end of his discourse. In respect to the many other questions which he raises and with regard to which he expresses many shrewd altho often inconsistent but always pronounced and dogmatical opinions, different readers may agree or disagree with him, and yet dissent most positively from his main position in respect to the study of Greek as an essential element in a classical education. These rambling and not always coherent remarks in respect to secondary topics are often shrewdly and forcibly put. They are generally bright and amusing, furnishing ample and stimulating food for thought even when they produce no conviction, or exciting the critic to interpose his caveat

or correction more frequently than the patience of ordinary readers would endure. The simplicity, the piquancy, the plausibility, and the essential one-sidedness and superficiality of many of these half true and wholly true remarks impart to the discourse more than usual interest; while the occasion on which it was uttered, the authority of the speaker, and the sympathetic favor with which it was received invest the discourse itself with an importance to which otherwise it would not be entitled.

Our readers will have inferred that the writer does not accept the position of Mr. Adams, that Greek should not be required in a classical education, much less that the attachment to Greek is a blind and superstitious devotion to a fetich, as Mr. Adams bravely but with a somewhat ambitious Quixotism affirms. We do not, however, affirm that the place of Greek in a classical curriculum or a liberal education is beyond discussion or dispute. There are not a few eminent educators, who are also eminent scholars and teachers of Greek, who hold with Mr. Adams that for various reasons Greek should be abandoned as a study invariably required, and should be relegated to the class of special or elective studies, while Latin is retained as one of the studies required for the Bachelor's degree. It is in view of these facts and of the general unsettledness of the public mind in regard to this question that we offer a few critical remarks upon the discourse of Mr. Adams, not confining ourselves to the discussion of the central question which we have indicated, but taking the liberty to comment upon a few of the many lively remarks which make this discourse so unique and so interesting. We make no apology because we need none for speaking freely of any position in a critical essay which is characterized by such untrammelled tho brilliant liberty of speech.

We propose to follow the order of topics discussed by the author so far as our own estimate of the importance of the principles concerned and the weight or weakness of the author's arguments will allow.

Mr. Adams commences by what seems an ungracious and unfilial reference to his own college life, which he represents as having been pleasant as a pastime indeed, but mainly misspent and unprofitable as a training for his future life, and especially for

this life in its modern peculiarities. While he acknowledges that he learned some useful lessons, he declares that "as a training-place for youth, to enable them to engage to advantage in the actual struggle of life—to fit them to hold their own in it and to carry off its prizes—I must in all honesty say that, looking back through the years and recalling the requirements and methods of the ancient institution, I am unable to speak of it with all the respect which I could wish. Such training as I got useful for the struggle, I got after instead of before graduation, and it came hard; while I never have been able—and, no matter how long I may live, I never shall be able—to overcome some great disadvantages which the superstitious and wrong theories and worse practices of my Alma Mater inflicted upon me." We cannot doubt that Mr. Adams was honest in the convictions which he expressed, but we cannot conceal our surprise at two or three striking omissions in the theory and logic of the argument into which this severe accusation is subsequently expanded.

First of all, we are surprised that Mr. Adams has nowhere adverted to the possibility that a system of education may be the most perfectly adapted to subsequent success in life—and even to success in modern life, with all its peculiarities—and yet fail of the best results by reason of indolence or want of enthusiasm or stupidity or perverseness on the part of the student. So far as we are informed we do not learn that the students have always been diligent and enthusiastic and successful in those colleges and departments of colleges in which Mr. Adams's favorite curriculum has been actually adopted and thoroughly tried for at least half a score of years, i.e., in which Latin has been made the "fundamental" or disciplinary ancient tongue, and German has taken the place of Greek, and Anglo-Saxon and English and French have been made prominent with the promise or expectation of meeting the peculiarities of modern life. So far as we are informed or can judge there are as many students under these supposed favorable circumstances who fail to achieve eminent success as under the old system—i.e., as many students who might have occasion with our confident critic to complain of the failure of their college career. Mr. Adams seems to forget that at least *three* solutions may be given for the apparent failure of his own college life, of which he has recognized but one. *First*, the failure was only

apparent but not real, or not to the extent which he imagines. He derived more advantage than he is now aware of even from the Greek, of which he says, "I have now forgotten the Greek alphabet, and I cannot read all the Greek characters if I open my Homer." There are many students who have forgotten much of their Greek and Latin and more of their mathematics and science, with all the adaptation of the last two to modern life, who have reaped from them the largest harvests of intellectual power. *Second*, the curriculum may have been wisely selected and the teaching may have been imperfect. If "a limp superficiality" characterized the teaching at Harvard College in Mr. Adams's time, it will also account, in part at least, for the failure of his college life. We do not believe this to have been true. We prefer to believe that Mr. Adams was mistaken. *Third*, the student may neglect and render futile the most wisely selected curriculum, even when enforced by the most skilful and zealous teaching. The last supposition is not only possible, but in many cases it is confessed to have been true by students themselves when they look back upon the manifold opportunities of their college life. It is sad, but it is true, that more than half the members of every college class will acknowledge that they have failed to make the most efficient use of the opportunities of college life. The reasons why are manifold, but the fact cannot be questioned that very many earnest and conscientious students fail to use the energy, the perseverance, and the zeal which every severe college curriculum must suppose and which it is fitted to reward with the highest satisfaction. Very many well-meaning youth are misled by the exuberance of intellectual power, the variety of their tastes, the confidence of youthful ambition, the fascination of special activities, or the illusions of a false theory of culture and of life, to say nothing of the many whom indolence and passion and procrastination cheat out of the golden days which self-discipline and self-control can alone turn to the noblest uses. We know nothing of Mr. Adams's college life, but we are not forced to choose between the horns of the dilemma which he proposes, that either the curriculum at Harvard was well selected and well administered or Mr. Adams would not have concluded that he derived from it scant advantages. We amend the dilemma by asserting that possibly

he did derive a very great advantage from it, or if he did not, that the curriculum was possibly not in fault, but Mr. Adams himself.

We are gratified to observe that Mr. Adams does not definitely favor the so-called New Education so far as it proscribes disciplinary studies, and by no means would approve the introduction of the elective system on the grand scale in which it is allowed at Harvard. He insists positively that a few "fundamental" studies are the condition and basis of a sound culture. He does indeed emphasize most earnestly the peculiarities of modern life as requiring a special preparation, but he accepts and repeats the golden truth that one study well mastered is better than a score only half learned. But he is possessed with the fancy that German and English can be made to serve as fundamentals more effectively than Latin and Greek; that is, can be made the medium of needed discipline more perfectly because they can be more thoroughly learned than Greek, while the influence of their modern realism and their affinities with modern thought and modern science will of themselves incite to thoroughness and zeal and success:—in other words, that were Greek and possibly Latin omitted as essentials in the college curriculum, and did German and French take their place, the course of study would be more efficient for its disciplinary value and be unspeakably more useful by reason of its closer practical affinities with modern science and modern life. To think otherwise in his view is stupid and superstitious; but so inveterate is this superstition among college men that Mr. Adams has little hope that it will easily be abandoned, and therefore he assumes the attitude of a Hebrew prophet and uses his well-known powers of irony and invective to arouse the university men of the country from their fetich-worship of the Greek language and to reconstruct their academic and university systems after the inspiration of modern ideas. What such an academic education might be when thoroughly modernized he sketches in an attractive delineation, altho it reminds us somewhat of the advertisement of a cheap boarding-school in which the public are informed that French and German are the only languages "spoken in the establishment."

Before we discuss the question as to the soundness and prac-

ticability of this theory of university studies, we may be allowed to say a word in respect to the testimony which Mr. Adams gives of his own experience of the workings and the value of the classical and collegiate curriculum, and as a preparation for professional and even for business life. The question is interesting and important how far this testimony would be confirmed by that of the majority of professional and business men who have been educated at the American colleges. We are perfectly well aware that the remembrances of the severity of the drill and the constant and unrelenting pressure of the exactions are painfully felt by not a few college graduates, and that many look back with shivering associations to the want of intellectual interest and of personal enthusiasm for the studies which were rigidly imposed. Sometimes, and not unjustly, college and university teachers are blamed for the want of personal interest in and sympathy with their pupils, not infrequently for their want of skill and fidelity in bringing the subject-matter of their teaching within their ready apprehension. But whether or not the teaching was in fault, the conviction is generally confessed that the pupil himself was usually more in fault than either the curriculum or the instructor, and that had the pupil only exercised a reasonable faith in those wiser than himself and achieved a moderate fulfilment of his better resolutions, he would have reaped an invaluable harvest from his neglected opportunities. At the same time it is also confessed that even an enforced and reluctant attention and constrained study have left invaluable impressions upon his character and his life. It is also to be observed that what are called modern studies, whether mathematical or linguistic, scientific or political, make up very largely the curriculum in all our colleges. The pure and applied mathematics and physics also have close and intimate relations to modern life—even to railway management; other sciences are intimately connected with politics and government, with law, medicine, and theology; while the modern languages are distinctly recognized as essential conditions of professional and business success, or accomplishments of gentlemanly culture. While it is observed that in some of these studies a more intelligent interest is awakened as the mind becomes mature and the responsibilities of life are anticipated, it is not observed that in

these boyish years the mathematics or physics or German or French are more diligently and enthusiastically pursued because of their apprehended relations to the modern life for which the boy has as yet but infrequent thoughts and slender cares. In short, all experience with college students and college graduates establishes the conclusion that intellectual training must to a large extent be directed by the judgment that anticipates the result from its own instructed experience and be accepted by the faith of those who trust the judgment of others. In other words, education in the "fundamentals" cannot be tested by the direct impression which it makes on the pupil, especially in his passing experience, nor always by his reflective judgment of the advantages which he has consciously reaped from his studies as he makes them, but rather from the conclusions which he forms of their value when he reviews his course from the standpoint of reflective experience. It is true that now and then a good student who has made the most of his college curriculum, under the ardent desire that he were the master of the German or French or chemistry or physics, which he has immediate occasion to use, will express his impatient regret that the time spent on Latin or Greek or the pure mathematics or philosophy had been bestowed upon the special study which he could just at the present moment turn to some practical account. Sometimes he condemns the whole college system as seriously defective because it did not anticipate his present wants and make him a specialist rather than seek to train him to the capacity to become a specialist when necessity should require it. Such college students reason about as unreasonably as does Mr. Adams when he intimates, or rather his logic requires him to assert, that Harvard College ought to have furnished him with a riding-school in order to fit him for his profession as a cavalry officer, or trained him in a machine-shop and a chemical laboratory in order to qualify him to be a Railway Commissioner, even tho neither Harvard College nor Mr. Adams could foresee that he was to be either. We know very well that Mr. Adams is too much of a man to say or even to think any such nonsense as this, especially when he expresses himself as orthodoxly as a Scotch Calvinist in respect to the necessity of "the fundamentals." And yet his logic in respect to the

adaptation of a college education to modern life, if it has any force, would require these extreme conclusions.

But granting that those college graduates are somewhat numerous who would give the same testimony as Mr. Adams in respect to the want of adaptation of college teaching and college study to their own subsequent necessities, we affirm that the number is far greater, and the testimony is far more weighty, of those who are ready to declare that the college course as it has been administered for the last fifty years has proved to themselves an admirable preparation for a great variety of professional and practical careers. We believe we may say that scarcely a man can be found who has mastered the college course with his best energies and has been endowed with a moderate share of practical common-sense who would not be forward to assert that his college studies have proved all that he could expect and the best which he could desire for his subsequent success in practical life. We well recollect hearing a lawyer of the highest eminence in New York City, towards the close of his very successful career at the bar, give his testimony several years since in an assembly of college graduates at the Commencement festivities of his Alma Mater, somewhat as follows: 'Very early in my practice I found myself committed to a case which related to some patent machinery. I had never before been familiar with machinery of any kind, and the little that I learned in college upon such subjects was of the least possible service. But I had been trained by the discipline of the college to apply my mind with discrimination and continuity to every question which I encountered till I had mastered it, and I found little difficulty in mastering this my first case in machinery, and still less in every one which followed. My capacity to meet and master the new subjects which I have encountered in succession in my long professional life was acquired by the discipline of my college life.' One of the most, if not the most, eminent fathers of modern physics was once asked by what process he was able to achieve his wondrous discoveries of the secrets of nature; and he replied, *By always intending my mind.* The chief design of college discipline is to train the mind to this capacity and habit, and the discipline can never be fairly judged except as this its chief end is distinctly kept in view. Mr.

Adams and his friends would doubtless be forward to concede and assert this. Indeed, as we have seen, Mr. Adams not only formally insists on a few fundamental studies as "essential to a well-chosen curriculum, and also that, as respects the fundamentals, the college training should be compulsory and severe," but it seems to be his sincere conviction that the modern languages can be made more effective to this end, for two or three reasons which he rather suggests than expands. The one is that with the longer time than can possibly be assigned to classical studies, i.e., with an earlier beginning and a longer prosecution, they can be more thoroughly mastered, and hence can give the conscious experience of a single piece of work which is thoroughly done. The other consideration is no less positively implied, and that is that these languages have closer relations to modern life, and therefore can be more easily and completely acquired and wrought into the habits of the living man of modern times.

These thoughts bring before us more distinctly what we have already recognized more than once as the one position of special interest in Mr. Adams's discourse, and that is the position that Greek should be abandoned as one of the fundamentals in a college curriculum to which "the training should be compulsory and severe." The question is a fair one, What are the reasons why this position should be rejected, or what advantages does the Greek possess over German and French in this regard, especially when they are set over against the manifest advantages of longer time, more complete achievement, and a nearer relationship to modern ideas?

The answer which we make to this fair question is this. The ancient languages in their structure, their thoughts, also in the imagery which their literature embodies, are better fitted than any modern language can be for the single office of training the intellect and the feelings and the taste; and in every one of these advantages the Greek is pre-eminently superior to the Latin. They are, indeed, remote from modern life in respect of any worthy scientific conceptions of nature, but they are very near to the universal intellect and heart in respect of their exemplification of that curiosity and wonder which are the perpetual inspiration of all science. They are also pre-eminent for that clear insight and

lucid speech without which the loftiest pretensions of science, whether ancient or modern, must sooner or later be rejected, and for inexorable exemplification of consistency with fact and with itself which is incarnated in the Greek geometry and the Greek logic. The perfection of the Greek language as an instrument for the perpetual training of the mind of the later generations is no accident of climate or atmosphere or other physical environment, however much the physical condition of man may have contributed to its perfection, but is rather to be ascribed to the fresh and energetic activity of cultivated man, as he was gradually awakened to the most important facts of this mundane existence.

The Greek language gives us in form and structure all that we can desire, and the best that the race could attain, when first in its riant and next in its reflective youth it looked out upon nature and looked in upon the human soul and constructed commonwealths and sought after social and domestic order and perfected art and was entranced with beauty, and only failed to find the living God and a blessed moral life and a satisfying spiritual immortality. The student who in any satisfying sense masters the Greek language so as to analyze it and to read its plainer prose and its fluent poetry with moderate facility has mastered the key with which to unlock all other languages. He not only has not wasted or misapplied the time which he might have better applied to German and French, but if he expects to learn German and French with the greatest facility and with anything like a complete mastery, he uses his time with the best economy by learning the elements of Latin or Greek before he proceeds to the two modern tongues. He does this because by acquiring the grammar of the Greek or the Latin he conforms himself to the norms of universal grammar, and learns once for all what the organism of language signifies when it is successfully applied to the expression of clear discrimination and coherent reasoning, of noble aspiration and pathetic emotion. Even Mr. Adams towards the end of his discourse concedes a place for the Latin, and in the revision of his radical ideas admits that it may be worth while to study it thoroughly for reasons not unlike those which we have given for the study of Greek. He assumes, however, that the Greek is too complicated and the

study of it too laborious to be consistent with the claims of modern science and the mastery of modern literature. Against this view we contend that the reasons for the study of Latin apply with pre-eminent force to the study of Greek; and that with a wise economy of the time of the pupil in early life, and a skilful method of teaching, the Greek and Latin can both be mastered, with no actual waste of time, but with a geometrical increase of facility in the command of the modern languages, and consequently an immense gain to the culture of the student. The logic of Mr. Adams's own arguments, and the inferences from his own concessions, would require him to accept the conclusion that Greek and Latin when thoroughly learned must impart a great increase of facility in acquiring the modern languages so far as these are required for the student's use. Leaving the question at present for further consideration whether the difficulty of mastering the Greek language has not been misconceived or grossly exaggerated by Mr. Adams, we return to a point which is more important, and which we think he has most seriously misapprehended, and that is the absence of all relationship between the college curriculum which includes Greek and Latin and excludes English, French, and German, and our peculiar, engrossing, and hurried modern life, with its physical science, its railways, its telegraphs, and its electrical light.

We are embarrassed in our attempts to make Mr. Adams consistent with himself, when he concedes so much to the Latin after having coupled it so closely with the Greek, and alternately excluded it from and included it in his ideal curriculum. We are still more surprised at the inadvertent remark concerning the Greek into which he has fallen, when he observes that the Latin "has its modern uses" apart from its literature, having "by common consent been adopted in scientific nomenclature," while Greek, "unlike Latin," "is a language which has no modern uses;" "not only is it a dead tongue, but it bears no immediate relation to any living speech or literature of any value." Surely Mr. Adams has not forgotten that the nomenclature of modern chemistry and geology and natural history is characteristically and thoroughly Greek, and that it has proved its unmatched and peculiar superiority by the readiness with which it has yielded itself to the service of these complicated and

ever-growing sciences in their needs of a symmetrical and germinant vocabulary. We are not so much surprised that our critic should have forgotten some of the Greek characters as that he has committed so great an oversight in his comparative estimate of the relation of Greek and Latin to modern ideas and modern science. We might expect a similar illiteracy in Mr. Spencer or Mr. Huxley, but hardly from so well-informed a critic as the sharp and critical Mr. Adams.

We contend that, for the very reasons given by Mr. Adams in his forcible delineations of modern life, the old classical training is needed more than ever as a preparation and a corrective—it is no paradox to say as a preparation because a corrective. The rush and hurry of our modern activity need the infusion of a calmer spirit and of steadier thoughts. Its rash and eager generalizations and its exaggerated statements need strong and steady thinkers who were trained in the school of severe definitions and sharp conceptions and steady and clear-eyed good sense. The extravagant oratory, the sensational declamation, the encumbered poetry, the transcendental philosophy, the romantic fiction, the agnostic atheism, the pessimistic dilettanteism, to which modern speculation and modern science and modern poetry tend, need now and then a “season of calm weather,” such as a dialogue of Plato, an oration of Demosthenes, a tragedy of Sophocles, or a book of Homer, or at least a letter of Cicero, an ode of Horace, or a book of Virgil, to quiet the fevered spirit. Even if it is too much to expect that the modern student shall retain the power or find the time to read from a classic writer, it will be of no slight value to call to mind the remembrance of the time when ancient thought and ancient feeling and ancient diction engrossed our attention for hours, and we breathed the fresh and breezy and possibly the frosty air of the morning of the world’s culture, and ourselves were strong and hopeful and clear-eyed—before the modern world with its stern and savage conflicts were upon us and its bewildering problems demanded their instant solution. We feel no disposition to deny the peculiarities of modern life. We acknowledge that Goethe and Schiller and Kant and Lotze and Schopenhauer and Coleridge and Tennyson and Spencer and Darwin and scores of others engross the attention and occupy

the energies and disturb the waking thoughts of the men of the present; but alas for them—we say emphatically, alas for every one of them—if they have never been men of the past in their thoughts and by their studies; alas for them if in their life's morning they have never known anything of the world's spiritual morning in its crisp and clear thoughts, in its glowing yet modest imagery, in its ardent yet subdued emotion, and its energetic yet tasteful speech; and alas for the generation that is content with the inspiration and guidance of teachers who must take all their impressions of ancient life from superficial and second-hand criticisms and sketches!

We know very well it will be said that this view of the influence of Latin and Greek studies upon the majority of school and college boys and youth is simply imaginary; that there are comparatively very few who derive any definite or permanent impressions of ancient life from their early training; that with the majority of youth this is pure task-work, mechanical and repulsive to the last degree, exerting no intellectual influence and kindling no inspiration. In reply it is only fair to say that in judging of the effects of a course of studies a sharp distinction should be made between the impressions which are actually received and the reflective recognition of these impressions by the recipient and his own consequent estimate of them. A boy, for example, may gain impressions for life of ancient thought and feeling by the painful reading of a single book of Virgil, without being sensible of any effect except the sense of drudgery in learning his lessons, while yet it may be true that the memory of the scenes and sentiments which it presents or suggests, and even of the conceptions and modes of thinking, may remain with him during all his subsequent life. We instance a book of Virgil, for it recalls the remark of a college classmate in a casual conversation concerning the value of the classical curriculum. He himself had entered college very late in life, after the briefest possible course of preparation which gave him "small Latin and less Greek." The most of his life had been spent in manufactures and trade, and he would be the last man to put a factitious estimate on college learning as such. We were conversing upon its value to a man devoted to practical affairs, and the writer can never forget the enthusiasm of

his assent to the remark that an intelligent boy who had been able to spell out by the hardest labor a single book of Virgil, and only that, had thereby been introduced to a new world. His enthusiasm was doubtless kindled by his own distinct recollection of what his little Latin had been to him during his subsequent busy and practical life. Mr. Adams does not recollect any such revelations to himself, but it does not follow that they were never made. We believe they were made before the period of conscious reflection and distinct remembrance, and that for this reason he counts "his small Latin and less Greek" to have been a sheer waste of time. He does recollect the time when he was fond of reading "and so learned English" himself and "with some thoroughness." And yet "his thoughts were expressed in abominable English"—the consequence, as he would intimate, of his not receiving a thorough and critical training in the language. We believe his English to have been far better than he thinks it to have been, and that he learned quite as much of his English through his Latin and Greek as through his extensive reading of English authors. And yet he insists that when the modern languages, English included, shall be taught critically and conversationally in his modern academy, the thorny stem of grammatical analysis shall flower with the roses of beauty and delight, and the youthful student, confronting nothing but modern ideas in modern phraseology, shall find grammar and criticism and composition and conversation in German, French, and English to be a perpetual delight, while the consciousness that these studies are immediately useful shall make the face of every boy to be animated with perpetual sunshine. Only put away from the temple of knowledge this "college fetich" of the Greek language and the spontaneous and natural piety of ingenuous boyhood shall break forth in finished utterances of Latin, French, German, and English speech. What are the hard and solid facts as contrasted with his romantic expectations we have endeavored to state and defend; and these are that the analytic and constructive study of language, to the youthful mind as to any mind, is an artificial process which involves reflection and effort; that the ancient languages are the best introduction and discipline for these activities; and that their remoteness from modern ideas and modern construction is an

advantage rather than an objection to their use for this purpose. The modern world will overtake the university scholar soon enough at the latest with its engrossing cares, its hurried movement, its peculiar objects-matter, with its unromantic contempt for the past and its more than romantic confidence in the future. The classically disciplined scholar who like Mr. Adams is swept into a cavalry saddle will make an excellent officer without being aware, as Mr. Adams seems not to have been, that his university training gave him the best general training for military life that he could require, except perhaps skill in horsemanship. Should he subsequently be called to fill a novel place in railway administration, and if he possess the strong common-sense and stern independence and acute insight which it requires, he may succeed as well as Mr. Adams has done by the aid of the discipline of which he speaks contemptuously and almost ignorantly. It is certainly no new thing for children, even those of an older growth, to fail to appreciate the value of the training to which they owe all their success in life, and to esteem those features of it the least to which they owe the most.

The argument of Mr. Adams we observe is limited almost entirely to his own experience. With the exception of four generations of the Adams family and the characteristic and flippant testimony of Thomas Jefferson, he makes little account of the unshaken convictions and the professed faith of many generations of English and German men of affairs as to the approved value of classical training in fitting men for spheres of action to which their training had no other adaptation than that of sharpening the intellect and maturing the manhood by the discipline of classical tongues and mathematical processes in the open and breezy sunlight of the early morning of the world's civilization. The statesmen and practical leaders who have gone from the universities of Great Britain into her colonies and her Indian Empire have not found it so very difficult to learn the special civilization or the languages of the countries to which they have gone, altho both are more unlike the life of England or Athens or Rome than the modern life which so overwhelms the imagination of Mr. Adams can possibly be strange to his world of twenty-seven years ago, when he left Harvard College. And yet we find that men go almost directly

from the classic gymnasia, where they have made their grand preparation, into fields of diplomacy or administration, all over the world, to make their special preparation for their life-work by learning in the saddle and in the field the languages and manners and institutions of the people with whom they have to do, after they have, in a certain sense, entered into the responsibilities of practical life.

Mr. Adams would make a great ado over the helplessness, say, of a man whose connection with railway interests should send him to Texas or Mexico without the mastery of the written and spoken Spanish language, and leaps to the conclusion that for this reason the American college ought to make all its scholars masters of the written and spoken Spanish, overlooking entirely the fact that a man thoroughly trained in the study and mastery of the classical languages ought to be able and is able to learn with comparative ease the language of any country in which he may reside, while, if he has the ambition or impulse to study the modern literature of Europe, the facility and impulse to do so will be furnished by good studies of the ancient languages. We say in *good* classical studies. We are not ignorant of the fact that in this country and in England, and to some extent in Germany also, the ideal methods of using the classics as a training for practical and public life, or for general culture, have not been accepted or put in practice, and that these defective methods give all the color of plausibility to Mr. Adams's incoherent and inconsistent criticisms.

Leaving this thought and returning again to the test of experiment, we take the liberty of referring to a single example, to which, as we write far from books, we must refer from memory. It happened to the writer to cross the ocean on the same steamer with the late Lord Elgin, who was successively Governor-General of Jamaica, Canada, and finally of British India. The chance acquaintanceship opened the way for the free interchange of opinion on a great variety of subjects, concerning educational, ethical, political, and theological matters. His own recollections of his university life were not the least interesting and instructive. He had been a first-class man at Oxford, and recalled with the enthusiasm of an old student many of the scenes and subjects of speculation which had engrossed his mind

during the years which to every college and university man of wakeful mind and earnest purposes are the greenest and freshest of his life. The character and career of this distinguished administrator are well known to have been of the purest and noblest type. A few years after his untimely death the writer accidentally encountered his memoir, and with a very natural curiosity referred to the history of his youth and his university career, to find what light, if any, they might throw upon his eminent success from the beginning. It was most instructive to learn that after leaving the university his future place in life was more than usually undefined, his father not having then inherited the title which subsequently descended to the son. At the age of twenty-six, he was appointed Governor-General of Jamaica at a critical time in the history of the island, in consequence of the then recent emancipation act, which so seriously disturbed the stability of its people. Doubtless his appointment was determined by political considerations. It certainly was made so suddenly and unexpectedly as to allow him no time for special reading and study. The biography informs us, moreover, that his studies during the brief and uncertain interval between his university and public life were more than usually miscellaneous and divided between business cares and general studies in politics and history and literature. From his entrance into public life till his death he became eminently and absorbingly a man of affairs, most successfully and honorably of all in seasons of crisis and excitement among the narrow jealousies in Jamaica and fanatical and riotous partisanships in Canada, in shipwreck on the Eastern Archipelago, at the storming of the imperial palace in Pekin, and in the weighty responsibilities of ruling the Indian Empire when it was rocking with the after-throes of the memorable civil earthquake which had well-nigh destroyed it forever. And yet Lord Elgin is but one example of what the classical training of a university education can do in the way of a general preparation for the special exigencies of practical life, and of the practical influence which studies which perfect the manhood may have in qualifying that manhood to enter quickly and readily into any relation to which the student may be called, whether it be in the saddle of a cavalry officer or the novel and

perplexing details of a Railway Commissioner. To all this Mr. Adams will reply that the English is unlike the American student in that the former can learn the modern languages and literature with greater readiness and a more complete thoroughness. To which we reply that the American student who has occasion to master the modern languages for the purpose of science or philosophy or theology or even of literature does this as frequently, as thoroughly, and as successfully as the English university student; while it is notoriously true of the English modernists of eminence, as for example Mr. Herbert Spencer, Mr. Huxley, the Positivist metaphysicians and psychologists and the whole regiment of sociological politicians, that their studies are generally limited to the French language, they being "willingly ignorant" alike of Aristotle, Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze.

It is worth our notice also that in Germany the question of the superiority of a classical to a modern training has of late been subjected to a practical trial on an extensive scale, by a comparison of the results of the gymnasial curriculum and that of the *Real Schule* as a preparation for a university course and indirectly for civil administration. In most of the German States—in Prussia pre-eminently—an attendance upon the university courses, with a certificate of fidelity and a succession of satisfactory examinations, had been the essential prerequisites to many of the most desirable official positions in civil life. To admission to all the privileges of the university an attendance upon the gymnasium with its classical curriculum was an essential prerequisite, carrying with it the consequence that to all the higher posts of civil life a course of classical study including Greek and Latin had till recently been a *conditio sine qua non*. The *Real Schulen*, which gave a shorter and a more scientific and popular course in which Greek was not included and the Latin was scanty, furnish an example of a "modernist" education. It was very natural that this condition of things should be felt to be inequitable by the teachers and pupils of these schools, and that an earnest movement should be made to set it aside. In several of the States it was successful. In Prussia, against strong conviction to the contrary, it was allowed for a term of years, by way of experiment, that the "modernists" (the *Abiturients* of the *Real Schulen*) should enter the university and enjoy all

its privileges. When this term had expired elaborate reports were called for from the leading instructors in all the universities of their judgment as to the proved capacity and success of the students who had attended upon their classes from each of the two preparatory institutions with their separate curricula. With but few exceptions, the reports were decidedly in favor of the classical curriculum as giving a better training even to the students of the mathematical and physical sciences. The arguments and reports in regard to this most interesting practical experiment are easily procured, and we would commend them to Mr. Adams's consideration as furnishing interesting material for an appendix to the next edition of his "College Fetich."

Mr. Adams would doubtless accuse the writer of a certain serious if not an intended unfairness in not recognizing the fact that he accords to a thorough classical training a confessed superiority for those whose time and tastes permit them to be thorough in it, and that he even grants that Latin should be insisted on for all the aspirants to a university degree. We are well aware of this fact; and we are as well aware that many if not most of the arguments by which he assails the Greek are as pertinent and effective against the Latin. All the fine and fervent things, moreover, which he says in favor of a thorough classical culture hold more eminently of the Greek than of the Latin. We are not responsible, surely, for the circumstance that he has in effect taken two or three different positions in respect to the main question, or that he has discussed what may be considered two questions at least in respect to what he sensationally calls a "college fetich," thereby more than implying, as many of his arguments tend to prove, that classical study, in both languages or either, is a sham and a waste. The deprecatory tone with which, towards the conclusion, he asks that "the modernists" may partake of the crumbs which fall from the table of the classicists scarcely comports with the rampant attacks which he makes upon classical discipline and classical thought and literature, supported as they are by the history of the opinions and experiences of the Adamses in four generations, and a sweeping and most characteristic criticism of Plato from the Sage of Monticello.

We should do scant justice, if not positive injustice, to Mr.

Adams should we omit one additional topic, which perhaps is the most important of all. It is a point which gives all the plausibility to his criticisms upon his own experience of classical study at the Boston Latin School and at Harvard some twenty-seven years ago. He informs us that he was forced to commit to memory solid pages of the Latin and Greek grammars; indeed, that he actually could repeat nearly the entire contents of both, and also that the studies of the most of his class never carried them beyond a few books of Xenophon, a book of Herodotus, and a few books of Homer. He speaks of himself as exceptional in that he actually read, tho as he thinks by a slow and painful process, the whole of the Iliad. And yet at present he cannot recall all the Greek characters. Against the memories of such method of learning Greek and Latin, with so limited a modicum of achievement, we join with him in an earnest protest. One feature of this method has been more or less generally abandoned, and that is the exaction of the matter of the grammar, as a feat of mechanical memory. We wish we were not obliged to add that it has been replaced by another method almost as vicious, which engrosses the student with an elaborate philological theory of the inflections of verbs and nouns and an elaborately metaphysical study of syntax and construction, to the neglect of facility in reading from comparatively easy authors for the sake of acquiring a copious vocabulary, and of gaining by what may be called insensible absorption or induction a familiarity with the diction and style of one or more classic writers. We are happy in knowing that the general movement among many teachers of the classical languages is in a somewhat better direction. There are very obvious reasons why this movement should be slow, and why also it should be hindered by influential teachers and scholars. Every thorough teacher knows, as no man can know so well as himself, that a thorough mastery in some sort of a grammar is essential to success in rapid and easy reading and intelligent analysis. He is naturally desirous that all his pupils, especially his better pupils, should appreciate as completely as possible all those relations which interest himself as a grammarian, and is therefore tempted to expend much of his energy in this direction. He is himself attracted by the study of a difficult rather than an easy writer,

and sometimes his zeal to test and stimulate the best men of his classes or his selfish regard to his own improvement leads him to select the hardest writer whom he can find, with short lessons and limited reading and a useless if not a wicked waste of time and energy. Then, again, very many able Græcists are so jealous lest their pupils shall in any way fail to work that they will not give them anything but the hardest Greek, with short lessons, little sense of progress, no advance in the possession of the language, and no proper study of the language or its embodied literature; in short, no study of the Greek language, but only from beginning to end a study of the Greek grammar. Against the introduction of reading at sight into their college exercises, or a rapid and current reading of easy authors, or the study of their writers as literature, not a few are invincibly set by the example of some brilliant philologists or the inveteracy of some college tradition. The consequence is that so soon as compulsory Greek is finished, elective Greek is limited to the very few who have decided tastes for grammar and philology, and the noblest benefits and enjoyment which ought to be realized both by the many and the few fail to be attained except by here and there a solitary student. The disciplinary advantages which cannot but follow from the study of the philosophy of language as exemplified in two of the most admirable of languages cannot fail to be realized, but the culture and elevation which might come were the power of rapid and facile reading cultivated, and the use of it for the expression of thought and feeling appreciated, fail in great measure to be attained. These mistakes and failures are probably more conspicuous in the American colleges than in those of England or Germany, for the reason that in England composition in prose and verse compels to a certain mastery of the vocabulary and a sense of the uses of words which mere grammatical analysis can never impart, and the eminent thoroughness with which the subject-matter of a few authors is studied insures what Mr. Adams so justly conceives as the advantage of doing any single thing well. In Germany the practice of composition from the beginning in the class-rooms and the actual application of linguistic forms as living principles, or, in other words, the more complete intellectualization of the instruction, insures the learner a far more

complete and living control over both vocabulary and grammar. Our inferiority to the English and German methods is intensified by the fatal temptations of the elective system, which flatters the student with a premature conceit of his own adult independence, and tempts him with the prospect of varied culture, and tickles his taste with a variety of superficial novelties.

It is not surprising that under this state of things faith in the possibility or desirableness of an enforced classical curriculum should decline, and even that some professors of Greek should be foremost in desiring to reduce the study of Greek to an elective branch and to treat it as a select and rare form of intellectual culture, like Quaternions or Anglo-Saxon or Icelandic, under which régime sufficient knowledge of the language might be maintained to provide for a few salaries and support a few philological societies and to promote sundry archæological researches. This is the real superstition which may properly be termed as "the college fetich." It can be set aside, not by limiting the study of Greek to a few by reason of narrow and technical methods, but by so liberalizing it that its use shall be justified to the tastes and enjoyment of those who teach and those who learn it, and it shall enter more fully into our modern culture as a formative element of strength and beauty. Against the fetichism of mechanical and formal grammatical learning which so offends Mr. Adams we unite in his earnest protest—but not because the language which is taught is Greek and therefore difficult by reason of its remoteness from modern life, for we have known German taught as stupidly and as ineffectually, but because it is taught after defective methods and in a technical and narrow spirit, and because the arrangements are so limited for the appreciation of its use in literature.

These difficulties are immensely enhanced by flooding the college curriculum with a mass of so-called elective studies and the temptation to magnify the excellence of the curriculum by boasting of their number and variety. For the purposes of education to students for the Bachelor's degree the great mass of the so-called Soft Electives should be regarded as a vast "Serbonian bog" in which "whole armies" of what otherwise had been solid battalions are doomed to be "whelmed and lost." Among the many questionable things which Mr. Adams

has said in this most interesting discourse we notice with pleasure the sound principles which he has asserted in respect to the necessity for a definite and enforced curriculum which shall include but few studies and require a mastery of them as the condition of a university degree. His criticisms, which we in our turn have freely criticised, are, the most of them, pertinent and tenable when applied to defects which exist indeed, but of which, as we think, he has failed to give the correct diagnosis. He is, after all, a Greek at heart, and if he will but take the trouble to recover that portion of the Greek alphabet which he thinks he has forgotten, and cursorily read again in the light of his modern experience the Iliad which he once so painfully studied, we are confident he will be convinced that Greek can be so wisely taught and so successfully studied that the next generation of the Adamses shall be convinced, in spite of the opinion of Thomas Jefferson, that neither the Greek language nor the study of Greek any longer deserves to be called a "College Fetich."

NOAH PORTER.

OUR IRON, WOOLLEN, AND SILK INDUSTRIES BEFORE THE TARIFF COMMISSION.

TO practical legislation the tariff now presents a dilemma of grievances. One class in the community feels sore at protection, as an unjust system of taxation; another class resents its proposed withdrawal as a breach of faith towards the industries founded upon its presumed continuance. Government is thus called upon to fulfil two obligations, each of which seems to entail the disregard of the other.

The protected manufacturers certainly have a right to demur at an abrupt and capricious change of legislative policy. They cannot, however, call a change of policy capricious which follows a change in the conditions inducing its inauguration. They cannot object to a withdrawal of support from those industries which can now support themselves; nor, on the other hand, from those which experience has shown never will be able to support themselves—unless, indeed, they can claim for these latter the performance of certain useful functions towards society which entitle them to a contributed subsistence. And the producers of iron, woollens, and silks can surely see no unfairness in investigating, upon such a basis, the present condition of their industries, and the consequent obligations of government towards them.

We propose to undertake such an investigation—to find out, in the case of each industry, simply whether, with the average rate of profit current in the United States, it can withstand foreign competition. We shall take as our data the statements of the manufacturers themselves,—noting, however, in our conclusions, that protection may itself create those very obstacles for which it professes to make amends.

I. That the amount of capital now invested in our iron industry suffices to employ the most advantageous processes of

production is now confessed even by the English manufacturers. In quality of product we can compete with foreigners: why not in cheapness? Two peculiar disadvantages are ascribed to us—dear labor and costly raw materials. As to the discussion of these points, we must observe that, in the industries as we are considering them, a high comparative cost of labor (represented by high wages) if the efficiency remains the same, would be a *real* drawback in the competition. It is doubtless true that a generally high rate of wages here forms an argument not for, but against, protection in general, since it only indicates an average cheaper production in our industries at large over those of other countries. But we are dealing with a particular *protected* industry, where the high wages are paid out of a product artificially enhanced in value, and not from a natural surplus over the cost of production. High wages do not in themselves constitute a plea for the existence of (e.g.) the iron industry; but, assuming its existence to be desirable on other grounds, they certainly impede its efficiency. The inability of the industry to furnish the current rate necessitates a special fund for the purpose which the tariff provides. This seems perfectly consistent with the theory of protection, and no denial of the general phenomena of high wages under natural circumstances of production.

Experience has shown that 95 per cent of the cost of pig-iron¹ consists in the wages of labor, either direct or as embodied in the raw materials. It is thence argued that, the daily wages being here double those abroad, the conditions of production are only half as favorable as those abroad. Both fact and inference must, however, be accepted with caution. The employers give one statement of the wages paid, the laborers a very different one of the wages received. But even admitting the fact of high wages, their influence upon cost of labor may be completely counterbalanced by superior efficiency. Whether because of their better implements or of their better living,² we certainly demand more from our operatives than is expected abroad. An

¹ It seems unnecessary to follow out more than this one department. What is true of pig applies equally well to bar and rolled iron, etc.

² The Industrial League have shown that the cost of food here is one half that in England, and that, on the whole, our laborers fare three times as well as the English: in consequence doing twice the amount of work.

American miner does three times as much work for his \$1.50 a day as the Spaniard for 50 cents: and labors seventy-five hours a week, while even his Teutonic competitor is equal to but fifty-five. Were it true, indeed, that cost of labor was in proportion to wages, pig-iron would cost 50 per cent more to produce in England than in Germany: yet in 1877 England exported 234,000 tons of pig to Germany. In the same way England produces silks more cheaply than Germany, and France produces cottons more cheaply than Spain: altho the wages in Germany and Spain are 50 per cent less than those in England and France respectively.

As a matter of fact, however, the direct wages paid by the manufacturer of pig amount to but a fifth of his expenses of production. High wages affect him chiefly only in so far as they may enhance the cost of his raw materials. Is he so ill-circumstanced with regard to these? One of the causes of their alleged dearness—cost of labor—we have already touched upon. Another is said to exist in the long distance between our iron-beds and coal-beds, necessitating a heavy expense for transportation to the manufacturing centres. In truth, however, the Lake Superior mines (to which allusion seems to be made) put out but a seventh part of the ore we consume, the other iron-mines (in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the Southern States) lying in close proximity to the coal-beds. Yet even from Marquette, transportation through the Lakes should be cheap and facile. England, on the other hand, is to such an extent hampered by her dependence on a foreign supply of ore that in 1880 she had to bring half of what she consumed all the way from Spain, paying for it twenty shillings (five dollars) a ton: and this at a time when “there was hardly a mine in America where it could not be handled for \$2 a ton.”

In coal, again, we seem to be England's superior. For from her vast product she exports so much that her furnaces fail to profit fully from her resources. While we, with a practically unlimited supply, are content with our own markets. In consequence, while the English founder must pay \$2 a ton for his anthracite, the Pennsylvanian gets his for \$1.47. And in charcoal and bituminous coal, both of which are in increasing use, we enjoy a much greater advantage.

Thus far we have been considering a hypothetical cost : the cost we should expect to result from an economical employment of our resources. As to the *actual* cost at present the manufacturers themselves differ widely,—their estimates ranging from \$14 to \$25 per ton of the metal. The key to this curious divergence of opinion may be found in a remark of Mr. Brook: "The average cost in this country is, I suppose, about \$19 or \$20 a ton: to be sure, *we can make it cheaper.*"

Now, we must insist that Government should consider the United States as a whole, and not a particular section of the United States. We are not bound to make up to each State its peculiar disadvantages compared with its neighbor, nor are we bound to recompense individuals for the results of their own ill-judgment or mismanagement. If Alabama and Georgia can produce our iron for \$14 a ton, we are not bound to impose a duty of \$6 so that Mr. Brook may manufacture in Maryland at \$20 a ton. Some eccentric patriot might take a fancy to establish a furnace in the Rocky Mountains, where he could no doubt spend a hundred dollars in the process; but should we for this reason compel the consumer to pay a hundred dollars for pig when the more favored districts might provide him with it for a fourth as much? The real test must be the least cost consistent with supplying our needs: which is to say—since we do now virtually supply our needs—the least necessary cost of our present product.

Our inquiries are luckily facilitated by an official report of the Ohio iron industries presented to the legislature of that State in 1879—a report the more reliable as representing no tariff interests whatsoever. This report gives in detail the various expenses of the manufacture, and sums up the total cost of producing a ton of pig as \$15.88. Pennsylvania, however, is first of our iron States. We have no analysis in her case similar to the one referred to above; but we know that the cost is less for her than for Ohio from the following considerations: Mr. Swank's report shows that in her industries the surplus remaining to capital over the expenses of production was 24 per cent on the amount invested, while in Ohio the corresponding surplus was but 8 per cent. Since, then, the same market-price of the commodity returns in Pennsylvania 16 per cent more than in Ohio, the Ohio capitalist must to this extent be at a disad-

vantage in his production. The ton of pig which costs him \$15.88 should cost his eastern neighbor but \$13.33.¹

Ohio and Pennsylvania put out 64 per cent of our total product. And if we include with them New York, New Jersey, and Illinois,—in which we have no reason to assume conditions materially different,—and the Southern States, which confessedly can manufacture still more cheaply, we shall have over 90 per cent of our pig averaging, at most, \$14.50 a ton.² This \$14.50, however, takes no account of the impediments to cheap production offered by protection itself. As to the element raw materials, the duty at once furnishes us with a fair estimate. The tariff makes us pay a 20-per-cent duty on all imported iron-ore: and it at the same time compels us to pay 20 per cent more than is necessary for our home ores. Now in 1880, of the total amount spent in Pennsylvania for the production of pig one half was for ore alone. What is true of the whole product is true, on an average, of a single ton of the product. Of the \$14.50, then, \$7.25 has been for the ore. But 20 per cent of this may be saved by the duty. The ore, then, costing but \$5.80, the total cost will be lessened to about \$13 a ton.

Nor have we indicated the whole saving possible. At present some Spanish ore must be imported because absolutely necessary, from its peculiar phosphoric qualities, for the production of steel. In Virginia and Tennessee, however, we have ore of like nature; and we continue to depend on the foreign supply only from the difficulty of communication with these as yet undeveloped regions of our own country. Now a cheapening of iron is nowhere more marked than in a cheapening of transportation.

¹ We are confirmed in this conclusion on finding, from the same report, that Ohio was inferior to Pennsylvania in nearly all the elements of production.

² In the face of a market-price of \$27.50, this statement will no doubt appear incredible. What? Does the iron-producer plead for \$13 a ton net earnings, when \$2 is declared by experts to represent a handsome profit? The modest inquirer stands aghast at such audacity. His doubts may be set at rest by an examination of the official report,—where the *average* profit of these industries is put at 21 per cent,—or by a glance at the statistics of the Bessemer steel-works, whose owners begged piteously for more bounty at the very moment they were announcing a 60-per-cent dividend. Perhaps his bewilderment is less excusable than that of the youngster who “wondered why the Romans asked for bread when they might have had cake.” The protectionist cake has often been a plummy one.

A removal of the duty, causing a fall in the price of pig, would induce many new lines of railroad to be opened up. The resources of the South would be thrown open to the manufacturers of the North. And the converter of pig would be saved the heavy cost of ocean transportation. Nay, he would gain doubly ; for cheap iron means cheap freight from West to East as well : wheat would be more plentiful in Pennsylvania, and wages would fall.

A general abolition of the tariff would, indeed, affect the manufacture still more considerably,—for it would offer an incentive to a cheaper production, which does not exist when the home market alone can be reached. “There is now a process,” says Mr. Johnson, himself a manufacturer, “by which iron and steel can be produced 40 per cent cheaper than by any method now in common use.” And “the reason why this process is not generally in use is, there is such a combination and monopoly in the production that in order to prevent a reduction of the tariff they fight every evident improvement in the manufacture which must materially reduce the cost of production.” We cannot be surprised at such a distaste for improvements, so long as improvements mean a surplus product that cannot be got rid of. No country will take our iron unless we take some product of hers in return. Here are Chili and Peru and many other South American States who would be glad to trade with us if we had not told them that all the trade must be on one side. They cannot afford to pay permanently in specie. So they must go to England, where they can exchange product for product.

Independently, however, of a general abolition of the tariff it has been shown that the removal of the duty on ore alone would directly reduce the cost of producing pig to \$13 a ton. In addition the indirect effects through the cheapening of transportation within our own borders might be expected to bring it down to at most \$12. Adding to this \$1, as representing a fair profit, we shall have \$13 as the probable market-price under the new conditions.

Now the price of English or Scotch pig, delivered in New York, is \$14 a ton ; delived at Hamburg, \$15 a ton ; and delivered at St. Louis, \$19.50 a ton. Why, then, should our manufacturers fear this foreign competition, when they them-

selves, even without the encouragement of a foreign market for their surplus, could produce pig for \$13 a ton; and, with the greater safeguards against loss which such a market would provide, might come to consider \$10 or \$11 a ton a fair return for their outlay?

Nor can we believe that the free admission of foreign ores would necessitate the closing of our own mines: free trade thus sacrificing one industry for the sake of another. A company, like that of Lake Superior, whose stock is 250 per cent above par, could scarcely be dependent on a 20-per-cent duty. Spanish ore which, duty free, could not be landed at New York for less than \$6 a ton would have a hard time to drive out of the market American ore which can be handled for \$2 a ton. But, as we have said, these foreign ores, so far from competing with our own ores, offer a substantial inducement to, and in fact supply a necessary condition of, their consumption.

II. We pass now to another Hercules crying for crutches. In the woollen as in the iron industry the cost of labor is no greater here than abroad. Mr. Dean asserts, as a matter of personal experience, that "altho in America we pay a man more money for his week's work, we get it done equally cheap, for we work longer hours, and we work very much faster; produce more pounds in a given time." The cotton industry as to its operatives and processes is almost the precise counterpart of the woollen. Yet so little is it crippled by high wages that in 1881 it reported 150,000,000 yards of its manufactured goods, of which 22,000,000 went to England herself: and so independent is it of government aid that it could afford to treat the Tariff Commission with contemptuous neglect. Our woollen manufacturers, on the other hand, cannot half supply domestic wants. What should cause such a striking difference in the efficiency of the two industries? Simply, as it appears, the relative difficulty of obtaining the raw materials necessary to the respective manufactures. Cotton is a commodity peculiarly easy of access here: the monopoly of the American producer being manifestly secure, any attempt on his part to raise the price by means of a duty would meet with ridicule.

With wool, however, the case is different. The culture of sheep requiring large areas in order to be at all profitable, every encroachment of population which renders the land better available for cereals diminishes proportionally its suitability for sheep-raising. But migration to more distant districts is a slow process, involving no little inconvenience: so the wool-growers of these States resorted to the tariff as the easiest and most congenial way of obviating its necessity. Protection having enabled them to raise the price of their wool to that of the unprotected vegetable products, they could still, even with the increased cost of land and labor, get from it the average rate of profit.

And tho of late the Western States have taken up sheep-raising; altho Texas ranks first and California second in the industry, and altho these vast tracts are, from their nature, specially adapted to produce wool more cheaply than the densely populated regions of the East: yet the duty has continued to be assessed on the basis of the more costly production in Ohio and Pennsylvania. It is no gain to the woollen manufacturer if sheep can be maintained for \$1.50 a year in West Virginia or \$1 a year in Texas: the price of his wool will be based not on this cost, but on the \$2.95 which it costs to maintain a sheep in Ohio. And so long as the *highest* existing cost of production shall be taken as a fair ground for a protective duty, so long will cheaper production profit him in naught. To the last solitary herder, clinging desperately to his crook in defiance of the advancing civilization, the sheep-raisers of Ohio will consider it their right to be protected. Protection to them means protection to *all* wool-growers. And with the constantly increasing cost of land there is no limit to the price which the desire to perpetuate a local industry may force upon the unhappy consumer. The sheep-raisers of the West do not object: why should they? Every addition to the duty enlarges their own margin of profits. They can well afford to rest quiescent, assured that those of their Eastern brethren who, through laziness or ignorance or lack of enterprise, make the least returns to the community will be the most zealous in vaunting their own importance before Tariff Commissions, and the lustiest in their clamors for assistance.

In deference, therefore, to the scantiest producers, our manufacturers have to pay twice as much for their raw ma-

terials as do the English. The raw wool forms one half the expense of the commodity: we are thus handicapped to the extent of a fourth of the whole cost of production. But here, too, the tariff adds absurdity to oppression. In spite of the duty we are yearly compelled to import over a hundred million pounds of foreign mixing-wools for the manufacture of those finer fabrics for which our own wools are not adapted.¹ The importation, so far from conflicting with, tended rather to advance the interests of our home producers. The duty, however, strikes the consumer doubly: not only making him pay an unnecessary amount for his foreign wools, but mulcting him besides for his domestic wools,—thus benefiting unjustly the home producer. And tho, as a manufacturer, himself protected, he may apparently make up his first loss by a proportional tax on his own finished product: yet the necessity of thus raising the price of his commodity must plainly shut him out from possible competition with the foreigner who gets his materials free, even tho as to machinery and processes he be fully the equal of the latter.²

We are thus forced to the same conclusion as that arrived at in considering the iron industry, that the obstacles to cheap production are themselves the result of protection, and cannot, therefore, be entertained as an argument for protection. Even now, with a duty of 26 per cent on carpet-wools, "we can practically make carpets as cheaply here as in England."³ But give the manufacturers free materials—relieve them of this terrible yearly tax of thirty-four million dollars—and what is now true of a small part will then be true of the whole industry. We import no carpets now; we should import no clothing then. Nay,

¹ In the carpet industry, for instance, out of 36,000,000 pounds consumed, 34,000,000 were imported. We do not grow carpet-wools in the United States.

² A duty is thus conflicting in its effects. What is demanded as a right in the case of a finished commodity is urged as a grievance in the case of a raw product: yet finished commodities being themselves, in their turn, raw materials as elements in a still further production, each duty added to one article means an obligation created towards the next,—and so on, through an interminable series. Protection, it seems, begins, a blessing; and ends, a curse.

³ Mr. Dobson has naively slipped by the natural inference—that the duty on carpets is no longer necessary. Perhaps, having come to ask for free wools, his modesty forbade him to more than hint at a nobler aspiration—free carpets.

we have sent cotton goods to England: why should we not send woollen goods also? Protection having made the finer wools practically inaccessible, the woollen manufacturer is at present constrained to the production of a single line of goods of medium grade: the market becomes overstocked, and stagnation and ruin are inevitable. Every increase of demand causes a disproportionate speculative production: followed shortly by repletion, fall of prices, and distress. No industry on the verge of supplying home needs can hope for a steady market without a foreign outlet for its surplus product. With such an outlet our woollen like our iron manufactures would be established on a firm footing, that neither foreign competition nor domestic crises could disturb.

Nor would the abolition of the duty cause the ruin of the wool growers. Of course, without the tariff, sheep could not profitably be pastured in the close vicinities of our large cities: but that the immense regions of the West, with ready access to our markets, should not be able to compete successfully with Australia and Spain is indeed incredible. Besides, it is to be remembered that wool, like coke, is but a partial product: and just as gas would be manufactured even were coke unmarketable, so muttons would be raised even were wool of no value. The sheep-raisers even now find it profitable to export their sheep to England and there sell the wool on their backs at the English rates. They need have little fear of a policy which would still insure them the same price in America, and save them the cost of ocean freight besides.

III. Next in prominence to the iron and woollen industries comes the silk industry. Like the two former it can no longer plead to insufficiency of capital to employ the best processes of production,—its product in 1880 having aggregated some thirty-four million dollars in value: nor can it longer be regarded as in an experimental stage. Its history shows it to have been fostered by the most advantageous conditions which legislation could afford. Not only has it, like iron and wool, been encouraged by a high duty on its finished product, but it has enjoyed what they have not—the free importation of its raw materials. Yet, with every circumstance in its favor that could have tended

to establish it upon a firm and prosperous basis, it now declares its inability to subsist without a protective bounty of 50 per cent. This declaration is thus tantamount to a confession of permanent weakness, and a demand for permanent protection.

We are thus led to class the silk industry with those unproductive enterprises the post-office or the police force which, tho losing in themselves, still offer a plea for existence, as performing certain useful functions towards society. What claims can it present in this character?

It is a common form of argument to point to the mere amount of capital invested in an industry as of itself conclusive proof of the importance of that industry to the community. Nothing could be more fallacious. The pride of the manufacturers in their borrowed finery is exactly that of the rake who, being asked how he was getting on, replied complacently, "Oh, capitally! Last year a month ago I hadn't a dollar to my name, and now I'm two thousand in debt!" (As if a loss were any the less a loss by being greater in amount!) The gain from capital to the community, as to an individual, is in the ratio of its net earnings: and the community must inevitably count as loss that capital which is employed unproductively. Now the maintenance of an unremunerative industry is a loss to the community in two ways: first, positively, in diminishing the profits of the other industries taxed for its support; second, negatively in divesting capital whose profitable employment might otherwise be contributing to the general net earnings.¹

But, indeed, we started with the purpose of discovering in what way—if in any—the money loss to the community from the duty was made up to it by some service other than pecuniary.

Closely allied with the preceding argument is that of diversification of industries: the silk manufacture is useful merely because, without it, we should not have any silk manufacture. The factories themselves are made a higher education and prosperity, instead of being considered what they really are—

¹ Strange that any one should fail to perceive this. And yet an attempt was made before the Tariff Commission to justify protection on the ground that these unproductive concerns were essential as *serving to keep capital out of the profitable industries!*

merely the *possible means of securing the instruments* by which it may be attained. The great establishments at Manchester and Lowell are a benefit, not in themselves, but in what they produce,—and in this only so far as it represents a saving to society. There seems no limit to this unfortunate confusion of ideas between the end and the means. Mr. Donaldson dilates in glowing colors upon the glories of culture,—and finishes his eulogy by demanding a duty on pictures. He first tells us that taste is desirable; and then proceeds to make it unattainable. It is the taste that we want, just as it is the cloth we want; and as the factories are useful only as they enable us to get better cloth, so our artists are worthy of support only as they give us better pictures. Mr. Donaldson asks that an artificial value be put upon American pictures having inconsiderable value in themselves: just as Mr. Cheney asks that an artificial value be accorded to American silks, to make up for their lack of real value. In the first case we get in return, not more taste and culture, but more artists: just as, in the second, we get, not more silks, but more factories. How happy might we be in our artistic enlightenment, could we have stifled the first suspicion of domestic pictorial genius! How comfortably clad in glossy textures, could we but have hidden away in some secret nook Mr. Cheney's fatal conception that we could *not* produce silk! Will the time ever arrive when we shall not be made to do what we cannot do? When we shall no longer waste our strength in a vain display of our weakness? When we shall cease to look with fear and trembling upon every newly discovered "resource," lest it close the door upon one more of the few blessings of nature that now remain to us?

A still more subtle plea—one which, however, involves the same erroneous view of the industry itself as the ultimate desideratum—is that of providing a remunerative employment of a high order for the American laborer. Such an assumption of philanthropy, on the part of corporations showing themselves purely mercantile in their actual dealings, has in it an element of the comical,—which one manufacturer, at least, has had the wit to perceive and the candor to acknowledge. Business, says Mr. Dean, is no place for sentiment: "my manufacture is followed to make money, and not to keep open a benevolent

institution for American laborers." It seems fair to assume the status thus deftly expressed to be that obtaining currently among mercantile concerns. And the silk industry is no exception to the general rule. We know, indeed, that in its efforts to get cheap labor it even goes so far as to import operatives from abroad—a proceeding hardly calculated to advance the welfare of our own working classes. Its value to the laborers of the community must, then, be judged on purely economical grounds.

Now if we examine its claim to services rendered, what do we find? That it doles out to each wretched operative a pittance of 88 cents a day, at a time when a mere farm-hand could earn \$1.25, and an iron-worker \$2.50! And this is the "remunerative employment," of which it makes such boast! To be sure, the silk-operative enjoys the privilege of "a high order of labor"—that is, I suppose, one which makes a greater demand on his energies and intelligence. But what the laborer needs is pay, as well as work: the education which he gets in superintending a loom is worth little to him if it only brings him 88 cents a day for the support of his family, when, with no education at all, he could be earning a dollar and a quarter on a farm. To appreciate even more justly how much the operative loses by the existence of the silk-mills, we have but to consider how much more he would have gained had its eighteen millions of capital been set to some really profitable undertaking; and the better wages, the steadier employment, and the higher standard of living with which it might then have provided him are what the silk industry has deprived him of.

The silk industry a blessing to the laborer! Why, with the twenty millions of dollars which it annually wastes for us, its capital might have ten per cent interest to remain idle, and its thirty-four thousand employés be paid twice their present wages to educate themselves for Congress! What silk-hand would not esteem himself happy in the change?

Another very plausible claim is that of protecting American consumers against the foreign producers. The silk-manufacturers point with exultation to the decrease in the price of silk since the tariff of 1861. But what does this prove? Not that the consumer is cheated less now, but that he was cheated

more before. The present cheapness of our silks is a cheapness only as compared with their former dearness: it is not absolute cheapness to the consumer, who, without the duty, could supply his wants at half the price which he is now forced to pay.

It would, however, be asserted that, our own manufactures once abolished, foreign silks would immediately rise in price to the American consumer. But such a rise, to be of importance, must presuppose either a monopoly on the part of some one foreign producer which does not exist, or a conspiracy between a number of them, such as would be utterly impracticable in the present condition of Europe: on the contrary, it seems more probable that the fierce competition between England and France, to secure control of the American market, would materially lessen the cost of the commodity to the American consumer. In no event could the price advance beyond the cost of production here.

Such are the various claims of service which our silk-manufacture might urge in extenuation of its pecuniary dependence on the community. Of these claims not one has a shadow of validity. Neither as benefiting society at large nor as benefiting individuals, neither as being labor-saving nor as being labor-aiding, can the silk industry be entitled to support. Not merely is it a non-producer; it is a giant spendthrift, wasting the substance of others on a mistaken speculation. It cannot even secure a cowardly survival, by foreboding ruin attendant upon its downfall: its dependencies, the producers of its raw materials, are abroad and concern us not. It must be left to its fate, whatever that fate may be. If it stand, it will by that have offered its strongest plea for existence, the ability to support itself. Its fall will show that it had deserved to fall. Government could as consistently force upon us the support of the silk industry as it could force us to support an individual, who insisted upon baling out the Gulf of Mexico,—not because the Gulf of Mexico would be of any particular use baled out, but because, as he might say, the operation of baling afforded such a genteel,—thanks to the general contributions—lucrative, employment to our laborers, besides keeping them out of the wheat-fields; and because, in case our ship of state ever should spring a leak, it would be so convenient to have at hand a lot of

native balers, instead of being dependent upon an insolent and capricious foreign supply!

But the collapse of the silk industry would be no process of devastation. It is high time that we got over our veneration for mere *names*. We should come to realize that we should no more annihilate the instruments, the machinery, labor, and capital now called the silk industry by applying them to the manufacture of cottons than we should annihilate the Capitol at Washington by converting it into a Lunatic Asylum. A change in the direction of energy is not a total loss of capacity: a change of the purpose for which a thing is used is not a destruction of the thing itself.

To sum up our general conclusions: The iron and woollen industries need protection, only because already protected. The silk industry needs protection from its own inherent weakness. But the latter cannot longer demand protection, since it makes no fit return to the community for the bounty it receives. From all three of these industries, therefore,—from the first two because they are no longer Infant Industries, from the third because it will never be anything else than an Infant Industry,—protection should be withdrawn. And by such a withdrawal Government would not merely be guiltless of bad faith towards them, but fulfilling its still more pressing obligations towards the larger section of the community now unjustly taxed for their benefit.

HERBERT PUTNAM.

INCINERATION.

“Vermibus erepti puro consumimur igni.”

SANITARY science in these last days has been teaching us some very important if not altogether palatable truths concerning our usual method of disposing of the dead.

It has very rudely dispelled the pleasing illusion of the peaceful sleep of the grave, and has most offensively opened to our astonished gaze, not the sweet repose of our departed loved ones, awaiting the resurrection, but, instead, the loathsome processes of putrefaction in all its stages, from the first fadings of life's bloom from the cheek of virgin beauty to the final resolution of the decomposing mass into its elements. It has ruthlessly obliterated the *requiescat in pace* from the tombstone, or left it to stand a hollow and painful mockery.

It has taught us that this process of decomposition is simply one of oxidation ; and that, as carried on in the grave, retarded by the surrounding and incumbent earth, it is well described by the technical term invented by Professor Liebig and adopted by chemists and physicians generally for its designation—*eremicausis*: *ερημος*, lone, solitary, desolate, and *καυσις*, burning—“a solitary or desolate burning.” It is the process by which life has been supported, carried on after death, until all the material fed to that life has been consumed. Thus science has discovered to us the fact that in our bodily material we all must burn. In this we have no voice of election, and no device of man can finally avert this destiny. We may choose as to whether it shall be a process of an hour in the clean, rosy glow of a crematorium, or a process of twenty, fifty, or one hundred years in the gloom and loathsomeness of the grave, but in

any and every case these material bodies must burn. The eviscerated and embalmed bodies of the Pharaohs and their descendants, preserved these thousands of years with almost unspeakable care, which are now being sent by shiploads from Karnak to England to be converted into fertilizers, furnish examples of the process of oxidation long retarded but not finally defeated. So the "adipocere" process, advocated by the inventors and patentees of metallic and other hermetically sealed burial-cases, may fill the land with slowly putrefying bodies, but these are only inventions for retarding nature's work and for robbing nature for a time of these pent-up forces. Ultimately cases and bodies alike must yield to the process of oxidation, and nature's perfect work attain completion. Whatever the process, and however retarded, "Ashes to ashes" is the inevitable decree.

Sanitary science has further taught us that the old superstition which peopled graveyards with the ghosts of the dead returned to drag the living to the under-world has underlying it a basis of fact, since in the form of ghastly disease the dead do haunt our burial-grounds to the peril of all who visit them. In the language of Sir Henry Thompson, "no dead body is ever placed in the soil without polluting the earth, the air, and the water above and about it." Of course the immediate danger from the corpses of those dying of contagious and infectious diseases is well understood—a danger which can be reduced to the minimum only by cremation—but hygienically this is not the chief danger to which the living are exposed from the dead.

The products of a decomposing human body, chemists tell us, are, besides water and non-volatile minerals, carbonic acid, carburetted and sulphuretted hydrogen, ammonia, nitrous and nitric acids, and other offensive organic vapors. Dr. Parkes informs us that each decomposing human body generates annually about fifty cubic feet of carbonic-acid gas.

The atmosphere of thickly populated cemeteries contains ordinarily more than double the normal proportion of carbonic-acid gas, besides other deadly exhalations; while, in times of calm, and in the spring of the year, when the opening earth releases the gases which have been imprisoned during the winter, the proportion of these deadly poisons is much greater.

Thus it is that multitudes who follow their beloved dead to

our beautiful cemeteries and linger there to minister to the departed carry thence in their systems disease-germs from which they sicken and die, no one suspecting the immediate cause of their disease and death. The atmosphere of burial-grounds is freighted with the germs of almost every form of zymotic disease; and those whose systems become charged with them, if not at once stricken down, suffer serious loss of tone and impaired vitality, accompanied with headaches, nausea, diarrhœa, and sore throat, and are peculiarly susceptible to all forms of contagious and infectious disease. Pasteur's experiments have proved that earthworms bring to the surface myriads of bacteria from the bodies of the decomposing dead.

Upon the authority of the eminent Drs. Koch of Germany and Ewart and Carpenter of England it is stated that the blood of animals dying of splenic fever may be dried and kept for years, and pulverized into dust, and yet the disease-germs survive with power to produce infection.

Still more alarmingly significant are the discoveries of Dr. Domingo Freire of Rio de Janeiro, who, while investigating the causes of a recent epidemic of yellow fever, "came upon the dreadful fact that the soil of the cemeteries in which the victims of the outbreak were buried was positively alive with microbial organisms exactly identical with those found in the vomitings and blood of those who had died in the hospitals of yellow fever." This characteristic parasite, says Dr. Freire, permeates the soil of cemeteries even to the very surface. From a foot under ground he gathered a sample of the earth overlying the remains of a person who had been buried about a year before; and tho it showed nothing remarkable in appearance or smell, under the microscope it proved to be thickly charged with these yellow-fever germs. The cemeteries, therefore Dr. Freire pronounces "nurseries of yellow fever" the perennial foci of the disease.

The plague at Modena in 1828 was shown by Prof. Bianchi to be due to excavations made where victims of the plague were interred three hundred years before; and the terrible virulence of the cholera in London in 1854 is charged to the upturning of the soil wherein the plague-stricken of 1665 were

buried. In New Orleans during the epidemic of yellow fever in 1853 the mortality in the Fourth District reached the enormous figure of 452 per 1000 of the population, being more than double that of any other. In this district were three extensive cemeteries, in which were buried the previous year more than three thousand bodies.

Thus we are storing up in our cemeteries the fomites of deadly zymotic disease ; and thus these cemeteries, beautiful as many of them appear without, are being prepared to be plague-spots and pest-beds to this and future generations.

The contamination of wells, fountains, and watercourses in and about burial-grounds, as sanitary science has recently shown, is also a source of far greater danger than is generally supposed. This grave-fed water has a peculiarly sparkling crystal-like brilliancy, due to the very large proportion of nitrates and nitrites therein contained, which are the products of the neighboring graves. The wells and springs of burial-grounds and their vicinity have a never-failing supply of this sparkling and seductive water, which is eagerly quaffed in large draughts by the multitudes of visitors, who, they know not why, find their heads aching and their throats dry and sore by reason of the poisoned air which they there breathe. The London *Lancet* says: "It is a well-ascertained fact that the surest carrier and the most deadly fruitful nidus of zymotic contagion is this brilliant, enticing-looking water, charged with the nitrates which result from decomposition."

In 1806 the New York Board of Health advised the removal of all graveyards from within the city limits, and recommended that the then existing burial-places be converted into public parks! To some extent this was done ; and Washington Square, which was then the potter's field of New York, is one of the fruits of this recommendation. Sanitary science had not then discovered that soil saturated with the emanations of the decomposing dead would continue, for generations following, a plague-spot in its neighborhood ; but even to this day a dense blue haze several feet deep rests every calm morning over Washington Square, and a physician who lived several years on its western border declares it impossible to raise children on the ground-floors of houses in that vicinity. And yet New York's

innocents are turned into this ancient potter's field by hundreds every day in search of health!

Of the great cemeteries about New York there is not one, not even Woodlawn or Greenwood, in the public lots of which three or more bodies are not put in one grave; that of John Doe, who died from "a bare bodkin," being sandwiched between those of Richard Roe and James Low, who were the victims respectively of small-pox and yellow fever. In the public or poor quarter of Calvary Cemetery a far worse state of things obtains—more appalling than even the *Fosse Commune* of Paris, for it is the *Fosse Commune sans chaux*. A trench is dug seven feet wide, ten to twelve feet deep, and of indefinite length, in which the coffins are stowed tier upon tier, making a flight of steps five or more deep, and with not enough earth to hide one from the next. And this is our vaunted "Christian burial" in this new country with its myriads of broad acres! What shall our children say of us when they come perforce from stress of space to build their dwellings upon these beds of pestilence?

The great cemeteries of New York are thus specifically presented simply as types of the beautiful park-like cemeteries all over the land; and in essential features the same is true of the burial-grounds of smaller towns. The fountains in them are corrupt and the air above them laden with disease.

The pernicious practice of earth-burial has so poisoned almost every well and fountain of Europe, except a few far up the snow-clad mountain-steeps, as to render each what another has aptly designated a *font et origo mali*, inasmuch that every tourist is warned by his Murray and his Baedeker to avoid the one beverage which pre-eminently nature intended for the use of man, but which man has so corrupted with his dead as to render it the source and carrier of disease.

For all this ever-increasing accumulation of evil what is the remedy which sanitary science has to propose? It is simply nature's remedy—oxidation, incineration, or cremation, whichever term may be preferred: not nature's remedy retarded, as by earth-burial, but nature's remedy facilitated; not nature's remedy with agencies and surroundings that render it offensive to our sense of the respect and veneration due the dead, but nature's remedy purified and beautified by the crematory fire;

not nature's remedy with pernicious and deadly effects upon the living, but under circumstances and through instrumentalities which renders it innocuous and beneficent.

Let it be once fairly and fully understood, as sanitary science has already demonstrated, that cremation is but a safe, cleanly, decorous, and economical method of accomplishing in an hour precisely the same result as is accomplished in fifty or a hundred years by earth-burial, and that it does this in the purifying glow of the crematorium free from all offensive accompaniments or evil effects instead of in the gloom and dampness of the grave attended with infection and deadly peril to the living, and surely an intelligent public cannot doubt which it shall choose.

As conducted at Gotha by means of the Siemens apparatus the process is thus described: The body is borne into the chapel and placed in a catafalque which stands in front of the altar. The section of the chapel-floor upon which the body rests constitutes the floor of a lift, or elevator. As the funeral service proceeds the elevator invisibly and noiselessly descends, bearing the body to the basement directly in front of the incinerator, which, by means of superheated air, has been raised to a white heat within, at a temperature of about 1500° Fahrenheit. As the door of the incinerator is opened to receive the body the rushing cold air cools it to a delicate rose tint; and the body, resting on a metallic bed, covered with a cloth of asbestos, or of linen soaked in alum, passes over rollers into this bath of rosy light. Immediately it becomes incandescent, in which condition it remains until incineration is complete. This requires about an hour per hundred pounds of the original weight. There remain only a few handfuls of pure pearly ashes, equivalent to about four per cent of the original. These are dropped by means of a lever into the ash-chamber below, and are drawn thence into an urn of terra cotta, marble, alabaster, or other suitable material and returned by means of the elevator to the catafalque. The service or ceremony being now over, the friends of the deceased find the ashes just where they had last seen the body of the departed, and may bear them thence to the columbarium or mortuary chapel, or set them in the border and plant violets, heartsease, and forget-me-nots in them from year to year.

"And from his ashes may be made the violet of his native land."

No fuel or flame of foreign substance comes in contact with the body. The process is accompanied with no perceptible sound or smell or smoke,—absolutely nothing that can offend the sensibilities of the most fastidious. All the smoke and volatile products of combustion are passed through a regenerating furnace before being turned loose into the air, and are absolutely purified. The process is indeed in every way so decorous and so beautiful, as compared with other methods of disposing of the dead, that it is described by those who have witnessed it as “fascinating,” and scarcely an instance is known of any one having witnessed the process, as thus conducted, who has not at once become a pronounced convert to cremation, whatever may have been his pre-existing prejudice.

Apart, however, from the sanitary argument in favor of cremation there are other reasons for preferring it to earth-burial.

To all who have a liking for cleanliness and decency in preference to that which is unclean and repulsive the appeal to a pure, refined, and exalted sentiment in favor of incineration must be very strong. Surely none who venerate their dead can be reconciled to the idea of thrusting their bodies into a gloomy grave to become a fermenting mass of putrefaction, corrupting in all its emanations, whithersoever they ramify through earth and air.

The theft of the body of the late A. T. Stewart from St. Mark's churchyard, and that of the late Earl of Crawford from the Dun Echt mortuary chapel in Aberdeen, are only conspicuous examples of body-snatching, of which Philadelphia, Richmond, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Amsterdam, and Montreal have recently had harrowing experiences. To-day a military guard surrounds the beloved Garfield's grave for the protection of his body from the ghouls; and years ago grave-robbers attempted to steal the body of the lamented Lincoln, and were, it is reported, caught in the very act by the detectives of Elmer Washburne, then chief of the government secret service, since which time that tomb has never been left without protection. Incineration, if universally adopted, would put an end to the work of the ghouls, and would leave no occasion for the ruthless invasions of avarice upon the dead's domain.

Another point upon which sentiment has somewhat to offer

is the very natural dread, amounting in many cases to an absolute terror, of being buried alive. "To be buried alive," wrote Edgar Allan Poe, "is beyond question the most terrific of all extremes which have ever fallen to the lot of mere mortality." Numerous well-authenticated instances are on record of those who had been laid out in grave-clothes and even placed in coffins preparatory to interment, arising from a protracted coma just in time to save themselves from burial. But what of the larger number who arise not? "Seven hours in a coffin added ten years to my life," was the startling statement of Martin Strong of Twelfth Street, Philadelphia, as he told of the terrible experience through which he passed in the summer of 1868, when, upon the certificate of death furnished by Dr. Cummings, who attests the painful truth of the story, he was encoffined for burial. The late Rev. William Tennent, when yet a theological student at New Brunswick, was placed in his coffin for burial—physicians and friends believing him to be dead. One particular personal friend, however, begged so piteously and persistently for postponement that for more than four days after the time appointed for burial he was kept in the coffin, and finally revived and lived a useful life of many years. Almost every month the newspapers bring to us the facts of such experiences.

Physicians are now pretty well agreed that there is no absolutely reliable evidence of death except decomposition, and as the modern icing process retards this and conceals its evidence, who shall tell what numbers are buried alive in these last days, unless indeed by this same icing process they be frozen to death? It not infrequently happens that upon opening coffins taken from receiving-vaults for final burial the turned body and contorted features, the expression of wild despair, the torn and dishevelled hair, and the partly eaten flesh of hands and arms attest the awful fact. In times of epidemics of contagious disease, when attendants are in haste to get the supposed dead under ground, this is especially the case, as was shown at Norfolk and Portsmouth when the hastily and imperfectly buried victims of the last great yellow-fever epidemic were reinterred.

A prominent undertaker of New York recently expressed to a member of the New York Cremation Society the desire that

his own body should be cremated after death, adding that he had so instructed his family and so directed in his will. Since, however, the instructions contained in the will of the late illustrious Italian liberator, Garibaldi, were so disregarded in this particular, it is difficult to believe that such instructions, even where known to be the dying request of the departed, will be observed by prejudiced survivors. The undertaker above mentioned stated as the reason of his desire the dread he experienced of being buried alive, adding that he believes live burial is far more frequent than is generally supposed. The late Charles Albert Reed of Newton, Mass., directed his attending physician to sever his head from his body after death to prevent the possibility of burial alive, and left in his will a bequest to him of \$500 for this service if faithfully performed. So the late Rev. Howard Malcom, D.D., LL.D., for many years president of the University at Lewisburg, and during the later years of his life president of the Hahnemann Medical College of Philadelphia, directed that to prevent the possibility of being buried alive his heart should be taken out, and it was done.

While cremation as well as burial forbids the hope of a return to active life in the flesh, it humanely prevents the possible agony of a return to temporary consciousness. Moreover, a well-appointed crematory such as the United States Cremation Company proposes to erect at an early day somewhere in the vicinity of New York will be provided with a warm room where all cases of possible suspension of life may be kept for a time and restoratives applied, as also a cold room for the temporary preservation of remains when desirable.

Another consideration in favor of cremation, with which sentiment is concerned, is the facility it affords for the preservation and transportation of the ashes of the deceased. Not a few have an experience in common with that of the Rev. Brooke Lambert of England, who some time since remarked: "I have lost three very dear kinsfolk in remote quarters of the earth, and I would give anything I could command if I could receive their ashes and keep them by me in a vase." And how the heart of many a mother, whose son has been slain in battle or carried off by camp-fever, would be consoled if she could receive in an urn the ashes of her boy!—a result that would be

quite practicable if our military authorities should adopt cremation as a means of disposing of the dead ; and this should certainly be resorted to as a sanitary measure no less than as a matter of sentiment after a great battle. Then the dead would not be left unburied for the vultures to prey upon, as was the case after the battle of the Wilderness, nor would they be left half buried, to breed a pestilence.

To some it may appear almost cruel to utter in connection with the disposal of our dead that hard practical word, Economy ; and yet there are in every large city families not a few who are shelterless and foodless because of the expense entailed in the burial of their dead. However we may abhor and most justly denounce vulgar pomp and extravagant display at funerals, we can but honor the sentiment which will sacrifice shelter and food and raiment to give decent burial to the departed. But while we thus honor the spirit of self-sacrificing love, we may also be permitted to point these bereaved ones to a better way. Apart from the burial-lot and tombstone and the expense for carriages, the average cost of a funeral among the lower middle classes in and about New York is not far from \$150. The average cost of burial-lots in Woodlawn and Greenwood, each containing space for six graves, is about \$450, or \$75 per grave. The cost of single graves in the public lots is \$25 each. The cost of a modest head and foot stone and their erection will add \$75 more, making a total of \$250 or \$300. These \$300, more or less, have to be paid in advance by the poor, to raise which they alone know what sacrifices must be made. Apart from carriage-hire, which we may assume to be about the same in either case, the cost of cremation decorously performed, including the case in which the body is carried to the crematory, should not exceed \$40, while the cost of a terra-cotta urn of classic pattern, the most tasteful and appropriate possible, could not exceed \$5. Add \$10 for a niche in the columbarium in which the urn may find a permanent resting-place in case the friends should not wish to take it to their homes, and still another \$5 for an inscribed tablet under the niche, and we have \$60, as against four or five times that sum for earth-burial.

The item of individual expense is not, however, the only one to be considered under the head of Economy. Nearly four

thousand acres of valuable land, occupying eligible building-sites about New York, Brooklyn, and Jersey City—land that ought to be life-producing and life-supporting—are sequestered and perverted from the use of the living to the abuse of burying the dead; while much of the adjacent land outside is practically rendered almost valueless, no one wishing to live on the borders of a cemetery, and wisely so.

With all these arguments, seemingly valid, in favor of cremation, what have its adversaries to urge against it as reasons why it should not be adopted as a substitute for earth-burial?

First, the medico-legal argument is urged; i.e.: In any case of poisoning it would destroy the evidence thereof, and so offer a premium upon this class of crime. This is true to some extent, and is therefore a valid argument—not against incineration, but in favor of the precaution of a careful autopsy before cremation in any possibly doubtful case. All non-volatile mineral poisons, however, would remain in the ashes, and would be more readily detected there than in the body itself of the deceased.

It is further objected that cremation by approved modern methods would be impracticable as a means of disposing of the dead of great cities. Those who are familiar with the octuple crematory of Major Martin, in Bombay, or with the multiplex portable incinerator of M. Creteur of Brussels, could not for a moment seriously entertain this objection.

Again, it is objected that “cremation is heathenish and barbarous.” Well, so is earth-burial, and was so thousands of years before it became “Christian burial,” and even since then has been practised by heathens and barbarians more widely and numerously than by Christians. So eating, drinking, bathing, and sleeping are heathenish and barbarian practices, but we do not therefore refuse to eat, drink, bathe, and sleep.

Some there are who think they have religious objections to cremation. They say that cremation has no recognition in the Bible, forgetting that when Saul the king of Israel, and his sons Jonathan, Abinadab, and Malchishua, fell in honorable warfare with the Philistines, “the valiant men of Israel arose and went by night, and took the body of Saul and the bodies,

of his sons from the wall of Beth-shan, and came to Jabesh, and burnt them there; and they took their [incinerated] bones, [or ashes], and buried them under a tree at Jabesh, and fasted seven days" (I. Sam. xxxi. 12, 13). This was according to an oriental custom that especially honored the bodies of kings and other distinguished persons by cremating them, even tho the common people should be buried, allusion to which is made in Amos vi. 10 and Jer. xxxiv. 5. It was also intended to prevent the desecration of the dead by their enemies.

There have been those who have thought the practice of cremation incompatible with a belief in the resurrection, and have looked upon cremationists as infidels and atheists. Of these the most conspicuous spokesman is the very Rev. Dr. Wordsworth, Lord Bishop of Lincoln, who, standing at the altar of Westminster Abbey, July 5, 1874, in the midst of a vast congregation, gathered from all parts of the United Kingdom to hear him anathematize cremation, and with many of the most illustrious dead of the Christian world entombed about him, denounced the practice of incineration as "barbarous and unnatural," and said: "One of its very first fruits would be to undermine the faith of mankind in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body;" adding that "the extinction of that faith would bring about a most disastrous revolution, . . . confirming and increasing the widespread licentiousness and immorality which prevail in all the capitals of the world."

Truly this is a most appalling picture to contemplate! But is it not a wonder that when, as often must have happened in the course of his ministry at funerals, the Bishop saw the black mould turned up in the deeply buried churchyards of England, it did not occur to him that this mould was human ashes—the product of half a century's combustion—but ashes just as truly as those in the cinerary urn, and should present precisely the same obstacles to the Bishop's faith in the doctrine of the resurrection? And surely "the faith of mankind in the doctrine of the resurrection" must rest upon a frail foundation if a few crematory fires are going so speedily to destroy it all!

Possibly the illustrious dead of that grand pantheon would have been less eloquent in the good Bishop's cause if instead of speaking through his lips some of those death-dungeons could

have been opened, and the inmates of that vast charnel-house could have been seen in all the repulsive loathsomeness of their protracted putrefaction, wherein, through long decades and centuries, most literally "the worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched."

Assuming the doctrine of the literal resurrection of the material body to be true, can it be supposed to be less possible or less easy for the all-knowing and almighty God to gather and revivify the material atoms after they have been oxidized and scattered by the agency of the incinerator than after precisely the same result has been accomplished by combustion in the earth? And if, as the Bishop of Lincoln seems to assume, it is impossible for God to raise up the bodies of those who have been burned, "What," it has been pertinently asked, "is to become of the blessed martyrs"—those who have suffered death at the stake or been broiled on beds of iron for the sake of truth and conscience?

Had his Grace the Bishop of Lincoln been graduated from Trinity College, Oxford, instead of Trinity College, Cambridge, he could daily during his undergraduate course have looked over into St. Gillis Street, a hundred yards to westward, upon one of the most beautiful Gothic monuments to be found in any land. This is known as "The Martyrs' Memorial," and was erected to commemorate the event, on the spot where Archbishop Cranmer and Bishops Latimer and Ridley were burned at the stake. And is there to be no resurrection for these holy men?

Let this beautiful memorial lift itself in graceful majesty to make answer also to the Bishop's declaration that "cremation would at once strike a fatal blow to all beautiful monumental architecture;" and beside it let there rise that most magnificent of monuments, Trajan's Column at Rome, which was built over the golden urn that contained the ashes of that emperor; and on the other side let there stand the grand prototype of all mausoleums, the monument which Artemisia erected at Halicarnassus over the ashes of her husband King Mausolus, which monument is known to us as one of "the seven wonders of the world."

JOHN D. BEUGLESS.

THE ARTIST AS PAINTER.

IN a previous number of this REVIEW I discussed the *technique* of the sculptor, throwing out, by the way, a few general hints respecting the character and function of that noble art which forms a basis for all true progress in formative expression. As in ancient Greece, so in Italy during the Renaissance, and in every marked epoch of art, sculpture necessarily precedes painting in its development. Every wise system of academic art-training recognizes the value of first grounding the pupil on a firm basis of plastic form—from the study of the antique he passes to the life school.

There are many points of contact between the arts—to a great extent they all exercise like faculties and tastes. The terms *painter*, *sculptor*, *architect*, are specific, with reference to the practice of particular arts, but the general term *artist* has a broader significance. One may be a painter, or a sculptor, and yet be in no proper sense an artist. The artist, in the larger sense, is the equivalent of poet—or rather it comprehends the poet as a maker or creator. Shakespeare was both artist and poet; so was Michael Angelo, and likewise Goethe. As artists they were masters of forms of expression, and as poets they expressed through these forms that which was emotional or poetic. In a general sense whatever is formative or creative in its means and methods is artistic. In recent times artists have so generally restricted themselves in their practice, under the dominating influence of modern specialism, that not only do we find painters, sculptors, and architects exclusively following their respective branches of art, but we find the painters restricted to a still narrower field as landscape-painters, portrait-painters, painters of marine, history, or *genre*. They are no longer artists in the

larger sense applicable to the great masters of the Renaissance, who united in their triumphs the practice of many arts. But there is evinced of late a new impulse that indicates a return to this broader conception of art. Recent exhibitions have shown the work of painters as sculptors, and of sculptors as painters; and if the practice be continued, the result cannot fail to be beneficial. Not only is there an intimate relation between the various branches of the several arts, but likewise, as I have said, there are innumerable points of contact between the arts themselves, a perception of which deepens with the degree to which we penetrate the subtleties of any single art.

In art every step taken by the artist in his practice is environed with considerations of *taste*, or artistic judgment, taxing, and resting upon, the general faculties of analysis and of synthesis. In the exercise of our perceptions we see things in their true character and relations only as we are capacitated to see them by intelligence. We bring home from market only the equivalent of that we carry in the pocket. A faculty for analyzing the sensible impression instantaneously, separating it into its various components, rejecting this, selecting that, and recomposing these accretions through the means of art, in materials widely removed from nature, this constitutes the artist. The laws governing the arrangement of the sensible image must be applied to the formation of a new unity, which is art. And they must be applied with that nice sense of truth, that fine judgment, which will give to the creations of art the character of life. It is idle, therefore, to undervalue the technical, in discussing a subject like that of art. The technical enters so intimately into every question of art, that to hope to arrive at any adequate enjoyment of its effects without some knowledge of its practice, or its principles, is impossible. How are we to become alive to the beauty that rests in a fine Greek statue without some very definite knowledge of the anatomy and function of the external forms of man? The sensibility is not blind; but it is only truly awakened through a knowledge of fact and truth: it is touched by a work of art when it finds in it a very subtle correspondence with nature.

Art, in the exercise of its higher function, is the imitation of the creative power, and not the servile copy of things. In

this respect painting and sculpture are imitative in a noble sense. We will see, therefore, in our analysis of art, that ever above the form hovers a still finer sense of form, an ideal deduced from the real. It has been cleverly said of the ancients that while they took nature for their model, they never mistook their model for nature. Herein we see the distinction between idealism and realism well suggested.

A close inspection of the methods of art, as applied to painting and sculpture, serve to make us better acquainted with the spirit and aim that animates the artist in his tasks. It also serves to direct the attention to underlying principles that govern taste in creations of art. Good taste is not a mere matter of instinct: the faculties on which it rests are subject to cultivation. There are, undoubtedly, what we term "natural gifts," as of an ear for rhythm, or an eye for form—physical qualifications, or proclivities in the rough—but these do not extend, in an undisciplined state, to the appreciation of the second or fifth symphony of Beethoven, nor to the plastic forms or frescos of Michael Angelo. The production of a work of art involves technical considerations of the finest nature. At every unfolding stage of his task the artist is environed with questions of fitness—what is appropriate? A character once conceived, whether it be in the novel, or the picture, or the statue, gathers to itself, by subtile laws, its natural complements. Thackeray was once upbraided for shaping the end of one of his characters—that of Colonel Newcome—as he did. He replied that *he* was not responsible for this, as it was the inevitable result of a chain of circumstances that was no less subject to law in the novel than in real life. The influence of circumstances—the *milieu*—on character naturally leading to inevitable issues. The artist's freedom, therefore, barely extends beyond his choice of subject, and every sequence is governed by law in its unfolding; art being merely the instrument through which these laws operate. It is the same in the experience of the sculptor—the action of the mind must permeate the whole figure, giving expression and movement to the forms—in the marble or bronze.

In all art, therefore, any subject that is conceived upon a certain plane must be shaped and governed by the laws that

operate on that plane; and when there is confusion of planes in the poem or the picture, the result is caricature, the effect ludicrous. Thus it is not the subject that elevates art, but rather the plane upon which the emotion or thought of the artist acts and moves. The subject may be an insignificant one, but if nobly conceived and expressed the artist lifts it upon a plane that lends it dignity. In this view we may see how the humble, squalid peasant-pictures of Jean François Millet—fagot-binders, ragpickers, potato-diggers, conditions of life only just above the soil—may transcend in interest even the grandiose martyrdoms of mediæval art; for he somehow shows us, in his pictures, that there is a breadth and depth in the meanest human bosom “every way fit to house and domesticate the infinite divine love.” To touch a truly sympathetic chord in the human heart it is idle to use the materials of formal traditions. Sincerity is ever at the root of that which is most valuable in art. However, it is not now my purpose to discuss these general ideas, but rather to sketch briefly, within the scope of a single article, the methods and means employed by the painter in his practice.

Throughout its practice, art is so continuously a process of analysis and of synthesis, and is so perpetually referential, at every step, that few subjects offer a more inviting field in criticism. It may, perhaps, be a matter of little interest for those not specially devoted to art, to inquire technically and specifically into the means and methods employed by the painter in his practice; but the ends of art are so intimately connected with these means that there can be no adequate enjoyment of the result without some knowledge of this kind. The Greeks, as we find exemplified in Socrates, never rested content with the merely sensuous enjoyment of effects; they demanded, as well, the intellectual analysis of the means, which sharpened their appetite for ends.

In order, therefore, that we may form some idea of the methods of art-production, we will follow each successive step as the painter advances from the original motive—his subjective conception—to its finished objective expression in art. We will imagine him as having selected his subject; or, rather, we will go behind this, and consider the ground on which he bases his selection—for he must exercise choice with reference to the

powers of his art. Many subjects when first arrayed before the mind, seemingly offering many attractions, are found, by experience, to be deficient in certain requisites of pictorial art. The experienced artist generally sees these capabilities, or deficiencies, intuitively, at a glance; yet it not infrequently happens, even with the best artists, that a subject may present itself which, only after mature reflection and repeated experiment, is rejected. It is then probably abandoned, for the reason that its attractions were misleading; they were not of that character that could properly find expression in sensible form. Every art calls for a distinct habit of mind, which perceives and reasons through the media of the elements that compose the art. The poet, the painter, and the sculptor, while contemplating the same object, distinguish with emphasis those features that are best adapted to the form of expression they individually employ. A theme that may be well adapted for metrical form would, perhaps, offer no attraction for the painter or sculptor, and a subject that is eminently pictorial is for this very reason ill adapted to sculpture; while that which is sculptural lacks qualities that are of paramount importance in the other arts. A distinct order of *values*, therefore, is sought by the poet, the painter, and the sculptor, and these values rest on the correspondence of form in the means and methods of the various arts. In some instances, however, subjects may be recast so as to adapt them to these requirements—as manifested in illustrative art.

All experienced workers in art mature their subject well, in the mind, before proceeding to its technical expression: and it is in this unexpressed conception that its character is really determined. The artist collates his material, selects, synthesizes, or composes this under some leading idea, and then proceeds to embody it in art. The real labor is that of preparation for his task. For the skilled hand the expression is often a delightful pleasure—pleasurable even where skill is taxed to the utmost, and its exercise followed by extreme physical exhaustion. Vasari relates of Leonardo da Vinci that having been engaged by some Dominican monks to paint for the refectory of their monastery, at Milan, a certain work—the celebrated *Cenacolo*, or Last Supper—he was incessantly importuned by the

prior to bring his labors to completion, as the latter could in no way comprehend why the artist should remain for days together absorbed in thought before his picture. But it was through this very unexpressed activity of thought that the work was in reality being carried forward to completion. The complaints of the prior called forth from Leonardo the assertion that "men of genius are sometimes producing most when they are apparently laboring least, their minds being occupied in the elucidation of their ideas, and in the completion of those conceptions to which they afterwards give form and expression with the hand."

Having his subject well thought out, whether it be a theme of history or the mere ordering of contrasts and relations of color and forms, as in the landscape—to the extent necessary to enable him to *see* "the living, acting idea, the sentiment when it becomes movement"—the painter advances his work by first sketching the forms and composing them in groups, either separately or in relation, on bits of paper or on the canvas; or, as is the practice with some masters, he may attack the final work at once with color. All methods of gradual preparation have their merits, since this admits of working out the theme through experiment, by affording opportunity for readjustment of the parts if they do not satisfy the eye or preserve a proper relation to the whole. For a conception as it exists in the mind is only seen in general form, and not through successive detail, while the methods of art necessarily advance through the latter. Methods of gradual preparation are imperative, therefore, with those who are not prepared to express themselves spontaneously and with precision—in short, when one has not attained to a complete mastery over the means. In literature a similar course is pursued when a writer prepares what he terms a *skeleton* of his proposed essay. But masters like Shakespeare and Goethe generally carried this order of arrangement in the mind, and rapidly advanced their work, *a la prima*, without blotting or erasing. And so it was with Tintoretto, Titian, and Rubens, and conspicuously with Michael Angelo—who, however, was sometimes led into scrapes by following such a course in sculpture: when his material gave out there was no remedy: he could not cut his statue in two at the waist and insert more marble, as one might insert more matter in the body of a discourse.

The composing of pictures is a matter of such importance in art that the term "composition" is often applied to them. To arrange or compose the materials, therefore, in a manner that is effective and forceful, is of the first importance. In any art what is more vicious in style than that of a discursive, incoherent, or confused arrangement, that subserves no unity and leads to no effective result? A picture that is thus defective, however accurate and pleasing in detail, fails to impress the observer. In composition there is a golden mean between excessive compactness and looseness, between tame monotony and overloaded incident, between bald generalization and excess of detail. Therefore the artist shapes and disposes his materials—his figures and forms—on the canvas in such order that the eye regards them simply and effectively. He avoids any confusion of forms that would perplex the eye. His desire is that the first glance shall decipher his motive, which the detail will simply enforce and extenuate. And so he advances the work by contributing what he deems necessary, and eliminating whatever can be spared. It was a maxim of Schiller that the master of style is indicated rather by what he omits than by what he says, and this holds good in all forms of art. When the labor of the artist is bestowed upon unessential accessories it weakens the character of the work: it diverts attention from greater things. Thus the details, when in excess, invite, allure, and distract the eye, and lead the mind away from the primal thought. This is the effect discernible in the work of minute elaborators, in whose pictures there is no distinction made between the leading idea and the most insignificant accessory. Contrast with such works the frescos of the Sistine ceilings, by Michael Angelo, and we see the distinction is one of character. The simplicity of those grand creations, "brooding on things to come," lift and expand the soul as we contemplate them. Minute elaboration, on the other hand, merely excites curiosity or a delight in simple imitative skill.

When the picture is composed—the forms or groups brought together in effective and proper relation—then the artist seeks in nature the material that will give life to these forms. He employs models for the separate figures. He draws the figures made, to determine correctly their forms, and then he clothes

them, and in clothing them he seeks that in their costume which precisely conforms with their character. The characteristics of mind, so far as may be evinced in sensible forms, are foreshadowed in the accessories of the person. Not only does one's walk, and every movement, express mental traits, but the garments of the body insensibly partake in some degree of the character of the man. It is very easy to detect in the picture whether the artist has conceived the character in the studio or in the field; whether he has *fancied* the humble belongings of character or *observed* them. Thus these insignificant accessories derive an importance through their relations; and an old hat, an old cloak, the very shoes upon the feet, may have a significance far beyond ordinary conception. Witness how suggestively and with what pathos Thackeray alludes here and there to old Colonel Newcome's clothes: how differently is that amiable character clothed when we first make his acquaintance, fresh from India, and when in the saddened twilight of his life as his light goes out in Grayfriars! Nothing is contemptible to the eye of the true artist, and if there be one thing that renders his vocation evangelistic, it is that it leads us to reverence things not for what they are, or may be, in themselves, but for what they may serve, as a means for expressing higher things.

When I say that the artist employs the living model in his work, it is not to be supposed that he finds in the individual employed for this purpose—who ordinarily is some one brought in from the street—the precise counterpart, the living reality, of his conception. The model he must use, but he must not subordinate his original conception to the accidental facts he finds there. He does not literally imitate what he finds in his model when he employs one for his picture. He indeed does this when he is using the model merely for purposes of study. But when employed for reference, to substantiate and ground in fact his own conceptions, the model serves him; he does not imitate or reproduce, he translates; for how could the unimpassioned, passive creature, that may be employed for such a purpose, know anything of the action passing in the mind of the artist? How could the sculptor of the Laocoön, for instance, find in his living model that agonized expression we see in the statue, sustained for the length of time requisite to model even the slightest mus-

cular action of the external forms? Indeed, were his model the first of living actors, it would be impossible to get up for the occasion an expression that would embody or express the conception of the sculptor of that group. The artist uses the model, therefore, simply to verify his own conception, to substantiate it on a basis of anatomical fact or natural truth. We may see, therefore, that the character of the artist must permeate his art. He cannot get away from it. An inferior mind cannot produce a superior work of art—water cannot rise above its source. However elevated his subject, he will inevitably drag it down to his own level. This is the secret of value in fine works of art: they express the mind and character of the artist. In the *Madonna di San Sisto*, therefore, we have not merely a sublime, humane image of a mother and child, but we have a reflection of the depth and tenderness of Raphael's own character as he labored over his picture. Whether it be a madonna or a landscape, therefore, it follows that art is nature *plus* the human sensibility through which the sensible image is reflected or transmitted. Art, therefore, is character, and character is the end of all human interests. But while these thoughts may be associated with the principal things in the picture, the artist must not overlook the fact that he is to touch the mind through the sense, while he makes melody in the soul he must charm and gratify the eye; for unless he does this the soul will none of his melodies. As we read the sonnet there is a finer rhythm of correspondence subsisting between the form and thought, more subtile than that which addresses the *ear*, which charms and gratifies the sensibility; for sensibility, in the æsthetic sense, is action growing out of the fusion of the sensible and the thoughtful—when objects of sense flow harmoniously into the mind, agreeably and naturally. The character of all poetic expression determines arbitrarily the form that alone is suitable for it. If the painter has selected a subject that is grave and sombre, he must adjust everything—color, composition, *chiaroscuro*, and even technical execution, harmoniously with this motive. A grave subject dressed in gay colors and treated with sprightliness would be incongruous. In painting, color is the element that particularly distinguishes this art, as such. But color without a substructure of form—that is, in the absence of design—is, in its harmonies

and contrasts, but of little more value than the sounds from an Æolian harp as compared with the symphonies of Beethoven. There must underlie its harmonies a structure that gives it firmness and significance. Tone reduces the contrasts and relations of color to order, as subserving some unifying effect.

But that element which, more than all others, is effective in pictures, and gives simplicity and force to the impressions they make upon the eye, is *chiaroscuro*, which signifies a unity of effect growing out of the relations of the lights and shadows as they are distributed over the canvas. Not only does this term apply to lights and shadows in the picture, but it comprehends likewise the arrangement of colors, with reference to their forces of light and dark. The distribution of light and dark objects in the picture "forms the masses of *chiaroscuro*, by combining or connecting their lights and shades in such a manner as to prevent the eye from wandering confusedly over the work." Titian illustrated this precept with a bunch of grapes: each grape, if seen separately, having its light and shade in equal degree, distracts the eye and produces tiresome confusion; but when connected in a general mass, having a larger distribution of light and shade, they are collectively embraced as a single, simple object. Upon *chiaroscuro* depends likewise the character of the picture, whether it be gay or gloomy, cheerful or solemn.

"Leonardo da Vinci was the first to make it apparent that *chiaroscuro* could express the depths of reverie as well as those of space, and, with all the reliefs of the body, the emotions of the soul. A precept advocated by Leonardo, that we should place a light background in contrast to a shadow, and a dark background to a mass of light, became a principle. But Rembrandt went further: he opposed to the shadow a still deeper tone, and to the light a still more vivid brilliance." Thus he added to Leonardo's precept the variety of light against light, and dark against dark; and, in short, Rembrandt has given us that infinite play of shadow and light which is unrestricted and capable of stimulating a great variety of emotions.

The old masters have left us not merely their finished works to admire, but in many instances they have left likewise the complete record of almost every step they took to mature and perfect them. The multiplied means for the reproduction of

these sketches or studies, in *fac-simile*, by photographic processes, now enable the artist to enjoy that advantage the printing-press formerly gave to the author exclusively—the press now scatters the fruits of the artist's mind no less broadly than hitherto it did those of the poet. Nothing is more valuable and instructive for the student than these sketches of the masters, for they discover to us the path over which the artist advances to his work. They show us the first elemental effort to embody the conception in form. They show, likewise, the experimental trials and modifications, in short the study bestowed upon the figures and groups, separately and in relation to the general composition. We learn through them that the most brilliant creations of genius are not supernatural inspirations thrown off by mere force of instinct, or intuition, through the redundance of creative energy. But they are wrought out with toil and thought, forged through much labor and patience upon the anvil of the actual—hard facts that underlie and substantiate the finest sentiment always. Carlyle said truly, within limitation, that genius was simply “an inordinate capacity for taking pains;” and I think any one who has studied attentively these preparatory sketches of the old masters will feel the truth of his assertion. They show us the gropings of the skilled hand in search for forms that correspond with the conception as it exists in the mind. They reveal the necessity, so palpably felt by every true artist or poet, that the emotional impulse, to be healthful and true, must rest on a firm basis of fact, and this distinguishes sentiment from sentimentality in art. I have before me a series of these fac-simile sketches, by Raphael, made in preparation for his picture of “The Transfiguration.” One of them is an outline pen-drawing, slightly shaded, of the entire composition. The figures are all entirely nude. Some four or five others are studies of the principal figures, drawn from the life. They are reproductions of the model, in the proposed attitudes, drawn entirely nude. Thus the anatomical forms and actions are accurately studied. Other sketches are of portions of the drapery, without the figures, but revealing, by the folds and cast, the forms within. From “The School of Athens” I have a series of these studies, of separate figures and of the various groups. These were his cartoons, evidently drawn large, and

directly from the models. Some of them are squared off with lines for the purpose of transferring them accurately to the walls. They are made in chalk and charcoal, and some of them show frequent changes in the outlines. As showing the extreme care and untiring patience of the master, one of them is a large study of several nude figures in violent action, which, in the finished composition, fills merely an insignificant bas-relief on the pedestal of a statue in the background. This shows a sensitive eye for truth; what was not directly inspired by nature, even in subordinate details, has little value in the estimate of the master. In the finished composition we see how he has modified all that he has gathered from his models, rendered more elegant the forms, clothed the figures with drapery the lines of which are the consummation of grace, and to the whole he has given that spontaneous and, as it were, unconscious action which transforms the commonplace and renders it beautiful.

Every experienced artist knows that nature does not exist in the model, but may be seen through the model. Nothing is farther from the truth than that realism which simply copies. It is through a thoughtful digest of facts that we discover truth. The facts under observation may be deformities, which are accidental deviations from nature's accustomed practice. Therefore they do not represent nature in the more select and permanent form. While there is no ideal form that has any pretension to truth, and consequently to beauty, outside of nature and independent of her laws, we must distinguish what is nature from what is a perversion of her tendencies and higher function. Unless this distinction is made we are not in an attitude to understand or appreciate the ideal as the Greeks manifested it in art. Thus we see that the artist inquires into nature, investigates and informs himself of the facts, with a studious insight no less acute than that of the scientist. But while the latter inquires for the sake of knowledge, the former inquires for the sake of production.

JOHN F. WEIR.

ANTECEDENT PROBABILITIES OF A REVELATION.

ASSUMING the existence of an Intelligent, Beneficent, Personal Power behind Nature, is there any reason for our knowing more of his will and purposes than we are able to discover by means of our natural faculties? Does not the question irresistibly arise, Why have we been brought into being? The inquiry is not purely speculative, but practical also; for, unless I know the end of my being, how can I know whether I am deporting myself so as to accomplish that for which I was created, or am wholly missing the mark? How inadequate our knowledge is has been beautifully expressed by Tennyson in the following lines:

“ Behold we know not anything;
I can but trust that good shall fall
At last—far off—at last, to all,
And every winter change to spring.

‘So runs my dream; but what am I?
An infant crying in the night:
An infant crying for the light:
And with no language but a cry.”

(“ In Memoriam,” liii.)

But must God’s children forever cry, and their piteous pleading be unheeded? Can he listen coldly to the perpetual prayer of humanity for light, and never once in all the ages heed the piteous petition? Has he planted within the human spirit this longing for divine communications only as a mockery and a source of misery? The evidences of goodness in the constitution of nature seem to forbid such a supposition. In every organism there are appetites and desires, and correlative to them

there are at hand the means of gratification. The beneficence of Nature regards the wants of even the lowest and most insignificant creatures. Their wants are not only provided for, but their appearance in life is postponed with special reference to the preparation of means to supply their wants. "Insects do not emerge from the grub until the means of their subsistence are at hand; indeed, they conform to the irregularity of the seasons if the growth of the plants requisite for their food is delayed by bad weather" (Christlieb's "Modern Doubt," etc., p. 177). If this be referred by the naturalist to the environment rather than to the provisional act of a beneficent being, we have only to seek a little farther for an example that cannot be thus explained. "The larva of the male stag-beetle, when it becomes a chrysalis, constructs a larger case than it needs to contain its curled-up body, in order that the horns, which will presently grow, may also find room. What does the larva know of its future form of existence, and yet it arranges its house with a view to it!" (*Id.*, p. 157.) Has the Power behind Nature implanted this instinct in the larva for its benefit, foreseeing what it could not see, and has this same Power implanted in man, the highest earthly creature, a soul capable of self-determination and the consciousness of guilt, without making adequate provision for man's guidance and for the pardon of sin? But man's natural faculties do not enable him to know his whole duty or to discern a way of escape from the sense of guilt that pervades his consciousness when he violates the moral law that is written in his heart. A full and supernatural revelation seems necessary in order to inform his intellect, sustain his hopes, and assist his efforts. The proof of this is found in the experience of the ancient world. "One philosophical school followed another. What one proclaimed for truth was denied by its successor; the end was complete scepticism, doubt, and despair of all truth. 'What is truth?' asked Pilate, and with him multitudes of his contemporaries. In long array Cicero adduces the doctrines of different philosophers concerning the human soul, and then adds: 'Which of these opinions may be true a god may know; which may be only probable is a different question.' 'Ah! if one only might have a guide to truth,' sighs Seneca. Thus men then looked for guides; Plato, Pythagoras, the ancient philosophers,

must be such. The quest went beyond the Greeks; Egyptian, Indian wisdom seemed to offer still greater assurance. Thus something brought from far, replete with mystery, inspired confidence at first. Here, too, men discovered that they were deceived. 'We must wait,' Plato had already said, 'for One, be it a god or a god-inspired man, to teach us our religious duties, and, as Athene in Homer says to Diomed, to take away the darkness from our eyes;' and in another place: 'We must lay hold of the best human opinion, in order that, borne by it as on a raft, we may sail over the dangerous sea of life, unless we can find a stronger boat, or some word of God, which will more surely and safely carry us.' The old world, convinced of the fragility of its self-constructed float, now desired this stancher vessel; confused by its own wisdom, it longed for a Revelation." (Uhlhorn's "Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism," pp. 69, 70.)

The modern world has not been more successful in the effort to satisfy its cravings for certainty. Descartes was compelled to retire to the precincts of the colorless abstraction, "*I think, therefore I am,*" the barren assertion of self-existence, from which he emerged into the world of objective reality only with a painful slowness, if not with doubtful certainty. Spinoza mistook a mere definition for the total of truth, and from the imagined oneness of all substance proceeded by a metaphysical geometry to resolve all into God, obliterating in the process the Divine Personality, the human will, the immortality of the soul, and every rational motive and hope of life. Malebranche, lost amid two abstractions into which he resolved the known universe, elaborated with wonderful skill and eloquence his two mystical doctrines of the Vision of all things in God, and Occasional Causes. Locke, by restricting the origin of all knowledge to the sphere of the senses, tho admitting the power of reflection, laid the foundations of a philosophy that resulted in France in a soulless materialism, feeding the fires of political revolution and the holocaust of religious beliefs. Berkeley, following Locke, and writing in the interest of religion, denied our knowledge of the material world, and passed on to Hume an idealism which the latter quickly evaporated into nihilism, leaving in the darkened universe neither matter, soul, nor God. Leibnitz, the

most comprehensive spirit of his age, propounded his ingenious theory of monads, and concocted the fatalistic notion of pre-established harmony. Reid could do no better than to remind the world of its common-sense, which seemed, indeed, to have been forgotten. Kant boldly attempted the anatomy of the soul, leaving a detailed chart of its nature, but likewise leaving it a mutilated corpse that speculative philosophy seemed unable to galvanize into life, and which his practical philosophy restored only by the copious infusion of its own warm blood. Fichte bravely strove to evolve the universe from the *ego*, Schelling to evolve the *ego* from the universe, and Hegel to evolve both from nothing. Auguste Comte declared philosophy a failure, and grouped some hasty generalizations of physical science into a "positive philosophy," to which he afterwards added a "religion of humanity," in which he stripped from humanity everything distinctively human, and from religion everything distinctively religious. Hamilton, with unparalleled erudition, reinstated transcendentalism in England; but, tho a devout theist himself, left a heritage, borrowed from Pascal, in the doctrine of the conditioned and the unconditioned, which, if logically applied, would destroy theology. Mill, handing on the torch of empiricism received from the hand of his father and lighted by John Locke, burns the bridge between the soul and the outer world, and leaves man an isolated "thread of consciousness," a "series of sensations," wholly at the mercy of certain "permanent possibilities of sensation," unknown and unknowable. Spencer points backward to a certain "homogeneous somewhat," out of which all things have been slowly "differentiated" by the "unknowable;" which, nevertheless, he calls "force," and affirms that it is "persistent." Huxley, as a scientist, traces our protoplasmic ancestry through slimy reptiles, climbing apes, and mute savages, creeping upward through the ages from primal pools, only to point as a philosopher to nihilism, inherited from Hume. Such are the lights of the world!

We may well consider the wise words of Dr. Christlieb: "We maintain," he says, "that no philosophy which entirely rejected the aid of revelation and sought to comprehend the world and God by mere efforts of reason ever succeeded in attaining to any positive lasting results. From Thales and

Pythagoras onward to Hegel and Herbart, not only has one system taken the place in due time of another, but also by its criticism has demolished the earlier one. In criticism and negation, then, philosophy has made mighty strides; men have grown wiser in pulling down, but not in building up. The former is, no doubt, much the easier of the two. Down to our time, philosophers have come to no agreement even as to the basis from which philosophical speculation has to proceed; whether from some general principle or idea, or from matter; whether from the idea of pure being, or from consciousness; they are not agreed as to the relation between the real and the ideal, whether the former or the latter is that which truly is; not yet agreed as to the idea and nature of God and his relation to the world, nor as to that of man, his reason and his spirit; they are not yet agreed as to the relation existing between soul and body; nor as to our freedom of will and accountability; nor, in short, as to any one fundamental question in speculative knowledge, morals, or religion. In whatever direction we turn, we find ourselves confronted by 'open questions,' unsolved problems, and views either diametrically opposed or importantly divergent." (*Ubi supra*, p. 80.) Why is this so? Let us receive our answer from the high authority just quoted. "Philosophy," says Dr. Christlieb, "has ever desired to solve the questions What am I? Whence am I? and Whither am I and the world going? But who is it that puts these questions? Reason. But reason, we are told, is able to answer them. Is it able? *Would it persist in asking questions of which it knew the answer?*" (*Id.*, p. 76.) This is a significant question, and its answer must be a decided negative. Another question, however, not less significant, obtrudes itself upon us: *Would reason, the highest power in known creation, persist in asking questions to which there is no answer?* What means this tendency, then, universal in the human mind and springing out of its essential constitution, to reiterate in every age the questions What am I? Whence am I? and Whither do I tend? Does not the persistency of this tendency plainly indicate that there is in man's nature a constitutional demand for a supernatural revelation, a demand placed in the human spirit to guide it to the supernatural light when the light is flashed down from heaven upon our planet? The Star

in the East might appear and pass away unnoticed if the Magi of Earth were not waiting and watching for it. If an appetite is correlated to sustenance, why is not the persistent inquiry of reason correlated to revelation? An affirmative answer cannot be escaped, unless we assume that the Power behind Nature is less beneficent in gratifying the highest needs than in satisfying the lowest. Either that Power is capricious in action and the boasted uniformity of Nature's laws is a dream of speculation, or the watching of the Magi argues the appearance of the Star that shall guide their eager feet to the birth-spot of the Incarnate Word—the expected Revealer for whom Plato waited.

What must a revelation *contain* in order to meet the demand? Plainly, it must answer those questions which reason is forever asking, but can never answer, What am I? Whence am I? and Whither do I tend? It cannot fairly be expected to do more than supplement our natural faculties. It is unreasonable to suppose that it would in any respect supersede them and leave them without a purpose. This would be equivalent to an act of repentance in the Creative Power, and would imply a blunder in man's primary constitution. Here is apparent the error of those who expect to find in a revelation a full explanation of the system of Nature—an astronomy, a geology, a botany, a zoölogy, a psychology, a logic—either one or all. It is enough if what we know of these sciences is not directly contradicted. It would be no impediment to our acceptance of a suitably accredited revelation if terms were employed in it based on the *apparent* rather than on the *real* constitution of the universe; for, being a communication to man, man's modes of expression must be adopted in order to make the contents intelligible to him. If natural facts undiscovered by man's faculties were taken for granted or expressly declared, the communications made might seem needlessly to contradict his knowledge, or to contain incredible paradoxes. This would only prevent the reception of the revelation by a portion, at least, of mankind. But, however this might be, the revelation of anything that could be known by the methods of human science, or of what might be experimentally ascertained, would be apart from the main purpose for which supernatural enlightenment is needed. References to anything in the sphere of science, then, would naturally

be few, brief, and purely incidental. If absolutely and irreconcilably contradictory to known facts, the statement of a pretended revelation could not be rationally accepted; but it would be natural that anticipations of known facts would be misunderstood by those who did not possess full knowledge. This would necessitate a *progress* in the interpretation of a revelation, the rejection of old interpretations and the formation of new ones. This would not invalidate the revelation in any sense, unless those particulars were involved which it was the express design of the revelation to declare. Even among those particulars there might be some that would be important to one age and not to another; some which, at any given moment of time, would be obsolete; and others which, at that same time, would be of only prospective value. Nor would it be strange if such a revelation as man needs should be wholly meaningless to all the men of any given age of the world; for it might be important that it should exist in order that time might confirm its authority by showing that events were foretold in it long before their occurrence. Much less, then, would it be strange if there were some particulars that would be unintelligible to the men of one age, since these might be intended for the benefit of subsequent generations. Indeed, it would be expected that a revelation would contain many things not confirmed by our natural

- faculties, and many that might be surprising to us, for the communication of these would be the very object of a revelation, inasmuch as they would be beyond human discovery and proof. It would not be a reason for our rejecting either the whole or part of a well-attested communication if it should contain some announcements that were disagreeable to us, or if it should impose some very difficult tasks upon us, or if it should point out many errors in our conduct or in our judgments of which we had not formerly been conscious. In brief, we could form no *a priori* conclusion as to what announcements it would contain, or how they would affect us, beyond the expectation that it would inform us of what we need to know for the practical ends of life in reply to the questions What am I? Whence am I? and Whither do I tend? Nor would these answers be likely to assume such forms as to gratify an idle curiosity, but rather to meet a felt spiritual demand in our higher nature. Hence we

could not fairly reject a well-accredited revelation because it was deficient in scientific completeness, or because it was not expressed in scientific forms of language, or because its full meaning could be learned only gradually, or because it contained matters unintelligible to us, or because its contents were not rationally demonstrable, or because its announcements were disagreeable to us, or because it failed to gratify an idle curiosity.

What *form* would a revelation be expected to assume? Concerning this we could hardly frame a reasonable conjecture. If we could anticipate the form, it might seem, on this very account, that the revelation was not a divine, but a human, product. All that we could expect would be that the form should be such that the revelation could be clearly proved to be a revelation and not a mere human fabrication, and that it could be preserved and transmitted, in its substance at least, to future ages. It might consist in the appearance of a living being whose words and conduct should declare the truth we need, or a succession of such living beings. It might consist in a written document or a series of documents, composed in human language. Or it might consist in a combination of persons and documents appearing at intervals, each with a new increment of truth to announce or record. These might add very considerably to the sum of revelation from time to time, and this condition would argue nothing against the earlier revelations. Nothing but a direct contradiction could fairly be understood as invalidating the claims of any one of several parts in the progressive total of the revelation. New interpretations of the old might be necessitated by the new. This would be only a parallel to the progress of human science. The facts of chemistry, for example, remain ever the same, but old theories are constantly giving place to new ones. Nor does this show that the chemistry of the eighteenth century was either false or useless, but merely that it was incomplete. A theology based upon the early portion of a revelation in like manner would be neither false nor useless, but merely incomplete. It would be natural, indeed, to hold in comparatively light esteem early and partial instalments of a revelation, after the later and fuller instalments had been added; but to affect a contempt for the earlier knowl-

edge would be as unreasonable as a contempt of childhood on the part of manhood. All Nature reveals development. We find it in the growth of the human mind and body as well as in every human science and in every form of social polity. We find it in the history of thought, invention, art, and politics. It would be anomalous, indeed, if we did not find it in a revelation designed for men of different attainments and of different consequent needs. The progressiveness of a revelation, however, might easily be imagined by some as an objection to its genuineness; for the contrast between its earlier and later parts would necessarily be vivid in proportion to the extent of the developments; and this vivid contrast might easily suggest inconsistency and even apparent contradiction between the extremes. The superior dignity and more refined expression of the latest part of the revelation, being intended for a mature age, would possibly render the communications to the world in its intellectual infancy relatively childish, if not almost incredible. This being almost necessary, some apparent crudities and puerilities might naturally appear in a revelation without invalidating any portion of it. To urge their presence in a series of communications pretending to be divine as a refutation of the claim, would be as foolish as to question the wisdom and kindness of the father who gives a picture-book to his son when he is an infant and bestows upon him a library of learned volumes when he becomes a man. But if, side by side with supposed crudities, there should be found truth so sublime and recondite as to transcend human powers of discovery in the early age when the statement of it was made, truth which subsequent science should confirm and demonstrate, truth which no age could outgrow, truth which every age should esteem more and more highly as its grandeur became more evident—this would be a conclusive proof that the communication of it was supernatural. Such evidence might in time come to have such force with persons capable of estimating its conclusiveness as to lead them to suppose that no other proof of the reality of the revelation was needed. This conviction might even become so established in their minds as to induce them to regard any other kind of proof as a reproach to their intelligence. Signs and wonders, necessary at first to the confirmation of the truth,

might thus come to be esteemed positive disadvantages, since contradictions to the ordinary course of Nature, or even occurrences unknown to ordinary human experience, seem to require special proof of their reality, or may appear to the scientific mind absolutely impossible. Thus the very proofs demanded by one age may become incredible to the superficial thinkers of another age, and indeed to all who do not consider what proofs are necessary to assure the reception of a revelation at the time of its first announcement.

How, then, must a communication be *accredited* in order that it may be accepted as having a divine origin and authority? Rationalism asserts that truth bears its own credentials—that it needs only to be clearly stated in order to be universally received. Tested by this criterion, very little truth would be left in the world, for no truth has been universally received. The existence of efficient causes, of final causes, of a soul, of an external world, in fact of everything, has been at some time denied. The validity of sense-perception, of reasoning, and even of consciousness, upon which all knowledge rests, has been repeatedly questioned, and it is repudiated by whole schools of philosophy. How, then, can it be soberly affirmed that truth is its own witness and needs no confirmation? But how shall we expect reason to recognize and accept answers to the questions What am I? Whence am I? and Whither do I tend? when history shows that the answers are not found in the sphere of reason? How can reason confirm what reason does not know? Every possible answer has been given to these questions, What? Whence? and Whither? Does reason universally accept any one of them? Suppose one to write out answers to these questions and affirm that these are answers revealed to him, on what ground shall we accept the answers as true? Shall we accept them because reason knows them to be true? If reason had known the answers, the questions would never have been asked; or, at least, all men would spontaneously give one answer. Shall we accept them because of the character of the man who gives the answers? Men of the purest character have given the most opposite answers. Shall we accept them because the person who gives them claims to be divine? How shall we know that he is not a deluded enthusiast or a lunatic, such as those in the asy-

lums who solemnly declare themselves to be "God the Father"? How, in short, shall we distinguish between the divinely appointed revealer and the cunning or self-deceived pretender? How shall we decide between the conflicting claims of Jesus Christ, Zoroaster, Buddha, Mahomet, Emanuel Swedenborg, and Joseph Smith? What can decisively determine our judgments, except credentials of an unmistakable character as to the supernatural origin of the revelation which they attest? If the revelation be only natural, it will not meet the demand; for the answers to our questions cannot be obtained in the sphere of our natural faculties. The questions are propounded to the Power *behind* Nature; they are not therefore to be answered by any response of Nature, not even by human nature, for it is human nature that asks, on bended knee, with bowed head and with imploring hands, that its helpless ignorance may be enlightened. The *inquiry* is made of the *supernatural*, and the *reply* must come from the supernatural. In order that we may know that the answer comes from the supernatural, it must appear in a supernatural halo of confirmation. Nothing short of this will meet the case. The modern antagonism to a supernatural revelation is bitter and relentless in its mockery of a religion based upon the miraculous. It sneers with unutterable scorn at what it caricatures as "divine magic;" as if the Creator of heaven and earth would descend to the low level of a common showman, and astonish mankind with celestial sleight-of-hand performances! How grossly irrational this opposition to the miraculous is becomes apparent as soon as the true state of the case is candidly considered. Man has been endowed with longings after knowledge that reason cannot furnish. This knowledge is important to the guidance of life, and to the attainment of the highest ends of existence. Is it unreasonable to suppose that the Power behind Nature can furnish this knowledge? Is it "divine magic" to reveal this knowledge to man and to confirm its supernatural origin and authority by supernatural signs? Does this supernatural supplement imply imperfection in the original constitution of man? or does it not rather dignify man by making him a special object of regard in the supernatural gratification of his highest desires, while at the same time it enlarges his conception of his Creator as a Being

whose resources are not exhausted even in the production of this visible universe of wonders?

The hostility to a supernatural revelation and to miracles in general as a confirmation of religion, so general and so bitter in our times, proceeds from an atheistic or, what is practically the same, a pantheistic conception of the universe. Modern rationalism in theology and the extreme scepticism of Strauss, Rénan, and the Tübingen school of criticism grew out of the pantheistic philosophies of Germany, and especially the system of Hegel, which allows no personal Power behind Nature. If there *be* no supernatural, it is, of course, idle for man to appeal to it. But as soon as we admit that there is a source of knowledge beyond Nature, all the objections to miracles fall to the ground. Hence if we accept theism, we need have no difficulty with the destructive criticism that would resolve every miraculous revelation into myths or legends, for this criticism proceeds distinctively upon the denial of the supernatural. Strauss lays down at the beginning the critical canon that a miracle is never to be believed, and that the narrative in which it is found is so far, at least, unhistorical. Rénan holds the same opinion. "The Bible for Learners," a rationalistic travesty of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, the latest and most popular exposition of the Tübingen school of criticism, is constructed upon the presumption that every narrative containing any element of the supernatural is of necessity a legend, for a miracle is an impossibility.

But before deciding as to the possibility of a miracle we need to have a clear idea of its *nature*. What is a miracle? It is not merely a *wonder*, for Nature is full of wonders. It is not merely a *mystery*, for Nature is full of mysteries. It is not necessarily a *contradiction* of natural laws, for this would indeed make a miracle *unnatural* and difficult to believe. It is an occurrence *transcending* natural laws for an *intelligible purpose*, and displaying a *control over natural forces*. Thus, while a miracle is not *unnatural*, it is essentially and distinctively *supernatural*. A strange and unprecedented occurrence is not a miracle. It must have an intelligible purpose and manifest a designed control, or it is a mere wonder. Thus regarded, a miracle is a divine manifestation, and miracles are the expressive language of supernatural revelation. A miracle is not, therefore, a sleight-of-hand

performance, tho a mere trick of a magician may be mistaken for a miracle by the superstitious, just as a fallacy may be mistaken for an argument by the dull. The probative value of a miracle is not destroyed by the fact that the simple may be deceived by a trick, any more than the conclusiveness of a sound argument is invalidated by the fact that men are daily beguiled by sophistry. A real miracle is a certain manifestation of the supernatural, and the difficulty lies wholly in the proof that the miracle has been performed. There is, indeed, in every case a metaphysical possibility that we may not be able to distinguish a miracle from a trick, but there is also the experimental certainty that men are constantly confounding arguments and sophisms. The truth is that a finite mind cannot know anything infallibly, for all our senses sometimes deceive us; but it is unfair and unphilosophical to place metaphysical difficulties in the way of supernatural knowledge which we do not practically place in the way of natural knowledge.

It is decidedly against the modern speculative denial of miracles that the chief objections urged against them were first clearly stated and pressed upon the attention of modern thinkers by one whose system of philosophy was blank nihilism—a hopeless scepticism that swept away the foundations of all knowledge, natural as well as supernatural. David Hume, the nihilist, wrote his “*Natural History of Religion*” in 1757, and it was posthumously published twenty years later. The speculative objections urged in that work against the possibility and the proof of miracles have animated all subsequent attacks upon supernatural religion. Hume’s quibbles have taken root in speculative minds so generally that, as Strauss confesses, “the chief offence which the old system of religion necessarily gives to the spirit of our age is its superstitious belief in miracles” (“*Leben Jesu*,” 1864, p. xviii.).

Hume’s view of the subject is thus presented by his latest biographer, sympathetic expounder, and admiring disciple, Prof. Huxley: “If our beliefs of expectation are based upon our beliefs of memory, and anticipation is only inverted recollection, it necessarily follows that every belief of expectation implies the belief that the future will have a certain resemblance to the past. From the first hour of experience onwards, this belief is

constantly being verified, until old age is inclined to suspect that experience has nothing new to offer. And when the experience of generation after generation is recorded, and a single book tells us more than Methusaleh could have learned had he spent every waking hour of his thousand years in learning; when apparent disorders are found to be only the recurrent pulses of a slow-working order, and the wonder of a year becomes the commonplace of a century; when repeated and minute examination never reveals a break in the chain of causes and effects, and the whole edifice of practical life is built upon our faith in its continuity, the belief that that chain has never been broken and will never be broken becomes one of the strongest and most justifiable of human convictions. And it must be admitted to be a reasonable request, if we ask those who would have us put faith in the actual occurrence of interruptions of that order to produce evidence in favor of their view not only equal but superior in weight to that which leads us to adopt ours. This is the essential argument of Hume's famous disquisition upon miracles." ("Hume," English Men of Letters Series, pp. 127, 128.)

Experience is, as Hume claims, our ground of expectation, but is it not a common experience that our experience is enlarged and even contradicted? It does indeed indicate the probable, but it can never reach absolute certainty. The only ground presented by Hume for our belief that the chain of known sequences will never be broken is that the chain never has been broken. His assumption is, then, that the future will be like the past. But how does he know that the future will resemble the past? He can be certain of this only by knowing that the resources of Nature have been entirely exhausted. To know this would imply omniscience, which Hume makes no claim to possess.

Hume's great mistake lies in defining a miracle as "a violation of natural laws." This, as we have shown, would be *unnatural*, whereas a miracle is only *supernatural*. Huxley perceives and criticises this error. He says, "The definition of a miracle as a suspension or a contradiction of the order of Nature is self-contradictory, because all we know of the order of Nature is our observation of the course of events, of which the so-called miracle is a part" (*Id.*, p. 131). Huxley errs, however, in assert-

ing that the so-called miracle is a part of Nature. It is not *natural* for one to rise from the dead, it is *supernatural*; and if a case were proved to be *real*, all men would admit this. The difficulty lies in the *proof*. Here is Hume's really strong point. He contends that testimony cannot prove the occurrence of a miracle, for it is more probable that men will lie than that a miracle will occur.

This position requires close examination. Huxley thus states his own ground: "The more a statement of facts conflicts with previous experience, the more complete must be the evidence which is to justify us in believing it. It is upon this principle that every one carries on the business of common life. If a man tells me he saw a piebald horse in Piccadilly, I believe him without hesitation. The thing itself is likely enough, and there is no imaginable motive for his deceiving me. But if the same person tells me he observed a zebra there, I might hesitate a little about accepting his testimony, unless I were well satisfied not only as to his previous acquaintance with zebras, but as to his powers and opportunity of observation in the present case. If, however, my informant assured me that he beheld a centaur trotting down that famous thoroughfare, I should emphatically decline to credit his statement; and this even if he were the most saintly of men, and ready to suffer martyrdom to support his belief." (*Id.*, p. 132.) This is good sense, and most sane men would accept it as such. No one differs from him in refusing to believe in the existence of a centaur, because there is absolutely *no reason why it should exist*. But suppose there *is* a good reason for believing that an object exists, tho it has never been seen, is testimony concerning it so incredible? Let us test Professor Huxley with a practical case. The origin of life on the globe is unknown to science, and presents the greatest mystery with which science has to deal. Suppose some one should affirm that he had discovered at the bottom of the sea a vast body of living matter, extending in a mighty belt nearly round the globe, and that all terrestrial life, including the human, originated in and was derived from this long-undiscovered mass: would this be credible? It was so to Huxley, and he paraded his supposed discovery in a scientific journal, announcing to the world, "Bathybius," for thus he christened his monster, "is a vast sheet

of living matter enveloping the whole earth beneath the sea." How inadequate the evidence was for the existence of this Bathybius is evident from Huxley's subsequent retraction of his theory, and the following careful statement of Dr. Lionel S. Beale, made after a close examination. "Bathybius," says Dr. Beale, "instead of being a widely extending sheet of living matter which grows at the expense of inorganic elements, is rather to be regarded as a complex mass of slime, with many foreign bodies and the *débris* of living organisms which have passed away" ("Protoplasm, or Matter and Life," p. 110). Yet Strauss had hailed this wonderful discovery as bridging the chasm between the organic and the inorganic, and as expelling the miracle of the creation of life from the universe. How could Huxley believe in a Bathybius so easily and refuse to believe in the existence of a centaur on any testimony? The plain answer is that he saw a *reason* why Bathybius should exist, but *no reason* for the existence of a centaur. The mystery of life was, as far as possible, to be explained. Now apply the same test to miracles designed to confirm a revelation. There is a *reason* why man should receive a communication from the supernatural, and such a communication could be confirmed, as we have seen, only by supernatural signs. How unfair it is, then, to rank miracles designed to be evidential of a revelation with stories of a centaur appearing in Piccadilly! Yet he declares that "judged by either the canons of common-sense or of science, which are indeed one and the same, all 'miracles' are centaurs or they would not be miracles, and men of sense and science will deal with them on the same principles" ("Hume," p. 134).

John Stuart Mill, who was in many respects a disciple of Hume, candidly states the case thus: "A miracle is no contradiction to the laws of cause and effect: it is a new effect supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause. Of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there can be no doubt, and the only antecedent improbability which can be ascribed to the miracle is the improbability that any such cause existed. All, therefore, which Hume has made out is that (at least in the imperfect state of our knowledge of natural agencies, which leaves it always possible that some of the physical antecedents

may have been hidden from us) no evidence can prove a miracle to any one who did not previously believe in the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power, or who believes himself to have full proof that the character of the Being whom he recognizes is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question. If we do not already believe in supernatural agencies, no miracle can prove to us their existence." ("A System of Logic," p. 440.) No exception can fairly be taken to these words of Mill. Our plea for the credibility of miracles rests wholly upon the assumption that there is an Intelligent, Beneficent, and Personal Power behind Nature. We claim, therefore, on the authority of Mill, that there is no antecedent improbability of a miracle designed to confirm a supernatural revelation, *except to an atheist*. We also claim that no man, whatever his mental tendencies may be, can abide permanently and peacefully in absolute atheism. Mill did not. While rejecting all other arguments as wholly valueless, Mill concedes, in his essay on "Theism," considerable weight to the argument from design. Having spoken of evolution by natural law, he says: "Leaving this remarkable speculation to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store for it, I think it must be allowed that, in the present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in Nature afford *a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence*." (Three Essays on Religion, p. 174.) Even Hume was not a hopeless atheist. Leslie Stephen, an admirer of Hume, writes in concluding an account of his opinions: "A vague belief, too impalpable to be imprisoned in formulæ or condensed into demonstrations, still survived in his mind, suggesting that there must be something behind the veil, and something, perhaps, bearing a remote analogy to human intelligence" ("English Thought in the Eighteenth Century," vol. i. p. 342). Nowhere among great thinkers do we find unfaltering certainty that there is no supernatural. As long as this is the case, a miracle, rightly understood, cannot be rationally pronounced impossible, and testimony to the actual occurrence of a miracle is not necessarily false.

But Hume seems to go farther than Stephen's words would represent. In one of his candid moods he writes: "The whole

frame of Nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author ; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion" ("Essays," vol. iv. p. 435). Commenting on our ignorance of the attributes of the Deity, he says, in another place, "Believe me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion is a longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance by affording some more particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the divine object of our faith" ("Essays," vol. ii. pp. 547, 548). As a "rational inquirer," then, even this illustrious manufacturer of doubts could not deny an intelligent Power behind Nature, nor that a "well-disposed mind" would desire and expect "a more particular revelation" than Nature affords. How is this desired and expected revelation to be given? Having conceded so much, in Mill's judgment, Hume could not logically refrain from conceding also that this revelation might be attended by miracles. All *a priori* objections being now removed, why should not the testimony of a sufficient number of witnesses, intellectually and morally competent, be received? If no further objection can be urged, there remains no case against a miraculous revelation.

DAVID J. HILL.

RECENT FRENCH FICTION.

IT is only a few months since the chance remark of an eminent American novelist in praise of another American novelist raised a most amusing tempest in a teapot in the right little, tight little island of Great Britain, and revealed to the joyful gaze of the delighted American observer the wholly unexpected fact that our British brethren are now as thin-skinned as we were once, and that the slightest pin-scratch on their gentle epidermis will bring blood and leave an ugly scar. Altho incautiously worded, Mr. Howells's assertion was substantially indisputable, since he did no more than declare the commonplace that the art of novel-writing refuses to stand still and is always in course of evolution. Like all other arts, it must go forward, under penalty of going back if it pause. In original genius the novelists of to-day may not be the equals of the novelists of yesterday; but their art is finer to-day than it was yesterday. The great novelists of the past would be the first to recognize this fact and to avail themselves with delight of the improved formulas of the present. It happens that among the English-speaking peoples these formulas have received their greatest extension on the American side of the Atlantic. Just now the art of the American novelist is a finer art, truer, more exact, than the art of the British novelist. Altho the British critic may hesitate to acknowledge this, the American critic proclaims it aloud, and the French critic sets it forth in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for the enlightenment of both hemispheres.

And it is only common courtesy in the French to come to the support of the American and to reinforce him at the moment of victory, for it is to a study of French models that the American novelist owes his finer art, his more delicate touch, and his more symmetrical construction. Both directly and in-

directly the effect of French fiction is greater in the United States than in Great Britain. For one thing, French novels are far more widely read in America than in England. Probably as many Americans as English read the latest tale of M. Cherbuliez, M. Daudet, or M. Zola in the original French. Certainly many more Americans than English read it in a translation, for the simple reason that five times as many translations into English of French novels are published in the United States as in Great Britain. It is only now and again that a French novel is deemed of sufficient importance in England to warrant a translation. But in these free and United States, where the absence of any adequate copyright legislation makes it seem easier to take a foreign author's work for nothing than to pay a native workman, the novels of all the chief French novelists appear in translation within a few weeks after their publication in Paris. It is possible in New York to pick up translations into English of nearly every novel of M. Octave Feuillet, of M. Emile Zola, of M. Alphonse Daudet and of M. Victor Cherbuliez. It would not be possible in London. Nor is the desire of that extraordinary entity the Average Reader to get the best foreign fiction confined wholly to French novels. There is an American edition of Turguénieff—for whose works you might ask in vain in any English book-store. There are American editions of the novels of Auerbach and of Björnson—whose works are almost wholly unknown to the mass of English novel-readers. There are several German novelists whose tales are familiar and accessible in English to Americans as they are not to the British. To say this, of course, is merely to give instances of the more cosmopolitan nature of the American reading public and to show that it lacks the insularity on which the British public prides itself. However, any dwelling on Russian or Scandinavian or German novelists is foreign to the present purpose of this paper. For the novelists of France have influenced the novelists of America far more than the novelists of any other nation, far more indeed, than the novelists of all other nations combined—England alone excepted.

In France just now there are to be noted most curious and instructive developments in the art of story-telling; and there is to be seen at work a most curious process of evolution. The

novel in France is in the act of rapid growth in influence and of rapid change in form. It is gaining here and losing there. It is enlarging its scope on most sides and it is revising its formulas. Of course it is too soon to see exactly where the revolution will land us, while we may see dimly where it is leading. Unfortunately we are too close to the event to observe its full bearing. We cannot declare with precision the grand sweep of the current, tho we may now and again catch a glimpse of the smaller eddies and whirlpools. As Yankee Doodle says, the houses keep us from seeing the town, and we cannot see the forest for the trees. We have before us too many novels and too many novelists to be able to remark with absolute exactness just what the Novel is. Therefore is it impossible now to give a philosophic study of French fiction as it is in this ninth decade of the nineteenth century. The most that may be done is to set down a few notes here and there, fixing salient facts, and co-ordinated as well as may be. These notes will be of use not as an elaborate treatise or a serried criticism on the novelists now writing in France, but rather as records of fleeting events and of constantly changing impressions. In a word, this article is an honest and a humble attempt to take an instantaneous photograph of one aspect of French fiction as seen in 1883.

There was a time, not very long ago, when it seemed to be absolutely indisputable that the French were far greater dramatists than novelists, and even that the French drama of the nineteenth century was far superior to the French prose-fiction of the same period. I cannot say that I have altogether changed my mind, but the case is not as clear to me as it once was. The roll of the dramatists is long and honorable, and wholly unequalled in any contemporary literature. The plays of Victor Hugo, Alexandre Dumas, Auguste Maquet, Eugène Scribe, Alfred de Vigny, Casimir Delavigne, François Ponsard, Alfred de Musset, Emile Augier, Jules Sandeau, Alexandre Dumas *fils*, Théodore Barrière, Mme. de Girardin, Victorien Sardou, Edmond Gondinet, Eugène Labiche, Octave Feuillet, Adolphe Dennery, Ernest Legouvé, Henri Meilhac, and Ludovic Halévy form a body of dramatic writing of the most imposing weight, which any other language may well envy. But Victor Hugo, Alfred de Vigny, the elder and the younger Dumas, Alfred de Musset,

Jules Sandeau, Octave Feuillet, and now Ludovic Halévy are novelists as well as dramatists. To offset the remaining dramatists, there are Honoré de Balzac, Charles de Bernard, "George Sand," Gustave Flaubert, Théophile Gautier, Alphonse Daudet, Erckmann-Chatrian, Victor Cherbuliez, Jules Verne, Emile Zola, Jules Claretie, Georges Ohnet, Emile Gaboriau, Henri Gréville, —who are primarily novelists, tho they each and all, having been tempted of the devil, have essayed the stage. A comparison of the list of the Frenchmen of the past half-century to whom the drama is the natural form of expression and whose genius finds its fullest freedom upon the stage with the list of the Frenchmen of the past half-century who have done their best as novelists in spite of any little leanings toward the stage revealed now and again —this comparison shows that the apparent superiority of the dramatists over the novelists may perhaps be due rather to the fact that the contemporary drama of France is very much better than the contemporary drama of any other country; while the contemporary prose-fiction of France, admirable as it is, strong and picturesque and rich as it is, is not, however, absolutely unrivalled, if indeed it may fairly be called greater than that of Great Britain. Alongside of contemporary French dramatic literature there is no English or German dramatic literature to bear a serious and searching examination. Alongside contemporary French prose-fiction there is a contemporary English prose-fiction which can hold its own sturdily. With the full recollection of the ample performance of Walter Scott, Charles Dickens, William Makepeace Thackeray, and "George Eliot," it is not difficult to deny any intellectual superiority to the prose-fiction of the French, even tho it is illumined by the great works of Victor Hugo, Alexandre Dumas, Honoré de Balzac, and "George Sand." I am not declaring any equality or superiority —far from it; my desire is only to show that the argument is open and may be made by whoso will. But argument as to the relative merit of the contemporary drama of France and England is futile.

Whether the apparent superiority of the French drama over French prose-fiction was due to its actual superiority over the drama of other languages or not, there can be no doubt that in France now the novel is rapidly gaining on the play. Time was

when the drama alone appealed to a large circle, and when the man who wished to lift up his voice in public had to deliver his message in the theatre. This is now no longer the case. During the past ten years an extraordinary change has taken place in the temper and in certain of the habits of the French. Once upon a time the French were not a reading people. Nowadays a single novel sells a hundred thousand copies. For the first time in the history of French literature the novelist is beginning to be as well paid as the dramatist. When Scribe brought to life again the Society of Dramatic Authors projected by Beaumarchais, and set it firmly on its legs, he assured the ample pay of the dramatist, who was thereafter enabled to receive about one tenth of the gross receipts of the theatre on every night that his play provided the entertainment. A theatre in Paris may take in from three thousand to ten thousand francs a performance—of which the authors would receive from three hundred to a thousand francs: and a successful play is often acted for a hundred successive nights. If a piece really makes a hit in Paris it brings in to its happy author a sum varying from five thousand to twenty-five thousand dollars: and this is for the performances in Paris only, independent of the sums received from the provinces of France, from Italy and Germany, from England and America. The writing of novels offered no reward like this. Indeed, the novelist's greatest hope of profit was that his story might be striking enough and popular enough to tempt a manager to ask him to let it be dramatized. Even in this case the possible profit was always shared with the professional dramatist to whom was entrusted the thankless task of shaping to the stage a story constructed without regard to the exigencies of the theatre. The difficulties of dramatic construction are too well understood in France for a manager or even for the novelist himself to be willing to dispense with the aid of an expert in putting the story on the stage. But of course it was only a very few novels, out of the hundreds written every year, which were deemed worthy of dramatization. In general, the novelist had to rely for his reward on the sum received from a newspaper or review for the serial publication of his tale and on the proceeds of the sale of the book itself.

The elder Dumas, with his marvellous fecundity and his great

renown, managed to get good prices from the newspapers for his delightful and interminable tales of adventure. So too did Eugène Sue with his fantastic attempts at realism. But Dumas and Sue were in a measure able to command their own terms, and these terms were altogether exceptional. They were as exceptional as the hundred thousand francs paid to Victor Hugo for the right to publish 'Les Misérables.' The very noise and tumult excited by the report of these extraordinary prices go to prove that they were hitherto unheard of and altogether out of the way. Balzac is a name of greater weight in the history of fiction than either Hugo or Dumas—and how very far Balzac was from receiving any such terms, or indeed any terms at all adequate to his gigantic powers, may be seen by the reader of his deeply interesting and highly characteristic correspondence, which is as full of references to money as one of Trollope's novels. "George Sand is the unapproached artist who to Jean Jacques's eloquence and deep sense of external nature unites the clear delineation of character and the tragic depth of passion," wrote George Eliot, the one Englishwoman who surpassed George Sand in both the gifts for the possession of which the Frenchwoman was praised: George Sand gained a European reputation at the very beginning of her literary career. Yet George Sand lived laborious days and nights and worked long and unceasingly for a meagre pittance, for a bare support for herself and her two children.

In 1835 Emile de Girardin, so M. Jules Claretie has lately reminded us, carried on a discussion with Balzac as to the literary supply and demand in France at that time. Girardin declared that all contemporary French novelists might be divided into five categories. First, those whose works were sold to the extent of twenty-five hundred copies: there were but two, Victor Hugo and Paul de Kock. Second, those whose works sold perhaps fifteen hundred copies: there were but four of them, Balzac, Soulié, Sue, and Janin. Third, those whose works sold from one thousand to twelve hundred copies: there were not six of them. Fourth, those whose works sold from six hundred to nine hundred copies: there were perhaps a dozen of them, of whom Alfred de Musset was one. Fifth, those whose works sold less than five hundred copies: the name of these was

legion, and Théophile Gautier was one of them—for his 'Grotesques' sold only two hundred copies.

Besides this classification of the French novelists of fifty years ago into five classes according to the circulation of their works, Girardin added a statement of the prices paid to these authors for their novels; and M. Claretie notes that it was estimated then that there were perhaps two hundred people in France ready to buy the best literary novelties, and that there were about eight hundred reading-rooms and circulating-libraries. With this restricted market the French publishers then, working in a vicious circle as the English publishers do now, put a high price on every volume and tried to spread out a story into as many volumes as possible. They did not pay a royalty on the copies sold, they bought the copyright outright for a lump sum paid down on receipt of the manuscript. According to Girardin the two authors of the first class, Victor Hugo and Paul de Kock, might hope to receive three or four thousand francs for a novel, while those of the second class—in which Balzac was—received from fifteen to seventeen hundred and fifty francs. Writers of the third and fourth classes might get from five hundred to twelve hundred francs for their fictions. The many unfortunates who filled the fifth class were forced to sell their manuscripts for sums varying from one hundred to three hundred francs.

A scant half-century has changed all this. A time of many readers and a time of cheap books have arrived together, each helping the other. Of a novel by a well-known writer now edition follows edition: and it is as well to note that in France an edition may be taken roughly to mean a thousand copies. Sometimes five and ten and even twenty thousand copies are printed before publication to meet the advance orders. Three stories of M. Zola's have reached an aggregate sale of nearly three hundred thousand copies. These are 'Nana,' which is in its hundred and twenty-third edition; 'L'Assommoir,' now in its ninety-eighth; and 'Pot-Bouille,' in its sixty-sixth. His latest story, 'Au Bonheur des Dames,' lags behind as yet, not having attained its fiftieth thousand. Close after M. Emile Zola comes a new novelist, M. Georges Ohnet, who has written only three stories—'Serge Panine,' now in its eighty-sixth edition; 'Le

Maitre de Forges,' in its seventy-fourth; and a recently published 'Comtesse Sarah,' already in its eightieth thousand. M. Alphonse Daudet yields but little to any one in point of popularity; his 'Rois en Exile' sold fifty-seven thousand, his 'Nabab' and his 'Numa Roumestan' sixty-two thousand. His latest novel, the strong and painful tale of religious bigotry and ascetic intolerance called 'L'Evangéliste,' is already in its thirty-sixth edition. M. Jules Claretie, whose 'Monsieur le Ministre' dealt with a subject closely akin to M. Daudet's 'Numa Roumestan,' saw its sale fall only two thousand behind that of his friend's novel, reaching sixty thousand. M. Claretie's later tale, 'Le Million' sold nearly fifty thousand, and his last novel, 'Noris,' has been published too recently to declare its circulation, but it bids fair to catch up with its predecessors. The charming Franco-American tale written by the reformed dramatist M. Ludovic Halévy and called 'L'Abbé Constantin' is in its fifty-first edition, and the younger and equally charming 'Criquette' has already achieved its forty-fourth. Mme. Henri Gréville is too prolific and too rapid a writer for any of her books to do her full justice; her more recent novels have not been quite as well received as the firstlings of her muse. As Mr. Whipple said of a writer now forgotten but widely read once upon a time, Mme. Gréville pierced the bull's-eye with her first arrow and she has been shooting through the same hole ever since. Her first hit, 'Dosia,' is in its forty-first edition, and 'Sonia' is in its twenty-fourth: perhaps none of the other of her books are out of their teens. The novels of M. Victor Cherbuliez, altho much liked in America, have never been very widely circulated in France; the greatest number of editions attained at any time by M. Cherbuliez having been reached with 'Le Comte Kostia,' which is now in its ninth thousand. This is a little surprising, but it is not as unexpected as the discovery made in collecting the notes for this list, that the sensational novelists, whose serial stories send up the circulation of a paper by thousands and tens of thousands, do not attract the more careful public, which cannot be tempted to read a story in slices. M. Xavier de Montépin, M. Fortuny de Boisgobey, and M. Arthur Arnold are the delight of the countless readers of the *Petit-Journal* and its fellows; but their books very rarely reach

a tenth edition, and the average sale is certainly not five thousand, if indeed it be three. Their tales of crime, adventure, mystery, and hair-breadth escapes are effective only in homœopathic doses, and when given in the ordinary and regular quantities they repel. Even the works of the late Emile Gaboriau, the greatest master of the art and mystery of detective-story writing since the death of Edgar Allan Poe, even the books wherein are given the deeds of the 'Petit Vieux des Batignolles,' and the devices of the ubiquitous and omniscient 'M. Lecoq,' even these great masterpieces do not average a sale of ten thousand copies each. And only one of Gaboriau's books, 'Le Dossier 113,' has reached its twentieth edition.

This great development of the French reading public and this enormous increase in the circulation of the more successful French novels are the result of the awakening of the French people immediately after the war: at least one is inclined to accredit the effects to this cause, tho the precise working of the process is not wholly clear. Certainly our war had no such influence. Relatively, if not absolutely, the sale of 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' was as great as the sale of 'A Fool's Errand.' We are a reading race here in America, but the most successful American novel is not sold to the extent of eighty thousand copies in less than six months, as M. Ohnet's 'Comtesse Sarah' has been within the past half-year. It was thought remarkable when Mrs. Burnett's racy little tale 'A Fair Barbarian,' and Miss Woolson's fine and tender novel 'Anne' attained each of them a circulation ranging from ten to fifteen thousand copies within a year of their publication. And fifteen thousand copies is perhaps the utmost limit to which our very best novelists aspire. Special reasons other than unconditional literary merit have given to certain of the fictions of the late Dr. J. G. Holland and the present Mr. E. P. Roe a circulation not inferior to the most successful novels of American authors of higher fame. But plainly enough we have no half-dozen novelists whose latest works average a sale of from thirty to fifty thousand: and the French have. The French, it may be added, have not to fear the free rivalry of the imported British novel, to be had for the asking by any man who can control a printing-press.

And the direct reward of the French novelist is greater than

the reward of the American novelist. The French custom is to publish serial stories in the newspapers, and as there are many newspapers there is thus in France a greater demand for the novel than there is in America from the comparatively few magazines. The rates of pay do not differ greatly, altho a prominent French author can probably demand a heavier sum for the serial right of his story than any American author. From the sale in book-form, moreover, the American gets far less than the Frenchman. American novels sell at a price varying from one dollar, which is the most frequent, to two dollars, which is quite unusual. French novels sell at a uniform price of three francs and a half. The American author generally receives a royalty of ten per cent on the retail price, or from ten to twenty cents a copy. On a sale of ten thousand the American author might receive a thousand or fifteen hundred dollars—perhaps at the outside, and most infrequently, two thousand. The French author generally receives a royalty of one franc a copy. On a sale of ten thousand the French author is sure to receive at least two thousand dollars. A sale of ten thousand is very rare in America, while it is not at all uncommon in France. For his three novels M. Georges Ohnet has probably received about fifty thousand dollars.

It is also to be remarked that the successful French novel is very much more likely to be dramatized than the successful American novel, and that it is sure to be very much more profitable if it is dramatized. M. Daudet, M. Zola, M. Ohnet, and M. Claretie probably expect to see upon the stage the story of one out of two of their novels: they may indeed have written them with one eye on the theatre. There was a time when the French manager looked askant at the novelist and preferred to accept and to act an untried subject. But to-day this is all changed. Nowadays a notable novel is the best key to unlock the stage-door. A manager has even been known to engage to bring out a play solely on condition that its bold and unconventional story should first be broken gently to the public in the form of a novel. M. Ohnet's 'Serge Panine' and M. Albert Delpit's 'Fils de Coralie' were both plays before they were novels—but the novels were published long before the plays were performed.

In this highly flourishing condition of the novelist's trade, M. Emile Zola no doubt sees the full and complete triumph of the Naturalism of which he is the prophet. M. Zola willingly accepts pecuniary standards of artistic criticism. If a book sells widely it is because people like it, and therefore it is a great book. To M. Zola one man's judgment is as good as another's; he applies the principles of universal suffrage to literature; and he recognizes no supreme court to declare the popular verdict unconstitutional. The substance of the half-dozen volumes of æsthetic and literary criticism in which M. Zola has declared the true doctrine of Naturalism was neatly summed up by the late Sidney Lanier in two sentences: "(1) every novel must hereafter be the entirely unimaginative record of an experiment in human passion; and (2) every writer of the Romantic school in France, particularly Victor Hugo, is an ass." Hugo's works, as George Eliot said of Heine's, "are no Phidian statue of gold and ivory and gems, but have not a little brass, and iron, and miry clay mingled with the precious metal," yet the one clause of M. Zola's dictum is as true as the other. Victor Hugo is not an ass, and a novel cannot be a bare transcript of barren life relieved by no touch of imagination. As a fact, M. Zola is not true to his flag, for his own novels are not as bare and as barren as he says a novel ought to be; and he is guilty of using his imagination—now and then, not always. The best of his novels, the truly poetic '*Faute de l'abbé Mouret*,' is so far removed from the conditions of ordinary life that it is almost fantastic—but it is a good novel none the less; it is a strong, virile, romantic tale, dealing with people of flesh and blood, and handling natural and irresistible passion with skill and sobriety. Even '*L'Assommoir*,' in spite of its undue length and of the dirt which encumbered it and accumulated in its corners, was not entirely without imaginative touches. Of '*Nana*,' the less said the better: the book was wholly disgusting. It must be said, however, that even in the highly objectionable '*Nana*' there was nothing to stir the sensual appetite of a sickly and precocious boy; the story, far from setting out vice seductively, was rather an awful and cold-blooded warning against vice: it held up a grisly skeleton and let the fierce light play upon its decaying bones. In the still more ignoble '*Pot-Bouille*' vice is never

attractive; it is always degrading: but the result of the exhibition is hideously indecent and wholly unhealthy and intolerable. It is the soiling influence of these books and not their immoral tendency which does harm. As Mr. Lanier said of two far better novels, the final result is "such a portrayal as must make any man sit down before the picture in a miserable deep of contempt for himself and his fellows, out of which many spirits cannot climb at all, and none can climb clean." Here, indeed, is the bane of M. Zola's system and practice: it is soiling. In the exclusion of healthy people and of the ordinary scenes of life the writer is driven inevitably to the description of sickly people and of dirty things. He who touches pitch is defiled. He who reads 'Nana' or 'Pot-Bouille,' or even the latest and less offensive 'Bonheur des Dames,' must wash in water seven times and remain unclean until even.

The road along which M. Zola and his disciples are travelling, and which they take for the highway, is in reality a *cul-de-sac*, and there is No Thoroughfare. Sooner or later they must retrace their steps. As M. Schérer has taken pains to point out, the attempt to describe what has hitherto been left undescribed must fail at length for want of what will bear description. There are some things—and they are not a few—which common consent declares indescribable either because they are high and sacred or because they are low and loathsome. Sooner or later the Naturalists exhaust their material; they come to the point beyond which they dare not go for fear of common decency and the police. The faster M. Zola and his little band of imitators rush along this path, the quicker will they arrive at the barrier. In their haste to astonish and to shock and to outdo one another, they are going very fast indeed. Where M. Zola's rate of progress is arithmetical, that of his young rivals is geometrical. The end is at hand. Indeed, the evil must soon work its own remedy. The great trouble with these young men who have or affect to have an overwhelming contempt for those who do not like to look on dirt and who would rather not live on a dunghill will be when they have come to the end of their tether, when they hear the call to repentance, and when they wish to abjure sack and live cleanly. Rome was not reformed in a day, and we cannot slough off our bad habits in the twinkling of an

eye. In M. Zola's latest novel, for example, '*Au Bonheur des Dames*'—the subject of which, by the way, is fundamentally, identical with the subject of Richardson's '*Pamela*' and therefore open to the same obvious objections—there are signs a plenty of an evident desire to be decent and cleanly: and it is true that there is not as much unpleasant matter in the '*Bonheur des Dames*' as in '*Nana*' or '*Pot-Bouille*.' But the book is deadly dull: in the effort to be decorous M. Zola is unspeakably stupid and wearisome and none the less is the tone of the book hopelessly low and grovelling. As we read it, we feel as if we were turning over the soiled linen of humanity. M. Zola has a total incapacity to be other than ignoble. To him the best of men, the highest and the worthiest, is a fellow of base instincts and mean desires. Long before M. Zola, Wordsworth proclaimed a return to nature, but M. Zola's work is a constant denial of Wordsworth's noble declaration,

" 'Tis Nature's law
That none, the meanest of created things,
Of forms created the most vile and brute,
The dullest and most noxious, should exist
Divorced from good—a spirit and pulse of good,
A life and soul, to every mode of being
Inseparably linked."

That M. Zola labors under this disability to look on the bright side or even to acknowledge that there is a clean side is most regrettable, for his native ability is indisputable. He has power beyond question. His work conveys an impression of main-strength. Two or three of his disciples are clever young men. One of them is a man of very great ability. This is M. Guy de Maupassant, the nephew of the late Gustave Flaubert. It is to Balzac primarily that the Naturalists do obeisance as the great master; but they are willing also to burn a candle or two before the shrine of Gustave Flaubert. While the '*Comédie Humaine*' of Balzac is the Bible of the Naturalists, the '*Madame Bovary*' of Flaubert is admitted into the Apocrypha as worthy to be read and pondered. '*Madame Bovary*' must indeed be taken as the masterpiece of Naturalism—an accidental masterpiece it may be; at any rate Flaubert was unable to repeat his bull's-eye, tho he kept on firing at the same

target with the same gun. M. Guy de Maupassant has inherited not a little of his uncle's ability. His latest novel and his best, 'Une Vie,' is the revelation of a very striking talent—absolutely misapplied. It is not that his book is vicious or indecent; it is not that it is hideous or degrading; for none of these epithets can fairly be applied to it. But it is a painful tale and a pitiful. 'Une Vie' is as cold and as hard and as merciless as 'Madame Bovary,' with which novel it has many points of likeness. Both stories are unnecessary, while perhaps not unprofitable; both depict the life and death of a woman to whom existence has been hard. Madame Bovary is naturally vicious and corrupted, and she goes to the devil headlong in her own fashion. The heroine of 'Une Vie' is naturally pure and honest and made for happiness, but her life is one long misery. Every salient detail of her wretched existence is set down in black and white with uncompassionate iteration. The girl never has a chance of happiness, tho' endowed with a great capacity for it. From the beginning of the story, almost, she is a sufferer,—a patient, innocent, meek, helpless sufferer. With the hero of the 'Rehearsal' the heroine of 'Une Vie' might say,

" The blackest Ink of Fate, sure, was my Lot,
And, when she writ my name, she made a blot !"

M. de Maupassant's touch is more sympathetic than Flaubert's and less brutal; and he is a gentleman, which M. Zola is not. Yet it is plainly in accordance with M. Zola's tenets that M. de Maupassant goes into minute physiological details and describes what has not hitherto been described in books of literary pretensions. So well does M. de Maupassant write and so firm is his hand, that we resent these compliances with M. Zola's code as personal injuries. We are shocked and pained; and we long to get away from the scene, as if we were intruding actually on the privacy of domestic life. It was probably the presence of these passages, fortunately few in number, however execrable in taste, which led the respectable firm of Hachette & Co., who monopolize the railroad news-stands throughout France, to refuse to sell 'Une Vie.' Now, M. de Maupassant's book is not spoon-meat for babes, but it is not likely to hurt any one

who would read it; and it is far healthier in tone than anything M. Zola has written—and Hachette & Co. sell M. Zola's works freely.

Yet for M. de Maupassant's books as for M. Zola's we may borrow a criticism of Mr. Lanier's on 'Humphrey Clinker' and 'Tristram Shandy'—"I protest that I can read none of these books without feeling as if my soul had been in the rain, dragged, muddy, miserable." A great deal of modern French fiction is hard reading and painful. The poet Gray's idea of happiness was to lie on a sofa and read French novels all day long. The French novels that Gray liked were the Moral Tales of M. Crébillon *filz* and the amusing romances of M. Marivaux. The highly cultivated taste which liked these fine flowers of a corrupted court would be shocked and chilled by the French novels of the Third Republic, which are as dreary, many of them, as a document and as pessimistic as a Nihilistic proclamation. There is little life or gayety in modern French fiction. There is elaborate description, and there is minute analysis. Both of these qualities are also to be found abundantly in modern English fiction. But modern English fiction, however inartistic it may be in its construction and whatever failings and faults it may have, is at least not as dull and dreary. Dickens is as realistic in his love of detail as Balzac; and George Eliot has dwelt on provincial life with the same painstaking devotion as Flaubert. But in Dickens there is something warm and hearty; and George Eliot's 'Adam Bede' and 'Silas Marner' are not as cold and as gray as Flaubert's 'Madame Bovary.' The characters chosen by Dickens and by George Eliot are as humble in station, as poor in this world's goods, and as ignorant and helpless as those chosen by M. Zola: but the effect produced by the Frenchman is wholly different from that produced by the two great English writers. And this difference is not merely a difference of ability, or rather it is not at all a difference of ability. As M. Ferdinand Brunetière has pointed out in his most acute and instructive essay on "Le Naturalisme Anglais," it is a difference of attitude.

"A profound sympathy for these monotonous lives and for these vulgar laborers is the soul of English Naturalism," says M. Brunetière; "French Naturalism, on the contrary, has nothing

but disdain and contempt for its Bouvards and its Pécuchets." Every stroke of Flaubert's long description of Yonville, the little village where Madame Bovary lives, is as sharp as the snap of a whip, and as biting: you cannot help seeing that Flaubert knew the place inside out and hated it heartily and despised the people in it. You seem to detect in every line of Flaubert the satisfaction of a grudge. But George Eliot describes her Saint Ogg's or Hayslope with the calm serenity of a large mind and a large heart. Lowly as her characters might be, and poor, and queer as might be their pride, you recognize at once that George Eliot felt their common humanity and moved gently among them as one of them herself.

The French novelist who in this respect most nearly approaches the English ideal is M. Alphonse Daudet. Dickens has been M. Daudet's schoolmaster. And moreover M. Daudet himself came from the South, from Provence. So it happens that his novels have a warmth, a movement, a hearty life, and a gayety of color lacking in the novels of his fellow-workers. M. Daudet has far more charm than Flaubert or M. Zola or M. de Goncourt, and he has far greater delicacy. His nature is richer, one would say; so his art is richer. And above all, he does not hold himself high above his creatures, as if he were observing them through a microscope. Yet altho M. Daudet is not as unsympathetic as his fellows and his friends, he has not the identity with his characters which is the distinguishing feature of the great English novelists. He has not the same faculty of putting himself in their places and of feeling with their senses. Even to M. Daudet the Nabab and Numa Roumestan are not his brothers, creatures of the same flesh and blood, but interesting creatures of his mind and memory to whom he always remains superior.

And then, too, M. Daudet has given in to the current Naturalistic delusion of describing everything. There is a deluge of description destroying the interest of half the French novels of late years. At every moment the story stops that the scene may be painted. This is a trick the Naturalists have caught from Balzac—whose best work is not infrequently disfigured by the introduction of long pictures of things and of places, all admirably overdone and all inartistically useless. The object of

description is to describe, to bring up in a single flash before the reader, the exact impression of the things or the place or the occasion, to reproduce its mental image. The best description is obviously the one which does this, which produces this effect, with the smallest expenditure of force and of time. Success in description lies along the line of least effort. Now the most of the modern French novelists think otherwise. They describe for the sake of describing. They mass and accumulate detail to the verge of fatigue. Sometimes they set forth this detail out of the fulness of knowledge, but more often they go forth deliberately and get up the facts, taking notes, and in a word "cramming" to write a novel—as tho it were a competitive examination.

M. Daudet's latest novel is less open to this objection than some of his earlier stories. 'L'Évangéliste' is a study of religious fanaticism incarnated in a woman of iron will, beating down all barriers and bearing all before her. M. Daudet is too keen an artist to stay a story like this for pictures of places. The march of events in 'L'Évangéliste' is as inexorable as fate;—indeed the French novel suggests a Greek tragedy in its simplicity and in so far as its personages are impelled and driven by an irresistible force. The Evangelist herself is a narrow-minded and strong-willed bigot, using immense force in the remorseless furtherance of a cast-iron fanaticism. The story is one which deserves careful reading by all who desire to know how fictitious and how unholy is the morbid excitement of the "revival" and the "camp-meeting." It is told with great strength and great sobriety: and it was perhaps impossible that it should be other than painful. But it is not violent and cold like the novels of M. Zola and M. de Goncourt.

Of course M. Daudet, in writing a book with a purpose and in trying to preach for the first time, bears down too hard now and again. But the desire to be instructive, to set forth a definite warning, gives his work a greater ethical richness. After all, morality is the best coloring-matter for the novelist. Art for art's sake is always a rather pale affair. It is not necessary for the moral to be tagged to the tail of the story, as Charles Lamb said, "like the 'God send the good ship safe into harbor' at the end of the old bills of lading." The Apollo Belvidere

teaches its lesson silently ; and it would not be as useful if you were to put an electric light in its hand or on its head.

"The movement of a literature—a subject hitherto insufficiently studied"—M. Schérer tells us—"is governed by three great laws. The first is the changes which take place in the moral and intellectual state of the public. The point of view is in perpetual motion, especially in our modern societies ; and with the general point of view everything else changes, tastes like ideas, art as well as thought. It happens sometimes—and this is the second of the laws of which I speak—that the movement is not produced by a simple evolution of ideas, but, on the contrary, by a reaction more or less pronounced, the human mind rushing willingly and impulsively in the direction opposite to that it was going before. A third law, finally, and one not less frequently applied than the preceding, is that satiety is brought about by use and that the need of innovation is brought about by satiety."

The truth of this dictum can be seen by any one who cares to consider the course of French fiction during the last ten years. Slowly the Naturalists gained ground and conquered the public. Once in possession, they ran riot and exhausted the popular patience. A reaction set in ; and the strained and labored novels of the Naturalists failed to satisfy the popular taste, which sought for fiction brighter and breezier, with greater relief and greater color, at once both calmer and more joyous. It happened that M. Zola's '*Pot-Bouille*' appeared just at this critical stage of public opinion : and the dull and indecent tale was denounced as it deserved. It happened that M. Ludovic Halévy's '*L'Abbé Constantin*' appeared almost simultaneously ; and this cheery and pathetic little tale was hailed with delight and exalted to the skies.

M. Ludovic Halévy had been the partner of M. Henri Meilhac in writing between fifty and a hundred plays, comedies like '*La Boule*,' operas like '*Carmen*,' operettas like '*La Grande Duchesse de Gérolstein*' and the '*Belle Hélène*,' and tearful pieces like '*Froufrou*.' He had tired of dramatic authorship and dissolved the partnership. The neatness of touch and delicacy of style revealed in his plays and in certain lively little sketches were used in '*L'Abbé Constantin*' in the telling of a

delightful story, as fresh and frank and innocent as any in the history of fiction. In time 'L'Abbé Constantin' has been followed by 'Criquette,' the events of which are not quite so innocent, tho the moral is perhaps firmer. Both tales are simple and wholesome; and both are lighted and relieved by the use of an extraordinarily clear sense of humor.

It is to this same reaction from revolting themes and monotonous description that M. Georges Ohnet is indebted for much of his success. He came on the nick of time. M. Ohnet has no great originality; neither 'Serge Panine' nor the 'Maître de Forges' is strikingly novel in construction, in incident, or in character—altho the tragic mother-in-law of the first book is a firm figure and not at all hackneyed. But France is not a country with ten religions and only one sauce: M. Ohnet is a Frenchman who can serve you up any old situation with a new dressing so exactly to your taste that you can hardly declare you have met it before. The strength of M. Ohnet's hold on the public lies in the fact that he is a born story-teller. Now the born story-tellers are a precious few. "The truth is," Mr. Warner told us only the other month, "that the faculty of telling a story is a much rarer thing than the ability to analyze character, and even than the ability truly to draw character." This faculty of telling a story M. Ohnet possesses to the full. He does not analyze overmuch; he does not describe overmuch; he turns neither to the right nor to the left; he tells his tale simply; and a straightforward and healthy tale it is generally.

In this hasty review of the course of contemporary French fiction it has been necessary to pass over briefly or to omit altogether many names on which it would have been pleasant to pause. Names, however, are important rather according to what they represent than what they are. A name is of interest in this paper only as it stands for a group of writers or for a principle or for a tendency: if it speaks for itself alone, there is no need to dwell on it. MM. Erckmann-Chatrian, for example, have written a notable series of historical novels, in which we are shown the behind-the-scenes of the great battles of the Napoleonic era. But MM. Erckmann-Chatrian stand apart; they have no followers, no imitators. They are therefore—all question of ability aside—of less consequence to us just now than

M. Zola, for M. Zola stands in the centre of a little knot of worshippers who break their censers against his nose when they write criticism, and who out-Zola Zola in hideous degradation when they write fiction.

In considering the movement and growth and evolution of a literature, we find that there are writers we may term sporadic, so wholly are they outside of the prevailing influences of the time. Mme. Henri Gréville and MM. Erckmann-Chatrian may fairly be called sporadic. There are those who have this attribute of great genius that they are above their time and yield relatively but little to the currents of the hour. There are others, more flexible and more impressionable, who seem to sum up the contending influences of the time. M. Jules Claretie is one of these. He is a very clever man, a brilliant writer, gifted with the story-telling faculty, having a keen eye for character and a strong feeling for situation. He has a manner of his own too; and yet he is even more important as a typical specimen of the novelist produced by the meeting and fusion of the opposing theories of fiction now in fashion in France. M. Claretie's novels show an artistic compromise between the principles of the Romanticists and the principles of the Naturalists. Having a well-balanced head, M. Claretie avoids the extravagancies of the first as his innate decency keeps him out of the depths of the last. To call M. Claretie a genius would be stretching a point; but he is a man of great ability, high cultivation, untiring industry, and sound common-sense. He is a hard worker and a good workman. He will not found a school; and yet in his novels we can see the model of French fiction for the next few years. To an abiding sense in the reality of life and to a strong grip on the facts of life M. Claretie unites a clean mind and an honesty of feeling and execution. He describes well, but he no longer lets his descriptive faculty run away with him. He knows Paris thoroughly and through and through,—its healthy homes even better than its haunts of dissipation and idleness. 'Monsieur le Ministre' was quite worthy of the comparison with M. Daudet's 'Numa Roumestan,' provoked by the accidental identity of subject. Indeed M. Claretie's book as a study of political life was far truer to exact fact than M. Daudet's, and quite as powerful in its effect. M.

Claretie's next novel, 'Le Million,' was as typical as M. Halévy's 'L'Abbé Constantin' of the revulsion of feeling in France in favor of decency. It was as decent and as innocent as the English novels which the French mother allows her daughter to read. And his latest story, 'Noris,' is to my mind the best of the three; and its sturdy honesty is heartily welcome. It deals with the conditions of life as they are in Paris, but it deals with them austere,ly, and there is no lingering along the primrose path of dalliance.

In the preceding pages I have endeavored to make clear the change which has come over French fiction in the past few months. There was first the slow evolution of Naturalism, with its power of drawing pictures and painting the lower instincts of man. In time Naturalism sank deeper and deeper in the mire. Suddenly the public revolted and clamored for something cleaner, and accepted with delight the graceful and charming tales of M. Halévy, the passionate intensity of M. Ohnet's stories, the poetic, altho painful tract of M. Daudet, and the honest and honorable novels of M. Claretie. Even M. Zola saw the signs of the times and heard the call to repentance, but—*ne fait pas ce tour qui veult*. The scent of the roses will hang round it still: M. Zola cannot rid himself of his mean views and of his degrading touch. And even when he would, he could not write cleanly. The vulgarity was not only in the theme M. Zola treated, it was also, and even more, in M. Zola himself.

Occasion serves here to say again what cannot be said too often, that morality does not depend on the reward of virtue or the punishment of vice or on the few words of sermon tagged to the tail of a story by way of valedictory. Morality does not even depend on innocence of subject, nor on the chastity of detail, nor altogether on the practical lesson which the story teaches, nor on the sympathy excited for the right characters. As M. Francisque Sarcey recently reminded us, morality is rather a question of effect than of logic. The question to be asked is, What is the total effect of the story? Virtue may triumph and vice be vanquished, and yet by such ignoble means that we revolt. The ultimate outcome of a story may be complete poetic justice; the good people being snatched up to heaven in a chariot of fire, while the bad people are all cast into

outer darkness where is weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth ; and yet fire itself cannot cleanse us from the soiling effect of the sordid meanness and moral degradation with which that very story may have contaminated us. True morality consists rather in the total effect on us. Does the reading of a novel or the seeing of a play elevate us or degrade us?—that is the question. Does it lift up the heart ? Does it make a man better or stronger and nobler ? Does it make him more of a man and more fit for high deeds and lowly duties ? Does it sustain him, and give him strength, and make him more ready to rejoice in our common humanity, and more capable of the heroic self-sacrifice which may be demanded at any moment from any of us, even in this workaday world and in this matter-of-fact century ? The future of French fiction depends on the presence of a morality which satisfactorily answers these questions.

J. BRANDER MATTHEWS.

THE ABNEGATION OF SELF-GOVERNMENT.

THE fundamental idea underlying the government of every State of the American Union is that the people rule. Upon this the American people have erected their constitutional structure, and to this their laws and their conduct are supposed to conform. Their constitutions, State and National, tho they may be said to have grown out of their circumstances, were not forced upon them by the circumstances, and simply accepted with little or no volition on their part, as has very commonly been the case with government in other countries; but the controlling principle was adopted deliberately by them, from a conviction that it was exactly suited to their condition, their political traditions, their habits of thought and action, and their needs. They therefore made formal agreement that not only were the people of a country the rightful source and fountain of all legitimate authority in government, but that in the United States it was proper and expedient that they should retain in their own hands this authority, and exercise it. They had by their Declaration of Independence rejected as unfounded the assumption that by divine selection, or otherwise, any one without their consent had been made their rightful master, and they perpetuated in their constitutional system the "self-evident" truth that all men by nature are equal in right and privilege. Conceding the impossibility of all the functions of government being exercised by themselves directly, they created trusts and provided for their being performed by officers, but these officers were to be chosen by themselves in strict subordination to the principle that sovereignty belonged to and was to be retained by the people, and that all governmental powers in the hands of individuals were to be exercised by mere delegation. The underlying principle of their political structure

was, therefore, not a mere invention of convenience to meet a temporary necessity and provide for a crisis in public affairs, like the theory of original contract in England, but through constitutional forms it was given such effective vitality and force that the validity of legislative enactments and of other governmental action could be determined by it. The body that made the laws under the delegated authority must keep within the delegation, or its enactments would be mere idle fulminations, to which no one would owe obedience or need give any attention. Officers of all grades were to have their authority carefully measured out and limited; and this authority the people would not only recall if they saw reason for so doing, but while it continued they would periodically pass judgment upon the official conduct of those exercising it, and displace them if dissatisfied. Even the courts, with power to decide upon and apply the law, were, like all other agencies, to be under the law, and the restraints thrown around them were such as to make them understand and feel at all times their subordination to the sovereign power.

In the government of a State is implied the making of its laws and the establishment of rights thereby. The diversities of circumstances, opinions, aims, desires, interests, and passions on the part of the governed are such as to make this a task of infinite difficulty and nicety; and it requires for its performance not only great ability, long experience, constant and patient thought and reflection, and a willingness to be taught by events, but also a complete subordination of private to public interests, so that at all times that may be done which in the judgment of the ruler the public good demands. It is also implied that the laws made shall be enforced; that there shall be such provision for and adjustment of remedial and restrictive forces as shall give to the rights established effectual protection, and make life, liberty, and property secure. To this end every person concerned in the administration of the laws must be made to perform his duty, so that the laws may not be idle commands, but vital forces. The fact must be recognized that there are elements in society which tend perpetually to disorder and lawlessness, and that to hold these in due subjection perpetual vigilance on the part of the ruler is essential. If he re-

laxes this vigilance for his own ease, convenience, or private interest, he not only fails in duty and becomes deserving of severe censure, but he, in a degree, abdicates his authority in favor of those disorderly elements, who substitute their own will for the law which has, nominally, been made for their control. It is evident, therefore, that rare mental and moral qualities, and great self-renunciation, are required in the ruler of a State, and that he will very imperfectly perform his duty unless the public interest is constantly uppermost in his thoughts and the chief subject of solicitude.

It is, of course, not to be assumed that every member of a political society will be sufficiently enlightened and virtuous to make a wise ruler; but the aggregate wisdom and virtue of the community may be supposed superior to that of any one individual, so that the collected sense of the people respecting their own affairs is likely to be better than that of a single person, however great or eminent, and better deserving of expression in the laws of the State and in their administration. The self-government of a State is not only, therefore, theoretically the best, but it only requires that the sense of the people on public affairs shall be properly collected and given effect, to make it best in reality.

A vague notion is afloat, much acted upon without being expressed, that when the people have exercised the most important act of sovereign authority—the adoption of a Constitution—they are thereafter to manifest their sovereignty only in the elections, when they choose their representatives and other official agents, and pass upon such propositions as may by law be referred to popular vote. The absurdity of any such notion, when applied to the government of a king or other single ruler, would be apparent at a glance, for the responsibility of the government is upon him, not upon his subordinates and agents, and the duty to see that the laws are enforced is a personal duty, of which he cannot effectually relieve himself by any delegation. But it is still more absurd when applied to a popular government, where offices, for the most part, are held for definite terms, and the incumbents are not removable at will by the sovereign, but only at fixed periods. If, during their incumbency, the people are charged with no responsibility in respect

to the performance of official duties, the sovereign power of the State, for all practical purposes, must be considered as lying dormant from one election to another, and what is called the rule of the people can be little more than the privilege of making periodical choice of masters. This is so far from being the theory of American government, that the exact opposite is the fact; for the American Constitutions, State and National, assume that the sovereignty of the people is to be of controlling force at all times and under all circumstances, and they contain numerous provisions for making it so. All officers are subordinates and agents, who are chosen on the implied understanding that they are to represent the popular judgment, and give effect, so far as they may in their official conduct, to the sovereign will in the government. If they fail in this they are chargeable with misconduct either to the State or to some one or more of its citizens, or possibly to both, and it is the business of the sovereign authority to give redress.

Wrongs in government may be chargeable to either official personages or to private citizens. When chargeable to officers, they may be due to ignorance or incompetency, whereby, without intention, public duties fail in performance or are imperfectly or unwisely performed, or they may come from positive and intentional disregard of law and duty. It is not the purpose of the constitution that any such wrong shall be suffered without redress; but it may be well to survey the means of prevention which have been devised by the sovereign power, and the ways in which it is supposed to make its constant presence and superintending authority felt and respected.

The device of delegating to distinct departments of government the legislative, executive, and judicial powers is supposed to be of very high value, as it puts each department in a position where, for the protection of its own jurisdiction, it must aid in limiting to its proper authority each of the others. The checks and restraints which this division of authority establishes operate continuously, and to a large extent without attracting attention; and in so far as they accomplish the intent, they are to be regarded as continuous manifestations of the sovereign authority of the people which established them. If they fail of full effect, they at least show the purpose of the

Constitution, that every officer and each department of the government should at all times be in due subordination to the sovereign ruler.

The guarantee of liberty of speech and of the press, which is so effectual that no legislature can take it away and no court or officer hamper or abridge it, is meant to be as well a guard against public wrongs as a means of redress in case they are committed. The intent is that by the free utterance of feeling, sentiments, beliefs, and even suspicions, in respect to public affairs, warning may be given of any threatened danger or wrong, and the public heard in condemnation; or if the wrong shall be actually accomplished, the general voice may be at liberty to arraign the wrongdoer at the bar of public opinion, and inflict upon him such punishment as is involved in a public exposure of his abuse of trust or of his failure to meet the requirements of his position. The free use of this liberty is supposed to be an important part of the self-government of the people. It checks abuses; it punishes public offenders; it prepares the people for the proper and intelligent exercise of their duty in elections; it assists in driving unworthy characters from public life, and it enables those in office to understand public sentiment, and leaves them without excuse if they fail to respect it. Whoever makes use of this liberty to enlighten his fellow-citizens on public affairs, or on the conduct of public officials, is exercising a function of government, and if he does this conscientiously and with a view to just results, is performing a public duty which is imposed upon him by virtue of his citizenship in a free State.

The right of the people to bear arms in their own defence, and to form and drill military organizations in defence of the State, may not be very important in this country, but it is significant as having been reserved by the people as a possible and necessary resort for the protection of self-government against usurpation, and against any attempt on the part of those who may for the time be in possession of State authority or resources to set aside the constitution and substitute their own rule for that of the people. Should the contingency ever arise when it would be necessary for the people to make use of the arms in their hands for the protection of constitutional liberty, the pro-

ceeding, so far from being revolutionary, would be in strict accord with popular right and duty.

The continuous sovereignty of the people is sometimes manifested in a very striking manner when a department of the government assumes to take action which is not within the authority that has been delegated to it. The legislature, for example, adopts some enactment which is not authorized by the constitution. In a legal sense this enactment is void, because the people, in limiting the authority of the legislature by their constitution, have in effect declared that when the limit shall be exceeded the law-making function shall be inoperative. The people, therefore, nullify the unauthorized enactment by refusing to obey it; and this any one of them may do with the most perfect impunity, because the law will be with him in doing it. He needs for the purpose no judicial decision, no official assistance; he simply obeys the constitution, which is the law made by the sovereign, and is therefore paramount, instead of the law attempted to be made by the subordinate, which must necessarily be inferior, and if conflicting, inoperative.

When official wrongs are committed for which other remedies are ineffectual, a resort to the courts for the infliction of criminal penalties remains. The institution of a criminal prosecution may perhaps be made the official duty of some public prosecutor or other officer; but this duty is not exclusive. It is the right of every citizen to be complainant when the Commonwealth is wronged, and what is his right may become his duty if the law appears not likely to be otherwise vindicated.

Where wrongs proceed from private persons there is commonly a double wrong: first in the individual who violates the law, and next in the officers who fail to prevent the misconduct or to punish it. But the neglect of officers does not excuse the people for like neglect. If a bully shall flourish weapons and threaten violence, or shall actually be committing violence upon his family or other helpless persons, no citizen can innocently ignore the fact on the pretence that it is not his business to right the wrongs of others; for to right wrongs is precisely what he undertakes to do when he assumes the privileges and obligations of government.

It seems very obvious, when we consider the rights reserved to the people in forming their constitutions, and in choosing their official agencies, that the position of the American sovereign,—the aggregate citizenship,—as regards the enforcement of the laws and the protection of rights under them, is strictly analogous to that of the individual sovereign of a country, and is subject to all the same responsibilities and duties. The business of the sovereign is to govern; to make laws and to compel obedience to them; to give to the people the benefit of the laws in the protection of the public peace, and of individual liberty and right. And tho the duty to exercise functions of government may be delegated as a trust to individuals selected for the purpose, and in general must be so delegated, yet these persons can act as subordinates and agents only, and their responsibility is secondary to that of the principal who makes use of them as instruments. Agents are to perform not their own work, but the work of the principal; and if they fail in duty, and disorders occur in consequence, the principal, upon whom the final and continuous responsibility rests, must find the remedy. The sovereign himself must rule the State, whether he employs for the purpose many agents or few, just as much as if he employed none at all. The American sovereign, it is true, takes no oath to do this, such as is customary for hereditary rulers; but the reservation of the power by their constitutions is of itself a pledge to the coincident duties, and an oath could add nothing to the obligation.

Are these duties regularly and habitually performed under a sense of responsibility involved in the reserved power of self-rule? No conscientious and thoughtful person can answer this question in the affirmative. It is matter of common observation that laws are made by the representatives of the people which are afterwards suffered to be violated with impunity, the violators being not only never punished, but never complained of. We make no allusion now to such isolated and secret offences as under a vigilant government might escape detection or proof, but to open, bold, and contemptuous violations of law, where not only are the offenders known, but the proofs of guilt notorious.

Take, for example, the case of statutes to restrain or suppress

the sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage. Some of these absolutely prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks in the State enacting them; some of them simply surround the sale with securities for the protection of public order and private rights, and require heavy license fees from dealers. All of them are supposed to express the sovereign will on the subject to which they relate, and if that will is, for practical purposes, the law of the land, they will be obeyed. That they are not obeyed is notorious. There is not a State in the Union having laws on this subject which are at all stringent in whose large cities, at least, they are not disobeyed with practical impunity. Attempts to enforce them are spasmodic; they are made by single individuals or classes, while the general public look on with unconcern, or at least without giving active aid; and if they succeed in some cases they bring no warning, because the successes are exceptional. The dealers decide that they will not obey the statute, and it fails of effect; there is therefore one law upon the statute-book and another in the drinking places, and it is the latter which prevails. The sovereign will of the State succumbs to the will of the classes it attempts to restrain, and *pro tanto* there is an abdication of government.

To a considerable extent the same truth holds good in respect to the laws against gaming. If we inquire in any leading city of the country, we shall expect to learn that gambling places are open in various parts of it in which the laws of the State are habitually violated; that this fact must be known to the mayor and the aldermen, to the superintendent of police and his subordinates, to the sheriff and his officers, and to considerable numbers of business men and other citizens. But probably not one of all these persons is making vigorous effort to enforce the sovereign will of the State as against the conflicting will of the "sporting" classes, or is apparently conscious of a personal responsibility resting upon himself, as a participant in the sovereignty, to do what he can to make the law respected.

The case of laws purporting to regulate the sexual relations is still worse. Nominally, prostitution is prohibited; but in all considerable towns it is practically allowed, and the penalties against it are seldom enforced except when other disorders follow. The law, therefore, is that prostitution may be carried on,

and that statutes to the contrary may be disregarded. In every State there are also statutes which restrict divorce to certain specified causes; but the actual law is different, and every day divorces are being granted for causes unknown to the statutes. The courts, which often are not very vigilant, and do not always care to be so when there is no contesting party, suffer fictitious and collusive cases to pass into judgment; and we seem to be almost approaching the period when marriages will be arrangements of temporary convenience, to exist at the will of the parties concerned. This is a crying evil, and some persons have supposed a remedy might be found for it in a national divorce law, which should make the causes for divorce uniform throughout the country. Such a law would take away the opportunity for fraud by means of fictitious residences in States whose laws were most liberal; but this would do very little towards reform. The real evils arise from the very lax public sentiment on the general subject. A national divorce law would almost certainly be a very liberal one; but if it were possible to enact and enforce one of a different character, an inevitable result would be that the irregular and illegal relations now so common would find considerable countenance in public sentiment, or at least considerable tolerance, and would increase in number and publicity.

A more flagrant example of the nullification of statute law, and one involving several very gross and palpable wrongs, is to be met with in the case of homicide for alleged family offences. The two principles that in the administration of justice are absolutely without exception are, that no man shall be judge in his own cause, and that no person shall be condemned without a hearing on the evidence. These are fundamental; but we repeat them in our constitutions in order to emphasize them and put them beyond question. The Constitution of the United States, in prohibiting the States to deprive any one of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, renders the States powerless to set aside either of these principles. But what the State is powerless to do the Honorable Mr. Smith, or Colonel Jones, or Judge Robinson is suffered to do with impunity. Accusing a neighbor of an offence against his family rights, he proceeds to give judgment upon his own accusation; he allows

no delay, no hearing; he condemns, and he executes his own sentence. In the eye of common and statute law this is murder, with many circumstances rendering it peculiarly atrocious; among the least of which is that the punishment inflicted for an unproved offence is such as the State would not sanction if the offence were confessed or established on trial. But in some parts of the country an individual is not only suffered in this way to put aside the common law, the statute law, and the constitution, and to make and administer a law which is the mere outburst of his passions, but the public give this nullification of their own will approval, and if called upon to sit as jurors sanction it by their verdict. Intentional homicide with malice aforethought is thus excused upon a plausible story of personal injury in the perpetrator, which the other party, being promptly put to death before he could be heard, is unable to contradict. This is an advance upon the practice of the amusing primitive magistrate who refused to listen to the defendant after the plaintiff had told his grievances; for, tho he refused to hear one party, he at least stopped short of death in awarding judgment.

Other illustrations might be taken from the laws to secure freedom and purity in elections, but it is not needful. That evasions of those laws are calculated upon by managers and connived at by parties is well understood; and as many persons perhaps are amused as are indignant when one votes "early and often," or otherwise renders the law a lifeless utterance.

The most conspicuous instance of constitutional reservation of a share to the citizen as such in the ordinary administration of the laws concerns the jury service. Jury trial is preserved by every American constitution, and is given a certain sacredness, as something the value of which has been put by time and experience so far beyond question, that it is not to be submitted to legislative discretion or judgment. The right, and the correlative duty, to participate in it is a part of the people's sovereignty; the right to have one's rights determined by it only the people themselves by formal and deliberate action can terminate.

Whether it is wise thus to consecrate jury trial may be and is a serious question; but there is certainly much good reason

for it. In theory this method of trying the facts seems the best possible. What is the theory? It is that twelve freeholding citizens, selected without bias, and representing different employments, different classes of society, different parties, and different religious and social organizations as may happen, but wholly impartial as between the litigants, shall be the judges of the facts in controversy; consulting together upon them, weighing and canvassing the evidence, rejecting whatever to their common-sense appears false or improbable, and giving what seems its due weight to the rest, until a conclusion is reached in which all can unite. There is value in every feature of jury trial—in the requirement that the jurors shall be freeholders; in the investigation to determine their impartiality; in their being taken indifferently from the various conditions and circumstances of life, so that the prepossessions and prejudices of one class, if any there be, may be corrected or neutralized by the others; in the considerable number required for the panel, and even in the most doubtful particular—the requirement of unanimity. The sifting of conflicting evidence and the canvassing of witnesses is simply the application of the common-sense of the triers to the stories told on the witness stand, and the probability that an aggregate body, not too large for calm consultation and deliberation, will reach the truth is presumably greater than that it will be reached by a single judge, tho he may be more able and wise than any one of the twelve. The theory of jury trial seems, therefore, to be sound and right, and we see abundant reason for preserving it, independent of the inherited veneration we feel for its service to liberty in former times.

By the jury system every substantial citizen is a judge, and the life, liberty, and property of his fellows may be passed upon by him. He is not set apart to be a judge at all times and in all controversies; but he is a judge when the lot selects him, and he undertakes, as a party to the constitution of the State and nation, that he will faithfully perform his duty as such, and do justice to the best of his ability. This duty is most important in the great cities, not only because there the cases to be tried are likely to be most weighty and complicated, but also because in the cities the number of those who have the legal qualifications of jurors is relatively smaller than elsewhere.

Let us now ask how the substantial citizens of the country, and especially of the cities, perform this duty, which by institutions of their own making has been imposed upon them. Do the men of wealth and leisure in New York, the great merchants and manufacturers, the artisans and builders, the publishers and editors, the managers of banks and railroads and insurance companies, and of the thousand other organizations whose capital, and energy, and business ability make the city the commercial metropolis of the Western hemisphere—do they or any considerable proportion of them exhibit a willingness to perform their part in the government when summoned to this duty, and do they promptly respond to the call, intending with patience and fidelity to discharge the obligation it involves? Or do the leading citizens of any city in the Union show in their conduct that they accept in good faith the duty of jurors, and intend without evasion to perform it?

There is not a person in the United States who is both candid and intelligent but will without hesitation answer these questions in the negative. Jury duty we know is habitually shunned and evaded. Very seldom a man with large business interests puts aside his private affairs that he may perform it: very seldom a banker leaves his counter or an editor lays down his pen, or a prominent business man in any line leaves his business to his subordinates, in recognition of this great duty to the public.¹ The officers who select and summon jurors understand this, and are not likely to call upon him. If he is summoned, he is likely to treat the call with contempt; and if the court takes the trouble to send for him he will escape service by paying a fine. It is no longer the case, therefore, that trial by jury is trial by twelve substan-

¹ It has recently been the subject of commendatory remark in the public press, as something deserving of special praise, that a certain leading Member of Congress and candidate for the Speakership, when summoned to jury duty, promptly took his place in the jury-box and avowed his purpose to serve. But why should he be praised for it? Nobody bestows praise upon him for taking his seat in Congress when that body convenes; everybody assumes that to be of course, because it is his duty as a member. But the duty to serve as a legislator is no more imperative than that to serve as a juror; and really fit men are needed as much in the one place as in the other. Special praise for recognizing the duty can only be taken as an admission of general dereliction.

tial citizens freely chosen, but it is trial by such twelve persons as consent to sit. Some may sit from a sense of duty, some from fear of fines, some because they are without business, some because they are corrupt, and hope for an opportunity to make dishonesty profitable. It is an exception—in the cities a rare exception—when a jury represents the average ability, intelligence, and character of the community.

It is under such circumstances matter of course that jury trial shall be ridiculed and denounced; but let him who is without sin cast the first stone. When we condemn it we condemn a system of which we ourselves are a part, and which is ridiculous or corrupt because we fail in duty to it. For our private ease or convenience we put aside the duty, and the idle, the ignorant, and the mercenary assume it. The fit leave their proper places vacant that the unfit may take them, and when afterwards they complain that evil results follow, the complaint is self-condemnation.

If every capable citizen were honestly and conscientiously to accept and perform the service which the constitution and laws require of him as a juror, this method of trial might not only be restored to its former usefulness and dignity, but there is reason to believe it would recover public confidence, and hold with general approval the place it was meant for as one of the chief instrumentalities in self-government. But with individual duty repudiated, the jury is without public respect, and therefore necessarily without usefulness.

If, in so far as self-government is allowed to be supplanted by something else, satisfactory results are being obtained, the fact that the theory of the constitution is departed from is not, perhaps, very important. The excellence of a government is determined, not by its theory or its forms, but by its success in giving order, security, and content to the people; and when experience satisfies the country that any principles of its constitutional structure, or any forms, require change, the gradual modification by custom, to be by and by recognized in express changes in the constitution, may be the best. But none of us is ignorant that discontent with the administration of public affairs has grown and strengthened in proportion as the people have evaded their duty in government. Elections, which we

were predisposed to regard as a specific for the evils in free government, have wholly failed to answer such expectations. Some of the most serious of these evils are not within their reach. This is the case with all such as spring from the neglect of duty by private citizens. Elections might redress official wrongs if they were free, and if every man's vote was intelligently cast and controlled by his judgment; but this is far from being the case. Persons are chosen to be governors and members of Congress by the votes of men who in their hearts protest against the compulsion of party that demands it, and men are defeated by the votes of those who know and admit their superior worth and fitness. If a bad officer is rejected, he feels no condemnation so long as his party stands by him, and an election is so far from being an approval, that it may be found to come from the votes of a mercenary body of men who, by holding the balance of power between the parties, are enabled to control the district or the State. In elections party is more powerful than public opinion; but party itself is controlled by the few who make management their business, while the mass of the voters give this duty their attention only on election day, or at most on that day and the day for caucus or convention, after the course of things has been conclusively fixed by self-elected rulers, who, for practical purposes, constitute the party.¹ Elections under such circumstances are no proof of public approval; worth may influence the result but slightly; experience, if taken into account at all, may be taken as a reason for a change instead of a continuance in public place.² This does not come from perversity or evil intent, but from failure to recognize public obligations and duties, or at least their continuous and exacting demands.

These evils are not new, and tho some of them have as-

¹ A curious illustration of the manner in which it is assumed that the managers are "the party," is had in the recent utterances of a leading politician, who, in urging a plan for the reformation of "the primaries," speaks of the necessity of bringing *the people* into more intimate relations with *the party*.

² In a recent school election for an important town there was a rally of voters to put out an experienced board in favor of entire new men, for no other reason apparently than to show that they had the power to do so. After having succeeded, the meeting unanimously passed resolutions praising the wise management and economy of the board they had expelled.

sumed new forms and are more inveterate than formerly, there is no purpose in this article to say or to intimate that popular government on the whole is less satisfactory than in the early days of the republic. On the contrary, in many particulars there has been a steady if not a satisfactory advance. In other respects there ought to be a like advance when the need of it is once pointed out. To admit that the failures in government which have been indicated are without redress, is to admit the incapacity of the people for self-rule. To this none of us can assent. If the civil service is ever reformed, as there is reason to believe it is to be, elections will to a large extent be reformed also, and will come nearer a just expression of public sentiment. Side by side with this reform should go a vigorous effort to bring about a general realization of the fact that public duties under popular government are necessarily continuous, exacting, and burdensome, but must nevertheless be performed if the government is to be perpetuated. The absence of a king or a hereditary aristocracy is not popular rule; government is not a matter of caucuses, conventions, and elections merely. Paper constitutions do not establish government: they only lay out a groundwork, and by themselves are worthless and lifeless. However sound or noble may be the principles they attempt to express, constitutions and principles will alike sink into contempt unless the sovereign authority gives them life by giving them efficiency. If a king is king only in name, and subordinates his public duties to his ease and his pleasures, the actual rulers are likely to be his sycophants and flatterers—perhaps his mistresses; and their rule, like all irregular rule, will invariably be selfish and generally tyrannical. And what is true of an individual ruler is true of the aggregate ruler. The American people, with power as absolute as ever existed, have emphasized in their constitutions the declaration of their sovereign authority, and their purpose to exercise it. But their mistake has been in assuming that the declaration was to be self-executing, and that to proclaim self-government was to establish it. The obligation to perform day by day the duties involved in popular government has either failed of recognition altogether, or has been treated as tho, being the obligation of the community at large, it did not charge with duties any particular citizen. It

has been assumed that if individuals perform such services as are expressly commanded by law, and thus escape legal penalties, they are subject to no reproach as citizens, and anything further in the public interest must be matter of choice and voluntary individual action. A necessary result is that public duties are ignored or evaded; disorders follow which no one feels it his duty to suppress; and parties by indirect methods possess themselves of the power of the State and employ it to advance personal interests. Surely when this takes place the government is not self-government, whatever may be the theory or the provisions of the constitution. The necessary condition of self-government is personal and ready participation of the individual citizen wherever participation is needful to accomplish the purposes of the constitution or to ensure the enforcement of the laws. To a certain extent only does the law suffer the duties of the citizen to be delegated to officers, and even then his watchful oversight is assumed. The citizen who evades his duties or leaves them to be performed by self-chosen and mercenary rulers, is guilty of a crime against the State and against free institutions in general.

There is need also that we distinctly understand and appreciate the fact that the constitution and laws of a State never do and never can prescribe all the duties of its citizens. In America it is agreed that certain subjects shall be excluded from the domain of government which are regulated by it in other countries; but it is nevertheless supposed that citizens will perform in respect to them such duties as an enlightened conscience shall dictate. This is the case with religion: we will suffer government as such to have nothing to do with it except to protect the people in their exercise of religious privileges. But a very large proportion of all the people are of opinion that religion is a valuable conservative power in the state, and that its influence upon the laws and their administration is in a high degree valuable. It cannot be doubted that upon those who thus believe there rests a public duty to give countenance, encouragement, and support to public worship; and this duty being governmental in purpose and end, has no necessary connection with personal belief or faith. The State also, while providing for the administration of charity, never undertakes to make the provision complete, or

to prescribe to every citizen the full measure of his public obligation. Indeed, the attempt, if made, must necessarily fail. At best the charity of the law must be cold and formal: it can stir no warm feelings; it can excite no gratitude. To have the proper and full effect of charity it needs to be supplemented by the voluntary contributions of the people, collected and disbursed by charitable persons or organizations, who will be moved to what they do by no other compulsion than that which springs from humane impulses and sentiments. Only the charity that is the outward expression of heartfelt sympathy and self-denying benevolence can fully accomplish its purpose, and put the benefactor and the recipient in sympathetic relations as constituent members of the State, with common interests and reciprocal duties. And it may be added, that organized private charity is much less liable than public to foster fraud, and to encourage the idle and the vicious in their depravity. The duty of preventing cruelty to children and to animals almost of necessity is taken up by voluntary organizations, for much of it comes incidentally in family management or in ordinary business, and may take place before the eyes of the community without its significance being recognized or noted. Only an agency specially devoted to its suppression is likely to do effectual service.

The fact ought to be recognized and admitted also that the most effective agencies in bringing about reform of the evils and abuses in government have always been the voluntary organizations. It was not the law or the public prosecutor or the courts that broke up the fraudulent combination which a few years ago had fastened itself upon the city of New York for the purpose of public plunder; and no man can say how long the combination might have retained its power, nor how extensive might have been its robberies, had not private citizens in the performance of their civic duties originated and carried forward the proceedings which at last brought the guilty parties to disgrace and punishment. Other cities have had similar experiences. When corruption is installed in authority it makes use of the law as the instrument for perpetuating its power, and concerted action of private citizens to overthrow misgovernment becomes a necessity. It has been found to be so in State and National government. What could have been more hopeless

than the reform of the civil service, had not private citizens and voluntary organizations begun the work and pushed it forward with vigor and determination, until a sentiment was created which politicians and men in power deemed it wise to bow to and conciliate? But if government is to be self-government; if the people as a verity are to possess and exercise the sovereignty, and are to make the laws and cause them to be executed; if they would have a wise government or a pure government—it is not less essential that they should sometimes act in their capacity of private citizens in cases not prescribed by law, but which nevertheless have a direct and necessary bearing upon good government, than it is that they should cast their ballots for suitable persons in elections, or that they should perform jury duty, or bear arms when summoned to the defence of the State. If the citizen fails to recognize this obligation, and contents himself with the suffrage, and with the performance of such acts as the law commands, and suffers wrong, oppression, fraud, and dishonesty to possess the government or any of its departments or agencies, when his influence or efforts, legitimately directed and employed, might prevent it, he should neither be tolerated in complaining of the consequent injury and wrong to himself, nor be countenanced in any assumption that he is a worthy member of a self-governing commonwealth, and is himself one of its rulers. Whoever refuses to “stand fast in the liberty” to which he is called, by performing courageously its obligations and duties, must be content to be “entangled again with the yoke of bondage.”

THOMAS M. COOLEY.

DIVORCE-REFORM.

IT is extraordinary progress in the movement for reform in divorce legislation that it has so soon reached the stage where its chief danger is from its friends. According to precedent in the history of such movements, there should be, first, a period of active resistance; then a period of negative opposition, resting upon vested interest and the *vis inertiae* of society; and later, when the ultimate success of the reform begins to be assured, a period when the most important and vital contest has to be with partisans of reform compromising their cause by demanding exorbitant measures and asserting untenable doctrines. The divorce-reform seems already to be passing out of the second stage into the third. Very few are the decent people who venture nowadays openly to defend the existing condition of divorce-law in the United States. More numerous, and more dangerous, are those adversaries who have nothing to say in answer to the demands for reform except in terms of faint sympathy, while hinting that the case has been very much overstated, and who, while assenting to general principles, are averse to any practical application of them; whatever improvement of legislation is proposed, they may be counted on to object to "this particular measure;" they deprecate the agitation of the subject as likely to disturb social, political, or ecclesiastical harmony; and they reinforce with their dead-weight the *inertia* of the public, the passions of the lewd, and the vested interests of the lower strata of the legal profession. With such as these, no other argument is half so convincing and converting as the manifest set of the current of public opinion. If they lack "the courage of their convictions," they are capable of no small valor in the courage of

other people's convictions. And there is serious danger from this very class of people that, in the progress of reform, it will furnish more than its quota of those who will by-and-by endanger and perhaps for a time defeat it, by unintelligent assumptions and extravagant demands.

An article on prevalent abuses of divorce, published in the *PRINCETON REVIEW* in July of last year, under the title "Polygamy in New England," gave occasion to extensive comment in all parts of the country, and among all sects and parties, such as to indicate the various currents of public opinion on this subject. Only here and there is any journal found that has the impudence openly to justify the existing facility and prevalence of divorce—to claim that "when an error has been committed in case of a marriage without thorough mutual acquaintance, it is humane and just to rectify it lawfully;"—that "every time the legislature repeals one of the causes embraced in our laws as a rule for granting a divorce, it inflicts an injury upon society generally." But this is the doctrine of a leading newspaper in the capital of a New England State. More frequent are those which refer to the statistics of marriage and divorce in New England—figures derived from public record, and as trustworthy as such figures can possibly be—as "probably very much exaggerated," and belonging to "what may be called the fluxions of statistics" (as pretty a phrase as ever was devised by a hopeless disputant to parry the force of incontestable facts), and which lament the use of sarcasm on such a subject, and deprecate holding up to public ridicule three reputable citizens who had really done nothing but advocate easy divorce before a legislative committee. It is needless to say that the newspapers of this class are of eminent respectability, that they sincerely regret the existence of abuses and would be overjoyed to see them opposed, in a proper spirit; also, that they regard the facts concerning divorce among the native population of New England and its colonies to be well answered by the fact that foreigners and Roman Catholics in New England sometimes desert their wives.

But it is gratifying to testify that the greatest number, and by far the greatest weight, of the journals which have discussed the matter "brought into court" by the article in question

have dealt with it frankly, earnestly, indignantly even, recognizing the flagrancy of the abuse, and demanding reformation. The great current of opinion sets in the right direction.

The only class of comments that gives serious cause for anxiety concerning the future of divorce-reform consists of those which express enthusiastic approval, and demand that legislation shall be conformed to the eternal standard of right and wrong set forth in the Gospel, as the only right standard of legislation—a demand with which neither the article nor its author has a particle of sympathy, as he will presently make manifest.

But before coming to this practical subject of what ought to be the reforms of existing divorce-law, one more class of comments on the article "Polygamy in New England" deserves a measure of attention. The article has had the effect of drawing a certain class of critics into the study of that most seductive and fascinating question, How is our own superiority in virtue to be accounted for? How is it that we in New York have maintained so respectable a statute, while all our neighbors to the east and to the west have fallen so low? How can it be explained (so the *New York Churchman* asks, with the unfeigned humility of a grateful soul) that Puritanism should have come to "legalize polygamy and authorize adultery,"—and finds an explanation of it in the influence of John Milton. It is perhaps not the most magnanimous aspect of humanity, but still it is human, to find in the earnest and painful efforts of a community for the reform of a frightful abuse the food for a comfortable complacency in the spectators, or the opportunity for a little sectarian bounce and swagger. But it is prudent for such lookers-on to be quite sure of their position before giving public expression to their feelings. It is by no means certain that New York law concerning the sanctions of marriage is so much more respectable than New England law. It is the Puritan States, whose legislation is formed on the basis of the Mosaic code, that write adultery in the list of felonies, and punish it with imprisonment and disfranchisement. It is the States which, like New York, have received their traditions of law from England, as English law was left by the English Church Reformation, that have

virtuously purified themselves of the crime of adultery, by making adultery to be no crime, but only (if one is disposed so to consider it) a personal grievance, for which damages may be recovered by civil suit for "loss of service." Is it altogether surprising that the demand for larger divorce facilities should not be clamorous in a State which has inherited the worst opprobrium of English law, so that its penal code is a general permit of adultery to all men and all women? The cause of this anomaly is to be found in the character of the English Church Reformation, which conserved the sacramental idea of marriage so far as to hold that offences against it should be punished only by church-discipline. And since the Reformed Church of England has no discipline, it follows that adultery is not punishable at all within "the ecclesiastical realm," except by the "cruel and unusual" process of reading the Communion Service once a year in church to so many of the adulterers and adulteresses of her communion as are pleased to go and hear it.

It is well to give unstinted honor to everything that is honorable in the long record of the Roman Catholics on the subject of marriage and the family; and to recognize with the praise which it justly deserves the new-born interest of the American Episcopalians in questions of public morals. But on the whole it is hardly necessary for either of these parties to perplex their minds or exhaust their historical information in search for the causes which have made them so superior to the rest of us in their regard for the sanctity of marriage. It is perfectly demonstrable that where the Reformation was instituted and carried forward on Puritan principles, one of the constant incidents of it was the severe punishment of crimes against marriage, as contrasted with their impunity previously or elsewhere.¹ It must doubtless be a pleasing study to the readers of *The Churchman* to grope for an explanation of the revival of virtue in English society, and the rehabilitation of the sanctity of marriage, consequent on the overthrow of the Commonwealth and the restoration of the Stuarts, and to find it, at last, in the prevalence of "Church principles" and the

¹ See Bayle's Dictionary, article *Saint Cyr*; Blackstone, iv. 64.

temporary extinction of John Milton. But for real edification and the cultivation of the meeker virtues, it would be far more profitable to them to ask (for instance) whether the fact that the most shameful laws in Christendom, on this subject, are the laws of England, stands in any relation to the influence of those eminent Reformers, Henry Tudor, Defender of the Faith, and the Right Reverend Dr. Cranmer; or whether there is any significance in the fact that the prevalence of divorce in New England does not begin until the exclusive supremacy of Puritanism is impaired and the Episcopalians begin to grow to a certain measure of influence.

Coming back, now, to the writers in various quarters who have welcomed the author of "Polygamy in New England" to the ranks of those who demand that public legislation on the subject of divorce shall be conformed to the morality of the Sermon on the Mount, he begs them distinctly to understand that he does not ride in their troop; that he regards their canon of legislation as false, unscriptural, and mischievous. It is held by those who (whatever their theories of inspiration) have so little real respect for the Scriptures that they find in them two moralities—an Old Testament morality, and a New Testament morality that superseded it. There is no such duplicity in the Scriptures. That one of the prophets who is eminent among them all for his devotion to the law of Moses to its last details of ritual—Malachi—enunciates the exact morality of the Gospels, and sustains it by the identical argument used again, after so long a time, by Jesus Christ—the argument from the creation of one woman for one man. "Putting away" did not *begin* to be an abominable thing in God's sight about two thousand years ago. He always hated it, even when Moses, in His name, was giving a "law that was not good"—a law forbidding this hateful thing to be done without a notarial act. We have not two moralities here, but two different things,—one of them morality, the other jurisprudence.

There is no principle more distinctly taught in the Scriptures, none better worth pondering by American citizens, (and all the more as it is so commonly perverted by men that ought to know better,) than this—that the standard of personal duty is not the criterion of right legislation; and conversely, that pub-

lic law, even good law, is not the standard of duty for one's conscience. Blind to this principle, the scribes and Pharisees of Christ's day took that solid maxim laid down in the Mosaic code for the assessment of penalty and damages—"eye for eye, tooth for tooth"—for the gauge of personal duty; precisely as nowadays people will take up some clear maxim of morals, and demand that because this or that is morally wrong, therefore it must be made a penal offence by statute.

This is a very common and sometimes an effective line of argument in urging reforms in legislation. We never fail to hear it in a "prohibition" speech, and almost never in a speech for the Sunday laws. If it were sound it would be conclusive on the question now pending. But it is a mischievous fallacy. The movement for divorce-reform had better fail than succeed by means of it. There must be a hard fight, any way, against a growing shame that is intrenched in the statute-books, is a vested interest of the legal profession, is infecting the churches, and finds much timid acquiescence and now and then an unblushing advocacy among persons not otherwise disreputable; but a persistent fight will overthrow it, unless frustrated by the superserviceable assistance of fools and fanatics who "assume that all laws which allow divorce for lesser grounds than adultery are contrary to the law of God," and insist on engrossing the Sermon on the Mount into the penal code.

One demoralizing effect of this fallacious notion that personal duty is the standard of public law is seen when men turn it end for end (as they did two thousand years ago, and do to-day) into the maxim that public law is the criterion of individual duty. It is high time—no! it is long past the time—for Christian churches to give the State to understand that whatever acts are entered on the statute-book, the law which the Church administers is the law of Christ; and that when the State declares that to be lawful marriage which Christ declares to be adultery, it must count on finding the Church taking sides with her Master. It is long, long past the time for this. Churches and ministers have shamefully surrendered to Cæsar the things that are God's. The disgraceful laws of the New England States, that fall so far below the standard of good secular legislation, are become the canons of church fellowship.

Adulterers and adulteresses, the only mitigation of whose crime is that it is licensed by the State which ought to punish it, sit down together unrebuked at the table of the Lord's Supper. And in one notorious instance, at least, a man who has put away his wife, giving her a writing of divorcement, is maintained, without so much as the institution of an inquiry, in the fellowship of the Congregationalist ministry.¹

It does not appear that there is often any serious difficulty, either in New England or out of it, in finding reputable ministers of any desired Protestant denomination, who, for a ten-dollar bill, will stand up before an adulterous couple and declare them, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, to be husband and wife. If there has ever been an instance in which this transaction has brought the culprit under any formal censure from his brethren or his superiors, the fact is not generally known to the public. That Christian communion which will not only pass canons and resolutions and appoint committees, but will depose and excommunicate somebody for this business, will thereby reinforce its credit with the public for sincerity and earnestness in its belief of the New Testament.

It is easy to imagine the sense of assured victory with which the advocates of facile divorce will welcome the abandonment of the unscriptural argument from Scripture, and the putting of the subject on its proper basis of expediency. On the question whether, as a matter of expediency, an uncongenial couple should be allowed to separate and remarry there is so little room for hesitation! Here is a man who finds that he does not love his own wife, and does love his neighbor's wife. His own wife is willing to be rid of him, or if she is not, he knows a short and easy method to make her willing. His neighbor's wife shows a pleasing reciprocity, and has also at her command a large variety of arguments which can hardly fail (with due encouragement from the State) to bring her husband to a like con-

¹ Let me do this respectable sect the justice to say that if, on the one hand, it is more distinctly implicated than others in fellowship with this iniquity, on the other hand, it has the honor of having in its clergy the first "confessor" of righteousness—the Rev. Mr. Cutler of Hebron, Conn., who is sued at the law for having told a certain Mr. Fillmore "it is not lawful for thee to have her."
"Wherefore he had a quarrel against him."

sent. Here then is a case in which all parties in interest are agreed. *Volentibus non fit injuria*. Is it expedient—we appeal to you now as practical and humane men—is it not wrong and cruel—to compel uncongenial and alienated couples to remain under the intolerable bondage of a legal union, when one little whisper across the assignation end of the judge's desk of the Superior Court will set it all right, and instead of two wretched families you have at least one happy one, and perhaps more? Is it not better for the interests of all concerned to have this accomplished readily, quietly, and in an orderly and strictly legal way, and the new union cheered with the countenance of society and hallowed by the prayers and benedictions of a Christian minister, than to have the almost inevitable alternative? Could anything but a cruel fanatic austerity be guilty of refusing it? Such, not always in so frank and lucid a statement, is the case on which the advocates of easy divorce make their *naïf* appeal to the charity of a Christian public.

The worst thing about this appeal is the sincerity of it. The people who talk this stuff do in many cases actually believe it. They really understand by *the interests* of men the removal of restraints upon their passions. And their idea of *love*, instead of the Christian, the human, idea which allies it with duty, which ennobles it with the element of will, conscience, responsibility to the law of God,—Thou shalt, and Thou shalt not,—is simply and baldly the bestial idea which recognizes in human love no more of reason, choice, responsibility, than in the amours of bulls and stallions. “He cannot love his wife. He cannot help loving his neighbor's wife. Shall nothing be done for his relief?” Pah! There is no odor of “Puritanism” about this. It smells of “the sty of Epicurus,” of the monkey-cage of Darwin, of the primeval slime of Haeckel.

But perhaps the most mischievous fallacy in an argument which is compact of nothing but fallacies is the one covered under the expression “all parties concerned.” It is absolutely amazing to see how far the discussion of this subject is sometimes carried on, on both sides, under the easy assumption that there are no parties in interest in a suit for divorce but the parties to the marriage-covenant, unless the children, if any there be, or at furthest the family connections of the parties to

the suit, are to be counted as having a nearer or remoter concern in it. It was an instructive thing to observe the jocular gayety with which the Honorable Mr. Sumner, of Hartford, pleading in the name of humanity, before a legislative committee, against any limitation of divorce facilities, delineated the miseries of uncongenial marriage, in contrast with the Elysian delights of what, but for this humane expedient, would be illicit love, and described the beneficent working of his law-practice in effecting the transition from anguish to bliss in a given case, with apparently no conception that this case could stand in any more relation to the interests of society than if the parties to it were the sole inhabitants of a coral reef. But at the right hand of Mr. Sumner's beneficiaries there lives another couple between whom arise some foolish bickerings such as under the influence of right conscience, sustained by decent public opinion and righteous law, are suppressed with mutual forbearance and forgiveness, and love revives again. But Mr. Sumner's doctrine and the "humane" practice with which he adorns it are not in vain. That which he has preached at the Capitol, and illustrated in actual life before the eyes of these tempted ones, is not preached and illustrated without effect. Business makes business, and there is a new run of custom at Mr. Sumner's office.

And at the left hand of Mr. Sumner's beneficiaries lives another couple to whom Satan has come near with the more awful temptation of libidinous and adulterous solicitation. Time was when the solemn word of God, Thou shalt and Thou shalt not, would have made itself heard in their hearts, when the conscience of Christian society would have confirmed their own, when the terror of public law would have pointed to the State's prison to warn them from the beginnings of crime. But that is all changed now. They have been taught about "incompatibility." They have been charmed with Mr. Sumner's little speech. They have learned from their next neighbors how quietly and respectably the whole matter was managed, and at what a trifling expense. They know where to go for a minister of the Gospel to bless their purposed adultery "with the word of God and with prayer." They know it must be all right, for Mr. Sumner is such a respectable gentleman. In short, the consequence is a timid knock at Mr. Sumner's office

door—and who will dare allege that philanthropy does not pay?¹

Oh, a very dignified position indeed does the ancient and austere Puritan commonwealth occupy in this business! It creeps into the meditations of those who would not lightly or unadvisedly enter into the solemn covenant of marriage, and suggests “not so very solemn—there is an easy way out of it if you don’t agree.” It crawls up the church aisle with the wedding procession, and in response to the solemn words “until death shall part you,” chuckles out “death, or the Superior Court.” It finds its way into the bridal chamber, and sits, “squat like a toad close at the ear” of innocent love, to encourage evil thoughts by tendering facile opportunities. It intervenes in family alienations to insinuate propositions that are becoming to the fomenter of discord and the pander to adultery. A very noble institution is the Puritan commonwealth! God save the commonwealth!

“The parties concerned,” forsooth! As if any man who likes to be able to write after his name the State of his citizenship on a hotel register, without being ashamed of it, were not a party in interest here! As if the State itself were not the party chiefly interested in maintaining the sanctions of marriage! As if this whole “humane” scheme were not a systematic sacrifice of the interests of the many virtuous families to the libidinous passions or the wicked quarrels of the criminal few!

1. Approaching now, the question what change in the laws is desirable, it would be wrong not to say that the first improvement to be demanded is a better administration of the bad laws as they now stand. Some one has got to say, what lawyers do not dare to say aloud, that the course of divorce business through the courts is a personal disgrace to the judges, one and all. In a proceeding which is commonly either collusive or *ex parte* as to the main point, and in which the judge is the only representative of the vast interests of morality, society, and the State, the court habitually acts not only

¹ I have taken Mr. Sumner as a representative man in this matter, because he has volunteered in this capacity, and because he undoubtedly is a highly respectable man—for a divorce-lawyer—no worse than the rest of his class, and a good deal better than some of them.

with reckless haste, and slovenly inattention to the awfully imperilled interests of individuals, which are supposed sometimes to be represented by counsel, but in dereliction and apparent unconsciousness of any responsibility for the interests of society and the State, which have no representative but the court itself.

2. On the low, base theory on which the present laws are framed and administered,—that divorce is an affair between the two parties, so that if they are content it is nobody's business else,—on this vile theory even, there is need of provision against those scandalous malpractices resulting in irremediable damage to the innocent, and in the unpunishable triumph of the guilty, with which the newspapers teem from week to week. Let the statute at least be so constructed as not to effect any more evil than the evil which it aims at and that which is necessarily incidental thereto.¹

¹ No description or digest of the laws can give so good an idea of what they are and how they work as the following curious and genuine documents sent to a lawyer in Connecticut who answered the advertisement of a New York firm by an inquiry about their terms. The name and address of the firm are of course suppressed.

"NEW YORK, April 26, 1881.

"DEAR SIR: We enclose to you one of our circulars on Divorces. Shall be pleased to tender you our services in a legal way. We have, and are even now obtaining divorces for attorneys in all parts of the country. Our rates to the profession for an ordinary case is only \$40; to others they vary from \$50 to \$250. In all cases \$10.50 must be paid when the suit is entered for court fees—the remainder when the decree is granted. Shall be pleased to hear from you at any time. We are very truly yours,

"PANDER & PIMP,

"Main Office, No.— — Street."

The following is a copy of the circular:

"PANDER & PIMP,

"Attorneys - at - Law,

"No.— — St. and No.— — St.,

"New York City.

"Office Hours from 10 to 3.

"Having made divorce suits a specialty, we are familiar with all the laws relating to them in the District of Columbia and different States and Territories. Our suits are brought under laws best adapted to the case. They differ so much that persons wanting divorce should not be influenced by the opinions of attorneys or even judges, in ordinary practice, because *they* may have been unable to obtain a divorce under the laws of their *own* State.

"We are constantly procuring divorces for persons in *all parts of the Union*

3. Instead of a procedure which is prompt, rapid, cheap, and "without publicity," the process for divorce should be so open and so deliberate as to give ample "cooling time" to irritated temper, sufficient opportunity for a hearing to interested parties having a right to be heard, and some chance for personal per-

who could not or did not wish to bring suits in their own courts, and that we do so legally and successfully is evidenced by the fact that we guarantee to refund all money paid in any case where decree is not obtained.

"Your personal appearance at court is unnecessary, as we represent you as attorney, and proof made by your own or other affidavits; no unpleasant notoriety or *public exposure of charges* need attend the suit. We prefer personal interview with clients, as we can much better explain matters than by correspondence, but can in nearly all cases prepare the necessary papers without, and send to you to sign and return to us—no fee charged for consultation in person or by letter. Applicants can marry again in any State or Territory, as the decree places their relations to each other as they were before marriage. When property, etc., is involved, special correspondence is solicited.

"We guarantee to procure a full and absolute divorce with custody of children, if desired, under the latest laws, in about sixty days from beginning of suit, by legal proceedings in a duly qualified Court of Record, for *Incompatibility of Temper*, or where parties cannot live in peace and union together, *Adultery, Desertion, Bigamy, Cruelty, Impotency, Refusal to provide for Family or neglect of Home Duties and Children, Conviction of Felony, Fraud in Consummating the Marriage Contract, and Marriage under Age*.

"The cost including all court fees and costs will be \$—. If you wish us to prosecute your case, fill up the enclosed blank carefully and return to us with \$—, which amount is for actual and immediate court fees, which must always be paid in advance. Then we will prepare your petition and send to you for your signature. The balance to be paid upon delivery of decree of Divorce.

Send check or postal money order to

"Yours most respectfully,

"PANDER & PIMP, Attorneys-at-Law."

"*General Decisions by the United States Supreme Court, and other State Courts.*

"The laws of divorce differ essentially from those relating to property and personal rights, and it has been repeatedly decided by the United States Supreme Court and the various State courts, that a divorce once granted by any legally constituted court of record having jurisdiction in such causes, and according to the provisions of the law where such court is situated, cannot be revoked or annulled by any court of another State within the United States, no matter upon what grounds or pretexts it may be obtained, provided the statutory provisions of that State or Territory are satisfied.

"*Decisions of the United States Supreme Court.*

"Both parties to a cause for divorce and alimony which has been given by any of our State courts are bound by the decree. The decree is a judgment of and will be received as such by any other court, and such judgment or decree,

suation, moral and religious influence, and any other salutary forces of society to bear upon the case; and a better hope of detecting some of the wicked frauds and collusions which seem peculiarly to infest this department of law practice. The indecent haste and secrecy with which the petulance of an hour

rendered in any court within the United States, will be carried into judgment in any other State, and have the same binding force as it had in the State in which it was originally given.

"If the decree had become a matter of Record in the court granting it, it is binding on all the other States and courts in the Union. It is not in the power of any State Legislature, or of courts by judicial decision, proceeding under a statute or not, to reject the record, or give to it an effect less than it has in the State or court where made, and any State law to the contrary is simply unconstitutional. If it dissolves the marriage, all other courts would be compelled to hold such person afterwards to be unmarried.

"A decree of divorce dissolving a marriage is legal throughout all the world.

"A decree of divorce once granted cannot be set aside or annulled for any cause, even if the court granting the divorce was not fully advised of all the facts in the case.

"A decree in cases of divorce and alimony is not subject to judicial revision.

"Courts cannot interfere in a divorce granted in another State.

"Even a review of a judgment of divorce cannot be had in Indiana.

"Fill this circular carefully, and enclose to us money order for \$—, and a full and explicit statement of your case.

"PANDER & PIMP, Attorneys,

"No.— — St., New York.

"Your name in full.

"P. O. Address.

"Where married?

"When married?

"Name of Partner.

"His or her Address.

"By whom married?

"Did you leave him or her?

"How long since?

"Issue, how many?

"Male, age and name.

"Female, age and name.

"Who wishes possession?

"Any real property involved?

"Cause of application for divorce."

Of course one does not look in a document of this kind, either for good law or for good faith. But that actual practice does not differ from what is here described can be proved by many and many a "Modern Instance" more tragical than the "leading case" reported by Mr. Howells.

can be made, in the hands of a "humane" lawyer, to work the speedy and total wreck of a family, is one of the worst characteristics of the American laws.

Naturally enough, it is this very quietness and secrecy of divorce proceedings that is most dear to the heart of that eminent ethical teacher, Mr. Adirondack Murray. In the interests of a pure morality, which he has so tenderly at heart, and out of the depths of an unpleasant experience of his own, he deprecates the publication of the grounds of a divorce petition as painful to the parties and insalubrious reading to the public. But it is not at all for the public interest that the way of the divorce court should be made secret, facile, and delightful; and the public interest must be consulted rather than the convenience or the fine feelings of litigants.

4. The one main defect in our divorce legislation, as it is the characteristic defect in the common way of considering the subject, is the absence of any recognition of the public—society—the State—as being an interested party in the matter. The main desideratum in the way of legislative reform is to provide that the State, with its immense interest to maintain the sanctions of marriage, should be adequately represented in every divorce suit—whether, as in the English practice (which suggests so many good points for our study), by a special functionary like the "Queen's Proctor," or whether, according to a proposal lately made in Connecticut, by charging the prosecuting officer with the defence of all otherwise undefended divorce suits; or whether by allowing citizens, either individually or in associations, to intervene in the interest of decency and morality.¹

5. Another requirement is for some provision that crimes

¹ The working of the English system is illustrated in the account, in a London paper, of a recent divorce suit, where the woman was sued by her husband for divorce on the charge of adultery with two men. According to the English law, all the alleged guilty parties to a divorce suit are summoned into court. After the hearing a decree was granted the husband on the grounds he had claimed. By the English law the decree is conditional for the first six months, and during that time the Queen's Proctor has the right to come into the case, and if he suspects that there has been any collusion or fraud, to open the decree and contest the case. In the above case the Queen's Proctor opened the decree, brought in his witnesses to prove fraud and collusion, thereby having the husband's decree for a divorce revoked.

disclosed as the ground of divorce proceedings shall be tried and punished. Under the present system, the nominal respondent may be, in multitudes of cases is, the real petitioner for the divorce. He comes into court virtually alleging his own crimes—adultery, cruelty, abandonment, and the like—as the ground of his petition, and goes out again in triumphant impunity, carrying with him papers under the seal of the court which exempt him further from all pains and penalties, when he proceeds to add to his past crimes one more act which but for these papers would be the crime of bigamy.

It is said to be required, in the English system, that the evidence of the malfeasances relied on as the ground of a suit for divorce shall come into the divorce court in the form of a judgment or conviction in some civil or criminal court. If this reasonable requirement were in use with us, or if when crime was alleged in a divorce suit, proceedings should be stayed until the prosecuting officer could take that allegation into the criminal court and try it before a jury, collusive charges of adultery would be found far less amusing to play with in divorce proceedings than they now are; at least this would be true in the Puritan States, in which adultery is recognized as a crime. And one good result of this rigor would be to bring clearly into view an ancient inequality in the law of marriage, according to which the man's unfaithfulness to his marriage vow is less hardly dealt with than the woman's. If the women's-rights agitators were inclined to make themselves really useful, here is their opportunity. With the law equalized at this point, so that "civil adultery" and "criminal adultery" should both be covered by the same definition, this one provision, that crimes alleged in divorce proceedings should be dealt with as crimes, would of itself go far toward being a practically effective reform of the divorce laws.

6. The peculiarly base but notoriously frequent crime of conspiring to procure divorce by fraudulent charges or procedures ought to be punishable as felony. If, instead of the ordinary futile recourse to a cross-bill, there were ready recourse to a criminal process by which the divorce-suitor should be compelled under grave penalties to make good his allegations to the satisfaction of a jury, some of the villanies now practised with

impunity would be attempted only at the peril of the criminal. Such a provision would, in many cases, enable a State to protect its own families from foreign interference, recovering the matter to its own jurisdiction; and would have the additional merit of involving the profession of divorce-solicitor in a share of his client's peril.¹

7. It is of high public importance to insist, in face of the general opinion of the legal profession, on the restoration of the twofold form of divorce—of the distinction between the divorce *à mensâ et toro* and the divorce *à vinculo matrimonii*. The *naïveté* of the common objection to this measure is impressive. It is held to be dangerous to morality to have a class of persons separated from their consorts but interdicted from marriage, and therefore tempted to fall into immoral relations. And the expedient by which to prevent these immoralities is to constitute the immoral relations moral, by act of legislature. The most obvious objection to this expedient is that it does not go half far enough. Applied boldly and consistently, it is the shortest cross-cut to the Millennium ever yet devised. By this course the crime of adultery has already been completely extirpated from England and from several of the United States; and in like manner all crime might be abolished, and mankind brought back to a paradisaical state of innocence, by so simple a measure as the repeal of the penal code. But until our moral reformers rise to the courage of their convictions, and are prepared to apply their invention on the large scale, it is hardly worth while to continue the petty experiment of refusing to recognize the distinction between legal separation and complete divorce, and of insisting that wherever there is legal separation there shall be complete freedom of remarriage for both parties.

The value of this distinction is not that it would satisfy the demand for easy divorce by a less offensive substitute. That it would not do this in any appreciable degree is demonstrated by the experiment in the State of Michigan, where there is ade-

¹ There is much reason in that application of the *lex talionis* which made the instigator of a false prosecution liable to the evil he had tried to inflict. See Blackstone, Comm. iv. 14. In the notable case of Michael Servetus, the prisoner asked that John Calvin should also be put in prison to await the result of the trial, and in case of acquittal, to suffer the penalty proposed for his antagonist.

quate provision for either separation or divorce, and where the applications for full divorce with liberty of remarriage are multitudinous, and the applications for legal separation are only an inconsiderable percentage. It would not satisfy the demand for easy divorce, but it would answer all the decent and publishable reasons for this demand—the claims of humanity in behalf of the miserable victims of connubial cruelty; it would strip off the disguise of “moral earnestness” from Mr. Murray and his nasty new gospel; it would make distinctly manifest (as it now does in Michigan) the object of the queues of applicants that wait their turn at the divorce-court—that what they are after is not escape from the old partner, but adultery with a new one; it would give the friends of decency and society an effective leverage upon the conscience and sense of shame of all but the conscienceless and shameless, and from these would remove the covert under which they now shelter themselves—that innocent and blameless people are now sometimes driven to make use of the same procedure which is the common resort of the lewd, and to accept from the State, with the protection and alimony which they demand, a permit for adultery which is forced into their hands.

Withal it is of some consequence that the distinction between divorce and declaration of nullity of marriage should be recognized in the language of the law. The confusion of mind implied in divorcing a man because he never was married, as in pardoning a man because he never was guilty, is a demoralizing confusion.

8. Finally: An indispensable part, and probably the most difficult part, of divorce-reform is that which relates to the abuses growing out of the diverse and discordant laws of the different States. How great and mischievous are these abuses is at least vividly suggested by the congratulatory assurances of Messrs. Pander & Pimp, in their circular already transcribed. How real they are, the people of the State of New York seem to be only beginning to find out. The federal system seems to put it into the power of the pettiest of the States to make itself, like Monaco or San Marino among the States of Europe, a nuisance to all its neighbors—a nidus for the breeding of infectious social disease, the spread of which is not checked by political boun-

daries. But it can hardly be charged that any one of our States has actually assumed such an exceptional relation to the rest. Rather, as the New York shysters assure their customers, each State has its special points of weakness and laxity, which these ingenious and "humane" gentlemen are able to combine into a complete system, under which any imaginable demand for divorce can be satisfied, however groundless, inexcusable, and atrocious. What cannot be done in one State can be done in another, and divorce in any is divorce in all. The specialty of one State is a rich variety of lawful causes for divorce; of another, facility in acquiring residence; of another (as in New York), secrecy of procedure and opportunity of fraud. The combination is complete, and leaves to the vilest adulterer or his viler attorney absolutely nothing to desire.

It is natural enough that the first thought of recourse, in such a confederation of abuses, should be to the power of the Federal Government. Since the successful experiments at the close of the civil war, there has been a strong tendency to invoke the federal power to aid in moral or social reforms in the several States. So Congress engaged in the temperance reformation by means of an exorbitant whiskey-tax; and nothing dismayed by the result of this adventure, that sanguine statesman, Senator Blair of New Hampshire, now calls for a national Maine Law and a prohibitory amendment to the federal Constitution, and finds a number of enthusiastic ladies to sustain him. Another movement, which does actually seem to be moving, with a considerable momentum of influence in it and behind it, is the demand for federal subsidies to common-schools in the States, whether with federal supervision of the schools or without such supervision does not appear, nor is it clear in which form the scheme would be the more objectionable. Of course, and *à fortiori*, in the midst of the universally prevalent and most formidable divorce abuses, growing partly out of the sovereignty of the States and partly out of their federation, the minds of reformers, with perilous unanimity, are turning for redress to an amendment of the National Constitution that shall put the law of marriage and the family into the control of the national legislature.

Well: supposing the matter to have been made an issue in national elections, alongside of free trade and protection, and

the question of the civil service, and whatever other federal questions may emerge; supposing that reform to have been carried simultaneously in the States together which has never yet been achieved in one of them by itself; supposing thus that the nation collectively shows itself so much more wise and virtuous than the sum of its constituent parts; and supposing the enormous jurisprudential difficulty of devising all at once a new code of law for the family relations to have been overcome, and the dangerous transition over so vast a gulf of difference between the old system and the new to have been accomplished in safety—then, no doubt, we shall have gained the great advantage of a uniform and a better system of law on marriage and divorce.

But at cost of what a sacrifice! Nothing less than the sacrifice of the Constitution of the United States in its most distinguishing and vital characteristic!—the open abandonment as impracticable of that system of national government by confederation of sovereign States—the system described in the motto *E pluribus unum*—which was the glory of our fathers, as it has been the boast of their descendants, the admiration of political philosophers, and the envy of the nations! Once let the law of the family be taken away from the jurisdiction of the State, and absorbed by Congress and the federal courts as a department of the central government, and how much of the sovereignty or even the authority of the States will then remain? and of what does remain, how much is likely to remain much longer after the establishing of such a monstrous precedent?

It ought to be recognized as one of the gravest of the mischiefs attendant on the intolerable existing abuses of divorce, that they constitute at present the most formidable danger to the perpetuity of the American Constitution. The Union, which could not be destroyed by the most gigantic rebellion in history, may not very improbably succumb to the irritation of multitudes of individual and local annoyances. Within the last few years, before our own eyes, and yet without fixing our attention or teaching us, apparently, any warning lesson, the most ancient confederated republic in the world has practically ceased to exist, giving place to a consolidated nation. By peaceful and orderly but none the less revolutionary measures,

the Swiss federal legislature has been vested with the control of local affairs in the cantons until the rights and powers remaining in the once sovereign cantons are now so meagre that there is an open demand for the extinction of the cantonal governments—a demand to which it is no longer easy to frame an adequate reply. One may go into the Federal Congress at Berne and hear a polyglot debate on a bill prescribing to the village sextons the order in which they shall dig the graves in the churchyards. The lack of comity of legislation between the cantons resulted in so many practical inconveniences, even in such a matter as this of funerals, that it has at last, by a silent revolution, destroyed the cantons, and so destroyed the confederation of them. In like manner the lack of comity between our States in matters of such vital and practical moment as the marriage law must drive us toward consolidation; and in the case of a people covering the breadth of a continent, consolidation (as we need no De Tocqueville to teach us) means disintegration and decomposition.

LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON.

IVAN SERGHEÏEVITCH TOURGENEFF.

IT is a significant sign of the growth of international appreciation, that a writer of the present day who deeply interests his own countrymen soon sees his works passing the frontiers of his native land to meet with sympathetic readers in every quarter of the globe. That the death of Ivan Tourgeneff should have caused so strong and personal a feeling of regret in the United States and throughout Europe, is a testimony at once to his greatness and to the intellectual liberality of the world. It is by no means due to the absence of a national Russian literature that Tourgeneff has been the first of his countrymen to attract the attention of any considerable number of foreign readers: it is rather that he has been the first to combine a thoroughly national spirit with exceptional literary power. In the last century Russia possessed two writers of great repute in Lomonosof and Derzhavin—now hardly known to their countrymen except by name. Zhukovski, an excellent poet, wrote in the early years of the present century; and his contemporary, the historian Karamzin, was the first to show the capacities of Russian prose. The greatest writer of the first half of the nineteenth century was no doubt that Pushkin to whose poetry Tourgeneff so often refers admiringly in his own pages. The reader of "Fathers and Sons" will remember the striking scene when old Nicholas Petrovitch gloomily related to his brother Paul how he had just taken down Pushkin's poems, and had begun "The Gypsies," when his radical son, Arcadi, took away the volume and substituted in its place Buchner's "Stoff und Kraft," a popular work of the German materialist school, with which he thought his father would be much more profitably occupied. Notwithstanding the fact that Pushkin's most cele-

brated work, "Evgeni Onegin," bears distinct traces of the influence of "Don Juan," and that the author himself has not wholly unreasonably been called the Russian Byron, it is yet he who first discarded conventional subjects and forms of expression, and gave a national tone to the literature of his country. Whoever has visited the booksellers' quarter in St. Petersburg must have noticed the evident activity of the trade in books. Many of the Russian publications, to be sure, are translations, but there is no lack of works of fiction, history, and travel by native authors. Prominent among these are the works of Lermontof and Gogol, both of whom preceded Tourgeneff; the military novels of Count Tolstoi, the popular stories of Grigorovitch, the satirical novels of Pisemski, and Gontcharof's "Oblomof." Dostoyevsky, who died two years ago, and concerning whom the eminent Danish critic Georg Brandes has lately published a highly eulogistic article in the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, enjoyed a popularity in Russia perhaps equal to that of Tourgeneff, but his books were little known to foreigners. Like the majority of Russian authors, he experienced early in life the tyrannical oppression of the government. Condemned to death for alleged treasonable opinions, he was met by a reprieve when on the way to the scaffold; and his thirteen years of exile and suffering in Siberia gave him that knowledge of the misery of the lower classes which afterwards formed the groundwork of his books. Unlike Tourgeneff, he was an avowed philanthropist and reformer, and wrote openly in the cause of the oppressed. It is said that "what Wilberforce did for the negro in the British Parliament, Dostoyevsky did in literature for the Russian proletariat;" and it is this ever-present didactic purpose which marks the difference between the works of Dostoyevsky and Tourgeneff—the former was a pleader, the latter essentially an artist. The fame of Tourgeneff has eclipsed that of all his countrymen, as it has equalled that of his most noted contemporaries of other countries, no less by the national importance of his writings than by the art, at once exquisite and powerful, by the aid of which he placed his thoughts before the world. He made the real condition of Russia known to the Russians themselves, and he carried the art of expression to a perfection hitherto unknown in his own language and never excelled in any other.

The life of Tourgeneff, unlike that of most Russian authors, was lacking in incidents of a stirring nature. His father was a landed proprietor in the Government of Olef, Central Russia, where Ivan Sergheïevitch was born on November 9, 1818. He obtained a rudimentary education at home, and subsequently studied at Moscow and St. Petersburg. While in the former city his democratic ideas and his admiration of American institutions gave him the name among his fellow-students of "The American," and this predilection in our favor he retained up to the day of his death. When about twenty years of age he went to Berlin and studied the Hegelian philosophy, then so much valued by Russian students, and acquired an extensive knowledge of history and German literature. Soon after his return to Russia, in 1841, he published his first book, a volume of verses called "Panasha." The following five years of Tourgeneff's life were passed on his father's secluded estate, and these years, altho the least eventful, were probably the most fruitful to himself and to his country. Then it was that he roamed far and near through the Governments of Olef and Kalouga, with shot-gun or fishing-rod, exploring the rivers and forests, studying their inhabitants both finny and feathery, drinking in those beautiful impressions of nature which he has since shared so sympathetically with his readers. But above all, it was during these sporting tours, when taking shelter from a storm in the hut of a forest-keeper, when slaking his thirst at a spring in company with a few miserable peasants, when dining with a country proprietor, or borrowing a skiff from a serf, that Tourgeneff studied the different types of his countrymen and collected the materials for the invaluable portrait-gallery which he has left in the "Notes of a Sportsman." These sketches were published as they were written in the *Moscow Messenger*, and even in their detached state excited great interest; but it was not until they were gathered into a volume, when their general effect and meaning could be seized, that the full importance of the work was appreciated, and the Russians really learned to know themselves. The late Emperor Alexander, at that time the Crown-Prince, whose assassination so recently horrified Europe and America, acknowledged that in this book he found his first inspiration in favor of the emancipation of the

serfs. But the government was far from looking favorably upon the truth-telling author; and during the excitement caused by the "Notes of a Sportsman," a pretext was found in Tourgeneff's "Eulogy of Gogol," and he was ordered to remain as a prisoner within the limits of his own estates. During this confinement, an official would appear before him at regular intervals, present his written authority, and say, "What shall I do?" Tourgeneff would place a bank-note within the paper, fold it, return it to the officer, and reply, "Do your duty." Whereupon the representative of the government would bow low, apologize, and retire. At the death of the Emperor, Tourgeneff was released, and his subsequent life was passed almost entirely abroad, where the greater number of his novels were written. Paris and Baden-Baden were his favorite residences, but he was frequently seen at Rome, Florence, and London. As he spoke French like his native language, German, Italian, and English extremely well, he was able to make himself at home wherever he went. At intervals he would return to Russia and visit his estates, but the uncertainty of his position at home and the habit of a cosmopolitan life soon sent him abroad again. In person he was exceedingly tall and handsome, with regular, clearly cut features, a large nose, bright eyes, and a dark beard covering the lower part of his face. His genial manners and kindly nature added a warm personal affection to the admiration felt by many friends for his surpassing intellectual gifts. His mind was pre-eminently that of an artist, but was remarkable besides for uncommon breadth and penetration. No one who has read Tourgeneff's works, and has noticed the vein of sadness and tragedy that runs through them all, can have been surprised to learn that the great author's characteristic melancholy gradually gained upon him, and finally clouded his last days. He died at Bougival, in France, at the age of sixty-five years, leaving a son and a daughter. Tourgeneff's works may be considered from two points of view, both equally interesting—the philosophic and the artistic. We will first review the varied phases of social life which his books present, and then examine the literary methods so successfully adopted for their portrayal.

In the information it gives concerning the Russian people,

and above all that class of the people who needed most to have their condition made known, the most important of Tourgeneff's books is the "Notes of a Sportsman"—the results of personal observation by a spectator at once calm and sympathetic. In the Government of Orel the soil was poor; the villages consisted of straw-roofed huts, huddled side by side for mutual support; the peasants were small and ugly, wore bark shoes, had no trade nor manufactures, and lived by agriculture. But in the adjoining Government of Kalouga the peasants had better land, a little trade, and were far more prosperous. They were tall, had a contented expression of countenance, wore leather boots on Sundays, and purchased their freedom of action by a yearly sum paid to their masters, while their villages contained pine cottages, with plank roofs, standing apart, surrounded by well-built fences. While shooting in these two districts the young Tourgeneff saw both the best and the worst phases of Russian serfdom, but he always observed that characteristic of slavery—the abuse of wealth on one side and the consequent misery on the other. One day he chanced on a couple of peasants fishing. Entering into conversation with one of them, the young sportsman soon drew from him a description of his late master. This man turned out to have been a rich proprietor, living in the greatest luxury, keeping open house, ruining himself and impoverishing his people by the wildest extravagance, but still sustaining the character of a great lord, and exciting the unqualified admiration of his neighbors and servants. The picture described by the peasant is a brilliant one. But presently the other side of the medal is shown. The group by the river side here steps behind them, a wretched old man covered with dust approaches, and the following conversation ensues:

"Hullo, Vlass!" cried Touman, who recognized him at the first glance; "good-day, brother—where have you fallen from?"

"Good-day, Mikhailo Savelitch," replied the peasant, drawing near, "I come from afar."

"And where in the world have you been?" said Touman.

"Well, to Moscow, to see the master."

"Why."

"To ask a great favor of him."

"Come, what was it?"

"To beg him to reduce my dues by two thirds or a half, or else to re-

duce me to servitude. My boy is dead, and all alone I never can pay them."

"Your son is dead?"

"Dead. The good boy was employed as a cab-driver at Moscow, and to tell the truth, he paid my dues for me."

"Well! Your master?" . . .

"The master? the master? . . . he drove me away, saying, 'How dare you come to me! What do you suppose I keep an agent for? Your business is to talk to him. You talk about servitude; and where would you have me put you to service? First pay what you owe.' He was very angry." . . . The peasant spoke so calmly that it seemed as tho he were talking of another man; but a tear fell from his small, bloodshot eyes, and his lips were white.

"You are going home now," asked Touman.

"Where should I go? I must. My wife is there, famished."

"Are you going to see the agent?" asked Touman, observing with some astonishment the calm manner of the peasant.

"Why should I go? Consider that I owe and that I cannot pay."

The passage quoted is simply an example of the manner in which the author hints at, rather than exposes, the social abuses of his country. Sketch follows sketch, professedly relating only the adventures of a sportsman, but really exhibiting, to whomsoever will see, the vices engendered in the higher classes by their absorption of wealth and power, and in the lower classes by their privation of all chance of advancement. Portraits of the *Velmoges* (great lords) and of the *Odnovortsi* (middle class) are nearly as frequent as those of the peasants, and teach the same lessons.

A subject constantly alluded to in the "Notes of a Sportsman," and throughout Tourgeneff's writings, is the separation between the older and younger generation, brought about by the sudden importation into Russia of new ideas—little regarded by the older members of society, but seized upon with avidity by the younger. This is the chief theme of "Fathers and Sons." Nicholas and Paul Petrovitch, who are satisfied with the opinions derived from their own experience, present a striking contrast with Arcadi and Bazarof, who have accepted without reservation the theories of the German materialistic school. The young men adopt the new ideas hastily, violently, because they have no intellectual standards by which to judge them. Their minds are dazzled by these novel and plausible

theories; they push them to extremes and fall into extravagance. The following conversation between the "fathers and sons" forcibly presents the case of both sides:

"Aristocracy, liberalism, principles, progress," repeated Bazarof, meanwhile. "What strange words in our language, and perfectly useless! A true Russian has no use for them."

"What does he need then, according to you? To understand you, we are outside of humanity, outside of its laws. That is too much; the logic of history exacts—"

"What need have we of that kind of logic? We can get on very well without it."

"How?"

"Ah! look here. I think that you do very well without logic in putting a piece of bread in your mouth when you are hungry. What is the good of all these abstractions?"

Paul Petrovitch raised his hands.

"I do not understand you at all! You insult the Russian people. I don't understand that one can help recognizing principles and rules. What then directs you in life?"

"I have already told you, uncle, that we do not recognize any authority," interrupted Arcadi.

"We act in view of what we recognize as useful," added Bazarof; "to-day it seems to us useful to deny, and we deny."

"Everything?"

"Everything."

"How! Not only art, poetry, but even—I hesitate to say it—"

"Everything," repeated Bazarof, with an inexpressible calmness.

Paul Petrovitch looked at him fixedly; he did not expect such a reply; Arcadi blushed with pleasure.

"Allow me, allow me," interrupted Nicholas Petrovitch; "you deny everything or, to speak more exactly, you destroy everything. . . . Notwithstanding, it is also necessary to rebuild—"

"That does not concern us. . . . It is necessary in the first place to clear off the ground."

Such is Bazarof's "nihilism," and it is no more than modern rationalism run mad. Instead of casting out traditional errors, one by one, according as reason or experience supplied something better to replace them, he would have effaced in a moment the accumulated beliefs of centuries to leave nothing behind. His mistake was to suppose that superstition and error can be banished by a single intellectual effort; the mistake of the present revolutionary party in Russia is the belief

that liberty and civilization can be attained at one blow. Bazarof's "nihilism" had no political signification whatever, but this word, first made famous by Tourgeneff, has since assumed a wholly new meaning: from expressing simply intellectual denial of everything incapable of scientific proof, it has gradually come to stand for enmity to any existing state of affairs.

The novel which deals most particularly with Tourgeneff's views on modern Russian society is "Smoke." In this work he satirized mercilessly the class of rich but ignorant and frivolous nobles who travel over Europe, always boasting of the greatness of Russia and always imitating foreign ways. With equal severity and ridicule are treated the so-called reformers, half-educated, visionary men and women, whose heads are filled with the wildest schemes for the regeneration of Russia, who have neither sufficient knowledge of their country nor sufficient common-sense to understand that all changes for the better must be gradual. If satire could kill folly, there would soon be an end to such scenes as those in General Ratmirof's drawing-room and at Goubaref's reception. "If ten Russians meet together," says the sensible Potoughine, "the conversation immediately turns upon the greatness of Russia and her brilliant future, while in tracing her origin they go back to the eggs of Leda. They squeeze and suck upon and chew this unfortunate subject as boys do india-rubber, and with the same result. They cannot touch upon it without alluding to the corruption of the West. The West touches us on all sides, and how terribly corrupt it is! This would not be so bad if we really did despise it; but no: this is all boasting and falsehood. We cry out against the West, and yet cannot live without its approval." Then Tourgeneff reads his countrymen a severe lesson for boasting when they should be learning, for celebrating Russia in words when they should be making her celebrated by acts. Potoughine relates his observations at the Crystal Palace, in London, where the remarkable productions and inventions of the nations of the world are exhibited. "You see in foreign countries they have nothing to compare to us," he sarcastically observes. And yet, as he walked through the halls of the great exhibition, he was obliged to confess to himself that if any one

nation were to suddenly disappear from the face of the earth and at the same time its original contributions to civilization to be taken from that building, Russia might undergo that fate without making a single change or subtracting a single object. Even the disappearance of the Sandwich Islands would produce more effect, because some lances and canoes designed by their inhabitants would be missed by visitors. But the bark shoes, the knout, and the *samovar*,—the most important productions credited to Russia,—even these were not invented by her. And yet, adds Potoughine, “we continue to dilate on the originality of our art and our national productions. Some young philosophers have even discovered a Russian science, a Russian arithmetic. Two and two make four here as elsewhere, but more completely, it appears.”

But a small number of Tourgeneff's works have a political bearing: more commonly they are profound studies of character and passionate love stories, written with a delicacy and vividness that recall Meissonier's pictures. They contain more information regarding Russian men and women than we can obtain from any other source, and their wonderfully natural descriptions of passion introduce the reader to a susceptibility and a violence of feeling which men of English race do not readily understand. Tourgeneff was pre-eminent in the delineation of personages who usually baffle the novelist—men without very salient characteristics either good or bad, who are swayed one way and another by the force of circumstances. It is a testimony to his comprehensiveness of vision and to his fidelity to nature that it is difficult to find in his novels a man whom we are inclined to call either a villain or a hero, altho neither villany nor heroism are wanting. Polozoff, in “Spring Floods,” is an utterly degraded man, but his degradation is evidently the result of a long course of self-indulgence. His wife, Maria, is irredeemably bad, and is perhaps the only one of Tourgeneff's creations who may so be called. The difficulty with the usual villain of fiction is that he is a ready-made villain, forced, by the omnipotent novelist, to perform whatever evil act is necessary to the story. But with these ready-made villains Tourgeneff's subtle power has nothing to do. The whole man, with his strength and his weakness, is always there. If a crime is to be

committed, the reader is apprised of the greatness of the temptation; he feels it as tho it assailed himself; he trembles at the thought that under the same circumstances he too might be unable to resist. Sanin, in "Spring Floods," ruins his own happiness for life and breaks the heart of his betrothed with unhesitating cruelty. He has not the strength to resist a terrible temptation, but the reader feels that his natural impulses are good and foresees his subsequent remorse. Tourgeneff's scientific analysis of the human mind is nowhere more prominent than in the wonderful psychological study of Dimitri Roudine—a man in words so eloquent, in acts so impotent, sincerely aiming at lofty standards but incapable of attaining any in practice, so richly gifted and yet such a poor creature. In "Fathers and Sons" the shades of difference in character are remarkable. Nicholas, the plain, unsophisticated Russian gentleman; Paul, his brother, so like, and yet so disguised by his foreign polish; Bazarof, the out-and-out Radical, all intellect and coarse materialism; Arcadi, his disciple, with less mind and more refinement. Tourgeneff's power of giving life to his characters is admirably illustrated by Bazarof. This man stands for an intellectual principle, and would be unnaturally cold were it not for the bursts of uncontrollable passion called forth by his intercourse with Mme. Odintsof. That Tourgeneff attempted successfully the delineation of a second Lear is testimony enough to his genius. Unlike other novelists, he was equally successful in dealing with either sex. Liza, his most lovely heroine, the good Tatiana, the beautiful, girlish Gemma, the calm Alexandra, leave as little to be desired as the men. In Irene, he studied the woman in whom prudence takes the place of principle; in Maria Nicolaevna, the woman absolutely without principle, who loves evil and cruelty for their own sake. The latter, with her bewitching beauty and remorseless wickedness, is an extraordinary conception: most readers will believe and all will hope that she is an impossible one.

A species of "love" to be met with in Tourgeneff's novels is a passion which men of the Anglo-Saxon race know nothing of—at least under that name. It masters its victims in a moment: duty, family ties, honor, previous affection, are of no avail against it. Sanin loves Gemma, his affianced wife, and yet in

an instant, without warning, he completely loses his head and heart for a woman, beautiful it is true, but whom he knows to be vicious and without a single title to his regard. The passion meant by the English word love will do great things either good or bad, but it necessarily involves respect for its object and some degree of permanency. But this sudden, uncontrollable *amour*, described by Tourgeneff as by so many French novelists, is not love as we understand the word, but a momentary self-abandonment to physical impulse. The novel "Spring Floods," of which it forms the subject, is among the most grievously sad and repulsive stories ever written. The power which Maria Nicolaevna exercises over Sanin while he is at the time in love with another woman would seem fabulous in an English work.

Dimitri Roudine, whose life and fate were of the most tragic, proposed to himself as his *magnum opus* an article on "Tragedy in Life and in Art." Such, indeed, is the subject of Tourgeneff's writings. As we run over the list of his best-known works—"Dimitri Roudine," "Liza," "Smoke," "Spring Floods," "Fathers and Sons," "Lear of the Steppe," "Three Meetings," "The Superfluous Man"—the memories recalled are all of the saddest. It is true that relief is sometimes given by delicate satire and by brilliant sallies of wit. But, however varied the story, however different the characters, the tragic in life and in art is still the theme. Altho a book by Tourgeneff is sure to give pain, it is impossible, once begun, to lay it aside. We may dread the pang that the end of the volume will bring, but the fascination of the author's literary art leads us irresistibly onward.

The chief charm of Tourgeneff's works is to be found in the exquisitely artistic form in which his conceptions are clothed. Some other novelists interest us quite as much in the stories they have to tell and in the characters they have to describe. But in form and in composition—in pure literary workmanship—it is difficult to name any writer who is thoroughly his equal. This artistic quality is prominent where it would be least expected. The "Notes of a Sportsman" had a didactic aim. At nearly the same time, it was attempting in autocratic Russia what "Uncle Tom's Cabin" was attempting in Republican America—the creation of anti-slavery sentiment. Yet, while

the political object of "Uncle Tom's Cabin" is always present, while Mrs. Stowe is always pleading the cause of the black man, the "Notes of a Sportsman" is simply a work of art; its author never denounces, but simply shows a picture and allows the spectator to draw his own conclusions. Tourgeneff never expressly declared his enmity to serfdom. There is no trace in the "Notes" of a partisan's feeling nor of a reformer's enthusiasm. The book was the work simply of an artist. It had a great influence on the cause of reform, but its author was not a reformer in the sense that Mrs. Stowe and Dostoyevsky were such.

Tourgeneff's novels are exceedingly short—any one of them about one third the size of an ordinary English novel; but in this small compass an immense deal of matter is compressed. It is impossible to skip. The concentration of thought is so great that a slight omission may destroy the continuity. Each word has its part to perform in the presentation of the main idea of the book; there are always enough, but none could be cut out without injury. Tourgeneff wrote as an artist makes an ink-drawing; every stroke of the pen must tell. As a result, the reader's interest is kept up ceaselessly. Yet it is impossible to read very fast. Each phrase demands consideration. The reader often feels inclined to stop and to think over a paragraph, for, after all, what is commonly spread over pages and enforced by repetition is here compressed into a few lines. This extraordinary concentration of thought, so pleasurably shared by the reader, is admirably supplemented by the author's methods of composition. When he desires to place a scene before the mind, every adjunct to the chief figure, every object present, has its place in the general effect. Be it a sportsman resting on a hot day—we are made to feel the heat of the still air, the silence of the motionless leaves, to see the panting dog's dripping tongue lolling out at full length. The subtle influence of nature on the mental and physical condition of men is always powerfully traced. A love passage, as of Dimitri and Nathalie, is intensified by the state of the atmosphere, the stillness of twilight, the perfumes of vegetation. It is thought by some that Tourgeneff is deficient in the interest of plot. And it is true that he gives little complication of incident to excite curi-

osity regarding the *dénouement*. But to persons who wish for something more than the excitement of an involved story, Tourgeneff's plot is of the most attractive kind. It consists in the development of character rather than of incident. Instead of following the complications resulting from accidental circumstances, the reader traces the attainment of the end through the infinitely more interesting conflicts of motives and passions.

In accord with Tourgeneff's artistic composition is the manner in which he makes his characters known. There are no long descriptions of men. A few words of preface, and the acquaintance comes of itself; as with persons we meet and talk with, by their actions, gestures, and words. Affectations are described very neatly: "Karchagine affected a grand manner, which he thought full of majesty. He had the air of his own statue erected by popular subscription."

For Tourgeneff's skill in sketching a type take this:

Our dignitaries generally like to stupefy their inferiors; the means to which they have recourse to produce this effect are quite various. Here is one which is very often used, and is "quite a favorite," as the English say. The dignitary all at once ceases to understand the most simple words and seems attacked with deafness; he asks, for instance, the day of the week; they reply to him respectfully:

"Friday, your excellency."

"Hey? What? What is that? What do you say?" replies the dignitary, with effort.

"To-day is Friday, your excellency."

"How? What? What is Friday? What Friday?"

"Friday, your excellency, the day of the week."

"Come, do you pretend to give me a lesson?"

Matvei Ilitch, with all his liberalism, was yet a dignitary of this kind.

Tourgeneff shows a wide acquaintance with foreign literature. His eldest brother, his senior by nearly forty years, had known Bonaparte and Talleyrand, had met Lord Byron on the Rhine, had been intimate with Miss Edgeworth, and had been the guest of Sir Walter Scott at Abbotsford. For Miss Edgeworth's writings the elder Tourgeneff had a great admiration. At his country house in the Ural mountains he used to translate passages from her sketches of the Irish peasantry, and it is said that from these readings the young Ivan first derived the idea of his "Notes of a Sportsman." Mention of English

and American authors are frequent in his novels. In "Smoke" he makes one of his characters tell a curious anecdote of Mrs. Stowe. "Tenteleef always has been a terrible tyrant, you know, tho he calls himself a friend of emancipation. One day he was in a drawing-room in Paris, when Mrs. Beecher Stowe, the author of 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,' entered. Being exceedingly vain, Tenteleef asked the host to present him to Mrs. Stowe. As soon as she heard his name, she rebuked him with these words: 'How dare you show yourself before the author of "Uncle Tom's Cabin!" Leave at once!' and she gave him a slap in the face. And what do you think? Tenteleef caught up his hat and ran away." On one page in "Fathers and Sons" reference is made to George Sand, Emerson, and Fenimore Cooper. Elsewhere we will meet with Ann Radcliffe, Richardson's Lovelace, the Last of the Mohicans, Buckle, and many others, even the pre-Shaksperean Nash and Greene.

BAYARD TUCKERMAN.

THE "FOREIGN COMPETITIVE PAUPER LABOR" ARGUMENT FOR PROTECTION.

TO all who bestow any attention on the course of public events, it must be evident that the so-called "*Foreign Competitive Pauper Labor*" argument is hereafter to be more than ever relied upon to defend and sustain the cause of protection in the United States, and that the advocates and believers in protection regard such argument as not only all-sufficient for this purpose, but also as wholly unanswerable. Or, to state the case more plainly and in detail, the claim is set up in warrant and justification of a continued high-tariff policy, that the difference in wages in favor of competitive foreign producers constitutes a good and sufficient reason why compensating protective duties should be levied on their resulting products when imported into this country; and the assertion is further constantly and conjointly made, that unless such duties continue to be levied, the American manufacturer will be unable to withstand foreign competition; that our workshops and factories will be closed, and our workmen and their families made dependent on public charity. It stands to reason, therefore, that the issue here involved can be second to none in importance to which the attention of the people of the United States can now be directed; and further, that the accusation, which the position of the advocates of protection inferentially but necessarily make against all those who favor an abatement of the present tariff is so serious, as to rightfully subject the latter, if true, to the brand of unmitigated public scorn and infamy. But is it true? And with a view of helping the public in some degree to intelligently determine for themselves whether it is or not, it is here proposed to attempt to review the whole matter, and present the facts in

the case, as clearly and impartially as is possible for one who frankly acknowledges at the outset that he enters upon the discussion with a profound conviction that the assertions and implied accusations of the protectionists in the matter have not only nothing whatever of a substantial basis to rest upon, but that the continuance of the policy they advocate will inevitably and rapidly produce the very result they deprecate: and indeed has already done so, to a very considerable extent. Before doing so, however, it may profit to ask attention to certain incidents connected with the subject of an historical interest. Thus, in a little essay recently published (1883) by Mr. Taussig of Harvard University,—not in advocacy of either free trade or protection, but as a contribution to economic history,—it is shown that during the first half of the period of the existence of the United States as a nation the demand for protection and the claim that it was necessary was based almost exclusively upon the “infant industry” argument, or the asserted necessity of fostering domestic industries in their incipiency, the eventual cheapening of the resulting products being the chief advantage that it was proposed to compass; and that the pauper labor argument never put in an appearance. But about the year 1840 it began to be seen that American manufactures could no longer consistently claim protection on the ground of being infant industries, and that a new position must be taken; and then for the first time, says Mr. Taussig, the claim “that American labor should be protected from the competition of less highly-paid foreign labor” was brought forward, and has ever since “remained the chief consideration impressed upon the popular mind in connection with the advocacy of a tariff for protection.”

Recurring next to the subject more immediately under discussion, let it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that all that the advocates of protection assert concerning the absolutely and (as compared with the United States) the relatively low wages paid for labor in the different departments of foreign industry is in all respects correct; and next let it further be granted, that any real reduction in the standard of wages, and consequently of living, in the United States is most undesirable—and then what of it? Does it necessarily follow, as all advocates of protection invariably assume and assert, that the maintenance of a high tariff on for-

foreign importations will prevent or contribute to prevent the reduction of the wages of American labor and their assimilation to the so-called pauper-labor rates of foreign countries? Or, on the contrary, is it not the real truth, that while "protection" has never exerted anything more than a temporary influence in enhancing wages, it is now, in virtue of influences clearly and unmistakably referable to its policy, directly and powerfully operating in a manner exactly the reverse of what is popularly believed—or, in other words, to reduce the wages of labor in this country, and cause them to approximate to the European standard? Here again is the issue involved restated clearly and plainly; and as it is not for the interest of a single man or woman in the United States to ignore it or be misinformed, let us therefore reason about it.

Wages in the United States are, as a general rule, unquestionably higher than in Europe; and mainly for the following reason. Owing to our great natural advantages, a given amount of labor, intelligently applied, will here yield a greater or better result than in almost any other country. It has always been so, ever since the first settlements within our territory, and has been the main cause of the tide of immigration that for the last two hundred years has flowed hitherward. Hamilton, in his celebrated report on manufactures, made before any tariff on the imports of foreign merchandise into the United States was enacted, notices the fact that wages for similar employments were as a rule higher in this country than in Europe; but he considered this as no real obstacle in the way of our successful establishment of domestic manufactures, for he says "the undertakers"—meaning thereby the manufacturers—"can afford to pay them." And that this assertion embodies a general truth would seem to follow from the following considerations:

Wages are labor's share of product, and in every healthy business are ultimately paid out of product. No employer of labor can continue for any great length of time to pay high wages unless his product is large. If it is not, and he attempts it, it is only a question of time when his affairs will be wound up by the sheriff. Or, on the other hand, if a high rate of wages continues to be permanently paid in any industry and in any country, it is in itself proof positive that the product of labor is large, that the

laborer is entitled to a generous share of it, and that the employer can afford to give it him. And if to-morrow our tariff was swept out of existence, this natural advantage which, supposing the same skill and intelligence, is the sole advantage which the American laborer has over his foreign competitor, would not be diminished to the extent of a fraction of an iota. Consider, for example, the American agriculturist. He pays higher wages than his foreign competitor. In fact, the differences between the wages paid in agriculture in the United States and Europe are greater than in any other form of industry. The tariff cannot help him, but by increasing the cost of all his instrumentalities of production, greatly injures him. With a surplus product in excess of any home demand to be disposed of, no amount of other domestic industry can determine his prices. How then can he undersell all the other nations, and at the same time greatly prosper individually? Simply because of his natural advantages of sun, soil, and climate, aided by cheap transportation and the use of ingenious machinery, which combined give him a greater product in return for his labor than can be obtained by the laborers in similar competitive industries in any other country. What has he to ask of government other than it will interfere with him to the least possible extent?

In further illustration, compare the condition of Switzerland with that of the United States. No people are more industrious, frugal and moral than the Swiss. They are the Yankees of the Old World. No one talks in Switzerland of abridging the hours of labor in the interest of the laborer; but whenever the hand finds anything to do, it begins to do it with the rising of the sun, and keeps doing with all its might until not "the going down thereof," but until the darkness of the night makes further effort impracticable. But notwithstanding all this hard work and frugal living, Switzerland and her people are poor: wages are low, and the comforts and luxuries attainable by the masses are comparatively few. On the other hand, the people of the United States, working fewer hours and less industriously than the Swiss, and living as a rule wastefully and uneconomically, are as a whole, the richest people on the face of the globe. What is the explanation of this seeming paradox? There is but one. Nature has been niggardly in her bounties to Switzerland; and

lavish to the United States; with the result, that while the smallest product, in proportion to the labor and capital applied, is the law of production in the former country, the largest product at the smallest cost is the law for the latter. In short, great resources and large product are natural concomitants; and under such circumstances there is only one thing, under a government that affords adequate protection to life and property, which can prevent capital and labor from securing large rewards, *i.e.*, profits and wages—and that is the diversion of their products from the channels in which they would naturally flow, by destructive taxation; to which may be added this further corollary, that all taxation is destructive which is excessive and not restricted to the legitimate requirements of the State.

Take another case in point. Wages in England, in every industry, are much higher than in the continental states of Europe. In the cotton-manufacturing industries they are from 30 to 50 per cent higher than in France, Belgium, and Germany; and an English cotton operative receives more wages in a week than an operative similarly employed in Russia can earn in a month.

Now which of these countries has the cheapest labor? The question may be answered by asking in return: Does England seek protection against the competition of the continental states or is it the continental states that demand protection against England?—and by the further statement of fact, namely, that just in proportion as the wages in any country decrease, the demand as a general rule in these same countries for protection to domestic industries increases, as well as the dread of British competition. In short, instead of high industrial remuneration being evidence of high cost of production in this country, it is direct evidence of a low cost of production; and in place of being an argument in favor of the necessity of protection, it is a demonstration that none is needed. Furthermore, all experience shows that as the *per capita* results of production become greater, the profits of capital always tend to a less share of the product; and that this must be so will be apparent if one reflects that the more effective the capital, the lesser the proportion which the capitalist will need (and under competition can take) to make good interest upon his investment. Investigations made by Mr. Edward Atkinson show that, taking

the experience of Massachusetts as a basis for reasoning, "nine parts in every hundred of product are divided among those who do daily work for their daily bread in that State; and that ten parts in every hundred are the utmost that can ever be set aside for the maintenance or increase of capital or wealth." As the product increases, labor therefore, in the absence of disturbing causes, must get a larger share—or in other words, wages will rise; or, to put the case differently, large wages can only come from abundance, and not from scarcity.

High wages, then, are the normal result of low cost, and low cost is the normal result in turn of intelligence, conjoined with good machinery, applied to great resources for production. Wages in the United States, then, are and ought to be high, because here are the above conditions in a pre-eminent degree.¹

¹ Mr. Edwin Chadwick, the distinguished English economist, in a recent essay on "Employers' Liability for Accidents to Workpeople," furnishes the following very interesting illustrations, drawn from British industrial experiences, confirmatory of the above propositions:

"A coal-cutting machine," he says, "has been invented, by which one man and a boy will do better and more safely the work of twenty colliers; that is to say, at present in thick seams. I some time ago asked a large colliery owner whether he knew of the machine, and doubted that it would do the work. He did know of it, and did not doubt it would work; but they got on as they did, and change was troublesome. Recently I asked him whether they, the coal-owners, were not sufficiently pressed to have recourse to the machine. 'No, I do not think we are,' was the answer. 'I dare say that the Yankees will use it first, and then we shall follow them.' In Nottingham, the introduction of more complex and more costly machines for the manufacture of lace has, while economizing labor, augmented wages to the extent of over 100 per cent. I asked a manufacturer of lace whether this large machine could not be worked at the common lower wages by any of the workers of the old machine? 'Yes, it might,' was the answer, 'but the capital invested in the new machinery is very large, and if from drunkenness or misconduct anything happened to the machine, the consequence would be very serious.' Instead of taking any man out of the streets, as might be done with the low-priced machine, he (the employer) found it necessary to go abroad and look for one of better condition, and for such a one higher wages must be given."

Mr. Chadwick quotes an observation made to him by Sir Joseph Whitworth, the eminent English mechanical engineer and inventor, that "he cannot *afford* to have his machines worked with cheap and poor labor; and also states that the English shoe manufacturers, who have recently introduced the ingenious American shoe-manufacturing machinery, tell him that it paid them the best to work these machines with wages that are at least double those which were paid to the shoemakers under the old hand system.

But passing from these general conclusions, which may not command the assent of the reader without some careful reflection, it is proposed to next ask attention to the present industrial condition of the country, and to the action of certain influences on wages, the profits of capital, and the demand for domestic labor, which would seem to require to be merely pointed out to command universal recognition and acceptance.

The daily course of events is fast educating our people up to a comprehension of the fact, which economists have long been predicting, that owing to our great natural resources, our rapidly increasing population, the increased use and product of machinery and the energy of our people, the power of domestic production continually tends to be, and in most departments of industry is, far in excess of the power of domestic consumption. In the case of agriculture the fact is so obvious that no confirmatory evidence is necessary; but if any is needed, it is all-sufficient to call attention to the enormous surplus of food and cotton which we now export to other countries, and to the circumstance that these exports during the last ten years have increased out of all proportion to any increase of our home pop-

"At the beginning of this century the cost of spinning a pound of yarn (No. 40) was a shilling, and the wages divided amongst the workers—men, women and children—did not average more than 4s. 6d. a week, or 13s. 6d. per week per family of three. Recently, the cost of spinning a pound of yarn was three half-pence; but the wages have advanced to 40s. per week. In a paper by M. Poulin, a manufacturer at Rheims, France, it appears that in the wool manufacture there, the progress of wages and machinery have been similar. In 1816 the wages were 1*l*. 50*c*. per diem; they are now 5*l*. The price of weaving a metre of merino cloth was then 16*l*.; it is now 1*l*. 45*c*."

"I might at considerable extent adduce the experience of Lancashire, that as a rule the pressure of manufacturing distress has stimulated the adoption of labor-saving machinery and putting more and more capital or machinery under the same hands, *at increased wages*, attended by reduced costs of production, by extended consumption at reduced prices, and restored and augmented profits of capital."

"Finally," concludes Mr. Chadwick, "it may be noted that whilst all this progress has been made, population, which should have diminished, has been largely increased by the progress of labor-saving machinery. At the same time the profits of capital have largely diminished. At the present time capital is being driven to subsist on very small profits, and the quickened turn-over of large capital. Of late, a poor pinched and distressed capitalist would only get for a loan of £1000 (\$5000) of his capital (accumulated labor) for one day one shilling, or a third of the *improved* day's wages of a spinner."

ulation. And in respect to our so-called manufacturing industries it is only necessary to refer to general complaint that business, tho large (as it necessarily must be to supply the needs of a nation of fifty-six millions), is, through excessive competition, conducted with little profit; that a very large percentage of our manufactures, and notably those of iron, cotton, and wool, which enjoy high protection, have suspended or curtailed their operations; that manufacturers in certain lines of the two last-named articles especially have only been able to dispose of their surplus stocks by forced sales at auction and at prices less than the cost of production; that failures and fires (the latter the inevitable indicator and concomitant of bad times) are increasing at a rapid and alarming rate; that the wages of manufacturing operatives almost everywhere throughout the country are undergoing extensive and as the manufacturers claim, enforced reductions; that the opportunities for employment are conjointly becoming limited; and finally, that artisans especially imported from foreign countries to work in certain employments (*e.g.*, glass-making) in the United States are returning to Europe, with a view of bettering their condition.¹

The situation is extraordinary and anomalous, but only such as might naturally be expected from the circumstances. It needs but a superficial glance at our tables of exports to see that, comparatively speaking, we have but little other than the

¹ The following opinions concerning the present condition of the iron and steel industries of the United States have been communicated to the *New York Tribune* by Andrew Carnegie, the well-known iron manufacturer of Pennsylvania, under date of September 24, 1883:

"Much as I regret to say it, I believe that matters will grow worse for some months before manufacturing interests can reach a profitable business. A much more decided curtailment of production must take place before there can be any improvement. This will be brought about naturally by the prevalence of such ruinous prices as will compel manufacturers to stop producing goods in advance of the country's needs. But as great loss is entailed by curtailment of production, the works are kept running to their full capacity, altho prices have fallen to figures which leave even those manufacturers who have unusually favorable facilities little or no profit, and entail a positive loss upon the average manufacturer. I think the wages paid at the (iron) mills on the seaboard of the United States to-day are about as low as men can be expected to take. In the West, notwithstanding a recent agreement of the men to accept a reduction of 30 per cent, it now seems probable, from the very unsatisfactory outlook, that they will have to be asked to work for still less."

domestic market, and not the whole of that, for our vast and varied manufactured product—the ratio of exports for the years 1878–80 being only 12.5 of manufactured to 87.5 of unmanufactured commodities, or \$102,246,000 of the former to \$721,700,000 of the latter. And to make up even this beggarly 12 per cent it was necessary to count in lumber, coal, and leather as manufactured exports. Now it simply stands to reason that if the manufacturing industries of the United States are to be mainly limited to the requirements of a domestic market, that their growth must be also limited, and far below their normal capacity and tendencies; and if, under such limitations, or arrest of industrial growth, we are to have poured in upon us annually from half a million to seven hundred thousand immigrants,—mainly laborers in the prime of life,—and an annual increase of our population from natural causes of about 3 per cent per annum, it would seem also clear that there must be extensive reductions in the wages of American laborers; for with two, three, or more sellers of labor for every one buyer, the buyer will fix the price; and the price which the buyer or American employer will strive to fix, and indeed the price which his necessities will compel him to fix, if he is going to extend his operations and avoid producing at a loss, will be such as will enable him to produce equally cheap with his foreign competitor. A continuation of the present national fiscal policy, or in other words a continuation of our present high-tariff policy, inevitably means, therefore, low wages, and the degradation and impoverishment of the masses, or ensures the very results which it is claimed the protective policy is certain to avert. And there is no need further of adopting in any degree, in regard to such a conclusion, this line of prophecy, for the results in question have in a large degree already come, and in the absence of reform, have come to stay.¹

¹ The extent, however, to which many of even the most intelligent of American citizens fail to recognize the condition of affairs into which as a nation we are drifting, finds a striking illustration in the following reported extract of a recent speech by Hon. J. B. Foraker, one of the candidates for Governor in the State of Ohio, during the recent political canvass: "The laborer," he says, "in this country is a part of the governing power. He is a voter. He has a voice in the government. Aside, therefore, from all humanitarian reasons, we want him to have a chance for self-elevation. We want him to eat meat and be comfortable.

The main reason why American manufacturers cannot dispose of their surplus products by exportation and sale of the same in foreign markets, admits of a ready understanding, if one will only keep in view and reflect upon the following facts: 1st, from 80 to 90 per cent of all our manufactures exist because they must as a condition of our civilization, and because no foreign products of like kind can be imported. Any one may abundantly satisfy himself of this by analyzing the history or origin of the bulk of the commodities that pass him on the streets of any busy community, or are exposed for sale at the marts of trade; 2d, possibly from 10 to 20 per cent are in a greater or less degree subject to foreign competition; 3d, in the effort to protect this 10 to 20 per cent, through the agency of taxation and restrictions on exchanges, the cost of all the products of our entire industry is enhanced to such an extent

And for this reason it is that we say if we cannot go into the markets of the world without being subjected to an unjust and degrading competition, we will make ourselves independent of those markets by making markets of our own. Instead of sending our raw cotton across the ocean, to be there manufactured and sent back to us, we will have cotton mills here. We will mine our own coal, develop our own minerals, manufacture our own iron and steel, build our own railroads with our own products, and thus have home markets and domestic commerce." Now it is not the intent of the writer to say anything discourteous of a man of such high character as Judge Foraker, but it is nevertheless true, that if the above remarks are rightfully attributed to him, he certainly had very little idea of what he was talking about; for the trouble of to-day with our industry and labor is that as a nation we have too exclusively the very home markets he thinks so desirable, and are producing more than we can ourselves consume. We export at present more than three fifths of our annual product of raw cotton. Suppose, instead of sending this enormous quantity "across the ocean," we erect mills, as proposed, and spin it ourselves. What will then be done with the product of cloth in excess of domestic want? It must be sold abroad, if sold at all; and if sold abroad, the people who buy must pay for it in turn with the products of their labor, for they have nothing else to buy with. But this means foreign commerce and international trade, which Judge Foraker thinks we can profitably get along without. Again, we raise annually many millions of bushels of cereals in excess of any possible demand for domestic consumption; and unless this excess can be sold abroad, it will either not be raised, or, if raised, will rot on the ground; and what, under such a condition of affairs, would be the avenues of employment open to laborers in mining coal, smelting iron, or building railroads and agricultural machinery? In short, the system which Judge Foraker proposes is the Chinese system of inclusion and exclusion, which the Chinese are preparing to abandon; and his remedy more of the hair of the same dog that has already sorely bitten us.

that exports only exist in cases where our natural advantages for production are so great as to overcome the increase of cost thus artificially and unnaturally created.¹ And as confirmatory evidence, if not absolute demonstration, of the truth of this statement, attention is here asked to the results of an investigation in the last Report (1883) of the Massachusetts "Bureau of Labor Statistics," which altho constituting a contribution to economic science of surpassing interest, and of such a nature as ought to startle every fair-minded American citizen who has been educated to believe that our present high protective policy really works for the benefit of domestic labor and capital, has thus far, very curiously, almost entirely escaped public attention. In this report a very careful analysis is made of the comparative condition of 2240 manufacturing establishments in Massachusetts, representing 21 different industries and 207,798 employees, for the years 1875 and 1880 respectively; the elements of the analy-

¹ The following tables and estimates, deduced from the census of 1880, will afford approximately correct data for estimating the method in which the burden of the taxation imposed to maintain the protective policy of the United States distributes itself among population, occupations, and professions:

OCCUPATIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1880.

Agriculture.....	7,670,493
Professional and personal service.....	4,074,238
Trade and transportation..	1,810,256
Manufacturing, mechanical, and mining industries.....	3,837,112

Total.....	17,392,099
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Proportion engaged in agriculture who may possibly be subjected to foreign competition in some manner—mainly the growers of sugar and of rice, and of wool possibly, to a very small extent, about 5 per cent, or	400,000
Proportion engaged in manufacturing, mechanical, and mining industries, who can be in part but not wholly subjected to foreign competition—large estimate based on calculation.....	837,112

Total.....	1,237,112
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Proportion that are heavily taxed, and placed at a disadvantage in agriculture, manufactures, mechanical pursuits, and in mining, by the protective system...	16,154,989
Proportion in whose favor the protective system is invoked, but whose wages are not lower than in other employments.....	1,237,112

sis being the census returns made to the Federal and State Governments respecting capital, laborers, value of stock used and of product, cost of management, profits, etc., in the years specified, which are acknowledged to be as reliable as any such returns possibly can be, and as probably superior to any similar statistics ever before collected. The 2240 establishments also employed 53 per cent of the invested capital, paid 58 per cent of wages, used 57 per cent of the stock, and produced 57 per cent of the entire manufactures of the State. Premising further that Massachusetts practically produces none of the stock or raw material which its manufacturers use, but buys almost everything from beyond her borders, the investigation shows that the stock—metals, fibres, leather, coal, lumber, chemicals, and the like—used in manufacturing in that State in 1880, cost 11.52 per cent more than it did in 1875; and that the manufacturers, as the report expresses it, “counterbalanced” this result by reducing the wages of their employees during the period involved to the extent, on an average, of 4.35 per cent, and by submitting to a reduction of their net profit of 7.19 per cent. Now, when it is remembered that the prices of manufacturers’ raw materials have notably declined in all foreign competitive countries during the period covered by the Massachusetts analysis; that the wages of foreign competitive labor during the same time have also very generally advanced; and that, apart from possible differences in the wages of labor, Massachusetts industries, in comparison with foreign industries, are not only not subjected to any special disabilities, but on the contrary enjoy many advantages—it seems clear that the extraordinary results under consideration cannot be referred to any other agency than that of our present national fiscal policy, which, as above pointed out, does by excessive taxation and restriction of exchanges inevitably enhance the cost of all manufactured commodities and their elements. And if other evidence in support of this conclusion were needed, it is so abundant that the only difficulty attendant is to decide what to present; as, for example, the fact brought out before the Massachusetts Legislature at its last session (1883), that in respect to certain shoes, for which there might naturally be a large domestic demand to supply the requirements of tropical countries, the cost of the Massachusetts-made shoes is enhanced to

the extent of 60 cents per pair before the manufacture even begins, by reason of the taxes on their constituent materials: that cordage manufactured in New York of imported materials (which the country cannot produce) can be, and actually is, through a rebate of duties, sent to China and Brazil and sold there for the equipment of foreign ships, cheaper than an American ship-owner can buy it within one mile of the factory where it is made; and that, for the same reason, salmon packed in tin on the Columbia River can be transported by rail and sold cheaper to the people of New Brunswick for food than the people of Maine, many miles farther east, can buy it. Indeed, were it not joking on a serious subject, there could be no more fitting comment on the situation than to recall the lines of "Truthful James" when he says:

" Then I looked up at Nye,
And he gazed upon me ;
And he rose with a sigh,
And said, ' Can this be ?

We are ruined by Chinese (foreign) cheap labor ! "

It is not overlooked in connection with this discussion that the complaint of overproduction, restricted markets, and no profits in business, by reason of excessive competition, is at this time general in all commercial countries, and especially in Great Britain, where protection as an element of disturbance is wanting; and that, therefore, the reference here made of the existing unsatisfactory state of affairs in the United States to our national fiscal policy may seem to not a few to be unsound both in respect to facts and logic. That there have been great disturbances in the work of production and exchange of most countries in recent years, and, taking the world throughout, most notably since 1873, and that these disturbances still continue, is not to be denied. And the explanation of it is referable, in the opinion of the writer, in a very large degree to a class of agencies which have not thus far received the attention from economists and publicists which they merit; namely, the wonderful changes which through invention and discovery have recently taken place in the world's method of doing its work of production and distribution. These changes have been accompanied with immense losses of capital and great disturbances of

labor, in which the United States has participated and suffered in common with other countries. That their ultimate outcome, however, is to be good, cannot be doubted; for by an economic law, which Mr. Atkinson, of Boston, more than others, has recognized and formulated, all material progress is affected through the destruction of capital by invention and discovery, and that the rapidity of such destruction is the best indicator of the rapidity of progress.¹ But in the readjustment by nations of their industries to the new circumstances, which is still going on and is yet very far from complete, the "law of the survival of the fittest" is going to fully assert itself; and in this struggle the United States, by reason of possessing as no other nation does, the conditions for the cheapest production of the great staple commodities of the world's consumption, ought to prove itself the fittest, and dominate in "manufactures" as it now dominates in respect to the production of cotton and food products. Why such a result has not yet been attained; why in the readjustment of industries to the new conditions, the United States suffers disproportionately, or even as much as her chief industrial competitor, Great Britain; and why under the present national fiscal policy there is little chance for improvement—finds a sufficient explanation and answer in the results of the Massachusetts industrial investigation before referred to, even without taking into account a vast amount of other corresponding and confirmatory evidence.²

¹ Every man who is trying to make some new labor-saving invention or discovery is trying at the same time to practically destroy the value of previously accumulated labor or capital. If an invention could be made to-morrow which, at no greater cost, could spin or weave ten per cent more of cotton fibre in a given time than is now practicable, all the existing cotton machinery of the world, now representing hundreds of millions of dollars of expenditure, would be worth little more than old metal. By the discovery within the last decade of a method of manufacturing the coloring principle of madder (the principal coloring material used in printing calicoes), three or four factories in Germany and England employing but a few hundred men were substituted for hundreds of thousands of acres of land and thousands of laborers which had been before devoted to the cultivation of the madder plant. So also the construction of the Suez Canal is said to have practically rendered worthless over 2,000,000 tons of British shipping which, built for the India trade *via* the Cape of Good Hope and not fitted for the canal, was no longer wanted.

² A recent writer in the *British Boot and Shoe Journal*, after noticing the testimony given before the Massachusetts Legislature last winter, to the effect

Coming back now more directly to the "pauper-labor" argument: there is no question that there is a great amount of poorly paid, half-starved labor in Europe and other countries. But what, let us inquire, is its true relation, from a purely practical, business point of view, to the laborers and industries of the United States? Apart from agriculture, in the sphere of which industry we have no formidable competitors, inasmuch as we can profitably undersell the products of the poorest paid labor in the world,—the peasants of Russia and Hungary, the fellahs of Egypt, and the ryots of India,—the dreaded pauper of foreign countries is engaged mainly in handicraft, as contradistinguished from machinery manufacturing; as, for example, in the manufacture of pottery, where the laborer works almost exactly as did his predecessor four thousand years ago; or in the case of silk-ribbon weavers, whom a recent correspondent of the *New York Tribune* describes as operating their handlooms in poor, ill-ventilated cottages, and in the same rooms in which the operatives eat and sleep. And apart from pottery and silk, a great variety of other products manufactured or produced under similar conditions might be mentioned. In the case of Europe, the people who work at these handicrafts live for the most part in the most densely populated districts, where all natural advantages and opportunities for employment have long ago been exhausted, and where the moral inertia consequent on lack of intelligence or means is an almost insuperable obstacle in the way of any attempt on the part of the laborer to improve his situation by engaging in other pursuits or by emigration. Under such circumstances wages are undoubtedly very low, and the protectionist, in view of this fact,

that the existing capital and labor at present engaged in the manufacture of shoes in the United States is sufficient, if fully employed for nine months, to supply any current market demand for the entire year, the recent failures in the shoe industry, and the general tendency to a reduction of wages in this and every other branch of industry in the United States, thus pertinently comments on the situation: "One may here [England] ask, Where are the advantages and disadvantages of protection to the shoe trade? We have in this country [England] certainly not so much trade as could be done, but, nevertheless, we have a trade which exists all the year round; we have in addition a considerable export trade, and the wages of our workmen have advanced rather than declined. Our cousins across the Atlantic have six or eight months' home trade, no export, and a falling labor market. Surely the comparison should be deterrent enough."

asks us, with a sort of "now-I-have-got-you air," how can we, apart from the protection afforded by the tariff, enter into successful competition with them, except by bringing down the wages of our laborers to a level with the wages of these paupers? But, in the name of common-sense, why should we as a nation desire to attempt any such competition? What possible reason or inducement is there for wanting to introduce these handicraft industries into this country, and of attempting to keep them alive by means of enormous taxes levied under the tariff upon the whole people,—as, for example, 60 per cent upon silks, and from 60 to 100 per cent on earthenware and crockery,—when we can buy all we want of these products with a very small part of the excess of our cotton and grain; and which excess, it ought to be especially borne in mind, if not sent out of the country and exchanged for some products of foreign labor, will either not be raised, or if raised, will rot in the ground? The main thing which pauper laborers in Europe and everywhere else want is food; food beyond everything else, for they are starving. And when it is proclaimed, with real or feigned fright and horror, by political orators and partisans, that these people are willing to work for fifteen or twenty cents per day, the proclamation means that they are willing to give the results of each and every day of their hard and often disagreeable and degrading labor, in making things which the American agriculturist wants and cannot advantageously produce himself, for one fourth of a bushel of wheat, one half a bushel of corn, two pounds of beef, or three of pork or lard, products which represent but a fraction of a day's labor in the United States. For this is the basis on which the pauper laborer of foreign countries, working for fifteen to twenty cents per day, is going to exchange with us, if he exchanges at all. Certainly it would seem that there is nothing which the agricultural interest of the United States, which represents directly or indirectly three fourths of our entire population, could do to profit itself more than to encourage such exchanges.

Consider next the relation of this same bugbear of foreign competitive pauper labor to such of our manufacturing industries as rely mainly on machinery for the work of production. In regard to a majority of these, there can be no doubt that

their representative manufacturers would be able to defy the competition of the world if the burden of taxation was removed, to the extent that it is in Great Britain, from the materials which enter into their products, and from tools and machinery, and from many of the commodities which are essential to the living and comfort of their employees, and the continuance of which is no longer needed to meet any necessities of the state for revenue. Where the use of machinery—especially of a complex kind—which is the kind mainly used in the manufacture of the world's great staple products, and in the invention and application of which the United States especially excels—forms an important factor in the work of production, the cost of the wages paid to the people who work such machinery forms no criterion of the cost of the goods which are the resulting product. In all such cases "it is the operative that earns the highest wages who compasses the lowest cost of production;" and whoever doubts or fails to comprehend these propositions has not yet grasped the A B C of the subject. Thus, for example, when the product of one day's labor in the manufacture of cotton cloth in the United States, properly apportioned and with the aid of machinery, is equivalent to the product of at least twenty days' labor for a like purpose in China, Central America, and other semi-civilized countries (as is the case), it is a matter of very little consequence whether the laborers who grow the cotton in Texas or spin and weave it in New England receive a greater or less number of dollars per week for their wages; for the question as to who shall command the markets of such countries turns up other and entirely different considerations. To-day the poorest paid labor in the world, namely, that of the natives of India, will be glad to work for twelve and a half cents per day, making bagging (gunny-cloth) to bale American cotton out of the fibre of the jute; but the American manufacturer, paying from seven to ten times as much per day to women operatives, can make a better article so much cheaper, that the Indian producer has been practically driven from the field of competition in this country. And yet, so long as the Federal Government continues to levy a tax of six dollars per ton on the fibre which the American manufacturer uses there is very little chance for

the latter to sell the results of his ingenious machinery and highly paid labor in any other than his own country; and so a large number of the American bagging mills are now idle, and the home market is glutted with their unsold products. The case of the miserably paid women and children in the "black country" of England has recently been cited by a correspondent of the *N. Y. Tribune* as a fearful example of what the working men and women of the United States would be subjected to if they should undertake to make nails in the absence of a high protective tariff on the importation of nails, when the truth is that the logic is all the other way, and it is the English laborer who needs to be protected against the American, and not the American against the English pauper; inasmuch as the latter, if he will persist in making nails by hand, has got to compete against machines of American invention which can make more nails in one hour than the paupers working by hand can make in a day, and at less than a tenth of the expense. To which it may be added, that the operatives who work the American machines receive almost the highest wages paid in the United States in any department of mechanical industry.

One of the most novel and interesting illustrations, which the writer has recently met with, of the absurdity and fallacy of much of the current averment of the necessity for protection for such a country as the United States against the competitive pauper labor of foreign countries, is given in Senior's "Conversations and Journals in Egypt," (London, 1882). Mr. Senior was an English lawyer and economist of high standing, who some years ago visited Egypt in company with a celebrated British engineer, Mr. McLean, and in the course of their travels the two visited the Pyramids; and while on the ground speculated concerning the cost and the amount of labor entering into these great structures. "I asked Mr. McLean," writes Mr. Senior (pp. 63, 64), "for what he could reproduce the largest of them on a spot in the immediate neighborhood, as in their case, of a quarry. He said, roughly estimating their contents at 80,000,000 cubic feet, and the cost at 3d. (six cents) per cubic foot, for a million sterling. It appears that their contents are 88,000,000 cubic feet. The cost, therefore, would be £62,500 more—in all, £1,062,500" (or \$5,310,000). MCLEAN: "There would not be the

least difficulty in the performance, and with 25,000 men I could do it in one year; with 2500 men in ten years and turn out a much better article." SENIOR: "For what could you build a pyramid in England?" MCLEAN: "I cannot answer that question without knowing what I should have to pay for the stone—that is, for permission to extract it. Let me have the use of the quarry for nothing, and I think a pyramid could be built nearly as cheaply in England as in Egypt. It is true that labor is four times as dear in England as in Egypt, as our laborers receive three shillings a day where the Egyptians receive a sixpence, and our men do only two thirds more work; but our skill and our mechanical contrivances nearly make up the difference."

Now if pyramids were an article of international trade, *i.e.*, of demand and supply, and the question of wages was to be held to be determinative of what country should furnish them, it would seem impossible for the English laborer to engage in the pyramid business without being largely protected against the pauper labor of Egypt, when the real truth would be that it was the Egyptian pauper, working for sixpence a day and finding himself, that needed large protection against the comparatively high-priced Englishman, and that even then he could only supply a comparatively restricted demand of his own local market for pyramids.

Further evidence to the same effect might be adduced to almost any extent; but enough, it is believed, has been said to abundantly prove, that instead of fearing the competition of foreign pauper laborers, who are paupers mainly because of the absence of natural advantages and a lack of the ownership and use of machinery, we ought rather to welcome it and recognize that there is no way in which as a nation we can so rapidly and certainly enrich ourselves as by exchanging the products of our skill and machinery, representing but a comparatively small amount of labor, with the products of the so-called foreign pauper laborers, representing a comparatively large amount of labor.

DAVID A. WELLS.

CURRENCY PROBLEMS.

FOR nearly seventeen years the industrial and financial economy of the country was deranged by inconvertible paper money. In looking back to the supposed causes which led to a resort to a forced issue, it becomes evident that the measure was not only unnecessary, but mischievous and dangerous; and it is also evident that in almost any year that elapsed between the passage of the legal-tender act and the actual resumption of specie payments a little energy would have disposed of the incubus. Yet the only honest attempt to reach a sound currency basis—the policy of currency contraction adopted by Hon. Hugh McCulloch, then Secretary of the Treasury—was speedily thwarted and the old condition of affairs restored.

The year 1879 was marked by two events which have great economic importance. On the 1st of January specie payments were resumed, and the dead-weight of a currency that was irredeemable and fluctuating in value was lifted from the trade and industry of the country. In the fall occurred an unexampled revival in every branch of business, and the longest and most severe period of financial and commercial depression the country has ever experienced was ended. The knowledge that the currency was on a firm basis aided this revival and intensified its effects when it came. The two years of great prosperity which succeeded served to conceal, and even in a measure neutralize, certain dangerous elements in the financial economy of the country, which ignorant or interested legislation had introduced. At the present time the period of prosperity, of speculation, and inflated values is over, and a commercial depression which may become as severe as that which succeeded the crisis of 1873 has come. In this stage of reaction these elements of mischief

are again threatening, and it is evident that they have been acquiring force even while apparently inactive.

The circulating medium of the country is composed of three elements: gold and silver; legal-tenders, or circulating notes issued by the Federal Government and redeemable in gold or silver; and National Bank notes, the issues of which are secured by the deposit of United States Government bonds, and are convertible on demand into gold, silver, or legal tenders. But money is only the instrument of exchange, and the quantity that a nation needs depends upon the extent of its exchanges and the rapidity with which they are made. The exchanges are not a fixed quantity, but are subject to great fluctuations, ebbing and flowing with the general condition of trade and industry, of demand and supply or of the markets, and the state of credit. During the years that have elapsed since the resumption of specie payments the changes in the total amount of currency in circulation have been very marked, rising from \$1,165,553,503 in November, 1879, to \$1,488,838,554 in November, 1882. In order to meet these altered conditions of the exchanges it is essential that the currency may adapt itself to the situation, that it may be elastic; and one of the most perfect laws in economic science is that which governs the natural increase and decrease of a sound currency to satisfy the new conditions that arise.

In the currency of this country but two of the elements are elastic, and, as will be shown, these possess this quality in only a limited degree. Since 1878 the amount of legal-tenders that may be issued has been fixed at \$346,681,016, so that while this part of the circulating medium may be contracted, it cannot, under existing laws, be expanded. Any increase must therefore occur in the National Bank notes or the precious metals.

The issues of the National Banks are based upon a deposit of United States Government bonds. On the 30th July last the banks held bonds to secure their circulation to the amount of \$357,151,450, which is a smaller aggregate than they have held at any time since the system was first authorized. This amount was composed as follows:

6's, Currency....	\$3,452,000
5's,	15,000

4½'s,	39,797,500
4's,	104,693,650
3's,	201,989,800
5½'s	7,203,500

Total.....\$357,151,450

On September 29th this amount had been reduced to \$353,675,150. All of the outstanding three-and-one-half-per-cent bonds have been called, and will be cancelled by November 1. Any further reductions in the debt will be made in the three-per-cent bonds, of which there were outstanding on the 1st of October about \$305,000,000, and nearly two thirds of this total is held by the banks. The 122d call, issued in September, was for \$15,000,000 of these three-per-cent bonds, and in this sum was included about \$4,500,000 of bonds held by the banks. These three-per-cents are wholly under the control of the Government, and are subject to redemption as the income of the Government will allow, and in an order inverse to that in which they were issued. That is, the bonds that were first allotted will be the last to be redeemed. The surplus revenue applicable to debt reduction was in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1883, \$137,000,000, and in spite of changes in tariff and internal duties there will probably be nearly \$100,000,000 surplus income in the present year. So that, even supposing that the banks hold the bonds that will be the last to be called, in about one year they must begin to surrender their holdings, and with them their circulation. Nor will this contraction be gradual, but will be made by leaps and bounds, which will greatly aggravate the situation. The time is not far distant when the National Bank note circulation will be not only inelastic, incapable of expansion, but even a constantly contracting currency, unless other bonds are purchased and deposited in place of those called in. This remedy is, however, very unlikely, as the prices now obtained for the bonds bearing rates of interest over three per cent are so high, that, taken in conjunction with other burdens and restrictions imposed upon the banks, there will be little, if indeed any, profit in the operation.

Three remedies for this situation other than that just mentioned have been prominently brought forward :

1. The restrictions imposed upon the issuing of the legal-tenders may be withdrawn, and as the bank currency is contracted new government issues may take its place.

The objection to resorting to an increased issue of legal-tenders is one of principle and not of degree, as it applies to every such note. The issuing of circulating notes is not a necessary or proper function of government, and when resort is had to this measure there is a danger that it will be abused. This is particularly the tendency in this country, where a popular cry is often misinterpreted as a popular demand. The idea that plenty of money, irrespective of its quality, brings prosperity, and that the more money there is, the more prosperity, is one that meets us in the history of every nation, and again and again in the experience of any one people. The greenback is now at par because it is exchangeable for gold on demand, and it is known that the government is in a position to so redeem it when called upon. Its value rests upon no *fiat* of the government, but upon what lies in the vaults of the treasury for its redemption. It merely reflects, as it were, the value of that which it represents—the treasury reserve. So long as the issues are limited in amount, and a sufficient redemption fund of the right quality is maintained, these notes will circulate among the people at their full face value, and furnish a good medium of exchange. Senator Sherman briefly summed up the advantages of such an issue as follows: "A limited amount of United States notes is desirable for this reason, that the United States can better maintain and hold in reserve a larger amount of gold and silver coin than any association of banks can possibly do. Besides, the reserve is always under the eye of the public; that reserve cannot be dissipated by dishonest banking; it cannot be squandered by a fraudulent president or cashier; it is there in the sight of the world, the great fulcrum and basis on which your system rests; and there it should be preserved and maintained."

What if the limitation now imposed upon the issue of the greenback be removed. The government is as amenable to economic laws as the individual. It may have high credit; it may point to financial operations of great magnitude, the resumption of specie payments, the wholesale refunding at a low rate of interest of its bonds, an enormous revenue, which has

allowed it to make large reductions in its debt besides meeting all of its current obligations: still it cannot force into circulation at par a currency that is not of full value. It must have something tangible to support its credit, but it could not hope for this under an unlimited issue. The very fact that the amount to be put in circulation was under the control of Congress would excite a reasonable suspicion as to its quality, because Congress is open to influences which might easily lead it into an abuse of its power. There have been political leaders who have gravely urged, both in and out of Congress, the theory that money is wealth, that paper promises issued by the government are money, and that it is only necessary to keep the presses at work to bring to pass an industrial and financial millennium. The country has once escaped an invasion of this pestiferous doctrine, but the heresy is by no means killed, and there will yet be found many who will defend it when they see it is for their own interests to do so. A currency that was exposed to such dangers, and that depended upon such "regulation," would be the worst possible currency. There would be, and from the nature of things there could be, no guarantee that the notes would be redeemed or convertible in gold. Any overissue would return upon the treasury to deplete its reserve, and a slight panic or distrust would compel the government to suspend specie payment, and would result in again subjecting the country to a currency that was depreciated and fluctuating in value.

2. It is said that if the tax of one per cent on circulation were to be repealed the stability of the National Bank system would be assured. There exists in Congress a strong feeling against these institutions. They are regarded by many as having been specially favored, as having grown fat upon government bounty, and as monopolies that ought not to be continued. For this reason it is very doubtful if any new favor could be secured for them, however just it might be. The last Congress abolished the taxes upon deposits and capital, but left untouched that upon circulation, altho Mr. Knox recommended that it be reduced one half. It is this privilege of issuing circulating notes that embodies the chief cause for complaint against the banks, and it is very doubtful if Congress would remove a tax which keeps the banks in reminder that they

enjoy a privilege.¹ If such a repeal were made it would not afford more than a temporary relief, as it would in no wise influence the rate at which the bonds are being called in and redeemed. The real remedy must lie deeper. Of a like character, but somewhat more effective, is the recommendation of Mr. Knox that the bonds bearing higher rates of interest be refunded into three-per-cent bonds. "If the whole public debt were reduced to a uniform rate of three per cent, the present high premium upon bonds would almost entirely disappear, and the volume of circulation would respond more readily to the demands of business. The temptation to sell such bonds for the purpose of realizing the premium would no longer remain. . . . The proposition is that inducements be offered to the holders of the four and four-and-a-half-per-cent bonds to surrender them to the government, receiving in payment therefor three-per-cent bonds having the same dates of maturity as the bonds which are to be surrendered. The new three per cent bonds issued would themselves bear a small premium, and it is believed that the holders of four-per-cents would consent to such an exchange if accompanied by an offer of not more than fifteen per cent premium. The amount of the premium upon this class of bonds, say \$700,000,000, now outstanding at fifteen per cent, would be \$105,000,000, and this premium could be paid, as the bonds are surrendered for exchange, from the surplus revenue of the government, thus in effect reducing the debt of the government \$105,000,000 by a prepayment of interest which must be paid at a greater rate each year until their maturity.

"The benefits of this plan both to the holder and to the government are apparent. The holders would receive, in the shape of fifteen per cent premium upon the bonds, a portion of their interest in advance, which would be available for loans at rates greatly exceeding the borrowing power of the government, which is now less than three per cent. The government would

¹ It is worth noting that this privilege is not used to any great extent by the banks situated in the financial centres of the country, but rather by those in the smaller cities and towns. The city banks have many sources of profit other than circulating notes, but outside of the large cities the issue of notes is relied upon to make the business of banking profitable.

be enabled by this use of its surplus to save a portion of the interest which otherwise it would be compelled to pay hereafter."¹

This plan is marked by great ingenuity, but it introduces a somewhat new principle in the government finances—that of purchasing its own bonds at a premium.

3. A very high authority, Mr. Hugh McCulloch, recommends that a certain part of the debt, say about \$100,000,000, be made perpetual, in order to furnish the people "with an undoubted security." Apart from sentimental or economic objections to any amount of debt, there lies the point that it is no part of the government's business to furnish undoubted securities to its subjects. It exists to protect the lives and property of those over whom it is placed, and its duty is to promote the general welfare by making such protection effective; but it would require a very liberal interpretation of its powers to enable it to furnish sound investments for the governed. Even were this plea allowed, there would be no object in limiting the amount of such securities to \$100,000,000—a purely arbitrary limit; but the whole existing debt might be made perpetual, as there exists a demand among investors sufficient to absorb the whole of it. In case more was needed new debt might be created, until the supply was equal to the demand. The Federal Government is already overburdened with functions, and when it is drawing or threatening to draw to itself new and important powers, which have hitherto been entrusted to and exercised by corporations, it is no time to clothe it with an unnecessary function. It is to be regretted that abuse and mismanagement of important interests have created a distrust in certain classes of investments—notably in the securities issued by railroad corporations—which under a judicious and well-considered administration would be as safe an investment as government bonds, while making higher returns on the capital invested. But it is no part of the government to interfere by issuing undoubted securities. The debt ought to be paid off as rapidly as circumstances will allow, but not so rapidly as to endanger the stability of the institutions that have been built upon the debt.

¹ "Report of the Comptroller of the Currency," 1882, p. 21.

It thus becomes evident that if the existing fiscal policy of the government be maintained, the only really elastic part of the currency will be the gold and silver. But here it is necessary to make a distinction between the gold and the silver in the money of the country, and this will draw attention to a second danger which now threatens its financial economy, and an even greater danger than that which attends the rapid extinction of the National Bank system.

As a matter of convenience, the operation of coinage is usually entrusted to the government. The part played by the government in this operation ought, however, to be purely mechanical, accepting the bullion offered to it and returning coins of a weight and fineness which are determined by the laws of the nation. The functions of the mint are to form coins of the full weight and containing a certain quantity of metal, and the stamp impressed upon them is merely the guarantee of the government that they possess the qualities required by law. The government ought not to attempt to determine the value of the coins, as that is beyond the power of government to determine; nor should the government regulate the number of coins to be stamped. The value of the coins depends upon the quantity of gold or silver in the market, and their number is governed by the relation of the demand for coins to the supply. The operations of the mint are, or ought to be, purely automatic, and they are determined by the convenience of the public. "It is this self-acting character of the mint which is the great safeguard of the coinage. If it were in the power of the government to refuse to coin, they would be able to restrict the coinage, and to add to its exchangeable value. If they were able to alter the quantity and purity of the metal contained in the sovereign, they would be able to depreciate its value, as has in former times often been done. In either case they would be able to derange markets, and alter existing contracts which are made in terms of the pound. The self-acting character of the mint operations reduces the function of the state in issuing money to that of a verifier of weights and measures."¹

¹ Farrar, "The State in its Relation to Trade," p. 46.

It must be evident that while the laws governing the coining of gold respect this self-acting character of the mint, it is not recognized by the law of 1878, under which the standard silver dollar is coined. This last-named law fixes upon an arbitrary relation of silver to gold, a relation that did not exist at the time the law was passed, has never existed since, and which subsequent events have proved to be so far from the correct relation, that what purports to be one dollar is in fact worth but about eighty-five cents. The government guarantees that the coin contains four hundred and twelve and a half grains Troy of standard silver, but in the present condition of the silver market it is absurd to call the coin one dollar. It is a dishonest dollar. The law which committed this error made even a greater blunder in attempting to dictate how many coins should be struck each month, thus again setting aside the automatic character which properly belongs to the mint. The foolishness of such a proceeding is too patent to need any examination, yet it was at the time thought, and doubtless honestly, that the evils attending a double standard of gold and silver would thus be escaped. The law on this point is absolute: the Secretary of the Treasury is "directed to purchase, from time to time, silver bullion, at the market price thereof, not less than \$2,000,000 worth per month nor more than \$4,000,000 worth per month, and cause the same to be coined monthly, as fast as so purchased," into standard dollars. This coinage has continued as the law directs since March, 1878, irrespective of the demand. The result might easily have been foretold. The coins will not circulate, and have been steadily accumulating in the Treasury vaults, as the capacity of the country to absorb them is limited, and the limit seems to have been reached some time ago. Of the amount coined during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1883, nearly five sixths remained in the Treasury. As if to insure the non-circulation of the coin the certificate system was introduced; no sooner do the pieces get outside of the Treasury when they are returned to be exchanged for the more convenient certificates. The coins cannot form part of the reserve in banks, because these institutions are in duty bound to keep only the best forms of securities; nor can the banks in justice to themselves or to their customers

freely receive the certificates, as these issues are a legal tender for public dues only, and not for private debts. But even if this certificate system did not exist the attempt to force into circulation a depreciated coin must have failed. A market for silver bullion to the extent of at least \$2,000,000 per month was created, but no corresponding market for the coins was possible.

Honest money requires no law to make it circulate; the act is instinctive. A gold dollar is such a currency; the National Bank note is such a medium of exchange. Gauged in the money markets of the world, they have been found to be what they purport to be—sound money. Every merchant or banker who accepts them knows exactly what he is taking, and knows that he may part with them on the same terms. The standard silver dollar rests upon a very different basis. As its value is governed by the price of silver, it has one value to-day, another to-morrow; always fluctuating and uncertain. In no sense of the word is it a good currency. It is a discredited coin both abroad, where it will not be received except at its bullion value, and at home, where it will not as yet circulate.

The greatest danger attending a continued coinage of this useless dollar is that it is capable of doing great mischief. They may not circulate now, but the time is coming when they *must* circulate. They are now accumulating in the Treasury vaults, but so rapidly that it is only a question of time when silver must become the predominant element in the currency, and what is much worse, an element that is depreciated in value. Examine the figures (in part estimated) given by the Comptroller of the Currency for the total amount of currency in the country during the last three years (November, 1879–November, 1882). The legal-tenders have neither increased nor diminished: the National Bank note circulation increased only seven and one half per cent; gold, somewhat over fifty-nine per cent (a result due to exceptional circumstances, as will be shown); and *silver, more than sixty-eight per cent*. Nor is this the only indication of the excessive increase of silver in the money of the country; for the Treasury figures prove that it is crowding out the more valuable metal in the “reserve,” the fund which is held to ensure the redemption of the greenback or

legal-tender, and which gives it its value. While in September, 1882, sixteen per cent of the reserve was of silver, in July, 1883, it formed more than twenty-four per cent; and the amount of gold was diminishing while silver was increasing. In spite of all laws regulating the composition of the reserve, the time is approaching when the legal-tender, merely reflecting the value of that which is behind it and in terms of which it is redeemable, will be worth only as much as the silver dollar, or about eighty-four cents. Gold will be exported, the prices of commodities will be increased in order to be conformed to the new measure of value, an era of depreciated currency will be inaugurated, and who can even attempt to calculate the losses that must follow? As wages alone will not for some time rise in proportion to the increased prices, almost the whole crushing force of this piece of folly must be borne by the working-man—the man who is the least able to suffer any derangement of that kind, however small. These tendencies and facts were known a year ago, and were as marked then as they are now, yet Congress in the last session decided that it would be “inexpedient” to suspend the coinage of the silver dollar.

I have thus shown that silver is an elastic element in the currency, but it has not the right kind of elasticity, and so far from adding strength, is a source of danger to the financial economy of the country. How is it with gold?

There is still to be met much of the old mercantile system, which taught that the economic well-being of a state was in proportion to the quantity of money which circulates in it. Gold and silver are wealth only as grain, coal, and iron are also wealth; their use as money has not altered their real nature, and every exchange is still essentially an operation of barter. But it is commonly thought that an import of gold is a good thing, while an export of that metal is to be guarded against as a sign of weakness. In short, it is the old theory of exporting all you can in order that the precious metals may be imported. It is a fallacy which is bound up with the protective system, as that directly teaches that an export of gold is an indication of national impoverishment. During the fiscal years 1880–81 the country imported gold in excess of what it exported for the first time since 1861. The large exports of cereal products in 1879,

1880, and 1881 had made Europe our debtor, and in part settlement of the debt gold was sent here. In the two years 1880-81 the imports of gold exceeded the exports by \$174,585,498, according to the returns of the Bureau of Statistics. In the following year (1882) the tide turned, and the excess of exports amounted to \$6,945,089.

Was this influx of gold natural? In those years, while a wave of great prosperity flowed over the country, there was undoubtedly a demand for more currency in order to perform the necessary exchanges and to move the enormous crops.¹ But it would appear that the causes which occasioned the imports of gold were precedent to the revival of trade that occurred in 1879. Beginning with 1876 the United States began to export a greater value in merchandise than it imported, and in the years, 1878-9 the excess was very large, but due chiefly to an increased exportation of bread and breadstuffs. The value of the imports declined somewhat, and reached the lowest point in 1878, the last year of the depression. This was in accordance with economic laws, as the low prices then prevailing discouraged imports while favoring exports. An examination of the following table will show the movements of trade from 1876 to 1882, and will allow a clearer understanding of the imports of gold:

	Domestic Exports.	Imports.	Excess of Exports,
1876.....	\$525,582,247	\$460,741,190	\$64,841,057
1877.....	589,670,224	451,323,126	138,347,098
1878.....	680,709,268	437,951,532	243,657,736
1879.....	698,340,790	445,777,775	252,563,015
1880.....	823,946,353	667,954,746	155,991,607
1881.....	883,925,947	642,664,628	241,261,319
1882.....	733,239,732	724,639,574	8,600,158

In spite of the large excess of exports over imports that was yearly accumulating from 1876, no imports of the precious metals took place until 1880, altho the amount exported was being diminished from forty millions in 1876 to five millions in 1879. It is very likely that a part of this balance is due to dif-

¹ Some idea of the increase in business transactions which occurred in those years may be obtained from the average daily exchanges shown by the returns of the New York Clearing House Association: 1879, \$82,015,540; 1880, \$121,510,224; 1881, \$159,232,191; 1882, \$151,637,935.

ferences in the methods of computing the value of merchandise ; another part was liquidated by a return of State and railroad securities held abroad. It is also probable that the great increase in the exports of 1878 and 1879 (chiefly of cereal products) could not be met by any corresponding increase in the importations, as the condition of the markets would not allow it, and so were settled in gold. After 1879, or when prices had begun to rise in the domestic markets, it will be noted that imports were greatly increased, and thus more equal relations were established. After 1881 more gold was sent out of the country than was brought into it.

This curious circumstance leads to another question, What was the effect of this influx of gold? Such a sudden addition to the currency of the country was not wholly productive of good. It led to higher prices of commodities ; the high prices engendered speculation, and an undue expansion of credit occurred. An era of great prosperity was looked for, but it was of short duration. In less than three years after the revival first became marked, trade has become depressed, the markets are overstocked with many commodities, prices are nearly as low as they were in 1878, speculation has met with serious collapses, and a period of general liquidation is at hand. The lard and leather failures, the restrictions on production in the iron, cotton, woollen and other industries, and the shrinkage in the prices of securities, are merely methods of recovering from the fever of speculation and inflation—attempts to reach a firmer basis.

Could this influx of gold have been controlled, and thus these commercial and financial derangements modified? International trade is essentially a system of barter, an exchange of commodity for commodity. When a nation imports more than it exports it liquidates the balance in gold or silver. Place restrictions upon the free movement of merchandise, and the laws of trade are interfered with. Had the tariff of the United States been generally lower in 1878 and 1879 it would have offered an opportunity of settling a part of the balance with commodities, as was done two years later. But the existing high tariff compelled a settlement in gold.

This has a close bearing on the currency question, and it becomes important because, as I have shown, the gold ought to

form the basis of our money, as on it depends the value of the legal-tender, if not the National Bank note. The country has gained much gold; can it keep it? It cannot afford to lose it while the silver crisis is impending, but the laws which govern the movement of the precious metals are higher than the enactments of legislative bodies, and any interference with their operation is only productive of mischief. A nation's power to attract gold is measured by its capacity for exporting such commodities as are in demand. But it must be a natural movement, and not one fostered by bounties and subsidies. The high tariff by imposing restrictions upon importation restricts exportation, and so reduces the power of the country to command the gold supply of the world—a position for which its great natural advantages have prepared it.

I have already clearly indicated the remedies which I consider ought to be applied in order to place the currency upon a sound basis, but it will be convenient here to summarize them. (1) The coinage of the silver dollar ought to be suspended. This would remove a great danger that is now impending. (2) The tariff ought to be reformed: first, in order that the movement of the precious metals may be more free; and, secondly, in order that the surplus revenue now collected by the government, and the cause of the rapid payment of debt, may be abolished. This would ensure a moderate contraction of the National Bank note currency, and thus allow more time for securing some other form of paper money that is quite as secure; and also remove the fear that now attends any large export of gold. But both remedies should be applied.

WORTHINGTON C. FORD.

THE CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SCRIPTURES.¹

MOST people will agree that probably no quarter of a century since Bacon's day has witnessed such a rapid "advancement of learning" as the one lying immediately behind us, which opened, roughly speaking, with the publication of the *Origin of Species* (1859); and there are some who are disposed to think that during this period no one field of research has yielded more fruit to the scholar's labor than that of Biblical Science. A new school of historical critics has arisen—if we may so class independent writers of all countries, united only by holding the same general principles and applying the same general method; and the result has been to open a new era in Scriptural study, an era as completely new as that which the work of Darwin and his compeers opened in Natural Science. The questions raised by a critical study of the Scriptures are of course manifold and multiform, and already the literature of the subject is so voluminous that its bibliography would be no light undertaking. It will serve, however, to indicate the general character of the new criticism if we briefly examine one view recently advanced; namely, that which regards the Pentateuchal Law as originating among the exiles at Babylon, and becoming practically operative only after Israel had ceased to be a nation and existed merely as a municipality and a church. In substance this theory was put forth as far back as 1835, in Vatke's *Biblische Theologie*, but failed at that time to receive any general recognition. In 1866 it was revived by Graf in his *Geschichtlichen Bücher des A. T.*, but tho supported by Reuss, Lagarde, and others, the so called

¹ The Right and Wrong Uses of the Bible: Rev. R. H. Newton. The Old Testament in the Jewish Church: Prof. W. Robertson Smith.

Graffian theory was unable to cope with the received view of the history, originating with De Wette and maintained by Ewald, and the authority of the older school continued paramount until the publication in 1870 of Kuenen's *Godsdienst van Israel*, of Reuss's *Histoire des Israelites* in 1877, and Wellhausen's *Geschichte Israels* in 1878. The opinion of the general public doubtless still remains unchanged, owing to its ignorance of these recent works, but it can hardly be questioned—spite of the energetic denials such an assertion would assuredly call forth—that the contest between the older and newer criticism is virtually decided, and that the general conclusions of Kuenen and Wellhausen will eventually be accepted by all scholars. It is significant of this result that even so pronounced a conservative as Delitzsch has lately made marked concessions to the views of the new school. While much of course remains to be done, and something perhaps to be undone, and the new critics differ among themselves over many points of detail, yet their general position—the representation of Israel's religion as emerging out of the crude fancies of primitive ethnicism and slowly rising to the purest and profoundest spiritual conceptions; as a development from germinal principles that witnesses to a progressive revelation which adapted itself to the growing mind of the race—this seems to be supported by the only admissible interpretation of the historic records.

The new criticism is in effect a cross-examination of the Hebrew Scriptures, under which the historic theory obtained from their "direct" examination breaks down. According to that theory Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, and the Levitical Law in its entirety was given to the Israelites before they entered Canaan. The Law contained a revelation from God to his people which was a complete finality; its provisions covered every detail and circumstance of the religious life, and the keeping of it was the whole of religion. On these premises the religious history of Israel can be nothing else than the record of obedience or disobedience to the Law, and all possibility is excluded of a progress in revelation and a growth of the religious mind. The system of the Law set forth in the middle books of the Pentateuch is in principle a scheme of mediation which aims to provide the necessary conditions upon which the

divine displeasure may be averted and the divine favor secured. These conditions are rather formal than spiritual. For law in its own nature is only negative in aim and effect: it is regulative of conduct and preventive of sin, not constructive of character and creative of goodness. Thus the "holiness" which God requires of his people is a term of ritual as well as of ethics; it refers not only to personal character, but to the manifold ceremonial ordinances through which alone personal religion can find acceptable expression. Any neglect or irregularity of ceremonial observance is therefore on a par with the gravest moral offence, and merits an equal penalty. To avert such penalty an "atonement" is demanded, and this is effected by means of "sacrifice"—the blood of a slaughtered animal offered to Jehovah. But the offender himself can by no means bring his sin-offering to the altar. It is only the holy who can safely approach the awful presence of the holy God. The priesthood are a body specially consecrated by Jehovah to act as intermediaries between him and his people, and the main object of the priestly ritual is to offer sacrifice and make atonement for the sins of Israel. Thus the forgiveness of sin is absolutely dependent upon the hierarchy. The people at large are cut off from any direct access to their God, the approach to whose one sanctuary is guarded by a double cordon of priests and Levites.

The new criticism, as I have said, contends that this Law, called Mosaic, was unknown in Israel before the Exile; and it rests its case upon the testimony of the historical and prophetic books, together with an analysis of the Pentateuch itself. The heads of the argument may be summarized as follows: (1.) The books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings, which bring down the history in continuous narrative from the Conquest to the Exile, present a general picture of the life and worship of ancient Israel at all points irreconcilable with the assumed contemporary prevalence of the Levitical Law. To take a single crucial point: There is no more cardinal doctrine of the Levitical system than the law of the one Sanctuary and the relegation of all right and power to offer sacrifice to the priesthood alone. On the Levitical theory not only the tolerance of many local sanctuaries would be impossible, but their existence would be inconceivable. Other sanctuaries than the one of divine ap-

pointment are not merely less holy, places where communion with Jehovah is less solemn and intimate; but they are places where no revelation of his presence can anywise be found, and so they are not and cannot be sanctuaries of Jehovah at all. The popular religion knows nothing of such a theory. The history shows us local worship and lay sacrifice acknowledged as part of the established ordinances of the land; and worship at the local sanctuaries, tho conducted under forms full of irregularity from the Levitical standpoint, continues down to the reign of Hezekiah unrebuked by any voice of prophet, priest, or king. Nor is the worship of the central sanctuary at Shiloh, or afterward of the Temple at Jerusalem, any more accordant with the principles of the Law. The facts of their history make it evident that neither held that ideal position which the Levitical theory assigns to the one sanctuary of Jehovah, and hence that no such Levitical sanctuary anywhere actually existed. The pre-eminence of the Temple lay mainly in the circumstance that it was the sanctuary of the kings of Judah. Like the cathedral in the Kremlin it was one among various buildings of official use included in a vast citadel. It was in fact the chapel royal, and its service part of the regal state and under the regulation of the king. A certain discrepancy between the Pentateuchal theory and the popular practice has indeed always been perceived and admitted, and it is explained by alleging that Israel neglected and forsook the Mosaic ordinances under the influence of Canaanite idolatry. But our critics maintain that such an explanation is wholly inadequate to account for the facts of the case. For the history establishes by cumulative and overwhelming evidence that during the whole period of the Judges and Kings the Law was not merely disobeyed, but was entirely unknown even as the theoretic constitution of Israel's religion. Moreover it is impossible to regard the popular worship as merely a corruption of the Levitical system, for the reason that the difference which declares itself between these two is radical and essential and exhibits them as religions of distinctly opposite type. According to Levitical principles God is absolutely inaccessible to man except in the ritual of the sanctuary and through the mediating priesthood. In the popular religion access to Jehovah was open to every Israelite, and every

concern of private or public life that called men to look Godward was a summons to the altar. Every family feast was an Eucharistic Sacrifice. In the book of Proverbs, which speaks the ordinary language of the people, a feast and a sacrifice are identical; occasions of natural joy and festivity are at the same time occasions of religious observance. Throughout the history the practice of sacrifice appears interwoven with the whole life of the nation. The people found Jehovah and rejoiced before him, not in one place at rare intervals, but in every corner of the land and on every occasion of life. There cannot be a sharper contrast than that between the Levitical conception of sacrificial intercourse with God and the popular conception which ruled the religious life of Israel down to the captivity.

(2.) It is common for those who account for all variance between the legal system and the popular worship on the theory of disobedience to the Law to cite the prophets as continually rebuking this backsliding on the part of the stiff-necked and rebellious people. To this the new criticism replies: It is true that the prophets find great fault with Israel, but it is not for their neglect of any ritual law. On the contrary it is their complaint that the people make too much of ritual service, and, while needlessly punctilious concerning external forms, are careless of the justice and mercy which alone can make their religion vital and their worship acceptable to the God of righteousness. Jeremiah declares: "Thus saith the Lord of hosts, I spake not unto your fathers nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices; but this thing commanded I them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God and ye shall be my people." (Cf. Amos v. 21 sq.; Micah vi. 8; Isaiah i. 11 sq., xliii. 23 sq., etc.)

It is true again that we find the prophets of the eighth century agitating against the worship of the local sanctuaries, but this reform does not proceed from any starting-point of Levitical theory. It is not urged because in the very nature of the covenant there can be but one altar and one priesthood in Israel, but simply as a practical measure to meet a practical evil, the gradual paganizing of the Jehovah worship. But the deeper motive prompting the prophetic movement was hostility to the

principle of ritualism to which religion tended to become a routine of formal observances rather than a practical power over daily life. This would be heathenism indeed; for in the view of the prophets it is the distinctive principle of Mosaism that communion with God is found in no external rite, but only by the conscience and the heart. Hence the religious standpoint of the prophets is distinct at once from that of the popular worship and that of the Levitical system. They are organs of a spiritual revelation. They have stood, they say, in the secret council of Jehovah; they know the law of his working and the supreme design which guides his dealings with his people. For "the secret of the Lord belongs to them that fear him, and he will make them know his covenant." The prophets are not diviners, but intimates and confidants of Jehovah. Their knowledge of his ways is no mere intellectual gift, but comes through their sympathy with his heart and will. "When Israel was a child I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt. . . . I taught Ephraim to go, holding them by their arms. . . . I drew them with human cords, with bands of love." The prophets know Jehovah as the Father of his people, and with them religion is a filial relation of reverent and trusting obedience to the Divine righteousness and love. It is not a merely natural and unconditional bond, such as makes Moab the people of Chemosh; nor is it grounded in a legal covenant or pact; it is union through likeness in character, and Jehovah can be Israel's God only so far as Israel follows righteousness. Thus in the thought of the prophets religion makes men partakers in a divine life, while in the popular conception it only made Jehovah a partaker in the life of men. Hence religion as they teach it is something more than "ethical monotheism;" it goes deeper than all conduct; it is not primarily concerned with any law of works; it is the personal intercourse and fellowship with the heavenly Father and Friend in which is the growth of godliness and the moulding of men into likeness with the divine nature. And so when the prophets speak of the "law" (Torah) of God which it is their mission to reveal, it is plain that in their use of it this loose and elastic term signifies no law of ordinances, but the law of the spirit of a godly life. That law cannot be reduced to a written code; it is the living word in the mouth of the prophet, and

nothing can supersede this prophetic word but the writing of the divine revelation in the hearts of all the people. And this is the ideal state, the goal to which Jehovah is leading Israel by his servants the prophets. For their aim and effort is to lift the whole people to their own level; not to keep them in perpetual separation on a lower plane of religious privilege, as the Law subjects the people to the priesthood, but to bring them to an equal share in the blessings of the prophetic consecration. They looked forward to a day when God's spirit should be poured upon all flesh, and the function of the prophet should cease because all Israel should attain to his spiritual mind and stand with him in the circle of Jehovah's intimates. At that day, "they shall no more teach one man another, saying, Know the Lord, for they shall all know me from the least of them unto the greatest, saith the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity and remember their sin no more." Nor was the vision of prophetic hope bounded by the horizon of Israel. Jehovah's people were to be as a prophet among the nations, converting them to the knowledge of the Lord, leading them to the light and sharing with them its blessings. The glow and color of the splendid verse which paints the gathering of the Gentiles unto Zion and her God remain unmatched in literature. The conception of Israel as a priestly caste, fenced off from the world by her peculiar sanctity, forbidden to intermarry or hold any intercourse with heathen, this finds utterance by no prophet's voice. From the passage above cited and others similar it appears that God's purpose to turn the hearts of his people to himself and lead them to a knowledge of their true relation to him carries with it the forgiveness of sin. Nothing can be simpler than the prophetic teaching of free remission of sin to the penitent. The divine forgiveness may be had for the asking, and comes directly, needing no intervening rite of atoning sacrifice nor any ministry of a mediating priesthood. To the prophet its certainty is grounded in the unchangeable character of God: "I, even I, am he that blotteth out thine iniquity for mine own sake." It is in this deep spirituality that we find the inspiration of the prophets, and it is this that makes them the glory of Israel and true forerunners and foretellers of the Christ.

(3.) Finally the last branch of the argument is that drawn

from analysis of the Pentateuch. The pentateuch is a compilation of ancient traditions, incorporating three distinct legal collections which correspond to the three stages of religious development clearly marked out in the historical and prophetic books. The collection Ex. xxi.-xxiii. is the early law which ruled in Israel down to the eighth century, and gives expression to the ideas of the popular religion, as that is pictured in the history. It is not the code of a nomadic or pastoral people, but presupposes a simple agricultural life in settled homes. The civil laws are such as we find common to other primitive peoples, and the formal ordinances of the cultus contain little that is unique or peculiar. The distinctive character of Israel's religion at this period appears rather in the spirit than in the details of the legislation; above all in the clear enforcement of the truth that Jehovah's relation to his people is founded in moral principle and his favor forfeited by moral iniquity. The second code is comprised in Deut. xii.-xxvi. It is an independent reproduction of the first, in some instances modifying the older laws to conformity with a more advanced social state. The distinctive feature of the Deuteronomic code is its prohibition of the local sanctuaries, and this fixes its historic place as the law-book of Josiah's reformation. It was unknown to Isaiah and hence was not the basis of Hezekiah's attempted reform; but it was the result of the prophetic teaching, a practical scheme laid on the prophetic lines, to adjust the old religious constitution to present needs, arising from the great social change which had come over the people as it passed from the agricultural to the commercial state. From Josiah to the Captivity this code of Deuteronomy had but a generation to run. The third body of laws in the Pentateuch is the Levitical legislation. It is scattered through the books of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, not forming a compact code, yet clearly marked off from the two former. They are social as well as religious, and deal with the whole national life; this starts from the sanctuary and the priesthood and regards Israel as a Church, habitually addressing the people as a "congregation." It points to a time when Jerusalem was no longer the seat of a free state, but the centre of a religious community. We trace its origin to the Captivity, for we find a clear sketch of its whole scheme in the book of

Ezekiel. It is there given out as something distinctly new and in known contrast with former religious theory and practice; tho Ezekiel, who is rather priest than prophet, may well have found germs of his principles latent in the unwritten law of old priestly usage. The development of the system falls therefore between the time of Ezekiel and the time of Ezra, by whose agency it was first put into practical operation and became the Law of the second Temple and of the new religion of Judaism.

Such at briefest is some statement of the evidence on which the new school bases its general conclusion, that the history of Israel refuses to be measured by the traditional theory as to the origin of the Pentateuch; that religion never was cast in the mould of the Levitical system until the whole life of the old kingdom was buried and forgotten, until the Jews were nothing more than a religious community based upon vague traditions of a national existence which had come to an end. And they who know how the critical argument has been worked out and established in detail by many painstaking scholars cannot think that Prof. Smith oversteps the bounds of proverbial Scottish caution when he "ventures to call it a demonstration." In the light of this new learning the religious life of Israel is brought into accord with those broad historic laws which are the uniform and calculable ways of God's dealing with mankind. Mosaism, it appears, is not identical with Pharisaism; it is no finished system, but a germ of spiritual thought and life unfolding in the national consciousness under the slow training of the ages, and reaching its finest flower in the noble religion of the prophets. The priestly Law takes its true place, not as the primitive divine revelation, which makes all the worship of the people one long apostasy and makes the prophets mere acolytes of the priests, but as the narrow mould in which religion was recast after the independent life of the nation had become extinct. In the Old Testament record we follow Israel's religion through its successive periods of growth, culmination, and decline; and from the New Testament we learn not only how the development of that religion involved the destruction of the Hebrew state, as the ripened seed must burst its envelope, but how, even as the seed

itself "is not quickened except it die," it was from the grave of the national religion that a universal faith arose for all mankind.¹ The religious starting-point of Israel has in it nothing novel or peculiar. All the sacred ordinances and forms of worship which gave expression to the religious ideas of the people are so closely paralleled by those of Moabites and Phœnicians that they rather seem to assimilate Israel's religion to those of the surrounding nations than to distinguish it from them; and the "theocratic constitution"—the acknowledgment of Jehovah as the national divinity, the supreme ruler in war and peace, the leader of Israel's armies, and the fountain of right and civil justice—this was a principle common to all contemporary peoples. What was peculiar to the early Israelite was not his religion but his religiousness, his intensity of religious feeling. Hence the revelation to Israel was given in no dogmatic form nor addressed to the speculative intellect. The development of the conception of Jehovah was determined on practical lines. An early naturalism, in part derived from ancestral traditions and in part adopted from the neighboring peoples (Josh. xxiv. 14 15), appears in such passages as Ps. xviii. 7-15, and in the stone and tree and calf worship afterward taken up into Jehovahism since it could not be suppressed,—a process repeated by Christianity in relation to similarly stubborn pagan usages. But all association of Jehovah with the powers that work in nature dropped more and more into the background as the living God was sought in his definite dealings with his people which formed their actual experience. And as the tie that bound Jehovah to Israel was felt to be personal and close, it was ever more clearly apprehended as a relation founded in moral principles. Moral relations, however, have in themselves an universal character; and when this was fully realized by Amos, the founder of spiritual prophecy, Jehovah of Israel became for him the God of the universe.

At the outset the true distinction between Mosaism and all contemporary religions is found in the personal difference between Jehovah and the gods of the nations. The heathen gods have no personal character, nor any personal relations with their worshippers. They have indeed human characteristics, but character, in the sense of a fixed habit of will, of that which

maintains an individuality against all dividing forces, they do not possess. The gods remained always on the same ethical level with their people, and hence ethnic religions had no effect in developing character. Jehovah on the contrary showed throughout Israel's history which was ruled by his providence that he had a will and purpose of his own. All his dealings with the people were directed to lead them on to higher things than their natural character inclined them to. The influence of his revelation upon their national life was the personal influence of a holy character. Thus religion in Israel was a moral discipline and a growing spiritual enlightenment, and its advance is step by step with an increasing clearness of perception of the things which the divine character involves. Such a revelation, to which no other religion can offer any parallel, was only possible through an inspiration of the national mind, for "the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit, because they are spiritually discerned." That inspiration is the special vocation of Israel. To look, however, for this high intuition of Jehovah's character as ruling the thought of the masses would be to expect too much from ordinary humanity. It is the complaint of the prophets that Israel does not "know Jehovah," and hence finds no insurmountable barrier between his worship and heathenism. Such knowledge was indeed too wonderful and excellent for the people to attain to, yet when the prophets enlarge on the spiritual character of Jehovah as governing all his relations with his people, this view is by no one treated as a novelty, but accepted as the very foundation of Israel's religion from the days of Moses; and this tacit acknowledgment that the prophetic teaching in its spirit and substance is not something now heard of for the first time shows that Jehovah's long training of the national conscience had not been without effect. Still this "gospel before Christ" called the people's thought to spiritual heights it had no strength to climb. On the whole the prophets confront the nation with an ideal to which it does not correspond. The practical outcome of the Deuteronomic reform is little more than the limiting of Jehovah-worship to Jerusalem and its abolition everywhere else; whence results a great increase of influence to the Zadokite priests of the capital, who now get rid of their rivals the priests

of the country districts. Then follows the hopeless struggle of Jeremiah, "the evening star of prophecy," against king, priests, and people, and the virtual defeat of the prophetic religion by the religion of the priesthood.

In the earliest times the functions of priest and prophet were not clearly discriminated, and often both were united in the same person. To the last there remained official prophets connected with the priesthood and the sanctuary; and in the conflict with Jeremiah they are found ranged on the side of the priests as partisans of the theory of salvation by ritual. Down to the time of Elijah the "law" of Jehovah—a body of precept and precedent concerning religious, moral, and social duty, derived from the principle of the Mosaic revelation that Jehovah is a God of righteousness—was the common charge of priests and prophets. But such a law united elements which could not thoroughly combine and which finally developed themselves as antagonistic principles. Was religious duty one with social morality, so that to do justly and love mercy were the true service of Jehovah; or was it of man's life a thing apart, and limited to the due performance of liturgical rites? This question divided the true prophets from the priests, as later it divided Protestants and Romanists, and henceforth there were two religions struggling for supremacy in Israel; the one maintaining an external relation to Jehovah through the formalism of a ceremonial worship, the other urging inward communion with him through personal righteousness and the consecration of the heart. During the eighth and seventh centuries, when the priestly power was but loosely organized and always held in check by the power of the king, the ideas of the prophets were able to maintain at least an equal contest with the ideas of the priesthood; but even then the current was setting in a direction to make hierocracy inevitable, and when the returned exiles settled in what was now the Persian province of Judæa, under the government of their high-priest, the crude simplicity of the early popular religion and the profound simplicity of the prophetic faith were alike superseded by the elaborated sacerdotalism set forth in Ezra's law-book, and the bold and able scribe found means through his alliance with the temporal power to settle the foundations of priestly despotism in solid and lasting

strength. It was not accomplished, however, without a final struggle. The prophets had not lived and labored without leaving behind them inheritors of their spirit, ready to dare all for the cause of spiritual freedom; and a non-conformist party declared itself which refused to bow beneath the yoke of the Law. But the stern, unsparing use of force could lead to but one result. The leaders of the opposition were proscribed and banished, hunted down and slain; the spirit of prophecy was quenched and its voice silenced; and the very thought of freedom died from the hearts of men. Israel definitely entered on the path which was to make it "the people of the Book," and the principles of Ezra gained a sway over all minds never to be broken and growing more tyrannous as the years went on. (Matt. v. 12, xxiii. 30, 31; Heb. xi. 35-38.)

It may be said that in its day the Law was an historic necessity; if so, it was a necessary evil. It may be that but for its provisions to utterly isolate its votaries from the "people of the land," the little colony of returned exiles would have been absorbed in the nations surrounding them as the Ten Tribes were absorbed and disappeared in their captivity; it may be that but for the ossified forms of Judaism no life of true religion could have been preserved. Then surely we owe the priesthood a great debt, since whatever the means they used, the people of Jehovah were kept alive until the old stock of Mosaism bloomed again in Christianity. Precisely the same debt we owe to the builders of mediæval ecclesiasticism; for, while in its essential principles their religion was absolutely opposed to the Gospel they professed, yet they held together during ages of darkness and violence the historic organization of Christianity whence the Gospel was to emerge again at the Reformation. It is a remark of Hallam's that during the middle ages "had religion been more pure it would have been less permanent, and Christianity has been preserved by means of its corruptions." This holds equally good of Judaism during the period from Ezra to Christ. But while we acknowledge the services we may recognize the faults of Roman and Levitical religion. In essential points these two are identical, for sacerdotalism is one thing in all times and lands; and if as Protestants we cannot look upon the papal system as a legitimate development of apostolic

Christianity, neither as Christians can we regard the Levitical system as a true advance from the religion of the prophets.

It is only as we thus understand the historic genesis and the inward nature of the priestly Law that we can at all appreciate the relation of Christ to the religion of his time. If the Levitical Law be indeed the divinely appointed system of religious life, then the thorough acceptance of that system from Ezra to Christ will be the attainment of Israel's righteousness and of the divine approbation. But in fact the teaching of Christ is in direct condemnation of its fundamental principles.

Our adoption of the views of the Rabbins, supplemented by a theory of typology, has blinded us to the prime fact of his career, the distinctly revolutionary attitude he assumed toward Judaism, or blinded us at least to its full significance, and now it needs a new and careful study of his life to make its meaning plain. "The attitude of Jesus toward the ecclesiastics colors his career more deeply than any other fact of it; so that to study Christ apart from it would be like studying Luther apart from Indulgences, or writing a life of Wilberforce with the Slavery Question left out. . . . On the threshold of our religious studies there is nothing we should give more heed to than that antagonism between our Lord and the priesthood of which the evangelists say so much. We should lend our minds thoroughly to it, and look searchingly at it in all its aspects, should question and cross-question it, pray over it, Jacob-like wrestle with it and refuse to let it go till we win from it its secret."¹ At every point Christ sets himself not only against rabbinical tradition, but against the whole theory of religion on which the system of the Law was founded. His own religious life is held entirely aloof from the Temple at Jerusalem. According to the synoptical tradition he never appears there but just before his death, and then not to offer sacrifice but to make a last appeal to the people whom the great feast gathered in the Temple courts; and when he declares, "I will destroy this Temple and rebuild it in three days," he has in mind the Jewish religion which he would destroy in order to re-create. He consistently disregards the law of the Sabbath, which Ezra had insisted on with such earnestness and enforced with such difficulty, and annuls its legal obli-

¹ *Scotch Sermons* (1880). Am. ed. pp. 269, 270.

gation by declaring its humanitarian ground: "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath." In many utterances which may strike us as casual or limited to their particular occasion he repudiates in principle all ceremonial observances and attacks the essence of the piety of his day. When he requires of his followers a righteousness exceeding that of the scribes and Pharisees, we perceive that the difference between the two ideals he points to is one simply immeasurable and infinite. In his teaching there appears continually an irrepressible conflict between the fundamental law of Judaism and that of the kingdom of God. The Sermon on the Mount contains injunctions which are a complete reversal of the ethic and theology of the Law. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect;" the Jew had a precept apparently quite similar: "Ye shall be holy, for I Jehovah your God am holy;" but when we compare this Levitical term, holiness, whose radical idea is distance or separateness, with the sublime revelation of the essential divinity of human nature which is given us in these wonderful words of Christ, we find again the gulf of infinite difference that divides the Gospel from the Law. "Love your enemies, that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven:" the Jewish religion insisted on religious hatred; uncompromising hostility to the enemies of Jehovah had been inculcated from the days of the Restoration as a part of religious duty, and had become so rooted in the depths of the national feeling that the Romans found the chief characteristic of the Jew in his "hatred of the human race." In the teaching of Jesus God is the Father of all mankind and counts the just and unjust equally his children. To him religion is the love of this heavenly Father, which carries with it the love of all our human brothers; not only our neighbor, the like-minded, the right-thinking and virtuous, but our enemy, the foreigner, the heretic, the sinner. "Pray for them which persecute you;" the disciple of Jesus must abandon the religion of his fathers if he were to pray for the Roman oppressor, the persecutor of his people and his faith. The Teacher acted on his own principles. He went first to the outcasts from the synagogues, the unclean, the publicans. He offered them his friendship, and all the armor in which these hardened and embittered hearts had encased themselves against

the scorn and loathing of the pious fell from them at the touch of his irresistible compassion. It was this more than aught else that drew upon him the indignation of the narrow-hearted votaries of legal righteousness. This teaching of free forgiveness, of God's wiping out the sin of the penitent—this spiritual idea of atonement without any relation to sacrifice, was rank blasphemy to the Levitical religionist, and the attack on Jesus opened which ended in a little while on Calvary. The Pharisees made no mistake. They saw plainly that the Nazarene threatened their whole system with overthrow, and they made haste to silence him before it should be too late. On his part Jesus as plainly perceived that any reform of Judaism was impossible, and to seek any compromise with it would be as futile as to patch old garments with new cloth or put new wine into old skins. Let one look deeper than the superficial commonplace that Christ's teaching is eminently original, let him enter into the heart and spirit of the Gospel, and its inherent contradiction of Judaism will appear. It will become plain that the God of Jesus is not the God of the Pentateuchal Law, and it will be no longer possible to regard that Law as the primer of religious truth divinely imparted to Israel.

Yet in the gospel history Jesus does not present himself as the originator of an absolutely new religion, but rather as coming to realize the noblest aspiration and endeavor of Israel's great past. To him the law of Ezra was not the law of Moses, and therefore he could say, I come not to destroy but to fulfil the law and the prophets. The true advance of the prophetic thought which ceased with Jeremiah lay in the abolition not merely of a heathenish ritual of sacrifice, but of the externality of all sacrificial worship; not merely in the abolition of local sanctuaries, but of the principle of locality, the idea of worship as a meeting or tryst with God at some appointed place. And so Christ comes not to offer sacrifice, but to do the will of God, and declares that neither on Gerizim nor Zion shall men worship the Father, but in spirit and in truth. Much more than a prophet he surely is, but he is that. He comes into the world the true successor of that long line of fearless preachers of spiritual righteousness and the Divine Fatherhood. He too encounters the hostility of priestly zealots, and falls a victim to the brute force

which is always the last argument of bigotry. We see then the historic tie that binds Christianity to the religion of Israel. The Gospel is derived from Mosaism at the highest point of its attainment. There is a direct line of development from Jeremiah's conception of the new covenant (Jer. xxxi. 31-34) to its fulfilment in Christ. The Law, as St. Paul expresses it (Rom. v. 20), "came in from one side," and is to be regarded as an interruption and arrest of the progress of revealed religion. Yet it can hardly surprise us that this truth was far from being clearly apprehended by the first Christians. So tenacious was the hold of legalism upon the Jewish mind that the destructive bearing of Christ's principles was but slowly and with difficulty realized among his disciples. In the view to be taken of the Law was the root of a deep dissension and a long conflict within the Christian community. The Synagogue of the Nazarenes, as the little church at Jerusalem was called, might be thought to hold peculiar or erroneous opinions, but on the whole its practice was too well conformed to the rule of orthodoxy to draw upon it the reprehension of the Pharisees. It was only when Stephen the "Grecian" began to preach the subversive doctrine of salvation apart from the Law that their fury was again aroused; but then not indiscriminately against the whole sect. Stephen's party, the Gentile-Christians, was driven from Judea; the Jewish-Christians under "James, Cephas, and John" remained undisturbed in Jerusalem. And when the great Apostle to the Gentiles carried his truer gospel throughout the Roman world, the long and bitter struggle of his life was fought not only against disciples of his old associates the Pharisees, but against the Judaizing Christians, "false brethren" of his new household. Nor did the conflict of Law and Gospel fully cease until the destruction of the Temple and of the Holy City made complete observance of the Law impossible. When she saw Jerusalem compassed with armies and trodden down of the Gentiles, the Church might indeed look up and lift up her head, for her redemption from legal bondage was drawing nigh. Of the Judaizing party some were now fully converted to the Gospel of Paul and of Christ; others, known henceforth as Ebionites, sank to the position of sectaries and heretics; and revealed religion passed at length defini-

tively beyond the bounds of Israel and went forth to revolutionize the world and plant the seeds of a new life in the mind of its leading races.

But even yet its steps were dogged by the influence of the Jewish Law. Historically the founder of Christian theology is Saul of Tarsus, and all its doctrinal subtleties which have perplexed so many generations and obscured the grand simplicities of Jesus, are traceable to the leaven of Judaism that still worked unconsciously in the mind of the converted Pharisee.

Such and so far-reaching are the issues involved in this single question as to the date of the Pentateuch. Many other questions remain of equal and greater moment, and it appears probable that their investigation will lead to a radical modification of current opinions regarding Bible history. It is this probability that inclines so many to look on the critical study of the Scriptures with misgiving and alarm. They dread the self-confident spirit of criticism, and to give it free rein seems to them an opening of the floodgates to a tide of unknown evils. It would be to loosen the hold of the Bible on the unquestioning reverence of Christendom; to unsettle men's minds, raising questions hard to answer, bringing to their knowledge doubtful points and difficulties it were better they were ignorant of, and leaving them to wander away from the safe old paths worn by the feet of so many Christian generations toward the morass of unbelief at the beck of the *ignis fatuus* of rationalism. It must be owned that this apprehensiveness is at least not unnatural; but even were it granted that the free study of the Bible is fraught with real danger, it would not follow that such study should be fettered. What is there in life without its danger? The highest human faculty, our moral freedom in this world of temptation, is our most dangerous possession. We may say that Biblical criticism, like matrimony, "is not by any to be entered into unadvisedly or lightly, but reverently, discreetly, soberly, and in the fear of God;" but all the unhappy marriages do not make celibacy a duty, nor can any conjectural disasters make criticism a crime. In this matter we must accept the Protestant principle of free thought, or else the Roman principle of authority. There is no possible middle ground between

them, and the failure of the reformed communions to remain true to their own principle delivered personal faith again into the hands of ecclesiastical tyranny. The Decrees of Trent declared that the interpretation of Scripture must be conformed to the tenets of Holy Church and the unanimous consent of the Fathers. The Reformers on the contrary affirmed the right of Private Judgment to determine the sense of doubtful or disputed passages. They did not mean that one man's judgment is as good as another's and that every reader may interpret Scripture to suit himself. They meant that all questions arising in the study of Scripture must be decided by argument and not by dogmatism. In other words, the student can acknowledge no authority over reason, but only the authority of reason,—no extrinsic authority of ecclesiastical law suppressing mental activity, but only the inherent authority of rational principles approving itself to the individual mind. To take this position was to bring the Reformation into conscious alliance with the New Learning which was overspreading Europe at the time. Everywhere Christian scholars, inspired with an independent love of truth and a deep interest in the Bible as a living book, were eager to direct to the study of the Scriptures the newly awakened spirit of critical inquiry and the newly discovered methods of critical research. They refused to be bound by the Vulgate, which the Church pronounced of final authority, and went back to the original Hebrew and Greek, reading the sacred writings in the light of the best scholarship of the time, guided only by the impartial laws of all genuine science. With this appeal to Scripture the great movement began. Its leaders confronted the Pope with this Bible which they had studied for themselves, insisting on their right to interpret it like any other book agreeably to right reason and the mind and intent of the writers. They assailed the dogmatism of the schools with learning and logic, and sought to simplify the necessary creed by placing it on a plainly scriptural foundation. Unhappily the alliance of religious life and religious thought was only temporary. The rational, or rationalistic, principle of Private Judgment, while always adhered to in theory was soon abandoned in practice, and the progress of free inquiry abruptly checked when it was scarcely more than well begun. For the contro-

versy with Rome and their relations with civil governments imposed an exacting demand upon the Protestant communions to give an account of themselves, of their theological and ecclesiastical principles, of the doctrines they taught; and in the effort to meet this demand the Reformation passed into its second, or dogmatic, stage. Within thirty years there appeared no less than twenty different Confessions of faith, aiming to set forth a definite system of truth in opposition to a definite system of error. They were all professedly drawn from Scripture. To the question *By what authority doest thou these things?* Protestantism replied, *By authority of the Word of God.* When the men of dogma had pushed the scholars aside and come to the front the theory was that Protestant doctrine rested in no degree upon human reason, but solely upon the written word. Yet no theory was ever more opposed to facts. The men who shaped the confessional theology never approached Scripture with the free unbiassed minds of the earlier critics, but always under the influence of dogmatic prepossessions. They read their doctrines into Scripture and then read them out of it. The system became the measure of the Word of God, and not the Word of God the measure of the system. In theory the Confessions only possessed authority in so far as they truly represented scriptural doctrine, and consequently they were always subject to revision as the advance of learning should throw fresh light on biblical study and give a closer grasp of truth. But tho in three centuries that advance has been considerable, no Protestant Confession has ever been formally revised. To the Protestant mind dogma became identified with Scripture; it was invested with all the binding sacredness of revelation, and hence became incapable of essential change. Scholars were warned against approaching Scripture save through the medium of dogmatic conclusions already reached; and the fate of Servetus showed that Protestantism could hunt down the rationalist with all the ruthless severity of Rome. Thus religious thought had only changed masters. When it was held that Scripture was to be interpreted according to a dogmatic formulary and the interpretation declared and enforced by a council, the Protestant had evidently returned to place himself under that rule of an infallible teaching Church against which he had revolted. Hence the

necessity for that new revolt within the reformed communion, which found a leader in Arminius. The Remonstrants complained that all religious opinion was so controlled by the Confessions that "men, waiving and undervaluing the sacred Scriptures, appealed to them as unexceptionable rules, and he that swerved but a finger's breadth from them, tho' moved thereto by reverence for Scripture itself, was without any further question condemned of heresy. Thus hath the authority of Scripture been more and more weakened, until at length it has fallen away and been transferred to these human formularies as more perfect." It appears indeed that while orthodox Protestantism has been reproached for its Bibliolatry, its real offence was rather an idolatry of the human faculty of creed-making. It was the rationalist of the Reformation and not the dogmatist who showed true reverence for the Bible. It is plain that the authority of Scripture, however nominally recognized, cannot be practically maintained in the face of any dogmatic declaration which is allowed to settle its meaning. If any interpreter whatever intervene between the reader and the Book—be it an *Ecclesia Docens*, a patristic consensus, a rule of faith, or a current orthodoxy—that interpreter usurps the authority of Scripture. It is no longer the text of Scripture but this self-authorized expositor that becomes the Christian's teacher. Whence it appears that the actual authority of Scripture wholly depends on the allowance of Private Judgment, and the demand for a free Bible was an expression of undivided loyalty to that supreme authority. The principles of the Arminians failed to gain control of the reformed churches, and they were driven to form another sect of a distracted Christendom; but here a refuge was offered to burdened minds which had not lost the sense of freedom, and here the original Protestant spirit of free inquiry survived. Its presence may be traced in all the fresh and vigorous thought of after-times, notably in the rational school of English churchmen; and it appears again to-day in the general revival of biblical study in the countries where confessional theology had stifled and suppressed it—Holland, Germany, Switzerland and Protestant France, and now at length in Scotland.

It is the aim of modern scholars to return to the earlier and

better day of Protestantism and take up the work then beugn. They seek to do for our day what the Reformation critics did for theirs. The principles of the Reformation demand a systematic study of Scripture upon lines of research which were not open to the scholars of that time. We bring to our Bible study minds enriched by the acquirement and matured by the training of the past three centuries. Think, for example, what immense service has been rendered the student by the discovery of the Assyrian Inscriptions. We can throw upon the subject the light of modern scholarship in every field of cognate study—the study of language, of human races, of ancient civilization, of social growth, of mythology, of literature, of comparative religion; above all of history, in its widest range and minutest bearing. It is our duty to seek by every aid the fullest meaning of our sacred books; to interpret them historically by the scientific method of right reason and intellectual honesty; to follow that principle of induction which has been found the key of modern knowledge, because it discards all preconception and builds on realities. Such a biblical science, making its way slowly but steadily to sure results, would best show how highly we value and how truly we venerate the written word. Indeed it is just because we revere the Bible, because we believe in it, that we cannot be afraid to study it. If it be of God, men cannot overthrow it. If it be divinely true, it is able to take care of itself, to stand any test of the freest and most searching criticism. The timidity of some may seek to evade or forbid that quest of personal insight which is the birthright of the intellect, but the Bible itself rebukes them in the words of the Master: “Why are ye so fearful? how is it that ye have no faith?” If men can be thrown into panic terror by an unorthodox critic, it is because their hold on Christian truth is so uncertain and so tremulous. When we are told that a scientific study of the Bible will unsettle men’s minds, disturb their faith, and rob them of their peace, it seems pertinent to ask why will it? why should it? and whose fault is it if it does? Does it lie in the power of the veriest Vandal among critics to destroy one atom of eternal truth? Can Theism really be exploded by the unearthing of some new fossil, or the divinity of Christ endangered by the discovery of another uncial manuscript? If we believe in

the revealed religion we know that nothing really can be taken from us but our own mistaken views. But why is it that people talk about "destructive" criticism as if the critic's sole object were to convince men that the historic record is untrustworthy? The critic's work is not to destroy, but to construct. To him an ancient book is a fragment of ancient life, and bears the stamp of the historic circumstances which produced it; to understand it aright he puts himself back in the age in which it was written; he strives to enter into the writer's thoughts and to interpret them as part of the life of the thinker and of his time. In doing this the only thing in danger of destruction is the ignorance or error to which many so blindly cling. Now it is quite true that the critic should avoid giving needless offence to the conscientious narrowness of an unenlightened faith, should show all thoughtful consideration for the honest prejudice he may unhappily startle or pain. But when narrow prejudice, however conscientious, attempts to prohibit the free study of the Bible and to prosecute its students, it becomes our first duty to prevent the Christian church from falling under a control which would bring it into general contempt and destroy all its influence for good among educated men. The final result of the recent bitter and violent attacks upon Prof. Smith and Dr. Newton make it sufficiently evident, however, that such a disaster is not seriously to be apprehended. The rôle of a Bernard at Sens has become a difficult one to play. The gags and fetters of mediæval intolerance have a strangely rusty and antiquated look when brought out in modern daylight. They who would lay an ecclesiastical interdict upon free thought and free speech are struggling hopelessly against the strongest force that moves our land and time, and any barrier set up to check it will assuredly be broken down and swept away. The futility of prosecution for opinion is largely owing to general perception of its intrinsic foolishness. The questions raised by modern criticism are simply questions of fact. It is idle to treat them as questions of feeling to be determined by one's prepossessions. It is idle to treat them as merely shocking to the religious sense. They cannot be disposed of by anathema. They are questions of fact. They demand thorough and dispassionate investigation. They can only be decided, as

other questions of science and scholarship are decided, on grounds of reason and by weight of argument. Ejection from a professorship, deposition from the ministry, hysterical vituperation, reckless attacks on personal character, have simply no bearing whatever upon the solution of such questions as the date of the Pentateuch or the authorship of the fourth gospel. Any ecclesiastical body which meets the intelligent questioning of received opinions by its forcible suppression will deservedly lose the confidence of the community, for the inference is inevitable that those who are driven to silence their intellectual opponents feel themselves incapable of answering their arguments. It is plain that biblical science, like every other, must advance toward the widest and deepest knowledge it is possible to attain, and that a gradual popularization of its general results will accompany the work of original research. It cannot be doubted that already a strong public interest in the subject is aroused. In Scotland there was an average attendance of eighteen hundred upon Prof. Smith's lectures, tho most of them were dry in subject-matter and all demanded the close attention of the audience; and in this country publishers who sell to the million have deemed it worth while to bring out twenty-cent editions of Prof. Smith's and Dr. Newton's books. I cannot but regard this popular demand for what Dr. Newton calls "the real Bible" as a healthy and hopeful sign of the times. Prof. Smith remarks: "The great value of historical criticism is that it makes the Old Testament more real to us. Christianity can never separate itself from its historic basis on the religion of Israel, and no one to whom Christianity is a reality can safely acquiesce in an unreal conception of the Old Testament history. . . . In the interests of religion as well as of sound knowledge it is of the highest importance that everything which scholarship has to tell about the Old and New Testaments should be plainly and fully set before the intelligent Bible reader. . . . The more closely our study fulfils the demands of historic scholarship, the more fully will it correspond with our religious needs." Dr. Newton shares these convictions, and his book is laid on these lines. But while all the "apologetic" utterances of Prof. Smith seem aimed exclusively at the upholders of traditional orthodoxy, Dr. Newton

has equally in mind the radicals or rationalists among his hearers who are in danger of drifting away from all religious convictions—a class which he, so far as I know alone of Christian ministers, has succeeded in gathering within the walls of a church. He says in his preface: "These sermons were meant for that large and rapidly growing body of men who can no longer hold the traditional view of the Bible, but who yet realize that within this view there is a real and profound truth; a truth which we all need, if haply we can get it out from its archaic form without destroying its life, and can clothe it anew in a shape that we can intelligently grasp and sincerely hold. To such alone would I speak in these pages, to help them hold the substance of their fathers' faith." This shows the writer's perception of the one thing needful to be done in this day of religious transition. The simplicity, freshness, and vigor of the book will make it in the highest degree helpful to all earnest men who desire to read the Bible more intelligently, and its deeply reverent spirit will teach a wisdom better than all knowledge; but its chief value lies in the reconstructive purpose indicated in the above passage. It will help to save the religion of the Bible from eclipse. For it shows on the one hand the narrowness and poverty of the old bibliolatrous conception and as a consequence the futility of all Ingersollite attacks upon this Bible in buckram: for which scandal the traditionalists have only themselves to thank; and on the other hand it points to that scholarly and philosophic appreciation of the Hebrew Scriptures which finds in them a record of the divine revelation given through inspiration of the Hebrew consciousness.

This indeed is the end and outcome of a scientific study, that it demonstrates the objective reality of Israel's faith. It is received among Christians that the God of Israel's worship is one with the All-Father whom the Gospel declares. In the miraculous interferences, in the fulfilment of inspired predictions, in the marvellous episodes and designed coincidences recorded in Israel's history they find attestation of their belief that the hand of the Lord was with his chosen people. This teaching has been commended to the faith of its hearers; some have believed and some have doubted. Of the latter the more thoughtful have sought to gain a broader view. Every race of

men, they say, is a chosen people. Every nation known to history has or had its special vocation, and in that is the ground of its existence. The Greek, born with the love of knowledge and of beauty, was called to instruct mankind in philosophy and art; the Roman, gifted with a reverence for justice and a genius for administration, was called to develop in his institutions the principles of law and government; and the Hebrew was called to be the religious teacher of the world, for his privilege was a faculty of spiritual insight, akin to the Greek's æsthetic sense, which made his vision of the Divine another than that of the Greek who peopled heaven with human passions, or of the Roman who sacrificed to ethical abstractions. Such suggestions have their value, yet they are apt to be seriously misleading. The implication that Israel's religion differs in degree but not in kind from others, that it is the best of all but not unique among religions, is a failure to apprehend its true character. Other religions at the best are a product of the religious sentiment; they are a human yearning to seek some Divine One, if haply they may feel after him and find him; they are schemes to bridge the gulf between man and the vague Infinite; attempts to ascend into heaven to bring down God from above. Such religions are to be esteemed in proportion to the spiritual insight, the depth of feeling and of thoughtfulness their creed and cultus evince. If this fairly describes a religion, we may say that true Mosaism is not a religion at all. The faith in Jehovah cannot be classed with ethnic religions as a spontaneous growth of poetic imagination or of moral intuition. It is no human product. Other religions are makers of their gods, but God is the maker of Israel's religion. They are an aspiration that goes up from earth; this is a communication that comes from heaven. They are only concerned with the right relation of man to God; this starts with the relation of God to man. They begin in human longing; this begins with divine promise. Israel does not seek God, for God has first sought him and "called his son out of Egypt." This people has no "religious genius," like the Greek's for art. Their one gift is impressionability, receptiveness, responsiveness to the Divine teaching and training. They tell us that if the heathen have no knowledge of Jehovah's laws, it is because he hath not dealt with any

nation as he deals with Israel. The life of the people is an open page of the world's history, and its mind is mirrored in its literature. It is plainly to be seen that the mind of Israel grew under God's continuous education, that their history is his work, and their character the product of his influence. Not their belief in a living God; but the living God himself is the postulate of their national existence. They are his witnesses, and without him the people's life becomes inexplicable.

A scientific criticism establishes this result. It shows God in Israel's history not in occasional supernaturalism, but in the continuity of the nation's actual experience; not here and there in fleeting glimpses, but everywhere in broad sunlight, the source and life of the whole. And in this it makes no appeal to faith, nor argues from probabilities; it bases its conclusion on grounds of reason, and leaves it there, a scientific truth, independent of opinion and indifferent to assault, until the world shall reach it and receive it.

FRANCIS A. HENRY.

